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Abstract
T h e  European Community's Single Market programme has been designed to open-up 
public procurement in its M e m b e r  States. T h e  literature review indicated that the nature 
of public procurement operations in the European Union w a s  such that the public 
procurement legislation in place and the harmonisation of technical standards were 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for achieving this objective. This w as  
because the emergence of multinational networks of conglomerate firms, which are the 
major suppliers in m a n y  important procurement sectors, has raised unique competition 
issues which cannot be analyzed with traditional models of the theory of the firm. This 
thesis examined one of these issues, the linked oligopoly hypothesis, which states that 
multimarket contact a m o n g  oligopolistic firms increases their ability to exercise market 
power without engaging in collusion that would violate antitrust laws. That is because 
such contact m a y  allow the firms that supply the public procurement sector to respect 
each other's spheres of influence by adopting non-aggressive behaviour in those 
markets for fear of retaliation in other markets important to them.
The analysis of inter-company contacts of a sample of 240 leading European firms w as 
employed for the empirical estimation of the degree of firm inter-dependence created by 
these multimarket contacts. These measures were then introduced as explanatory 
variables together with additional variables in two equation models of the determinants 
of firm rank mobility and profitability. Based on these regression results and on expert 
opinions (interviews with U K  officials), the linked oligopoly hypothesis has been 
supported and suggests that multimarket contact and conglomerate merger m a y  be 
detrimental for efficiency and for competition. They are nonetheless desirable from 
firms' viewpoints as means of increasing collusion and therefore market power. This 
presents a difficult and immediate analytical problem to the anti-trust authorities: that of 
market extension in the public procurement field by company merger. It also raises the 
issue for European integration. European integration will increase multimarket contact, 
which, according to the linked oligopoly theory, m a y  decrease competition.
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1.0 I N T R O D U C T I O N
The European Economic Community's (hereafter referred to as the European 
Community, or just the Community) Single Market Pro gr a mm e  w a s  designed to remove 
m a n y  of the barriers to the free m o v e m e n t  of goods, people, services and capital 
between the M e m b e r  States by 1 January 1993. The main thrust of the Single Market 
Pro gr a mm e  has been directed at lifting the barriers and controls which hinder private 
firms from operating across what is n o w  termed (since 1 N o v e m b e r  1993) the European 
Union. It has thereby created out of twelve independent markets one "frontier free" 
market of 320 million people, comparable in some ways to that of the United States. 
Since 1 January 1994, with the entry into force of the European Economic Area (EEA)  
Agreement, the European Union procurement directives apply to Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, N o r w a y  and Sweden, effectively extending the Single Market to 17 countries. 
Since 1 January 1995, Austria, Finland and S w e d e n  joined the European Union, but this 
research w o r k  refers to the 12 original M e m b e r  States of the Union. The liberalization 
of public procurement w a s  one of key factors which initiated the debate on the Single 
Market. This Single Market would remain considerably less than perfect as long as 
public sector markets are not fully integrated. Therefore, in its White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market (White Paper, 1985, para. 81-87), the Commission of 
the European Communities (hereafter referred to as the European Commission, or just 
the Commission) emphasized the need for legislative action to ensure that public 
procurement markets are fully opened up to Community-wide competition.
Since 1971 the. European C o m m u n i t y  public sector has been compelled to put 
large construction contracts (over E C U  1 million) out to European Community-wide 
tender and since 1977 to do the same with large purchasing orders (over E C U  200,000). 
Yet there has been very little progress in the opening up of public procurement and 
statistics indicated a minimal application of the W o r k s  and Supplies Directives (White
1
Paper, 1985, para. 83).
In 1988, a major programme of studies, ’’Research on the Cost of non-Europe” 
chaired by Paolo Cecchini (also widely k n o w n  as the Cecchini Report), highlighted the 
importance of opening up public procurement in the European Community. The vast 
size of public procurement market - approximately 600 billion E C U  ( 1 5 %  of the 
Community's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) - the Cecchini Report stated, means that 
access to this market is very important for all firms. However, only 2 %  of public 
procurement contracts in the European C o m m u n i t y  were awarded to firms from a 
M e m b e r  State other than the one State advertising the tender. C o m p a r e d  with markets in 
general, the Cecchini Report indicated, for which import penetration w as  around 2 0 %  
for these countries, public procurement w a s  still very closed. Moreover, public 
procurement w a s  heavily concentrated on a relatively small group of industries and these 
depended on a competitive market for public procurement to develop the necessary 
products, skills and economies of scale to be successful internationally. T he  Cecchini 
Report also indicated that fewer than 20 subsectors of the 60 surveyed for procurement 
practices accounted for more than 8 5 %  of public procurement. A s  a result public 
procurement represented a substantial proportion of total sales for power-generating 
equipment and computers (30%), aerospace equipment (50%), and railway rolling stock 
and telecommunication equipment (90%). For most standardized products, the Cecchini 
Report indicated that there w a s  a highly competitive market and public-sector buyers 
actually appeared to pay less than those in the private-sector. For large non-standardized 
products, however, where the public sector is the only or major buyer (as with 
telecommunications, aerospace and power-generating equipment), the Cecchini Report 
indicated that anti-competitive practices by buyers and sellers at the expense of the final 
consumer were not unusual. A  restricted list of bidders or 'negotiation' were used for 
8 6 %  of public procurement contracts. T he  existence of economies of scale in the 
manufacture of these products has led to entry barriers and the creation of oligopolistic 
structures. For s om e  products such as power-plant and telecommunication equipment,
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governments are the major or only buyer, so they have considerable power to choose a 
product, select a contractor and negotiate a price. Its purchasing decision can determine 
the size and structure of an industry. T h e  opening up of public procurement, the 
Cecchini Report concludes, will increase intra-Community trade as well as induce 
significant price reductions as public authorities increasingly buy from suppliers w h o  
offer lower prices. In the longer term, lower prices will have to be reflected in 
production costs. This will lead to major restructuring operations (mergers and plant 
closures) which will result in economies of scale in a more integrated European 
C o m m u n i t y  market. T he  estimate developed in the Cecchini Report ("Cost of non- 
Europe" Vol. 5, Part A, 1988), shows that the attainment of the Internal Market in 
public procurement will give rise to economies growing annually to as m u c h  as E C U
17.2 billion at 1989 prices.
T he  procurement part of the Single Market P ro gr a mm e  influenced by the 
Cecchini Report, has four main aims:
- To strengthen rules on public works and public supply contracts. N e w  
Directives strengthen the existing W o r k s  and Supply Directives, broaden the scope of, 
and extend the effectiveness of European legislation. Also, these Directives provide n e w  
thresholds, implement G A T T  rules, and establish procedures for contract awards, 
criteria for contract awards and standards.
- N e w  rules proving a right o f  redress for disappointed tenderers i f  they feel 
themselves unfairly treated. T he  Compliance Directives are viewed to be 'tough ones 
and likely to open the w a y  to a would-be supplier to infuriate an important potential 
customer' (The Economist, 9 July 1988, p. 32).
- New rides opening public purchasing by utilities. A  development that extends 
open procurement to sectors that have remained exempted from it till now: energy, 
water, transport and telecommunications.
- New rules covering Services.
S o m e  of these measures have been already part of the national law of M e m b e r
States while others entered in force at various dates until the s u m m e r  of 1994 subject to
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2-3 years derogation for Greece, Spain and Portugal. T he purpose of the directives is to 
introduce more competition in public procurement, remove trade barriers and give 
suppliers equal opportunities.
The aim of this thesis is to examine the effect of the opening up of public 
procurement on the principal strategies being followed by the main firms in the 
procurement industries. This thesis argues that the nature of public procurement 
operations in most of the European Union is such that the legislation in place and the 
harmonization of technical standards m a y  be neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition to help with opening public procurement and that changes in the suppliers 
themselves might yield more competitively oriented procurement behaviour.
H o w  does one realize whether the implementation of the European Union policy 
has been successful? If one considers the rationale in the Cecchini Report, then perhaps 
one should look not at the public purchasers but at the suppliers themselves. The main 
element in the Cecchini Report concerned the breaking of national buyer-supplier links 
to form a leaner and larger supply side of European importance rather than national 
champions, ready to compete at h o m e  and abroad with American and Japanese 
companies. F r o m  that point of view, the timing of the Cecchini Report w a s  rather 
unfortunate. This is because during the same period the supplier industries in such 
sectors such as in power generation, telecommunications, railway equipment and 
mechanical engineering were undergoing major changes. A n  expected change (the 
Single European Market by 1 January 1993), more than a real one, was sufficient to 
generate great transformation in such sectors. Firms have not waited for the opening up 
of public procurement in 1993. Mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures have been 
changing the structure of s om e  European industries dramatically. Ascribing these 
changes to the procurement directives is a little hard, however. Cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions have been helped by lower regulatory barriers to overseas investments,
lower telecommunication and transport costs and freer domestic and international
4
capital markets. This trend to consolidation and internationalisation makes it rather 
difficult to assess the success of procurement policy, particularly w h e n  the major 
changes took place before the European Commission's White Paper proposals were 
implemented. If one gauges the success of the opening up of public procurement by 
analysing suppliers o w n  contact in relation to mergers and acquisitions, there are som e  
grounds for wondering about the likely effectiveness of the policy. It is not clear h o w  far 
the link between public purchasers and national suppliers will be easily broken in 
practice because of the emerging n e w  structure of European procurement suppliers. 
Although such structure is unlikely to be a permanent one, currently it consists of few 
major groupings or networks of firms which are full-line suppliers, in power plant 
equipment, mechanical engineering, transport equipment, telecommunications, 
electronics and defence equipment. The important changes in the structure of m a n y  
European industries indicates that a n e w  even more concentrated oligopoly is 
characterizing m a n y  sectors. This n e w  structure of multimarket interdependence is likely 
to maintain the collusive features of m a n y  industries, so reducing the gains from the 
Single Market. Moreover, the collusive nature of European product market is facilitated 
by the increased incidence of cooperative R & D  projects which is a further argument in 
favour of the observation that European integration m a y  decrease, rather than increase 
competition (Wegberg et al, 1994, p. 254). It will be therefore necessary to consider on 
a theoretical and empirical level the linked oligopoly hypothesis, a concept that might 
be useful for analysing the effects of the multimarket expansion of large diversified 
European procurement firms. The theoretical basis for this hypothesis is postulated and 
developed in the works of industrial organization by Alexander Henderson (1954, pp 
565-584), Corwin Edwards (1955), Almarin Phillips (1960, pp 602-613 and 1964, pp 
32-45) and Oliver Williamson (1965, pp 579-607). Thus far the theory has only been 
tested on U S  and U K  data. This thesis will raise further the issues for European 
integration. European integration will increase contact, which, according to the linked 
oligopoly hypothesis, m a y  induce decreasing competition. This prediction counterargues 
the familiar suggestion that European integration will intensify competition.
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W h a t  the hypothesis sets out to test is that multimarket contact of large 
European procurement suppliers leads to m ore cooperation in all markets c o m m o n  to 
rivals, and more cooperation translates into generally stable behaviour, thus exhibiting 
higher prices and lower quantities of goods and services. It is plausible that the linked 
oligopoly m a y  reduce competition that would otherwise occur and prevent the 
liberalisation of public procurement. If the linked oligopoly hypothesis is supported then 
it is reasonable to assume that the emerging structure of European suppliers, a network 
of linked oligopolies, is hindering such an opening. If this hypothesis is not supported 
then an opening up of public procurement will depend solely on the removal of the other 
barriers such as technical standards and nationalistic purchasing. T he  literature review 
will be focused on an analysis of the key area of E U  procurement legislation, the 
existing Works, Supplies, Utilities, Compliance, Services and Service Compliance 
directives and their influence on suppliers behaviour. It will also examine the findings of 
the 'Cost o f non-Europe' on public procurement and the effect of liberalizing public 
procurement by increasing competitive pressures on the Union's market, forcing 
structural changes, such as c ompany mergers and shut-downs, and whether there are 
large or small gains from economies of scale. T he review will fall into two broad 
categories: the "horizontal" issues of public procurement in connection with competition 
and technical standards and the sectoral case studies covering specific industries. The 
three independent variables of the study (legislation, competition and technical 
harmonization) are discussed jointly and separately, as predictors of opening up of 
public procurement.
O n e  of the major objectives of this thesis is the quantification of the number and 
magnitude of interfirm contacts a m o n g  the leading firms in the procurement supply 
sectors of the European economy. These firms m a y  interact in both horizontal and 
vertical capacities. T w o  firms have a horizontal relationship whenever they meet as 
competitors. Vertical relationships exist between two firms w h e n  they interact in buyer
6
and/or seller capacities. In the fashion outlined in chapter 7 (section 7.3), an attempt will 
be m a d e  to capture the actual horizontal and potential vertical relationships for a sample 
of firms. The second major objective of this thesis is to conduct specific tests for two 
aspects of linked oligopolistic behaviour. A s  noted above, the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis asserts that recognition of inter-market interdependence associated with 
multimarket contact raises profitability and reduces firm's rank mobility. This thesis will 
empirically test this hypothesized relationship for the leading firms that supply the 
public procurement sector of the European economy. Indices of firm interdependence 
will be constructed and used to establish determinants of firm rank change and 
profitability. In this fashion it will be possible to subject to empirical analysis this 
dimension of linked oligopoly behaviour.
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2.0 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT UNDER THE OLD PROCEDURES
2.1 How The Old Procedures Operated
According to the provisions of Articles 30-36 of the first Treaty of Rom e,  
M e m b e r  States of the European Economic C o m mu n it y  are obliged to remove all 
quantitative restrictions (or any other measures having an equivalent effect) that obstruct 
the free m o v e m e n t  of goods within the Community. Similarly, Articles 59-66 oblige 
M e m b e r  States to remove all obstacles to the free flow of services across national 
frontiers. Since 1958, the growth of cross-border trade in goods and services within the 
European C o m m u n i t y  in the private sector has been impressive (El-Agraa, 1994, p. 52). 
B y  comparison, the volumes of such trade in the public sector have been comparatively 
static. T he public purchasing programmes of central and local government indicate the 
national bias of these bodies in favour of domestic manufacturers and suppliers. 
Because the M e m b e r  States had failed to honour the free-trade provisions of Article 30- 
36 and 59-66 of the Treaty the need for additional legislation became evident. During 
the 1970s two directives were issued in an effort to remedy this situation. The ’Public 
Works Directive’ of June 1971 (Directive 71/305) sought to co-ordinate awarding 
procedures in public works construction contracts in order to m a k e  the process 
transparent to potential bidders across the European Community. T he  ’Public Supplies 
Directive’ of 1977 (Directive 77/62) w a s  similarly designed to open up the awarding 
procedures for public supply contracts.
It is these "old" procedures which are n o w  being modified or supplemented, 
though the structure of the earlier legislation has been retained. These rules applied to 
contracts put out to tender by central government departments, local or regional 
authorities or bodies such as the police or health authorities. Public telecommunications 
authorities were also covered by the Public W o r k s  Directive. Thresholds were 
established for the value of the contracts above which the C o m m u n i t y  procedures
applied (exceeding E C U  175,000 for supplies and E C U  1 million for works contracts).
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Consequently, all public authorities responsible for awarding contracts falling above 
these thresholds were required to ensure that their invitations to tender were brought to 
the attention of companies and suppliers throughout the European Community. This 
could be achieved comparatively easily by publication of a "Contract Notice" in the 
Supplement to the Official Journal o f the European Community. The Directives also 
m a d e  it illegal to split up tenders so that individually they fell beneath the two 
thresholds. M i n i m u m  periods were specified in which tenders were to be received to 
allow for bids coming from other M e m b e r  States.
T he subjects of the tenders have been very-wide ranging: office equipment; road 
works; hospital equipment; frozen food; fuel; clothing, etc. A n  electronic publishing 
system 'Tenders Electronic Daily' (TED), w as  established by the European Commission 
in order to improve the quality and speed of the publication of notices to tender. A  
network of European Information Centers, established in 1977, also provides 
information on tenders.
These Directives allowed public authorities to use either an "open procedure", 
in which tenders from all suppliers were considered, or a "restricted procedure" in 
which tenders were m a d e  by invitation only. However, the "restricted procedure" w as 
still subject to the requirement for a Contract Notice allowing suppliers throughout the 
European C om m u n i t y  to apply, within a defined time limit, to be allowed to participate. 
The awarding authority could impose conditions as to economic, financial or technical 
standing of the participant and such criteria had to be set out in the Contract Notice. At 
the end of the tender award an "Award Notice" had to be published in the Official 
Journal by the public authority.
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2.2 Defects of the Old Procedures
Under the "old" directives the contract-awarding bodies were explicitly 
prohibited from discriminating against non-national contractors or suppliers under the 
provisions of Articles 30-36. There were two exceptions to this requirement. First, 
M e m b e r  States were permitted to restrict trade on grounds of public morality, public 
policy, public health or public security. Second, they were permitted to restrict trade 
where the product in question fails to meet the M e m b e r  State's essential technical 
standards. Although regarded as a major advance for the cause of intra-Community free 
trade, the directives of the 1970s (70/32, 71/304, 71/305 and 77/62) had in reality a 
limited impact. They did little to remove the "buy-national" policies in most M e m b e r  
States. This resulted in as little as 2% of public purchasing being awarded to firms 
outside the 12 national markets ('Cost of non-Europe', Vol. 5, Part A, 1988, p. 12). 
Certain public purchasers, such as those in the fields of transport, energy and water, 
were totally excluded, while the provision of services to the public sector w a s  totally 
unregulated.
It soon became clear that contract-awarding bodies could find ways of evading 
the works and supplies directives in the limited areas in which they applied. In its 1985 
White Paper the European Commission acknowledged the inadequacy of this 
legislation. The two directives had still not been properly incorporated into national law 
in a number of M e m b e r  States. Typical infringements included (European Economy, 
1988, p. 56): failure to advertise tenders in the Official Journal; abuse of the exceptions 
from the normal tendering and award rules; illegal exclusion of bidders from other 
M e m b e r  States; discrimination in scrutinizing bidders' technical capacity and financial 
standing; and discrimination in the awarding of contracts. Also, m a n y  other awarding 
authorities have insisted that contractors and suppliers adhere to national technical 
specifications, even in those areas where European C om m u n i t y  technical standards have 
been established. Additionally, where it w a s  felt that the proper procedure had not been
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complied with by the awarding authority there w as  no national remedy. Moreover, it 
proved to be difficult for construction or supply companies to produce evidence 
demonstrating that they had been discriminated against illegally ( O w e n  et al, 1989, p. 
80). The only recourse w a s  to bring the issue to the attention of the national government 
or the European Commission in the hope that they would intervene.
2.3 The Contribution of the Research on the 'Cost of non-Europe’ 
Findings on Public Procurement
Early studies in European integration indicated that one of the barriers to trade in 
public purchasing w a s  the tendency of governments to protect national suppliers, either 
deliberately or otherwise, by limiting bidding to k n o w n  national firms, or by permitting 
public services to develop and continue to use special technical standards which are not 
harmonized with other European C o m m u n i t y  M e m b e r  States. O n e  such study, the 
Albert-Ball Report (1984, p. 1) stated :
...national governments with few exceptions favour 'national champions’ 
in public offers to tender. The opportunity to develop a European market 
is therefore lost. There is a need fo r more joint ventures andjoint public 
procurement between Community countries. It may not be necessary for 
all countries o f the Community to join in all projects, but Community 
offers to tender for European wide projects should be encouraged and 
competition drawn up fo r public and private companies to compete for 
them on equal terms...
The biases of public purchasing bodies towards local firms have been very 
widely reported. The extent and cost of such biases are not well quantified because of 
the secrecy with which official bodies operate. The Padoa-Schioppa Report, suggested 
that at least E C U  200 billion per a n n u m  of public procurement could be affected, and 
that premiums of up to 2 5 %  are paid to local suppliers (Pelkmans et al, 1988, p. 31). 
These calculations are based on French purchases during 1980 (the only records
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available) and they m a k e  no allowances for differences in quality or in service. They 
assume that each purchase could have been m a d e  at the lowest price recorded in any 
M e m b e r  State and although the price comparisons are very detailed, the assumptions 
have been considered to be "heroic" (Pelkmans et al, 1988, p. 31).
In 1988 the Cecchini Report, estimated that total public procurement in the 
European C om m u n i t y  accounted for about 1 5 %  of C o m m u n i t y  G D P .  Only part of this, 
to a value between 250 billion E C U  and 360 billion E C U  (1987), or 7 % - 1 0 %  of E C  
G D P ,  w a s  subject to individual contracts and thus potentially open to competition. T he 
study estimated that open markets for these contracts would yield total potential savings 
of between 8 and 19 billion E C U  per annum.
T he purpose of the following section is to give an overview of the findings of the 
Cecchini Report regarding the different types of legal system and customary procedures 
for public purchasing in the five European C o m mu n it y  study countries (Belgium, France 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). It cannot be an exhaustive list of procurement 
procedures and practices; but merely outlines the context within which increased trade 
m a y  occur and indicates the existing and past constraints on European procurement. The 
Cecchini Report focused on the following aspects of the European C om m u n i t y  
procurement area: the structure of public sector and the organisation of public 
purchasing, the importance of nationalistic purchasing, the volume and characteristics of 
public sector procurement and the evaluation of the economic implications of 
liberalising public procurement.
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2.3.1 The Structure of Public Sector and the Organisation of Public 
Purchasing
T he Atkins Study (named after the consultants that carried out the research on 
public procurement) for the European Commission indicated that there were significant 
differences between countries in both the structure of the public sector and the 
organisation of public purchasing ('Cost of non-Europe' in Public Procurement, 1988, 
Vol. 5). This influences the extent to which increased cross-border trade is likely to 
result from removing of barriers. In particular, highly decentralized purchasing can lead 
to small individual contracts of little interest to foreign suppliers, and to purchasing 
defrayment with inadequate resources to handle international contracts. In some 
countries, notably in France and in the United Kingdom, local authorities were 
increasingly tendering to form consortia for the purpose of pooling their purchasing 
resources and achieving economies.
However, assessment of the implication of particular public purchasing policies 
must be based not only on the number of separate purchasing entities or decision centers 
involved. It must also consider the percentage distribution of public purchasing power 
across those entities. The Atkins Study stated that the evaluation of individual national 
policies must take due account of both these criteria. S o m e  examples of this are: 
Belgium, with moderately decentralized local government spending, has approximately
1,000 purchasing entities.
France, with around 50,000 entities, has very decentralized local government 
purchasing, but with strong central policy making and monitoring of public purchasing. 
There is a strong central purchasing power in gas, coal, railway, airlines, 
telecommunications and defence.
Germany is the most decentralized 20,000 purchasing entities, with central purchasing 
only for railways, telecommunications and defence.
Italy has a complex structure with around 20,000 entities, which is as decentralized as 
Germany, although power generation is also centralized.
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T h e  United Kingdom is more centralized and has around 700 entities. It has fewer and 
larger local government authorities than any other M e m b e r  State. There are five 
powerful central purchasing agencies (including Defence and the D H S S ,  jointly 
accounting for over 5 0 %  of government purchases) most of which act commercially and 
are required to m a k e  a profit.
The procedures for awarding contracts vary from one country to another and 
from one purchasing body to another. European C om m u n i t y  legislation distinguishes 
three types of procedure:
open tendering: a public call for competitive tender with no
prequalification requirements
restricted tendering: a public call for prequalification followed by
competitive tendering amongst selected bidders.
negotiated tendering: non-competitive contract negotiation with one or
more bidders (this m a y  be preceded by competitive 
pre-selection of bidders).
The United K i n g d o m  w as  unique a m o n g  the five countries in having no national 
statutory framework for public procurement other than the European C om m u n i t y  and 
G A T T  rules. There w as  a system of regulations in G e r ma n y  and statutory systems in 
Belgium, France and Italy. In Belgium, France and Italy, the law specified certain 
permitted procedures and favoured open tendering with price only adjudication where 
possible, with other procedures allowed under specified circumstances. In general, the 
choice of procedures w a s  at the option of the purchasing agencies. In practice, for often 
very good and justified reasons, (e.g. the high cost of public tenders, sophisticated 
nature of goods required, etc.), the open procedure became the exception. Negotiated 
and restricted procedures were preferred, particularly in the public enterprises. In Italy in 
particular, open tendering w a s  hardly ever used. In France, policy and regulations were 
updated by the 'Commission Central du Marche', which also defined special norms and 
standards for c o m m o n  items of public procurement. The G e r m a n  regulations favoured
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selection on a price/performance index, without emphasis on price-only selection. The 
regulations enforced secrecy, even after contract award, making competition ineffective. 
They attempted to prevent concentration of market power by encouraging decentralized 
purchasing and frequent change of supplier. There w a s  considerable emphasis on 
G e r m a n  norms, which m a d e  foreign competition difficult. T he United K i n g d o m  has in 
recent years been formalizing procurement procedures, which have been at the 
discretion of individual authorities subject to overall Treasury Guidelines. A  'Central 
Unit on Purchasing' has been established to coordinate central government purchasing. 
Most authorities preferred restricted tendering or negotiations with select suppliers, 
using their o w n  lists of approved suppliers. Wider tendering w as  not seen as a 
significant w a y  to reduce costs.
2.3.2 The Importance of Nationalistic Purchasing
The Atkins Study tried to identify the reasons for nationalistic purchasing by 
interviewing the purchasing officers in sectors where public procurement comprised a 
dominant share of the d e m a n d  (Cost of non-Europe1 in Public Procurement, 1988, Vol. 
5). M a n y  government purchasing officers, the Atkins Study stated, particularly in local 
government, were civil servants with little professional training in purchasing and little 
experience of the commercial world. They were free from the profit discipline, and m a y  
indeed have wanted to preserve their budgets. Procurement officers did not have the 
resources to deal with large numbers of bids, especially foreign ones with unfamiliar 
specifications from firms w ho se  credentials it w a s  difficult to check. Usually, there w as  
no specific policy of buying national goods, but there were strong psychological, 
administrative and practical pressures.
O n  the other hand, the greatest volume of purchasing w as  by authorities such as
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Ministries of Defence or Public Works, nationalized industries and central purchasing 
agencies, which had dedicated, professional purchasing staff. In an increasingly 
competitive world, they were becoming more concerned with value for money. In m a n y  
cases, particularly concerning c o m m o n  supplies and works, there were good economic 
reasons for buying locally. These included: value for money, because of lower transport, 
trading and marketing costs; after sales service; lower delivery times, allowing lower 
stocks and reduced inventory costs; the need for a local distribution service for delivery 
to end users such as schools, hospitals, depots etc.; products adapted to local tastes, 
environment or methods; other barriers to trade, especially customs procedures for 
imported goods; language difficulties in dealing with foreign suppliers; and quality 
assurance procedures, especially where inspection of the suppliers premises is required.
Even though there w a s  little direct international purchasing by the public sector 
purchasers, this w a s  not in itself evidence of lack of competition. A  large proportion of 
public supply contracts were with intermediaries and would be with importers if 
imported goods were considered better value for money. In fact, most purchasing 
officers saw it as the suppliers' job to sell to them, rather than for them to seek out and 
help foreign suppliers. Therefore, in order to sell to them, suppliers should have a local 
agent, subsidiary or dealer. S o m e  purchasers actively sought out and tested foreign 
goods, but then tried to obtain similar specifications and prices from a local supplier.
T he  Atkins Study confirmed that nationalistic purchasing pressures did exist and 
depended upon the type of product. For example:
- for "visible goods" (cars, tableware, prestige furniture) there w a s  a fear of 
criticism for buying foreign goods;
- for strategic goods, there w a s  a desire in all countries to maintain a 
national capability for security of supply, notably in defence systems, power 
generation (especially nuclear) and telecommunications;
- there w as  a pressure to support declining sectors where non-national 
purchasing would cause unemployment, especially in coal, railway rolling
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stock, shipbuilding and heavy fabrication;
- the major infrastructure had a century of investment in capital stock with a 
heritage of different technical standards (although this m a y  not be a 
serious barrier to international suppliers), notably water supply, power 
distribution and railway equipment;
- there were deliberate policies amongst environmentally damaging industries 
to support local business (although not national ones). In particular, this 
w a s  for coal mining and nuclear industries.
It is remarkable that none of the purchasing officers interviewed admitted the 
existence of a formal policy of "buying national", but they quoted the above mentioned 
reasons explaining it. These reasons can be divided into general and specific. The major 
specific reasons (such as lower transport, trading and marketing costs, shorter delivery 
time, after sale service, products adapted to local needs, etc.) are clearly overcome by 
the organisations of m a n y  of the multinational firms which operate in the procurement 
market. Ninni (1990, pp 320-1) gives the example of Asea-Brown Boveri (ABB) in the 
power equipment industry. ABB has been able historically to carve up the domestic 
markets of m a n y  power equipment producers, supplying them through both national 
production and imports of spare parts and intermediate products. M o r e  worrying were 
the general reasons quoted by the purchasing officers: from the infant industry argument 
to cultural and socio-political factors (defending employment), up to 'strategic' factors. 
These factors are due more to general interests, and far less to the specific interest of a 
public purchaser. Even in those markets where it is not in a m onopsony condition, a 
public purchaser should prefer to face competition a m o n g  several suppliers by opening 
up tenders to foreign producers'. Ninni (1990, p. 321) argues that nationalist purchasing 
in the power plant industry is the rule in all European countries where one or more 
national suppliers exist. It seems to be due both to the so-called 'general interests' of 
public authorities, and to a sort of collusive behaviour on the part of public suppliers, 
through a classical sharing of markets.
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However, nationalistic purchasing strategies are not unique to publicly-owned 
industries. Similar behaviour has been characteristic of G e r m a n  electricity utilities 
where m u c h  of the industry is private or partially private. M c G o w a n  and T h o m a s  argue 
that nationalistic purchasing [in the utilities] does not appear to be due to ownership 
characteristics ( M c G o w a n  and Thomas, 1993, pp 3-4). They believe that there are four 
plausible reasons for national utilities buying from national suppliers: supplier carve-up, 
government pressure, benefits from close involvement with h o m e  supplier firms and 
organisational incentives. T he  last option of organisational factors rather than ownership 
is considered important in affecting utility conduct. Whether a monopoly is private or 
public, it is less likely to be concerned about the cost of equipment supply and they m a y  
even be inclined to go along with political pressures to buy national ( M c G o w a n  and 
Thomas, 1993, p. 4). For example, the British-French power equipment company GEC- 
Alsthom has been unsuccessful in securing contracts in Italy. This is mainly due to the 
nationalist preference on behalf of Italian purchasers w h o  think that the ’Italian market is 
only for the Italians' (Interview with Mr. Heigtley, November, 1994).
Is it possible to identify any real difference to purchasing decisions in the 
European Union?
S o m e  early signs of change can be found in the United K i n g d o m  which is the leading 
country to engage in a major change of ownership and organisation with the latter 
moving towards greater competition. Moreover, as European economic integration 
advances and trade between M e m b e r  States increases it becomes meaningless to 
distinguish between trade with another country and domestic commerce, and the less 
feasible it becomes for public purchasers to insist on buying nationally. In that respect, 
the Single Market programme has worked, and built m u c h  more than a free-trade area. 
Thinking back a decade one must admit that things have really changed. At the 
beginning of 1983, the European Commission w as  investigating 770 different cases of 
protectionism blocking of the flow of goods between M e m b e r  States. T en years on, in
January 1993 the ’four freedoms’ of m o v e m e n t  of goods, service, people and capital
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promised for the European Single Market are thought to be a reality. Vanni D'Archirafi 
the European Union Commissioner with responsibility for the internal market indicates 
that the number of notices published in the Official Journal increased from 19,000 in 
1988 to 67,000 in 1993, equivalent to an increase of almost 4 0 %  each year. H e  also 
adds that 'it is clear to everyone that the sheer scale of public procurement is such that it 
is capable of influencing the practices of a large number of firms, including practices 
pertaining to their private contacts' (European Access, 1994, p. 7).
2.3.3 The Volume and Characteristics of Public Procurement
Public procurement as a whole includes all purchases of goods and services by 
government (central government, national government agencies, and regional and local 
government) and by public enterprises that benefit from a monopoly, franchise or 
special status in the provision of public services (post and telecommunications, railways, 
energy supply, etc.). In 1987, such purchases represented approximately 600 billion 
E C U  in the C o m m u n i t y  of Twelve ( 1 6 %  of G D P )  (Bulletin of the European 
Communities, 1991, p. 16). Only part of public purchasing is put out to tender. Small 
current expenditure such as rents, heating and electricity expenses, postage and 
telephone charges and insurance costs are incurred without using tendering procedures. 
A s  Table 2.3.3.1 shows the contractual part of public procurement w a s  worth between 
175 and 251 billion E C U  in the five C o m m u n i t y  M e m b e r  States in 1987 (between 5 and 
1 4 %  of G D P )  with significant variations between M e m b e r  States.
In all countries, a small group of purchasing entities account for around three 
quarters of all public procurement by national bodies (excluding local authorities). The 
share of local government varies from about 1 5 %  ( U K  and Belgium) to 5 0 %  (Italy).
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Table 2.3.3.1 
Economic Dimension of Public Procurement (billion ECU),1984
B D F I UK Total
Total purchasing by 
general government 6 57 54 44 65 227
Total purchasing by 
public enterprises 11 34 34 25 54 158
Total public 
purchasing 
(as % of GDP)
17
(17)
93
(12)
88
(14)
68
(13)
119
(22)
385
(15)
Total public 
procurement* 
(as % of GDP)
8-11
(8-11)
42-63
(5-8)
39-58
(6-9)
33.-43$
(6-Eif
■ 54-76 
(10-14)
175-251
(7-10)
* Public procurement: that part of public purchasing which is 
the subject of contracts of between 45-65% of total public 
purchasing.
Source: Eurostat, Atkins
The analysis of an extensive database in thq Atkins Study (Cost of non-Europe' in 
Public Procurement, 1988, Vol. 5, pp 11-2), confirmed the thesis that there is very little 
direct public sector purchasing from foreign suppliers: less than 2 %  of the total value of 
purchases. Imports are purchased from local suppliers and importers. However, 
products k n o w n  to be imported amount 8 %  of the total, still a very low figure, but it m a y  
understate the true total. There are marked differences between countries. Italy and the 
United K i n g d o m  have very few k n o w n  public sector imports -less than 5%; France and 
G e r m a n y  are moderately open with 10 to 16%; Belgium more so at 21%. All these 
figures are m u c h  lower than the import penetration for the whole economy. The 
database also confirms the predominant use of restricted tendering ( 4 5 %  of sample by 
value) and negotiated contracts (32%). O p e n  tendering is less than 7 %  of the total. The 
structure of the public sector differs markedly between the study countries. This affects 
the pattern and the procedures of public purchasing as well as the potential impact of the 
opening up public procurement.
"Public undertaking" does not only include companies with a majority public 
ownership (whether constituted as "public law" or "private law" companies) but also 
companies with substantially private ownership) but providing a non-competitive
product or service within a government concession which gives it a local or national
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monopoly. This includes s om e  of the privatized public services, such as British Telecom 
or British Gas and also the privately o w n e d  utilities such as m a n y  small electricity 
companies in Germany.
T he  key characteristics which are important to the pattern of public procurement 
and its openness to European suppliers are ('Cost of non-Europe' in Public Procurement, 
1988, Vol. 5, p. 19):
- the degree of decentralization, the number of individual purchasing entities 
and hence the size and accessibility of contracts.
- the allocation of responsibilities for purchasing between central and local 
authorities, especially for roads, public works, health and public order.
- the size, number and constitution of public enterprises, together with the 
degree of government control over their management and purchasing 
activities.
- the nature and extent of legal restrictions and central control over public 
sector purchasing procedures and policy.
The Atkins Study ('Cost of non-Europe' in Public Procurement, 1988, Vol. 5, p. 
175-6) identified the degree of decentralization of public purchasing in the five M e m b e r  
States of its investigation. It can be seen that there are significant differences between 
the five study countries in the number and types of public sector purchasing entities. For 
example, Belgium is moderately centralized relatively to its population. The number of 
local government units is comparable to G er ma n y  and Italy. In France purchasing is 
extremely dispersed but with a powerful centre. There are a large number of local 
government units, m a n y  independent public bodies and public enterprises. There are, 
however, a small number of very powerful purchasers. There is central purchasing of 
central government supplies. In Germany purchasing is highly dispersed. However, the 
railways, posts and telecommunications and Ministries of Defence, Transportation and
Interior, constitute a major group of purchasers. Utilities are run by a complex m ix of
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public and private companies. M a n y  public sector activities (housing, transport) are 
actually run by limited companies. G e r m a n y  has a very large number of publicly o w n e d  
companies each understocking its o w n  purchasing. Operating departments and local 
offices (e.g., individual police stations) m a k e  their o w n  purchasing decisions and as 
result contracts are frequently of very low value. In Italy the number of individual 
purchasing entities is similar to the n um be r  for Germany. There is a diversity of types of 
organization d o w n  to the very large number of industrial and commercial subsidiaries of 
the state holding companies. T h e  United Kingdom is the most centralized country, with 
fewer local authorities than even Belgium, a small number of nationalized industries 
(and n o w  private ownership of key utilities) and five powerful central purchasing 
agencies.
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2.3.4 Evaluation of the Economic Implications of Liberalizing 
Public Procurement
T h q Atkins Study ('Cost of non-Europe' in Public Procurement, 1988, Vol. 5, pp 
563-572) identified products for which there w a s  a significant price difference between 
M e m b e r  States and industries for which there might be important economies of scale or 
restructuring effect. Significant price differences existed in products which:
- had a large share in public purchasing, so that price differences led to 
significant savings,
- were tradeable,
- were not at that time freely traded, so that there w as  a possibility of price 
differences existing (after allowing for transport/trading costs),
- benefit from nationalistic public purchasing policies, the removal of which 
might lead to increased trade by the public sector.
Sectors that were subject to restructuring effect are those which:
- depended heavily on public sector purchasers,
- had few dominant producers, because economies of scale are important, so 
that these were the sectors where there were "national champions", and 
which governments were driven to favouring in order to protect jobs, 
guarantee security of supply or promote innovation and investment.
M a n y  of these products were "old friends" cited in previous studies on public 
procurement. They can be divided into two broad groups.
- declining or static industries of strategic importance, for which loss of 
business might lead to closures: Coal, iron and steel tubes, special steels, 
heavy steel fabrications, power generation equipment, shipbuilding and 
railway rolling stock.
- strategic new technologies requiring heavy support for R & D :  Nuclear fuel 
processing, computers, telecommunications, electronics, specifically 
lasers, aircraft, avionics.
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This classification w a s  only loose: there were high technology products and 
heavy R & D  segments of the mature industries like power generation, naval shipbuilding 
and high speed railway locomotives. T he  following product groups for which the prices 
paid by the public sector and offered by suppliers had been investigated in the five study 
countries.
* pharmaceuticals
* cars and vans
* electrical office equipment
* power cables
* street lighting
* office lighting
* schools desks
* office desks and furniture
* filing cabinets and shelves
* uniforms
* paper
* cement
In addition, the following products had been the subject of a price investigation.
* electro-medical equipment
* telephones
* railway wagons
* electrical transformers.
The analysis of the data by Atkins indicated that there were indeed very 
significant price differences recorded between countries. It is notable that for the 
products in the direct price enquiries there were significant price differences between 
quotes within countries.
The Atkins Study identified three major areas for cost savings which in m o n e y  
terms (i.e., the potential expenditure savings gained in this area) were estimated to be 
between E C U  8-19 billion for the five countries surveyed in 1984. These savings 
stemmed from the realization of three beneficial effects witch would occur, according to 
the report, consecutively:
- the 'static trade effect’ meaning public authorities buying from the
cheapest foreign supplier ( E C U  3-8 billion).
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- the 'competition effect’, leading to d o w n w a r d  pressure on prices charged 
by domestic firms in previously closed sectors, as they strive to compete 
with foreign companies entering the market ( E C U  1-3 billion).
- the 'restructuring effect', or the longer-run effect of economies of scale, 
occurring as industry reorganizes under the pressure of n e w  competitive 
conditions ( E C U  4-8 billion).
T he  savings were concentrated in certain high technology sectors like 
computers, telecommunications and aerospace. But this w as  not the limit of potential 
benefits. Further items, which were impossible to quantify, included:
- savings for private sector buyers w h o  paid less for goods (e.g., office 
equipment, building materials) w ho se  prices had been reduced by the 
break-up of restrictive trade practices in the public sector;
- the dynamic effects of greater competition on innovation, investment and 
growth.
Adjusting the figures upwards for the Twelve European C om mu n it y  countries 
and averaging out the spread, total savings which would result from open public 
procurement Community-wide, were estimated at around 17.5 billion per a n n u m  (or 
0.5% of 1986 C o m m u n i t y  GDP). In addition, if defence procurement figures were 
included (an area not covered by the research programme) separate estimates suggested 
that gains of another E C U  4 billion could be achieved by market opening. O n  this basis, 
the Atkins Study concluded that the total annual cost of "non-Europe" in public 
procurement amounted to E C U  21.5 billion.
Around half of the estimated potential savings were concentrated in the sectors of 
telecommunications, power turbines and data-processing. In order to asses the potential 
price savings which would result from open competition, Atkins m a d e  a series of 
calculations, relating to a range of specific products in the five countries surveyed.
A  sample of the savings to be derived from the combined impact of static and
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competitive effects included: pharmaceuticals, office machinery and instrumentation, 
telephone switching, telephones, electrical equipment, motor vehicles and coal. Other 
items for which the report identified substantial gains (25-50%) as a result of 
procurement liberalisation in high price countries included x-ray machines, uniforms 
and filing cabinets. T he Atkins Study also indicated that for several products were no 
apparent potential savings at all (e.g., fluorescent tubes, school desks, cement and 
cardiac monitors).
T he negative consequence of closed and protective procurement w a s  that in 
certain key high technology supply sectors (capital equipment for defence, power 
generation, telecommunication and railways) where public authorities were the major 
purchasers, a symbiotic relationship had gradually built up between suppliers and 
buyers. This w a s  no surprise, the Atkins Study added, because in most of the key 
industrial sectors the largest world firms were generally American or Japanese. They 
were not just more competitive than European firms on world markets, but were better 
organized to compete for European Community-wide markets. The fact that the 
European C o m mu n it y  had m ore companies than the U S  and Japanese, the Atkins Study 
indicated, did not do it m u c h  good. It added nothing to the degree of competition in 
European C o m m u n i t y  countries because the protection of European national markets 
merely sustained their sub-optimal performance. At that time, in m a n y  key sectors, the 
Atkins Study concluded, companies were operating without the specialization and size 
necessary to compete globally. A n  important contributory cause of this w a s  the 
protection afforded by closed public procurement.
The Atkins Study looked at the gains in product costs and customer prices which 
would result in selected sectors from economies of scale triggered by more open 
competition. Sectors analysed in case studies conducted by the Atkins Study were: 
boiler-makers, turbine generators, locomotives, mainframe computers, public switching, 
telephones. Generally speaking these industries suffered from excess capacity, except
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telephones and mainframe computers (mainly due to IBM, according to the study) and 
public switching equipment (mainly due to trade between local European subsidiaries) 
(see Table 2.3.4.1).
Table 2.3.4.1
The Structure of European Industries Influenced by Procurement
Community Intra-EC Number Number
Market Trade of EC of American
(billion ECU) producers producers
Boilermaking 2 little 12 6
Turbine generators 2 little 10 2
Locomotives 0.1 little 16 2
Mainframe computers 10 extensive 5 9
Telephone exchanges 7 moderate 11 4
Telephone handsets 5 little 12 17
Source: EEC Commission (1988) (Atkins).
The Atlcins Study ('Cost of non-Europe' in Public Procurement, 1988, Vol. 5) 
concluded that there w a s  a considerable scope for savings in public purchasing in these 
products, but not only as a result of increased international trade. Increased efficiency 
and transparency in public purchasing ought also to lead to a reduction in the dispersion 
of prices, and to overall lower prices, within each country. Increased standardization 
might also lead to reduced prices (by increasing competition as well as by adopting the 
most cost-effecting specification), but there will always be differentiated products to 
meet specific local requirements. Uniforms, despite their name, the Atkins Study states, 
are a good example. They need to differentiate the personnel of different services, and 
be adapted to the m o d e  of w o r k  and to the climate.
T he Cecchini Report as a whole, has received wide publicity. It still remains the 
most comprehensive w o r k  on the subject of public procurement, and the quantitative 
assessments contained in it have been regularly used by the European Commission, 
M e m b e r  States and researchers, as the scientific support for the internal market 
programme and an important instrument to influence market expectations. But the 
quantitative assessments in the 'Costs o f non-Europe', need to be seen in n e w  light as
28
s ome of the micro-macro-economic variables have changed. T he contribution of this 
w o r k  has been considerable but this does not, however, m e a n  that it should be n o w  only 
of historical interest. T he  importance of the 'Cost o f non-Europe' lies in the implicit 
economic logic and the strategy revealed through its pages. They are essentially the 
economic logic and the strategy of the European Commission associated with the 
implementation of the internal market programme (Tsoukalis, 1991, p. 77). Several 
questions have been raised regarding the main assumptions and the methodology 
employed in the European Commission's study; and often, indirectly, about the 
economic strategy behind the internal market programme. The authors of the study 
admitted to the existence of a wide margin or error for their quantitative estimates, and 
m a k e  it clear that they exclude from the potential savings in total public procurement 
very important elements (saving for the private sector purchasers and the dynamic 
effects on innovation and growth) ('Cost of non-Europe', 1988, Vol. 5, Part A, pp 44-5). 
T he  majority of similar studies for the completion of the internal market undertaken by 
both private and official organizations in the different M e m b e r  States have produced 
significantly lower estimates than those found in the Cecchini Report, and this has 
usually been attributed to lower expectations regarding the dynamic effects (Tsoukalis, 
1991, pp 81-2). A  notable exception is the attempt by Baldwyn to incorporate the 
dynamic effects of the internal market on savings and investment, leading him to 
conclude that the final effect could be as m u c h  as five times the gains given in the 
Cecchini Report (El-Agraa, 1994, pp 163-4). C o x  argues that there is little agreement on 
the total level of public procurement and, therefore, no clear basis for calculating 
possible savings from the adoption of a more open tender and contract system. Until 
s ome objective research is undertaken on the effective size of the market, C o x  adds, the 
true potential for public expenditure savings through more competitive and transparent 
contracting will be a matter of guesswork (Cox, 1992, p. 143).
In view of the very large degree of uncertainty about savings, the internal market
effects should be treated at best as very rough estimates of the indicators of the direction
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of those effects and the broad orders of magnitude. The essential question is whether the 
opening up of public procurement should be viewed as a matter of marginal or 
substantial importance. T h e  assumption is that it is of potentially substantial importance.
2.3.5 Case Studies on the Impact of Liberalizing Public Procurement 
and Recent Changes in E U  Procurement Industry
The case studies are related to seven manufacturing industries mainly supplying 
the public sector. Atkins interviewed 60 companies operating in seven industries in the 
five countries studies ('Cost of non-Europe', 1988, Vol. 5, Part B). There is not enough 
r o o m  here to embark in a detailed account of the seven manufacturing industries. 
However, the most recent evolution of these industries is difficult to understand without 
taking into account its main features from a certain time base -1988- and try to outline 
briefly at this point, the forces that caused changes within the structure of each industry.
(i) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Manufacturing
Most firms in the sector believed that opening of public procurement w as  firstly highly
improbable, and secondly unlikely to have any short-term effect. In the longer term,
however, it would aid and accelerate the restructuring of the industry which w as  already
under way. There w a s  no doubt that the boiler-makers were supported by public
purchasing policies by subsidies and by aid. Assuming that public procurement could be
completely opened up, and that suppliers actually responded, the immediate effect
would be pressure to reduce h o m e  market prices. S o m e  firms thought prices might fall
by up to 10%. Since the overall profits margins were very slim, this can only happen
with the present industry structure if export prices rise to compensate. With intensifying
competition for these (generally lower technology) products from cheap labour countries
this w a s  very unlikely, so firms would m a k e  losses and be forced to merge or close. In
ithe longer term, opening up the internal market would assist the restructuring that
producers were already facing. T he  ability to m o v e  sub-assemblies and products around
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Europe, the easing of trans-European mergers and cooperation agreements, mutual 
recognition of standards and other aspects of the Internal Market were more important 
than changes in public purchasing policy. T w o  aspects of public purchasing policy were 
important, however:
- in the 1980s, each national government supports two or m ore national suppliers. 
A n y  attempt at merger, takeover or closure would bring anti-trust action. If the whole of 
Europe is seen as the natural market, firms m a y  be able to merge. Several firms viewed 
the ideal scenario as having an integrated power station supplier in each of the major 
markets, with 'orderly' marketing agreements.
- the threat of real competition from outside the European Community, which 
would be a necessary consequence of open public tendering, is already causing firms to 
m a k e  cost reducing investment and restructuring plans.
Without opening up public procurement, the Atkins Study concluded, European 
firms would remain too small, unprofitable and increasingly non-competitive. They 
would require increasing protection against low cost producers until eventually it would 
be too late to adapt if exposed to competition, and the industry would be destroyed.
(ii) Turbine Generators
The turbine generator industry has similar structural characteristics to the 
boilermaking industry. Here, too, there w a s  little intra-Community competition and 
capacity utilization rates were relatively low. Price differences were evident between 
M e m b e r  States. T he  market in the major producing countries w a s  clearly closed to 
foreign competition. Only Belgium, actually invited foreign bidders and suppliers 
believed, rightly or wrongly, that they did so only to compare ACEC's (national 
manufacturer) prices. Suppliers did not believe, however, that merely invited to tender 
would really change things. T he  obstacles to intra-European C o m m u n i t y  trade were 
seen to be:
- national preference: suppliers believed that even if markets were opened up, 
other European C o m m u n i t y  customers would prefer to buy U S  equipment because of
31
bilateral links with US.
- the legacy of standards: customers perceived other European C o m mu n it y  
suppliers as being locked in to their o w n  national standards, whereas US, Japanese and 
suppliers from the smaller nations are mor e  used to working to foreign standards. 
Suppliers said this w a s  untrue, and differences in standards presented no design or 
manufacturing difficulties. It w a s  partly excuse, partly prejudice on the customers' side.
- Customers' perception of after sales service capabilities: again seen as false 
prejudice.
In these circumstances suppliers said they would not waste m o n e y  bidding. T he 
smaller suppliers were likely to be more aggressive than the majors in this respect. A s  in 
the boiler sector, British and Italian firms particularly feared that their growing h o m e  
market, coupled with their o w n  lack of demonstrable new-build experience in Europe 
over the last decade, would m a k e  them vulnerable to attack from the French, G e r m a n  
and non-European C o m m u n i t y  producers over the next decade. During the interview 
programme, suppliers did not foresee, and had apparently not considered, m a n y  mergers 
in the European industry. The Internal Market, however, would permit an increase in 
capacity utilizations across all firms, without wasteful capacity expansion in the growing 
markets of the United K i n g d o m  and Italy. This would bring French, G e r m a n  and non- 
European C o m m u n i t y  firms into the British and Italian markets and stimulate 
rationalization by transfusional mergers (more likely between European C o m m u n i t y  and 
non-European C o m m u n i t y  companies than between European C o m m u n i t y  companies). 
T he fall in production costs could amount to about 12%.
Recent changes in the power equipment industry
Over the past five years, the expected change of opening up public procurement 
in the electricity sector in 1993 w a s  sufficient to generate a 'continuous earthquake' in 
the sector (Financial Times, Survey on World Electricity, 14 M a y  1992). There have 
been two important and partly corporate trends which have changed the face of the
power equipment industry. T he  most obvious is the response of European suppliers to a
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long standing problem of overcapacity and to challenges of pan-European and global 
manufacturing (Financial Times, Survey on World Electricity, 14 M a y  1992).
T he result w a s  the merger of the power engineering sections of the United 
Kingdom's GEC and Alsthom of France, and the creation of Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) 
from Asea of S w e d e n  and Switzerland's Brown Boveri not foreseen in the Atkins Study. 
Although m a n y  reasons have been put forward to explain thqABB merger, Ninni (1990, 
p. 326), argues that the expected changes in the institutional context of the European 
C om m u n i t y  and the Chernobyl accident were the causes that triggered the merger. After 
the merger, however, ABB went on through agreements with other suppliers and 
acquisitions. Its initiative became even speedier and broader after the most important 
reaction of its competitors, the GEC-Alsthom joint venture (December 1988). Both ABB 
and GEC-Alsthom have emerged stronger through eliminating duplication and 
consolidating manufacturing. The second trend is based on technology and especially 
the need for equipment suppliers to have access to the gas turbine technology that forms 
the basis for combined cycle power generation. Deals exemplifying this trend include 
venture between General Electric (GE) of U S  and Alsthom of France and hence n o w  
between GE and GEC-Alsthom. T he leaders in developing gas turbine technologies are 
at the centre of groupings; GE, with its arrangement with GEC-Alsthom; ABB; Siemens 
of Germany; and the Mitsubishi/Westinghouse partnership. T he  industry still believes 
that mature western markets, notwithstanding the importance for suppliers of combine 
cycle orders in countries such as the United K i n g d o m  and Netherlands, are likely to 
gro w  only moderately, and attention is switching to the Far East and eastern Europe 
(Financial Times, Survey on World Electricity, 14 M a y  1992). Overall, therefore, the 
w e b  of inter-relationships between power equipment suppliers is increasing in 
geographical scope and complexity. However, the future of small-and medium-sized 
European power equipment suppliers is still uncertain. They might be acquired by the 
multinationals or could maintain a niche strategy, cooperating alternatively with the big 
groups in different bids.
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(iii) Electric Locomotives
T he Atkins Study examined the effects of opening up of public procurement for 
the electric locomotives industry which w a s  oligopolistic. It concluded that there were 
signs that s ome European railways are becoming more open about procurement. For 
example, British Rail has a policy of competitive procurement. This opening up of the 
market resulted largely from technological factors. There were a number of innovations 
in locomotive design, which m a d e  potential gains from international procurement. The 
extension of high speed networks, coinciding with the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel, w a s  leading to construction of n e w  tracks for the first time in decades, giving an 
export opportunity to the French manufacturers of TGVs, which have a significant lead 
over other manufacturers. There were also important advantages in the control systems 
for locomotives by the application of microprocessor control. These technology changes 
were forcing international procurement, and were leading to pan-European grouping of 
manufacturers. Public procurement w as  therefore responding to technology changes. 
Conversely, opening up public procurement per se would have little effect on the 
competitive environment. T he main barrier to competitive bidding w a s  that development 
programmes for n e w  models have in past been done jointly by the customer and the 
supplier. There w a s  subsequently little chance of another supplier being able to win 
orders for existing designs and none would bother to try. Effective joint development 
requires geographical proximity and a c o m m o n  language and industrial culture. It is 
possible, however that in the next generation of locomotives, development will be at 
arms length.
T he relationship between railways and suppliers of electric locomotives w as  
changing. Railways in Europe historically designed and built their o w n  rolling stock. 
W h e n  steam w a s  replaced in the 1960s, railways lost some of their manufacturing but 
held on to design. N e w  technology is n o w  coming from the manufacturers: British 
Rail's unsuccessful attempt to design high speed trains ended its design dominance in 
the United K i n g d o m  and BREL, its manufacturing subsidiary, w a s  privatized.
If there were continued mergers, takeovers and consortia between European
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firms in order to obtain technology transfer, there w as  likely to increased trade in sub- 
assemblies or whole locomotives in future, even if national railways continue to have 
close technical relationships with their domestic manufacturers. Differences in technical 
standards were not a barrier to trade per se; manufacturers could easily manufacture to 
the standards of any other railway. In the long term, European railway systems must be 
harmonized. This would give s om e  scope for economies of series production and 
savings in development costs.
There would be n e w  trade in sub-components and assembled locomotives, 
reaching levels of import penetration in the major countries of perhaps 5 0 %  in 20 to 30 
years. A n  'ideal' industry would have say 4 major companies each producing a 
rationalized range of sub-assemblies or models (while in 1986 there were 16 European 
manufacturers compared with only two in the US). Import penetration in these four 
producing countries would then be 7 5 %  and in all other European Union countries 
100%. This scenario, thq Atkins Study concluded, resulted from technology changes and 
from the external market environment, to which public procurement responds. It w a s  
not a result of public procurement legislation.
Recent chanses in railway industry
T he  last five years has been an era of 'massive consolidation' within Europe's 
railway manufacturing industry (Financial Times, Survey on Light Rail Systems, 6 April 
1992). Large firms were taking over their smaller rivals, mainly in the electrical 
engineering sector. The industry believed that to date, most railway procurement in 
Europe has been nationalistically driven, but the advent of the Single European Market 
increased the scope for cross-border deals. T he  same survey says that most of the large 
European suppliers n o w  think in European or indeed global terms.
Overshadowing the market n o w  are the two earlier mentioned multinational groups, 
Swedish-Swiss Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and Anglo-French GEC-Alsthom. ABB has 
important manufacturing capacity in G e r m a n y  and a stake in BREL, the former state-
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o w n e d  railway workshops in the United Kingdom. GEC-Alsthom famous for its French 
high speed TGV o w n s  suppliers in Spain and Belgium and has a collaboration 
agreement with the railway arm of Fiat in Italy. Competing with these two 
multinationals are s o m e  large G e r m a n  companies. Siemens, a long-standing supplier of 
electrical equipment, bought a few years ago a majority holding in Ger ma n y  based 
Duewag, one of the largest light rail vehicle builders in the world, and recently acquired 
a majority stake in Skoda of Czechoslovakia, a builder of electric locomotives. The 
railway activities of the Daimler-Benz group have been consolidated under the AEG- 
Westinghouse collaborative venture in which Weslinghouse of U S  o w n s  19 per cent. 
Such grouping were an inevitable reaction to the Single European Market and the 
importance of combining resources for R & D  (Interview with Mr. Curcher, June 1994).
(iv) Mainframe Computers
The Atkins Study indicated that the mainframe computer industry w as a highly 
competitive industry. In each of the large M e m b e r  States an indigenous manufacturer 
w as  fixing prices in relation to IBM, the sector leader. ICL, for example, generally tried 
to be 7 - 8 %  cheaper than IBM  ('Cost of non-Europe' 1988, p. 133). Although national 
purchasing has been opened significantly in recent years, preference w as given to 
indigenous manufacturers by public sector clients, while IBM  dominates the private 
sector market. If the market were opened up, there w a s  unlikely to be d o w n w a r d  
pressure in prices. For one thing, the public sector comprises only 3 0 %  of the total 
market. If, however, the performance of the European C om mu n it y  manufacturers in the 
private sector is a guide to their true competitiveness, then an opening of the market 
should lead to a decline in the indigenous manufacturers' historical dominance of the 
public sector market. In the long term, the redistribution of market shares between 
companies would not be significant enough to generate price savings through 
economies of scale. Nonetheless, the relatively high degree of dependence of indigenous 
manufacturers on the public sector market w as  posing more problems than
opportunities. The U S  view w a s  that the European computer industry w a s  not really
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viable, being dependent on the acquisition of 'off-the-shelf Japanese technology, 
preferential access to public sector markets, and in s ome cases, state financial support. 
T o  b ecome truly competitive, there must be rationalization of product lines, and the 
development of a strong technological base. Both requirements would best be served 
through mergers or joint ventures. T o  s o m e  extent, this w a s  already happening (e.g. 
collaboration in R & D  between Siemens, ICL and Bull) and would be encouraged by full 
implementation of O p e n  Systems Interconnecting Standards. However, there w a s  no 
sign that manufacturers were considering any collaboration in production, or product 
specialization.
Recent chanses in the Computer Industry
T he  past few years have seen a 'radical restructuring' of the European computer 
industry and the formation of n e w  defensive and strategic alliances, including s om e  with 
the U S  and Japanese computer makers, w h o  dominate the world market and have 
s ho wn  increasing interest in Europe in the run-up to the Single European Market 
(Financial Times, 7 April 1992). Hopes that a n e w  European computer 'super-champion' 
might emerge to compete with IBM  and Digital Equipment Corporation of the U S  and 
Fujitsu of Japan, vanished w h e n  Fujitsu acquired ICL. Since then ICL, the only 
profitable European computer hardware group has acquired Nokia Data. In spite of 
mergers and acquisitions, there is still substantial overcapacity and profit margins for 
hardware manufacturers are shrinking. O f  the top 10 information technology companies 
in the world, only three were European: Siemens-Nixdorf (8th), Olivetti (ninth), and 
Group Bull (tenth) (Financial Times, 7 April 1992). Since a 'full-blown' merger of 
Europe's remaining independent information technology groups is thought unlikely, it is 
clear that to survive, European companies are starting to form strategic alliances with 
powerful partners. For example Groupe Bull reached a broad agreement with IBM  in 
1991 to obtain access to IBM's expertise (Financial Times, 7 April 1992).
The mainframe computer sector the subject of the Atkins investigation, is n o w
developed; there are few n e w  customers to be found and existing customers are usually
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w e d de d  to existing suppliers by the cost and the complexity of changing software. Also 
the trend to "downsizing" using a smaller, less expensive computer based on m o d e m  
technology to replace the mainframe is growing. Nevertheless mainframes represent a 
significant source of profits for companies determined to remain as full-line computer 
suppliers. The list is short and exclusive and includes IBM, Fujitsu (including its 8 0 %  
o w n e d  subsidiary, ICL), Hitachi, Digital Equipment, NEC, Unisys, Amdahl, Siemens- 
Nixdorf Groupe Bull and AT&T. Olivetti markets Hitachi mainframes within Italy. 
W h a t  happens to the European industry in the short term is likely to depend on the 
economic environment. It is believed that in the long term, it is already clear that the 
computer, consumer electronics and telecommunications industries are moving ever 
closer (Financial Times, 7 April 1992).
(v) Telephone Exchanges
The telephone exchange industry is notable for the scale of public funding of its 
R & D  costs. T he  seven different digital technologies in the European countries, five of 
them developed under protected public purchasing arrangements. The price per line in 
Europe is significantly higher than that in the U S  and major reorganization such as 
mergers, privatisation and cooperation agreements is currently taking place in the 
industry. It is expected that such activity will eventually leave only two domestic 
European producers.
(vi) Telephone Handsets
T he telephone handset industry w a s  an industry producing volume products at 
low unit costs. The price differences between M e m b e r  States were partly explicable by 
different quality standards and differences in national regulations. However, free 
competition between producing countries would yield cost reductions of 30 to 4 0 %  in 
Belgium, France, Germany, following a rationalization and reorganization of production 
facilities. Import penetration of low cost hand sets from Far East manufacturers w as  
expected to be increased substantially.
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Recent changes in the telecommunication equipment market.
After one of the 'biggest' shake-ups in the history of industrial manufacturing, 
telecommunications equipment suppliers are adjusting to the realities of the 1990s 
(Financial Times, Sui*vey on World Telecommunications, 7 October 1991). Takeovers 
and acquisitions that begun in the mid-1980s are significant and by no means been 
completed. M o v e s  to open the public procurement markets in the United Kingdom, U S  
and Japan, for example, have increased the trend toward multi-sourced switching and 
transmission equipment in m a n y  countries and diminished the reliance of public 
network operators on their national manufacturing champions T h e  resulting industry 
shake-out-exemplified by the watershed merger of the telecommunications interests of 
Alcatel and ITT in 1987, but followed by other agreements between Siemens and GPT 
of GEC, and AT&T and Italtel - saw reduction in the number of European 
manufacturers from more than a dozen at the beginning of the last decade to only a 
handful n o w  (Financial Times, Survey on World Telecommunications, 7 October 1991). 
Whether this concentration within the switching and transmission industry will 
ultimately be to the detriment of remaining medium-sized companies or n e w  market 
entrants such as Bosch, Nokia, Philips or Matra is not yet clear. O n e  of the biggest 
bonuses for manufacturers in recent years, however, has been the arrival of mobile 
communications as a mass market, a market that w a s  extremely difficult to predict 
(Financial Times, Survey on World Telecommunications, 7 October 1991). In Europe an 
interesting development has been the strategic use of standards and spectrum 
management in deployment of the n e w  pan-European digital cellular radio system, or 
GSM. Arguably a defensive' measure aimed at safeguarding suppliers within the 
European Community, the intricacy of the GSM specification has meant that only those 
firms with highly customised research and development, such as Ericsson and 
Motorola, have been able to enter the market from outside (Financial Times, Survey on 
World Telecommunications, 7 October 1991).
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(vii) Laser Industry
The laser industry w a s  a very competitive, young industry with a predominance 
of small high technology engineering firms. Public procurement w a s  more open than in 
other sectors. Substantial falls in prices and major restructuring were likely but these 
will not be a consequence of liberalization of public procurement.
2.4 Conclusions on the Impact of Liberalizing Public Procurement 
under the Old Procedures
The "old" procurement directives of 1970s had a limited impact in opening up 
public procurement and they did little to remove the "buy national" policies in most 
M e m b e r  States. Moreover, s om e  sectors in the field of utilities were totally excluded, 
while the provision of services to the public sector was totally unregulated. Additionally, 
there w a s  no national remedy, where it w as  felt that the proper procedures had not been 
complied with by the awarding authority.
In 1988, the Commission of the European Communities in its extensive research 
on the 'Cost of non-Europe' (or the Cecchini Report) confirmed the thesis that there 
w a s  very little direct public sector purchasing from foreign suppliers, less than 2 %  of the 
total value of purchases. It also confirmed the predominance of use of restricted 
tendering. T h e  report estimated that for the twelve European C om mu n it y  M e m b e r  States 
total savings at around 17.5 billion E C U  per a n n u m  or 0.5% of the 1986 C om mu n it y  
G D P  would result from open public procurement. Around half of the estimated potential 
savings were concentrated in sectors like telecommunications, power generation, 
transport and data-processing equipment. T he negative consequence of closed and 
protective procurement, the Cecchini Report said, w as  that in high technology supply 
sectors where public authorities were the major purchasers, a symbiotic relationship has
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gradually built up between suppliers and buyers. Because of this, the Cecchini Report 
indicated, the largest world firms are generally U S  or Japanese, while the protection of 
European national markets merely sustains the larger numbers of European companies 
(in comparison to the U S  or Japan) but of a sub-optimal size and performance. Such 
companies were operating without the specialization and size necessary to compete 
globally. A n  important contributory cause of this w a s  the protection afforded by closed 
procurement. The Cecchini Report examined the gains in reducing costs and lower 
customers prices which would result in selected sectors from economies of scale 
triggered by more open competition. Case studies related to seven manufacturing 
industries - boiler-making, turbine generators, locomotives, mainframe computers, 
public switching, and telephones - mainly supplying the public sector were analysed. All 
these industries with the exception of mainframe computers and telephones suffered 
from excess capacity. T h e  Cecchini Report concluded that there w as  a considerable 
scope for savings in public purchasing in these products, as increased efficiency and 
transparency in public purchasing would lead to a reduction of prices. Increased 
standardization, the study added, might also lead to reduced prices by increasing 
competition and by adopting the most cost effective specification. In the case study of 
boiler and pressure vessel manufacturing most firms believed that the easing of trans- 
European mergers and cooperation agreement, mutual recognition of standards and 
other aspects of the Internal Market were more important than changes in public 
purchasing policy. Finally, in the case study of electric locomotives, technology changes 
in that sector were forcing international procurement and were leading to pan-European 
grouping of manufacturers.
Most of the predictions of industries' responses to opening up public procurement
are being realized because changes are taking place continuously in these industries.
The emerging structure of European supply consists of three major groupings or
networks of firms plus s o m e  specialized suppliers. They are full-line suppliers involved
in heavy and electric engineering, transport, energy and electronics. They have been
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formed in a very similar w a y  by acquiring control of smaller firms and forming joint 
ventures between large firms, through cooperative agreements which are used to carry 
on complex arrangements.
T he  'Cost of non-Europe' still remains a comprehensive w or k  on the opening 
up of public procurement. Nevertheless its quantitative assessment needs to be seen in a 
n e w  light as s om e  of the micro- and macro-economic variables have changed since its 
publication in 1988. It is accepted that such quantitative assessment is of substantial 
importance. The contribution of the Cecchini Report is that it expressed the economic 
logic and strategy of the European Commission. That strategy w as  subsequently 
embodied in the n e w  rules on public procurement outlined in the next chapter.
(
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3.0 DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT  
LEGISLATION IN THE SINGLE MARKET
In its 1985 White Paper on "Completing the Internal Market" (White Paper, 
1985, para. 85-86), the European Commission laid particular stress on the urgent need 
for improvement of existing public procurement Directives to increase transparency, and 
for extension of legislation to cover the four major sectors -energy, transport, water and 
telecommunications- which at that time were not covered by Directives. Therefore, n e w  
Directives have been adopted which strengthen the existing W o r k s  and Supply 
Directives and extend similar provisions to supply contracts in the Utility Sector (water, 
energy, transport and telecommunications). A  fourth Directive provides a right of 
redress in the case of a breach of the n e w  public works, supply and utility rules (and has 
been extended to the Services Sector), whilst two n e w  Directives apply similar 
purchasing rules to the provision of services such as accountancy, facilities management 
and maintenance. A s  with the earlier Directives, the rules do not, in general extend to 
public purchasing related to defence procurement.
Before embarking on a more detailed examination of the n e w  legislation, an 
overview will be presented in this section of the main legal instruments through which 
the E U  is gradually seeking to ensure compliance with Treaty obligations on the 
opening of public procurement.
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3.1 Public Procurement Legislation - The New Rules
T he n e w  rules share certain c o m m o n  features:
Contract award procedures
Precedence is given to the use of open tenders. However, public purchasers n o w  
have a choice of a "negotiated procedure" in addition to the existing "open" and 
"restricted" procedures. This allows a public purchaser to negotiate directly with one 
or more supplier of its choice in certain limited circumstances. In some instances the 
public purchaser m a y  use the negotiated procedures without prior publication of a 
Contract Notice, though an A w a r d  Notice will still be required.
Contract award criteria
Public purchasers m a y  accept either:
(a) the lowest price only; or
(b) the "most economically advantageous bid".
This second criterion would allow purchasers to consider factors such as price, 
quality, delivery and financial standing. In the case of services, additional criteria such 
as professional skill, efficiency and reliability m a y  be considered. In certain limited 
circumstances other conditions might be imposed in the contract awarded, such as a 
requirement to use local labour or local suppliers, or to create n e w  jobs, but such factors 
m a y  not be considered in assessing a tenderer's suitability (Article 28(2) of 88/295/EEC 
and Article 29a of 71/30 5 / E E C  expired on 31st December 1992, and must not be used 
of giving preference to certain tenderers). T he conditions to be used in the assessment of 
bids must be set out in the Contract Notice.
Standards
W h e r e  the Contract Notice specifies particular standards which a bidder must
adopt, these must not as a general rule be purely national standards which would operate
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to prevent a contractor or a supplier from another C om mu n it y  country being able to 
meet the contract. W h e r e  available, a public purchaser should specify European 
( C E N / C E N E L E C / E T S I )  standards or national standards, such as BSI or DIN, 
implementing European or other international standards. Specifications m a y  not refer to 
the use of particular patented or trade marked products.
A n  exception to this rule applies where failure to use national standards could 
create problems of incompatibility with existing equipment would cause excessive cost 
or would limit innovation. Public authorities must keep records of the reasons for the 
use of national standards. Increasingly, public purchasers are replacing product quality 
specifications with a requirement for tenderers to s h o w  overall performance by 
compliance with international quality control standard I S O  9000 (Bird and Bird, 1991,
p. 6).
3.2 The Specific Measures
The European Commission’s action programme envisages the following 
measures of legislation: a revised supplies and a revised works directive; two 
compliances directives; an utilities directive and two services directives.
3.2.1 The Supplies Directive
In 1988, the Council of Ministers adopted proposals to change the 1977 Supplies 
Directive (Directive 88/295/EEC - n o w  replaced by consolidated Supplies Directive 
93/36/EEC). The European Community's approach w a s  influenced by its experience 
with the supplies and works directives during the 1970s, hence the revisions to tighten 
up the existing rules and seek to m a k e  the procedures for tendering and the award of
contracts more transparent. Both directives are important not only in their o w n  right, but
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also because they served as precedents for the subsequent utilities directive.
The Supplies Directive makes clear that the procurement affected by the 
Directive need not be by outright purchase, but m a y  involve leasing, rental or hire 
purchase (Article 2(a)). It also outlines a method of valuing these latter contracts so as to 
m a k e  more difficult for them to be split or undervalued in order to evade legislation. 
T he supplies threshold is E C U  200,000 for regional and local government and E C U  
130,000 for central government departments bound by the G A T T  Government 
Purchasing Agreement (Article 6).
Large purchasers n o w  have to give advance information of their procurement plans for 
the year ahead and they have to publish such advanced notices in the Official Journal. 
(Advance notice of annual anticipated requirements by product area if above E C U  
750,000). The n e w  rule (Article 9) also requires the relevant public authorities to 
publish a notice of the outcome of each tender while safeguarding sensitive information.
T he  Directive provides for different types of tendering procedures; open, 
restricted or negotiated. H o w e v e r  the Directive seeks to m a k e  open tendering the 
norm, and to restrict the use of any other procedure (Article 7). For example, restricted 
tendering will be an option only in certain cases, such as where the value of the contract 
is low or where the product required is highly specific. W h e n  selective tendering has 
been used, purchasers are required to submit a written report justifying the procedure 
and giving information on the tender and its outcome. There have been improvements in 
making easier for suppliers in other European C o m mu n it y  countries to m a k e  bid, and 
the n e w  Directive extends the m i n i m u m  closing dates purchasers can set for the receipt 
of bids. References to standards are n o w  more precise and the Directive n o w  obliges 
purchasing bodies to refer in their notices to European standards, where they exist 
(Article 8). Technical specifications must be defined by reference to national standards 
which implement European standards or by reference to ’common technical 
specifications’. This change is in line with the EU's policy on technical harmonization 
and standardization.
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3.2.2 The Public Works Directive
The amendments to the 1971 W o r k s  Directive were adopted in July 1989, and it 
follows the principles of the revised Supplies Directive (Directive 89/440/EEC, n o w  
replaced by consolidated W o r k s  Directive 93/37/EEC). It defines the scope of its 
coverage more clearly, and indicates more precisely what it meant by public works 
contracts (Article 1). It makes also clear that it includes planning, design and 
management contracts as well. In order to limit compliance costs with rising inflation 
the threshold w a s  increased from E C U  1 million to E C U  5 million before V A T  and is to 
be revised every two years (Article la).
T he scope of the Directive has also been extended to include contracts which are 
more than 5 0 %  subsidized from public funds and which are awarded by the public 
bodies listed (Article 1 a(l)).
3.2.3 The Utilities Directive
T he liberalization of public procurement rules also involves extending the scope 
of competition to sectors not already covered by existing directives for both supplies and 
works contracts to four major n e w  sectors; water, energy, transport and communications 
sectors. T he Utilities Directive (Directive 90/531/EEC, n o w  replaced by consolidated 
Utilities Directive 93/38/EEC to cover services) is considered as one of the 'most 
ambitious and controversial parts of the Single European Market and that it m a y  
potentially be an important instrument for stamping out nationalistic buying by utilities' 
(Winter, 1991, p. 763). T he European Commission has argued that these n e w  sectors 
are important in that they are areas where public d e m an d  is capable of providing
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European C om m u n i t y  firms with a sufficiently large market to enable them to
strengthen their competitiveness on the world stage.
The European Commission has carried out a series of studies on the structure of 
the market in these sectors and on the implications of opening them up to competition 
((a) Development o f the Common Market for Telecommunications Sennces and 
Equipment, Brussels, 1987, (b) Research on the "Cost o f non-Europe" Equipment 
Services in the Community, Luxembourg, 1988). T he specific legislative proposals had 
to deal with the ownership issue as both public and private sector utilities provide 
services in these sectors. T he criterion that was finally agreed, w a s  independent of 
ownership and applies to any public or private utility operating in the four sectors which 
have been granted "special or exclusive rights" by national or local government. The
organizations covered by the proposals include railway companies, airport and port
authorities, electricity and gas distributors, oil and gas producers, telecommunication, 
water and urban transport services. T o  prevent interpretation problems a list of public 
and private purchasing entities are covered in the annex to the Directive.
Coverage is also determined by varying thresholds. T he  European Commission 
c am e  under pressure from industry, especially from purchasers, not to set high 
thresholds and in the end man ag e d  to set the levels slightly higher for the supplies at 
E C U  400,000 and for telecommunication supplies at E C U  600,000 (Article 12).
Most M e m b e r  States were prepared to accept a directive with a very broad 
coverage, while s om e  members, notably France, wanted to go further and include 
purchase of electricity. This w a s  opposed by Ger ma n y  because of the massive support 
for G e r m a n  coal by the G e r m a n  utilities. A s  with supplies and works directive it soon 
became apparent that there were not enough European Standards. For m a n y  utilities the 
mutual recognition approach to standard making is not adequate because of the need of 
network interconnectability. A  specific standards institute, the European
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Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) w a s  created only for 
telecommunications, the sector in which the E U  has been active for some time. In the 
other sectors, initiatives were taken within C E N  and C E N E L E C .
T he  standards issues became a point of dispute between British suppliers, w h o  
wanted European standards, and the purchasers, w h o  wished to retain sovereignty in 
standards and technical specifications. T he  purchasers prevailed and the British 
government placed a formal reserve on the obligatory use of European standards. 
According to W oo lc o ck  this reserve had little impact, but the continuing absence of 
agreed standards, whether European, international or, even national, in m a n y  of the 
utilities means that the speed with which markets actually open will depend on progress 
in this field (Woolcock et al, 1991, p. 34). The early signs are that many, if not most, 
utilities are already applying the Directive's procedures. Over 1,000 calls for competition 
by utilities had been published in the Official Journal by mid-March 1993, worth about 
E C U  15 billion and covering (to a greater or lesser degree) all the relevant sectors and 
each type of procedure available (Brown, 1993, p. 747).
3.2.4 T h e  Compliance Directives
The lack of effective compliance w a s  seen as major reason for the failure of the 
earlier Directives. The European Commission, therefore, has introduced a Compliance 
Directive (Directive 89/665/EEC) which provides the right of redress with each 
M e m b e r  State for aggrieved tenderers based in the European Community. (This applies 
only to Works, Supplies and Services Directives as a separate one has been adopted for 
the Utilities). Rather than establish a central regulatory regime, the European 
Commission sought to provide equivalent national remedies and for cases of alleged 
infringement of European C o m m u n i t y  rules on open tendering, to provide an incentive 
for aggrieved suppliers to initiate cases, thereby helping to open markets by their o w n
actions. This w a s  considered to be a practical approach, because the Commission is
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simply not able to monitor the thousands of tender contracts placed every day. A n  
aggrieved supplier therefore, should seek redress initially via a review body set up in 
each M e m b e r  State. That review body has the power:
- T o  take interim measures, including suspension of the awarding contract;
- to order the removal of discriminatory specifications and/or set aside 
unlawful contracts;
- and to award damages to the injured firms for the cost of unnecessary 
studies, profits forgone or opportunities lost;
T he  European Commission, recognizing that suppliers m a y  not. wish to 
jeopardize their o w n  positions, has given n e w  powers for itself to intervene. It has the 
power to ask M e m b e r  States for an explanation where they believe there is an 
infringement of C o m m u n i t y  procedures, with M e m b e r  States given 21 days to respond 
(Article 3(3)).
The compliance rules for the utilities include the optional use by private sector * 
bodies for outside audits to ensure correct tendering procedures are being followed. The 
directive passed through the European and national parliaments without m u c h  debate. In 
its original form it proposed giving to the European Commission the right to intervene 
in national proceedings to ensure precedence of the C om m u n i t y  interest and compliance 
with European C o m m u n i t y  rules. T he  Commission proposed that it would be able to 
suspend a contract award procedure for up to three months. B y  the time the proposed 
directive returned to the Council of Ministers, business lobbies, representing suppliers 
and especially purchasers in M e m b e r  States, had alerted national governments to the 
disruptive effect on business of contract suspension. However, after further opposition 
within the Council of Ministers, the intervention powers of the European Commission 
have been greatly reduced. T he reason w a s  that M e m b e r  States opposed the increase in
the Commission's power associated with European Community-level suspension,
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because this might set a precedent for the European Commission to have powers to 
intervene in national review procedures. The European Parliament suggested that the 
European Commission's right to suspend the procedure be restricted to the period before 
a contract award is m a d e  while the Council of Ministers sought to remove the 
suspension altogether.
T he  M e m b e r  States retained for themselves the discretion not to suspend or take 
other interim measures 'where their negative consequences could exceed their benefits'. 
The Commission m anaged to keep a so-called corrective mechanism, which enables it 
to notify M e m b e r  States in cases of clear and manifest infringement. The Commission 
can intervene both informally and by means of legal action against a M e m b e r  State 
which is not itself complying or ensuring compliances with C o m m u n i t y  law. If M e m b e r  
States fail to correct a tendering infringement, the only remedy would be the somewhat 
cumbersome Article 169 (EEC) before the European Court of Justice. This in turn could 
encourage individuals and firms to seek legal redress through private actions (Winter, 
1991, p. 751). Six Article 169 actions relating to procurement have already been brought 
by the Commission and have proceeded to a full hearing. In all but one of these cases, 
the state brought before the court w a s  found to be in breach of its obligations 
(Arrowsmith, 1992, p. 3).
It has been argued that compliance with the directive will depend largely on 
aggrieved suppliers being prepared to bring cases against their potential customers. In a 
recent study (Woolcock et al, 1991, p. 35) it is reported that 'with one or two notable 
exceptions, the companies interviewed felt that it w as  unrealistic to expect them to bite 
the hand that feeds them in this way'. It is therefore by no means certain that the 
directive will be effective. But a few cases, the study continues, brought by 'maverick' 
companies, m a y  m a k e  the sanctions credible (Woolcock, et al, 1991, p. 35).
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Compliance in the Excluded Sectors
The above mentioned Compliance Directive covers only government 
procurement proper and not the private and mixed-ownership utilities. F r o m  the early 
stage of the debate on the excluded sectors it became clear that a separate directive 
would be needed. The European Commission's intention w as  to apply the compliance 
directive for supplies and works, but M e m b e r  States and business argued that a less 
interventionist directive had to be developed. The Commission therefore incorporated 
two additional elements in its proposal (Official Journal, C  179, 10 July 1991, p. 18).
T he first, proposed by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), w as  the use of 
an audit or attestation system which would give suppliers more confidence than a set 
of rules with which purchasers could technically comply but still pursue parochial 
purchasing policies. T he second drew on an idea promoted by the G e r m a n  industry. This 
w as  the establishment of an European Community-level conciliation procedure, in 
which an ad hoc body, including industrial representatives, would hear complaints from 
aggrieved tenderers. Neither attestation nor audit w as  seen as replacing remedies in the 
form of damages, or prejudicing rights of action under the directive. Attestation m a y  
provide an alternative to the suspension of contract award procedures and is seen as a 
solution to the G e r m a n  problem of private-contract law. G e r m a n  companies and 
government argued that public tendering subject to private contract law is not subject to 
a suspension of contract, since neither the Commission nor the G e r m a n  Federal 
Government could intervene. The G e r m a n  idea of a conciliation procedure will enable 
an individual c ompany to initiate conciliation in a sub-committee of the Advisory 
Committee for Public Contracts, which would m a k e  recommendations. The Utilities 
Remedies Directive 92/13/EEC (O.J., 1992, L76/14), entered into force on 1 January 
1993.
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3.2.5 The Service Directives
T w o  Service Directives have been adopted: one to cover public and local 
authorities (Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992); and another (Directive 93/38/EEC) 
extends the scope of the Utilities Directive (90/531/EEC) to cover purchases of services 
in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors. Both operate in a similar 
ways to existing rules and covers the same entities as the Supplies, W o r k s  and Utilities 
Directives. T he  Directives aim is to cover all public purchasing not covered by the 
existing regime, and to avoid potential overlaps, e.g., supply of standard software treated 
as supply contact whereas bespoke software treated as a service contract.
Both Directives operate in a similar manner to existing rules through advanced 
publicity of requirements, a choice of award procedures, including for architectural and 
engineering services, design contests and controls on standards and definite time limits. 
The value of thresholds for general services is E C U  200,000 and for services related to 
works, (e.g. design services) E C U  400,000. Services in both directives are based on a 
two-tier application and are divided into priority services (subject to full purchasing 
regime), such as maintenance and repair services, accountancy services, 
telecommunications and computer services; and residual services (subject to standards 
requirements and publicity to m a k e  tendering mor e  transparent), such as legal services, 
personnel and security services, vocational training. The Directives cover also local 
authorities concessions where right to provide services is given to external bodies, e.g. 
in transport, water or waste disposal sectors. M e m b e r  States have been obliged to 
implement Directive 92/50/EEC, before 1 July 1993, and Directive 93/38/EEC before 1 
July 1994.
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3.3 Public Procurement Legislation and Legal Integration
Public procurement has been an important part of the European integration 
process at the economic or political level. A  complex and multi-facet relationship exists 
between that process and the legal sphere (legal structures, institutions and norms). A  
survey of the interactions between the different levels can certainly serve a good basis 
for an overall reflection on the opening up of public procurement.
The central thesis is that 'formal' factors of integration, although considerably 
influenced by external (non-legal) factors, also experience a dynamic of their o w n  
(Dehousse et al, 1990, p. 242). Legal integration has m a d e  significant progress since the 
early 1960s (Dehousse et al, 1990, p. 242). L a w  has always been a basic instrument and 
a central symbol of European integration. Yet today the effectiveness of European 
Union law increasingly seems an issue. Even in ordinary circumstances, this state of 
affairs would raise serious questions of law, policy, politics and social theory (Snyder, 
1993, p. 19). Historically speaking at least integration started as a law-making exercise, 
an attempt to establish, through the creation of institutions equipped with law-making 
and monitoring powers, conditions for an increase in exchanges and cooperation 
between European countries. Far from being market-driven, the creation of an E C S C ,  
the first of the European Communities, w a s  essentially a political response to a political 
problem. L a w  w a s  then regarded as the central agent of integration and changes in the 
legal sphere were meant to transform production conditions. A s  time went by, this 
historical primacy of 'formal' integration w a s  challenged by growing importance of 
economic and technological developments (Dehousse et al, 1990, p. 243).
Very often, legal integration takes the form of a replacement of national rules by 
European ones. The necessity of adopting European rules has also led to the creation of 
n e w  institutions, with their o w n  means of action, both legal and financial. This is 
certainly by far the most visible aspect of the entire process and for m a n y  Europeans the
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c r e a t io n  o f  E u r o p e - w id e  in s t i tu t io n s  is  t h e  v e r y  d e f in i t io n  o f  in t e g r a t io n .
At first sight, for instance, both the harmonization of national regulations and the 
mutual recognition of their basic equivalence can be used, alternatively or together, to 
reach the same result: the completion of the "internal market". This means in effect the 
undistorted freedom of m o v e m e n t  within the European C o m m u n i t y  of factors of 
production as envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. However, economic integration cannot 
be achieved only through the elimination of obstacles (negative integration). It also 
needs the creation of equal conditions for the functioning of the integrated parts of the 
economy (positive integration) which involves intervention by the European 
Community, by harmonization or coordination (Dehousse et al, 1990, p. 245). 
Technically speaking, they present great differences. Whereas harmonization tends 
towards the adoption of a E U - wi d e  norm, mutual recognition is primarily a negative 
obligation imposed on the M e m b e r  States to prevent them from applying their o w n  
regulations to imported goods. Consequently, their symbolic value will also differ 
considerably: harmonization will lead to a far more visible result than mutual 
recognition, which operates essentially ex post, as a conflict-solving device. It is far 
from sure that mutual recognition will suffice to encourage economic operators to m a k e  
the necessary adjustments. This is one of the principal difficulties in the "new approach" 
to technical harmonization adopted by the C o m mu n it y  in 1985. Although mutual 
recognition can be considered as necessary in order to facilitate the decision making 
process, it is m u c h  easier to impose negative obligations on M e m b e r  States than to get 
them to define collectively the standards a given product must meet in order to circulate 
freely within the European Union.
T o  summarize the current European Union philosophy, negative integration 
demands deregulation and liberalization, and positive integration should be kept at an 
efficient m i n i m u m  (Herting, 1991, p. 332).
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3.3.1 Law and the Dynamics of Integration
It is generally accepted that integration is a long and gradual process, leading to 
an increase in the exchanges between the various societies concerned and to a more 
centralized form of government. However, this evolving character renders any 
assessment of the role of legal elements within this process more difficult. B y  its nature, 
law tends to provide a fixed and relative rigid image of the situations it takes into 
consideration. Thus, with the passage of time the legal system must often change to 
adapt to the emergence of n e w  conditions.
It is probably for that reason that in m a n y  theories of integration, legal elements 
are regarded more or less explicitly as dependent variables which reflect the changes 
under w a y  at the economic or political level (Dehousse et al, 1990, p. 246). T he  original 
impetus is often seen to originate in factors like technical progress, international trade, 
or changing political conditions. There is little doubt that this analysis is essentially 
correct. However, legal factors can also play an important role in the integration 
process. The legal system is sometimes animated by a dynamic of its own, and one 
could argue that, even if law is not the main catalyst of change in the integration 
process, m a n y  changes are greatly conditioned by legal and institutional elements. A  
legal dynamic can exist w h e n  autonomous organs are entrusted with judiciary 
competence. Although courts are generally regarded as mere interpreters of the law, they 
sometime take on a truly creative role. T he emphasis on free m o v e m e n t  in the Treaty of 
R o m e  and the generous w a y  in which relevant provisions of the Treaty have been read 
by the European Court of Justice have to a large extent limited the M e m b e r  States' 
capacity to regulate their o w n  economies - not because of a congenital objection to any 
kind of government intervention, but rather because it w a s  felt that such intervention 
should not hamper free m o v e m e n t  or distort competition (Dehousse et al, 1992, pp 393-
4). For m a n y  years the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been the most active and
creative C o m m u n i t y  organ and the impact of the ECJ's case law often reaches well
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beyond the legal sphere. Scheingold argues that the weaknesses of the Community's 
political structure have impinged directly and unmistakably on the Court of Justice. 
There has been an obvious tendency, Scheingold notes, to thrust upon the Court difficult 
jobs that the other institutions have failed to deal with in a satisfactory manner 
(Scheingold, 1965, pp 272-3). Mos t  of the 1992 programme rests on the principle of 
mutual recognition first developed by the Court in its landmark Cassis de Dijon ruling. 
That w a s  the basis for the White Paper's ’’new approach” which altered the integration 
process from ex-ante harmonization to a more market oriented approach. It is, of course, 
impossible to say what would have happened if the Court had opted for another 
decision. It seems clear, however that the European Commission would have faced 
m a n y  more obstacles in elaborating its internal market strategy.
Legal and institutional factors largely condition the evolution of the integration 
process. O n e  of the reasons w h y  this is not always clearly perceived is that the influence 
of these factors is often indirect. It is generally accepted that the institutional framework 
can directly affect the substance of the policies pursued by the various actors - or indeed 
be responsible for the fact that no policy whatsoever can be adopted. Lastly, any overall 
assessment of the role of law in the integration process must take into account the 
inherent conservatism of any legal system. All policies have to be adjusted in response 
to economic and social changes, and the mere fact that they are enshrined in a legal 
framework can render this adaptation more difficult. This tends to be. true in all legal 
systems, but there is in a transnational context an increased risk of legal obsolescence 
due to the largely consensual nature of the decision-making process. The adaptation of 
harmonization directives to technical progress, for instance, can prove extremely 
difficult, even if the political value of the problem is often minimal. In other words, 
there is a real danger that obsolete norms will remain in force for lack of an agreement 
either on their reform or their replacement. Such a deadlock an eventually lead to strong 
disintegrating pressures, and encourage violations of legal rules.
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3.3.2 Classifying Legal Parameters
Having reviewed s o m e  ways of thinking about multi-facet relationships between 
the legal sphere and economic factors, it is necessary to turn to the parameters which 
can be used to assess the magnitude of the opening up of public procurement within the 
legal sphere. Then it will be possible to attempt to sketch an overall picture of the entire 
process as it appears from the combined use of those various factors.
The first fact to be said here is that any attempt at a review of legal patterns of 
integration should encompass the relationships between all actors interested by this 
phenomenon: public actors, of course, but also private ones. A n  opening up of public 
procurement should, for instance, result in an increase in legal relationships at the 
European level a m o n g  firms or between firms and other actors like public purchasers.
Moreover, private actors can play a semi-normative role in drafting integration 
instruments like standard contracts, standard or arbitration clauses, or in setting 
technical standards. Transnational bodies like the International C h a m b e r  of Commerce, 
the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, G A T T  and O E C D  play an 
active role at this level. O n e  of the cornerstones of the European Commission's strategy 
for completing the internal market lies precisely in the free circulation within the n o w  
termed European Union of goods conforming with the technical standards defined by 
private harmonization bodies. Several types of legal variable can be of help in assessing 
both the depth and the magnitude of the integration process. M ost of these concepts 
have been described at length in the literature dealing with legal aspects of European 
integration. The first set of variables covers the relationships between the various 
organizations which have been created on the European scene and their M e m b e r  States, 
and deals with decision-making processes, the type of competences allocated to those 
various organizations, and the binding effect of the decision taken in those fora. The
most important of those variables, and by far the most widely used, relates to decision-
59
making.
T he extent to which legal decisions of European institutions have binding effect 
can also vary considerably. T h e  Treaties establishing the European Communities 
envisaged from the beginning the possibility that European C o m m u n i t y  institutions 
would adopt measures directly binding on those to w h o m  they were addressed, thus 
disregarding the rules governing the relationship between international law and 
municipal law in the legal orders of the M e m b e r  States.
T he  legal structures governing public procurement and remedies against illegal 
practices vary considerably across the European Union. S o m e  countries such as France 
and Italy have detailed administrative law and administrative courts. Britain and 
D e n m a r k  have no administrative courts and redress must be sought mainly by 
application to a high court for judicial review. In G e r m a n y  the Basic Law requires 
public purchasing to be governed by private law and thus precludes any intervention by 
a public body to enforce compliance. M a n y  countries provide for damages and in Spain, 
Greece and D e n m a r k  powers exist to suspend contract award procedures. The original 
European C o m m u n i t y  directives on supplies and works in the 1970s helped little 
because they were not accompanied by efforts to align national remedies, depending 
instead on national administrative guidelines, which provided no legal rights for 
individual companies. The remedy for non-compliance w as  recourse to E C J  via Article 
169 (EEC) for general non-compliance with the Treaty, a long-winded procedure and 
too distant from the aggrieved supplier to have m u c h  effect (Woolcock, 1991, p. 73). 
Nevertheless, the French construction com pa n y  Bouygaes created a stir in 1989 w h e n  it 
successfully complained that D e n m a r k  has infringed the rules on public works in 
awarding the contract for its Great Belt Bridge. This had specified the use of local 
materials and labour. The contract w a s  not suspended but Bouygues w o n  the right to 
seek damages and recover its bidding costs. The publicity surrounding such cases will
encourage others. Ultimately, firms will c o m e  to realize that the prospect of winning
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business in other European Union countries is not as unreal as they thought. This 
change in mentality will eventually open up markets, but it is impossible to legislate for 
and will take long time to materialize. A s  far as law-making is concerned, the range of 
integration techniques is even broader. T he  1992 programme, which is regarded as the 
basis of the current relaunching of integration within the European Union, is 
nonetheless characterized by a lesser emphasis on harmonization than in the past, and by 
a more intensive use of mutual recognition, which is, as mentioned earlier on, a far less 
'integrated' technique.
3.3.3 Differences in Implementation
Actual integration depends not only on the number of provisions adopted, but 
also on their implementation. The implementation and the enforcement of European 
C o m m u n i t y  law are carried out partly by the European Commission, the European Court 
of Justice and the Court of First Instance. However, it is done primarily by the M e m b e r  
States through national administrations and national legal systems. The situation of the 
European Union - stronger than a mere international organization, weaker than a state - 
is m a d e  evident by looking once again at the problem of compliance with European 
Union law. Although by international organizational standards compliance has been 
good, commentators agree that the European Union suffers a significant degree of non- 
compliance, especially with procurement legislation (Financial Times, 23 N o v e m b e r  
1994). Snyder (1993) sites an empirical study that distinguishes different types of non- 
compliance and indicates that they include lack of implementation (incorporation or 
transposition), lack of application, lack of enforcement, pre- and post-litigation non- 
compliance, legislative, executive and judicial non-compliance, defiance, evasion and 
benign non- compliance (Snyder, 1993, pp 22-3). It is, however, difficult to evaluate the 
extent of non-compliance satisfactorily because there is a shortage of information. 
Although since 1983 the European Commission has published an annual report on the
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implementation of European Union law, it tends to focus on formal non-compliance 
cases, and does not provide an overall assessment of the M e m b e r  States' diligence in 
putting European Union provisions into practice.
However, the European Commission's Progress Reports on the completion of the 
internal market provide useful data in the following areas of public procurement:
- incorporation of directives into national law,
- monitoring of implementation in practice by the various public bodies
concerned in the M e m b e r  States,
- infringement management.
T he Tenth Annual Report by the European Commission, for example, confirmed 
the existence of wide disparities, and indicates that countries like Spain, Greece and 
G er ma n y  find it difficult to keep in step with the rest of the European C o m mu n it y  
(Table 3.3.3.1). Thus as far as implementation is concerned, a 'two-speed' Europe 
appears to be already part of the problem. Although M e m b e r  States m a y  deliberately fail 
to comply with European Union procurement law, more pervasive is faulty compliance, 
as a result of a collapse of enforcement in a manner that distorts or conflicts with norms. 
Faulty compliance can generally be corrected through diligent detective w or k  by the 
European Commission and action, w h e n  necessary, by the European Court of Justice; 
but 'deliberate non-compliance, however camouflaged or rationalized, is more difficult 
to correct' (Keohane etal, 1990, p. 279).
Finally, the Directives have been criticised by the industry to be extremely 
difficult to understand. Another observer has also complained that they are 'classic 
European C om mu n it y  productions and they bear all the hallmarks of ill digested 
reviews, committee drafting, compromises and legalize, which create an arcane world 
that rejects easy comprehension' (Hanks, 1993, p. 4-5). Thus, effective implementation 
can be achieved solely through a fundamental change in the behaviour of both public 
buyers and tendering firms.
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Table: 3.3 .3.1
Progress in Implementing Directives Applicable to 
the Opening of Public Procurement
Directives
applicable
Directives 
for which 
measures 
have been 
notified
%
Belgium 8 6 75
Denmark 8 8 100
Germany 8 5 63
Greece 7 3 43
Spain 7 4 57
France 8 7 88
Ireland 8 7 88
Italy 8 6 75
Luxembourg 8 5 63
Netherlands 8 6 75
Portugal 7 5 71
United Kingdom 8 8 100
Average progress 75% 
Source: Tenth Annual Report (1992), C0M(93) 321 Final.
3.4 Conclusions on the Effect of Public Procurement Legislation 
in the Single Market
T he 1985 White Paper and the research findings on the "Cost of non-Europe" 
resulted in the creation of a comprehensive array of legislation that n o w  covers almost 
every aspect of public purchasing over certain thresholds with the exception of defence 
procurement. In preparing the n e w  legislation, the European C o m m u n i t y  institutions 
were faced with the problem of overcoming the hostility of M e m b e r  States to certain 
aspects of the n e w  proposed legislation, and generally speaking, it would appear that 
they succeeded in doing so (Weiss, 1993, p. 160). T he n e w  W o r k s  and Supplies 
Directives tighten up the existing rules and seek to m a k e  tendering procedures and 
award of contracts more transparent. They also remove ambiguity as to the type of 
contracts covered and they serve as precedents for the utilities directive. Reference to 
standards are more precise and the Directives oblige purchasing bodies to refer to 
European standards. T he  Utilities Directive is considered as one of the most ambitious 
parts of the Single European Market. T he  European Commission argues that such
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sectors such as telecommunications, energy and transport are important and a European 
market will enable them to strengthen their competitiveness on a world-wide scale.
The lack of effective compliance w a s  seen as a reason for the failure of the 
earlier Directives. The Compliance Directives provide remedies on the national level 
and they are expected to provide an incentive for aggrieved suppliers to initiate court 
cases and eventually to open markets by these actions.
Public procurement legislation has been an important part of the European legal 
integration process and takes the form of a replacement of national procurement rules by 
European ones. Such integration is a long and gradual process and reflects the changes 
under w a y  at the economic or political level. Although law is not the main catalyst of 
change in the integration process it has a dynamism of its o w n  and m a n y  changes are 
conditioned by legal elements. T he  original European C o m m u n i t y  directives on supplies 
and works in 1970s helped little because they were not accompanied by efforts to align 
national remedies, depending instead on national administrative guidelines which 
provided no legal right for individual companies. There is a need for an overall 
assessment of M e m b e r  State diligence in putting procurement provisions into practice. 
Although there are m a n y  shortcomings and inadequacies in the Directives, there is n o w  
a growing awareness by public purchasers that they no longer can expect to get away 
with ignoring European Union rules on non-discrimination with the same degree of 
impunity as in the 1970s and the 1980s.
Experience with earlier procurement legislation indicates that although the 
procurement directives are necessary measures, they are not sufficient instruments for 
opening up public procurement. There are two other important non-tariff barriers which 
m a y  restrict such an opening: restrictive practices by firms and the existence of national 
standards. The next chapter is devoted to a discussion of such obstacles, which m a y  well 
mitigate the successful achievement of what is intended by the procurement directives.
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4.0 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IN  
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
T he literature review and analysis in the previous chapters illustrated s ome 
aspects of the European Union's efforts to open up public procurement in the internal 
European market. A  procurement legislation programme that covers almost all business 
activities is in place and together with efforts to harmonize technical standards and to 
impose a European competition policy is expected to bring the benefits that the Cecchini 
Report identified.
4.1 Public Procurement and Non-tariff Barriers: What are they?
The first question that this research project will address is whether an opening up 
of public procurement will be realised by the Single European Market programme. In 
this respect, various assumptions are possible as to the degree of opening up of public 
procurement. The assumptions, although theoretical, m a y  constitute the limits of the 
expected effects. These assumptions are:
Aj assumes that the introduction of n e w  public procurement legislation in the 
Single European Market, even if all other barriers are removed, will not open up public 
procurement. Under this extreme assumption, suppliers often deliberately m a y  not 
respond to invitation to tender from an other M e m b e r  States.
A2 is an assumption under which opening of public procurement will be achieved 
anyway, regardless of public procurement legislation, even if there is no removal of the 
other barriers to trade, because- technology changes are forcing firms to adopt Europe- 
wide, and indeed world-wide, production and strategies.
A3 is a conservative assumption under which opening of public procurement will 
be achieved not because of the existing legislation but because all trade barriers being 
removed. These barriers are: (a) Monopolistic and collusive practices by firms aiming to 
restrain competition, and (b) Differences in technical standards, regulations and
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certification procedures which m a y  directly or indirectly discriminate against foreign 
goods sold within a M e m b e r  State.
H o l me s  suggests four broad categories of non-tariff barriers although he notes 
that such barriers are difficult to define (Holmes, 1991, pp 27-8). These are:
(a) Administrative or financial costs imposed on goods crossing borders.
(b) Differences in technical standards, regulations and certification 
procedures.
(c) Nationalistic industrial policy measures, notably nationalistic 
purchasing and subsidies.
(d) Monopolistic and cartellistic practices by private firms.
C o x  distinguishes between two types of obstacles to an efficient public 
procurement system: private and public sector obstacles. Since the mid-1980s, C o x  
argues, Europe has been experiencing a profound concentration of market sectors and 
the problem is that concentrated and oligopoly markets m a y  create price fixers rather
rthan price takers (Cox 1992, pp 143-153). A  further problem, C o x  adds, is that market 
rationalisation m a y  also reinforce existing logistical inertia in the market rather than 
eradicate it. It w as  assumed by the European Community, C o x  continues, that firms 
would buy up their competitors in other European C o m m u n i t y  countries, rationalise 
their operations and structure and thereby reduce costs and prices. Unfortunately, while 
this type of multinationalisation or Europeanisation of production is taking place, C o x  
adds, there m a y  be cases where it does not operate as intended. There m a y  be changes in 
ownership of domestic firms but without any consequent improvement in productivity or 
rationalisation to generate cost and price savings (Cox, 1992, p. 145). M ay es  makes a 
similar point in a study of the railway industry and concludes that despite the major 
changes in the pattern of ownership of the railway equipment industry, there has as yet 
been rather less change in the location of production or rationalisation of its structure 
(Mayes, 1991, p. 131). C o x  identifies a third difficulty for cases where there is already
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significant vertical integration in the market and cites the case of ENI in the energy 
sector. ENI, which is 9th in Europe's top 1000 companies by turnover (The Times 1000, 
1992-93), is both a public sector purchaser in Italy as well as a significant supplier, and 
can indulge in "transfer pricing" within the group of companies if it wishes. The 
capacity of the European Union to police or even control such anti-competitive and 
collusive practices is seriously in doubt w h e n  this takes place (Cox, 1992, p. 146). C o x  
also indicates that there are at least eight major public sector obstacles: the problems of 
liberalising public monopolies; the eradication of the national champions and defence 
industries; the role of purchasers in specifying technical standards; the structure of 
purchasing systems; reciprocity and protectionism contract conditions and preference 
schemes; regional policy; and finally and most importantly, C o x  adds, the problems of 
creating an effective enforcement system to remedy national abuses of the system (Cox, 
1992, pp 149-150).
T he  assumption A t illustrates that changing public procurement legislation, even 
if all other barriers are removed, will not induce totally free trade for the following 
reasons:
* Suppliers, particularly small firms, m a y  deliberately ignore international 
calls for tenders and instead prefer to supply only local, regional or 
national markets.
* Suppliers taking account the cost of tendering in a M e m b e r  State where 
there are language problems m a y  consider that the probability of success 
is not worthwhile the effort.
* Suppliers in s om e  M e m b e r  States are unfamiliar with open tendering 
procedures and are very reluctant to bid.
* Purchasers m a y  consider other good reasons than price for purchasing 
locally such as after sales service, m i n i m u m  stock holding, loyalty to local 
suppliers.
6 8
There is very little evidence to support assumption A t that no opening up of 
public procurement will take place. Although this assumption could be valid for small 
firms, the fact that not all European firms are small and indeed s ome successful 
tendering by non-national firms is already taking place, indicates that assumption A, 
should be rejected. The question arises w h y  are som e  firms unwilling or reluctant to sell 
to governments generally. A  survey in the U S  found that the five most-cited problems 
were slow payments, narrow bid specifications, difficulty in making contact with end- 
users, excessive paperwork, and competition from other firms (MacManus, 1991, pp 
330-343). A  similar survey in the United K i n g d o m  commissioned by the Department of 
Employment for studying small and m e d i u m  enterprises' ( SM Es )  perceptions of 
supplying to central government departments, found similar problems: low profit 
margins; understanding buyer requirements; tendering deadlines; and tightness of 
product specifications and other contract terms (Purchasing and Supply Management, 
M a y  1992, pp 8-9). Harvey, working for the European Commission on advising S M E s  
on the Procurement Directives has spoken to approximately 1,000 companies, he 
identifies three types of firms behaviour: "Unaware companies" with lack of knowledge 
about public sector market and the opportunities it provides; "confused companies" that 
despite being aware of the Directives, find them nonetheless to be bureaucratic, 
legalistic, complicated and confusing to the extent that they are an active deterrent to 
b ec om e  more involved in the public sector market;"concerned companies" that find 
procurement Directives too bureaucratic, inconsistent and costly to comply with, 
favouring larger companies, operating in opposition to partnership sourcing and subject 
to late payment (Harvey, 1993, pp 1-6).
The assumption A 2 assumes that changes in technology, are forcing international
procurement and are leading to pan-European groupings of manufacturers. Support for
this assumption was given in the Atkins case study of electric locomotives (section
2.3.5.). Public procurement w a s  responding to technology changes, the Atkins Study
indicated, and opening up public procurement per se would have little effect on the
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competitive environment. Although the above assumption could be valid for that 
particular sector (or a few other sectors), evidence in the majority of other case studies, 
such as boiler manufacturing, telecommunication equipment and power plants, indicates 
the existence of technical barriers which the European C o m m u n i t y  at present tries to 
eliminate.
Previous studies on public procurement and on other barriers in the European 
market and empirical evidence support the assumption A 3. The ever-increasing 
integration of the European market place through cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 
the adoption of a European competition policy and the mutual recognition of technical 
standards are considered important factors in the opening up of public procurement. The 
potential savings of E C U  8-19 billion, calculated in section 2.3.4, in the 'Cost o f non- 
Europe', are the potential result of a complete internal market, across all goods and 
services purchases by the public sector. Merely opening up public purchasing 
procedures, the Research on the 'Cost o f non-Europe' says, will not in itself allow these 
savings to be achieved ('Cost of non-Europe', 1988, Vol. 5, Part B, p. 188). It also 
concludes that the price differences of a given product from one country to another are a 
particularly useful indicator in most cases that other barriers to trade exist. These other
barriers could be:
- cartels
- market share agreements
- exclusive dealerships
- trade formalities (e.g. on cars and high technology goods)
- national standards
- product approval procedures
T he  above non-tariff barriers essentially consist of the two broad categories of 
barriers mentioned earlier on, namely: restraint of competition (monopolistic and 
collusive practices), and national standards (differences in technical standards, 
regulations and certification procedures). Geroski in analysing the entry barriers in the 
G e r m a n  Beer Brewing Industry (Commission of the European Communities, 1989, p.
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72) reaches the same conclusion. Geroski argues that the removal of an entry barrier 
does not guarantee an increase in the intensity of competition if other equally effective 
barriers exist. This point cannot be over-emphasized, Geroski continues, since any 
policy toward harmonization of the European Single Market can only be successful if all 
trade barriers can be detected and removed.
4.2 Competitive Challenges in Public Procurement
The outcome of the Single Market should be the changes it should bring about in 
competition in public procurement. T h e  European Commission has attached great 
importance to the competition policy in connection with the Single Market programme. 
Starting with the Padoa-Schioppa Report of 1987, and continuing with the Cecchini 
Report published in the following year, the Commission has developed the argument 
that Europe will reap the full benefits of the Single Market only if the opening of 
internal trade barriers is accompanied by the full and free play of competition.
In the public procurement sector, anti-competitive practices by purchasers and
suppliers at the expense of final consumer are not unusual (Holmes, 1989, p. 531).
Apparently, there is not a clear distinction between collusive behaviour and government
action and in som e  M e m b e r  States an anti-trust law did not exist (Italy, for example,
adopted anti-trust legislation only in 1990). A s  the Cecchini Report indicated, either a
restricted list of bidders or 'negotiation' were used for 8 6 %  of public procurement
products. Regulations play s om e  part, but in most cases practice exists independently of
rules (Holmes, 1989, p. 531). For example, for most standardised products, there is a
highly competitive market and public-sector buyers, actually appeared to pay less than
private-sector buyers. For large non-standardized products, however, where the public
sector is the only or major buyer a situation of monopsony or at the most oligopsony (as
with telecommunications, aerospace and power-generating equipment) there is a
relationship between buyers and sellers at the expense of the final consumer. The
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existence of economies of scale in the manufacture of these products has led to entry 
barriers and the creation of oligopolistic structures (Bulletin of the EC, Supplement, 
1991, p. 16). It is possible then to view these sectors in terms of a bilateral oligopoly. In 
the classical theory of the firm oligopolistic behaviour acts as a brake on market- 
opening (Lipsey, 1980, p. 285). In the previously excluded sectors, the cost of research 
and development is typically high, and patterns of d e m an d  are cyclical or irregular. A s  a 
result, suppliers are wary about market-opening that threatens the oligopolistic structure 
of the markets. Even w h e n  they accept change they prefer an orderly transition from 
national oligopolies to oligopolistic market structures, whether on a European or an 
international scale. For s ome products such as power-plant and telecommunication 
equipment, government is the major or only buyer, so that it has power to choose a 
product, select a contractor and negotiate a contract. Its purchasing decisions can 
determine the size and structure of an industry. Public purchasers usually tend to favour 
domestic suppliers and usually within this particular group of suppliers the so called 
"national champion" stands out and receives the majority share of orders.
Such nationalistic purchasing w a s  one of the key factors which initiated the
Community's Single Market P r o gr a mm e  and the legislative action to ensure that public
procurement markets are fully opened up to Community-wide competition. The
response by firms to the developing Single Market comes from the use of cross-border
mergers, acquisitions or other forms of linkage with other firms in their strategies. Such
cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose from 2,190 in 1987 to 4,553 in 1992 (The
Economist, The European Union, Survey, 22 October 1994); they are one of the means
by which the national markets are being integrated into the Single European Market.
British companies were the biggest acquirers abroad during 1990 followed by the
French companies (Financial Times, 18 N o v e m b e r  1991). It is believed that the pressure
for mergers and acquisitions w a s  essentially market-led, with companies coming to
terms with the ever-increasing integration of the European market place, culminating in
the Single Market of 1993 (although in practice a single market has already been
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achieved in m a n y  manufacturing sectors) (Financial Times, 18 N o v e m b e r  1991). It is 
difficult to fully support the above statement as it is not possible to sort out which of the 
steps that firms are taking are really a consequence of measures contained in the Single 
Market programme and which would have been taken in any case. The Single Market is 
such an important development that it is often used as a reference point; it is cited as the 
cause w h e n  it is a cause (Mayes, 1991, p. 19). Nevertheless, the Single Market provides 
two short-run influences on merger and acquisition activity. O n  the one hand it makes 
linkages between companies more desirable, but on the other it is actually helping to 
m a k e  the formation of such alliances easier (Mayes, 1991, p. 16). 'As geographic 
markets are becoming larger the danger that oligopolies in national markets m a y  turn 
into oligopolies rather than monopolies at a Community-wide level is a more obvious 
danger in relation to mergers' (Horspool and Korah, 1992, p. 363). This merger activity 
prompted policy-makers to adopt a merger-control regulation.
T he  agreement on a European Merger Control Regulation (M CR) of the 21th 
September 1990 is a step towards creating a coherent merger policy for the Single 
Market. Under this the European Commission finally achieved powers that it has been 
seeking for sixteen years. N o w  it has the exclusive right to vet the largest mergers and 
concentrative joint ventures between firms whose aggregate turnover exceeds 5 billion 
ECUs. The strategic approach to the procurement debate adopted by companies so far 
has generally been to organize themselves to establish a position inside national foreign 
markets. Thus, for example, as already mentioned, United Kingdom's GEC has 
developed a heavy engineering link with GEC-Alsthom, and the Swiss-Swedish ABB 
(Asea Brown Boveri) concern has acquired BREL, the former British Rail Engineering 
Ltd. This suggests, that for the time being, continue to be organized along national lines. 
But there are som e  signs of change. For example, Siemens and ABB have both w o n  
contracts in the United K i n g d o m  power sector.
7 3
4.2.1 The Implications of Intensification of Competition; The 
Emergence of Euro-Champions?
Montagnon argues that the implications of the restructuring of the European 
industry in general, is that it will produce an intensification of competition which, m a n y  
expect, will eventually see fewer and stronger firms in each sector producing more 
goods, more cheaply and for a larger market (Montagnon, 1990, p. 5). Although other 
outcomes are also possible, M ontagnon argues that such a process could ultimately 
produce a situation in which there is less competition as weaker firms are taken up by 
their strong rivals. There m a y  not be m u c h  difference between having one European 
manufacturer of railway locomotives with a monopoly hold on the entire European 
C o m m u n i t y  market and several separate companies, each with a monopoly in its o w n  
national market (Montagnon, 1990, p. 5). It is very difficult Montagnon adds, to tell in 
advance at what point the rationalization road to the benefits stops and the danger zone 
to competition is reached. A s  has been seen in the opening up of public procurement in 
the excluded sectors, the current philosophy on mutual recognition of standards is linked 
with liberalization and deregulation. It is possible that the present programme of 
deregulation, in particular concerning public tenders, especially in previously 
inaccessible areas, such as energy, transport and telecommunication, has been seen as an 
opportunity for firms to compete on markets in other M e m b e r  States. . *It is therefore 
clear that there is a considerable enthusiasm for the concept of open markets but 
systematic reservations by business where their own, sometimes transnational, interests 
are at stake' (Holmes, 1991, pp 46-7). Ehlermann, (1992, p. 259) argues that through the 
increase in cross-frontier activities, business and industry have given additional impetus 
to integration and have injected unprecedented dynamism into the competition process. 
A s  a result, Ehlermann concludes, the conditions for maintaining and developing 
effective competition within the C o m m u n i t y  on a broad basis have improved. M c G o w a n  
and T h o m a s  (1989, p. 552) argue that the Commission's proposals on liberalizing public 
procurement have influenced the restructuring of the heavy electrical industry in the last 
two years. The pressure for reorganization (from surplus capacity primarily, but latterly
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from the decreasing willingness of utilities to sustain old relationships) has been 
building up for more than a decade, with the emphasis on cross-border arrangements. 
T h e  alliances themselves have been geared towards the exploitation of 
complementarities in technology. T he  rush of mergers, they add, m a y  also have been 
akin to a domino effect: once the first m o v e  w a s  taken by companies seeking to 
cooperate, other firms were obliged to react, generally in similar directions.
The assumption is that it is likely that there are very few industries like the heavy 
electrical industry where mergers can be regarded as vital to permit the realization of 
economies of scale. A  Commission Report (European Economy, 1989, p. 21), however, 
did single out a number of sectors as having potential gains from more concentration. It 
divides sectors into those where this could be achieved without any serious loss of 
competition and those where that w a s  inevitable.
* Chemical/pharmaceuticals, computers/office automation, 
telecommunications, electronics, aerospace and motor vehicles.
In these sectors d e m a n d  is growing and there is thought to be enough external 
competition. The latter includes the traditional public procurement sectors.
* Boiler-making, cable/heavy electrical plant, railway equipment, 
shipbuilding, and s om e  food processing and beer.
H olmes (1989, p. 534) suggests that the above analysis is too sympathetic to the
mergers in the former category and a real dilemma poses itself in the latter industries.
Clearly mergers are inappropriate if they are aimed at forming anti-competitive business
concentrations. T he problem is to distinguish between rationalization and harmful
concentration. This can be done, as Cecchini argues (1988, p. 18) if the internal market
programme is accompanied by a vigorous European-wide pro-competition policy to
enforce competition and inhibit cross-border mergers w ho se  aim is to forestall
transnational competition. Experience in recent years shows that the European Union
institutions and M e m b e r  States have recognized the growing importance of competition
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policy.
Ehlermann (1992, p. 258) gives three examples of such growing importance. 
Firstly, the importance which the European C om mu n it y  attaches to competition policy 
m a y  be illustrated by its extension to include areas to which they did not previously 
apply (such as air and sea transport) and its adoption of the Merger Control Regulation. 
Secondly, that M e m b e r  States individually are attaching greater importance to 
competition policy m a y  been seen from the m ov es  which have already been successfully 
completed (in s om e  cases after decades of efforts) such as the setting up of an 
independent cartel office in Italy and Ireland and the reform of the Belgian L a w  on 
competition. Thirdly, Ehlermann, indicates the attention with which European 
C o m m u n i t y  competition policy is being followed by the public at large. Never before 
have the decisions taken by the European Commission and the opinions of the 
Commissioner with special responsibility for competition at that time, Sir Leon Brittan, 
been so widely reported in the national and international media.
T he recent approval by the European Commission of Nestle's bid for Perrier has
implications for competition laws. For the first time the European Commission has
explicitly m a d e  clear its intention to challenge mergers on the grounds that they would
create not just a simple monopoly or dominant position but an oligopoly, in which
several producers jointly dominate a market. It is clear from the growing debate, both
within and outside the European Commission, that 'EC merger policy is advancing into
unchartered territory, where the guidelines m a y  be defined largely by the success of the
Commission's efforts to test the limits of its power' (Financial Times, 23 July 1992).
M a n y  experts believe that these uncertainties increase the need for an objective review
of European Commission merger policy, to m a k e  it more transparent, predictable and
accountable (Financial Times, 23 July 1992; interviews with Mr. Frooms-Brown and
Mr. White, July 1994, see Appendix C). U nder the European C o m m u n i t y  system, that
responsibility lies with the European Court of Justice. It is understood that a restrictive
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interpretation of the 1990 merger rules would leave the European C o m mu n it y  market 
prey to such large-scale duopolies and oligopolies as neither the European Commission 
nor Member-States would have the power to restrict European Community-scale 
mergers which create or strengthened such situations (Financial Times, 23 July 1992). 
The question arises whether there is a need for the European Commission's merger 
authorities to examine potential duopolies and oligopolies in the public procurement 
sectors. The answer is yes given the continuous change in m a n y  sectors mainly of that of 
the traditional procurement industries. T he  n e w  structure seems to be characterized by 
the building up of ’networks’ of firms such as GEC-Alsthom, ABB and Siemens. They 
aim at reducing over-capacity, thus reaching traditional economies of scale; being 
present in every market, but particularly in the most dynamic and innovative business 
and keeping on a relative flexible organization through a plethora use of joint ventures 
with each other and with American and Japanese firms and the utilization of links with 
independent, specialized suppliers. Therefore, a n e w  more concentrated oligopoly is 
characterizing the procurement supply sector industries due to the changing structure of 
the d e m an d  side and to technological evolution. This n e w  structure of the supply side is 
likely to maintain the collusive features of m a n y  industries, so reducing the gains from 
the Single Market. It will be interesting to see what impact the n e w  procurement rules 
will m a k e  on deep-rooted national administrative habits of procurement from "national 
champions", particularly in times of economic stress in national economies (Weiss, 
1992, p. 335).
There is a lack of information regarding the structure of European manufacturing 
and services industries involved in public procurement. Although s o m e  w or k  covering a 
few sectors has been published by H. W .  de Jong (1988), in ”The Structure o f European 
Industry", and more recently by David M a y e s  (1991), in the "European Challenge: 
Industry's Response to the 1992", there is a need to scrutinize in more detail the various 
internal and external strategies developed by firms to deal with the opening up of public 
procurement.
7 7
This section has sought to place the evolution of opening up public procurement 
in the context of the development in the European competition policy. It is likely that 
competition is the most important independent variable in this process as it can 
determine h o w  an open market in public procurement develops. It has also stressed the 
difficulties associated with rationalization and moves within industry sectors towards 
cross-border mergers and company alliances. The problem with mergers and 
acquisitions is that they facilitate the growth of oligopolies in sectors of high value 
added, high technology and high cost goods and services - such as military equipment, 
telecommunications, railways and power plant equipment -which will offer the 
opportunities for substantial savings. Firms' size, technology and oligopoly m a y  be 
barriers to market entry where supplier collusion is most likely. Since high technology is 
so complex, s ome sectors have been historically closed to foreign competition for public 
procurement by the w a y  in which public purchasers act in the specification of technical 
standards. This is dealt with in the next section.
78
4.3 Technical Trade Barriers in the EU
T h e  establishment of c o m m o n  technical standards across the European 
C om m u n i t y  is one of the fundamental components of the Single European Market. 
Differences between national standards have divided the European Com mu n it y  market 
and have constituted important barriers to cross-border trade. The European 
Commission finds national standards most problematic:
... barriers created by different national product regulations and 
standards ave a double-edged effect: they not only add extra costs, but 
they also distort production patterns; increase unit costs; increase stock 
holding costs; discourage business cooperation, and fundamentally 
frustrate the creation ofa  common market fo r industrial products.
(White Paper, 1985, point 60).
Standards play a major role in the opening up of public procurement and the 
absence of agreed standards, whether European or international means that the speed 
with which public procurement actually opens will depend to a large extent on progress 
in this field. In the 'new' Directives, the rules on technical standards have been bought 
into line with the n e w  policy on standards. This n e w  policy is based on a double 
strategy:
(a) the principle of mutual recognition of national requirements where the 
objectives of national legislations are essentially equivalent;
(b) the process of legislative harmonization is confined to laying d o w n  essential 
requirements, and the elaboration of technical specifications in the form of European 
standards is entrusted to non-governmental standardization organizations which act by 
qualified majority voting (e.g. C E N  and C E N E L E C )  (O.J., C  136, 7 M a y  1985).
The existence of national technical standards that differ between M e m b e r  States 
protects domestic producers against international competition. T he  reason is that foreign 
producers or suppliers, supplying other markets where the standards are less far-
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reaching in their requirements, have to m a k e  a choice between giving up the market in 
the specific country or making changes in the products exported to the market with 
higher requirements. In both cases, it is obvious that domestic producers in that market 
will be protected and the existence of national technical standards will be of the same 
type as the effects arising out of a tariff regime (Hansson, 1990, p. 76). Thus, a free 
market cannot be created if M e m b e r  States can effectively use national standards to bar 
importation of foreign goods. Also, a situation which compels producers to adapt their 
products to a number of different sets of national norms and standards divides the 
market and thus costs welfare.
O n e  of the studies commissioned by the European Commission for the "Cost of 
non-Europe", examined the cost associated with the technical barriers to internal trade 
('Cost o f non-Europe', 1988, Vol 6, Technical Barriers in the EC). W h e n  an European 
C o m m u n i t y  producer, the study states, must alter his product to comply with industrial 
standards or legal requirements for commercialization in another European C om mu n it y  
country, and/or, if a producer must have his product tested and certified by the importing 
country he faces a technical trade barrier. There are three types of technical trade 
barriers:
Differences between countries in industry standards, w h e n  imposed as a 
condition of entry, sale or use, create the first type of technical trade barrier. Here 
standards refer to voluntary specifications regarding product form, functioning, quality, 
compatibility and/or interchangeability. Standards are not legally binding and are 
defined by private individuals and organizations (i.e., standardization bodies such as 
BSI in Britain, D I N  in G e r m a n y  and A F N O R  in France) in their o w n  interest.
Differences in legal regulations, where regulations are specifications similar to 
standards but differ in that they are legally binding often with the purpose of serving the
public interest, in particular the objectives of health, safety, and environmental
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protection. The legal basis and the public interest of regulations distinguish them from 
standards, i.e., the pasta purity law in France, Italy and Greece which specifies that 
'pasta' must be composed of dur um  wheat only. B y  contrast to standards, the w a y  in 
which a country's regulations prevent a good from being imported is unambiguous: they 
m a k e  importation illegal if the good does not comply with them.
Testing and Certification Procedures are designed to ensure conformity to 
existing regulations or standards. Technical trade barriers are created w h e n  an importing 
country requires an additional certification procedure to that required in the country of 
origin. Pharmaceutical certification procedures and the type approvals necessary for 
automobiles are examples of this technical trade barrier. T he  trade hampering effects 
include the cost, time and effort producers must expend to comply with these 
procedures.
Table 4.3.1 shows the incidence of technical trade barriers in six industries. T he  
purpose of the table is not to develop an exhaustive picture of the existence of technical 
trade barriers in each of the six industries, but to present a partial view as to the relative 
existence and incidence of barriers in each industry.
Table: 4.3.1
TYPES AND INCIDENCES OF TECHNICAL BARRIERS
Industry | standards | 
1 1
Regulations[ 
1
Authorization & 
Certification
Foodstuff o X X X o
Pharmaceuticals o o X X X
Automobiles o X X X X X
Building Material X X X X X X X X
Electrical Products
and Machinery
(high Volt) X X X X X X X X
Low volt o o o
Telecommunications X X X o X X X
Legend : xxx high incidence/impact on trade
xx intermediate incidence/impact on trade 
o low/non-existence
Source: European Community ("Cost of non-Europe", Vol. 6, 1988)
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In previous years, the European Commission has attempted to establish a single 
standard for individual products on a product-by-product basis. This led to the adoption, 
at the end of 1985, of a total of 270 directives - each full of technical detail with 
emphasis very m u c h  on the motor industry and on weights-and-measures. This proved to 
be a very slow and unpopular process as the average adoption time for the last product 
directives has been ten years and because technological advantages had already m a d e  
them obsolete. While progress w a s  slow, the national technical standards barriers 
remained and were often prohibitive to companies seeking to trade and therefore in need 
of reform (Cecchini, 1988, p. 28).
The European Commission's n e w  approach w a s  built on the Information 
Directive, adopted in 1983, and took its essential structure form the precedents set by 
both the Low Voltage Directive (LVD) and the Cassis de Dijon case, which provided the 
definition for essential safety requirements (Woolcock et al, 1991, p. 43). The aim of the 
information Directive w a s  to prevent the introduction of n e w  technical barriers, in the 
form of compulsory technical regulations adopted by M e m b e r  States and voluntary 
standards worked out by private standards institutions. The Directive requires M e m b e r  
States to notify and register draft technical regulations to the Commission and if it is in 
the Community's interest the Commission can propose a directive on the matter. In s ome 
cases the drafts notified were blocked by the introduction of C o m m u n i t y  directives or 
subsequently amended. After this Directive's entry in force, over a thousand drafts of 
technical regulations have been notified by the end of 1990 (Green Paper, 1990, point
5). The L V D  introduced the concept of the delegation of competencies to standard 
institutions. The three main standards institutions - D I N  (Germany), BSI (United 
Kingdom) and A F N O R  (France) have been the most active.
In 1985 the European Commission introduced the concept of "mutual 
recognition" to trade ministers. T he  concept of mutual recognition derives from the well 
k n o w n  "Cassis de D ijon" ruling which clarified application of Article 30 of the Treaty
of Rome. Mutual recognition implies that a good lawfully produced and commercialized
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in one country of the European C o m m u n i t y  should be able to be freely transported and 
sold in another m e m b e r  country, without being modified, tested, certified, or renamed. 
Mutual recognition, therefore, is the first tool the European Commission has at its 
disposal to ensure the free flow of goods. In those instances where two countries differ 
concerning h o w  to protect safety, health and the environment, the only solution to 
ensuring free trade is for the M e m b e r  States to agree to a harmonized set of regulations. 
Harmonization takes the form of directives which are legal, Community-wide 
proclamations that state the measures with which a product must comply to be 
commercialized in any country of the European Community. If a good is produced 
according to agreed measures no national legislation can prevent its commercialization 
in a given country. F r o m  the 1960, to the early 1980s the European Commission went 
about the process of developing "harmonization directives" in all areas where the 
principle of mutual recognition proved ineffectual. H o w ev e r  despite the efforts of the 
Commission, as mentioned earlier on, considerable disadvantages and shortcoming 
continued to exist (Pelkmans, 1987, pp 252-3).
M e m b e r  States recognize each other's rules for a given product provided those 
rules met safety criteria agreed between the European Commission and the national 
governments. If a government wanted to block the import of an item it would have to 
persuade a committee of all M e m b e r  States that it did not meet the "essential safety 
requirements”. T he European Commission introduced a novel distinction between 
regulations and standards. Regulations it argued, are to achieve ends, mainly safety, 
while standards are there for convenience. T he  European Commission's n e w  approach 
w as  formed during the drafting of the old-approach pressure vessels directive. For first 
time the distinction emerged between essential requirements and technical standards. 
Legislators are concerned with ends: that the pressure vessels shall not explode even 
under extreme conditions. They are not concerned themselves with h o w  these aims are 
met, because technology changes the ways of doing so continuously. The standard- 
setters m a y  then set about ways of doing the convenience of a standard pattern of
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pressure vessels that are interchangeable, connect with one another and conform to 
international standards. T he  n e w  approach has already caused a great impact in the 
creation of basic product law for the Single Market. The Dassonville and Cassis de 
Dijon cases and their extension to similar cases on food products, have been considered 
to be an efficient w a y  in removing barriers based on discrimination against products 
form other M e m b e r  States.
Article 30 (EEC), which prohibits quantitative restrictions or 'measures with 
equivalent effect' has been applied successfully regarding barriers relating to the 
composition of products, especially foodstuff and beverages. H o w e v e r  it has had less 
impact on barriers that result from different national provisions on health and safety, 
because, according to Article 36 (EEC), they represent permissible exceptions. Essential 
requirements have n o w  been set out for:
Pressure vessels,
Toys,
Construction material,
Electrical interference,
L o w  voltage machinery 
Machine safety 
Gas appliances
The European Commission has proposed a two-fold approach; s ome products 
would continue to acquire uniform European C o m mu n it y  legal standards, but in m a n y  
areas the Commission has proposed that individual national authorities could agree to a 
system of mutual recognition of one another's standards (O.J., C  20/6 28 January 1991, 
para. 2). Distinction w a s  drawn between 'what is essential to harmonize, and what m a y  
be left to a mutual recognition of national standards'. Conformity assessment is one of 
the most difficult issues in the n e w  approach.
Several European certification bodies have been established over the years: the 
European Committee fo r Standardization (CEN); the European Committee fo r  
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC); and the European Telecommunications
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Standards Institute (ETSI).
T he  great flow of directives, and the European Commission’s efforts to create 
Europe-wide procurement by governments, have created a relentless n e w  pressure for 
harmonized standards, which C E N  and C E N E L E C  are working hard to satisfy. C E N  
has established s ome 140 technical committees which operate by consensus so there has 
to be m u c h  give and take between countries as to whose standards should form the basis 
of the n e w  European ones. Their recommendations have then to be adopted by a vote 
within C E N  using qualified majority voting. If they agree upon a full European 
standard, this is adopted, identically, by all M e m b e r  States as their n e w  national 
standard.
T h e  desire to retain harmonized national standards rather than replace them with 
full Euro-standards, remains strong, however, and inconvenient for suppliers. The 
positive aspect of this process is that in the space of s om e  five years the standards- 
setting habits of European countries have b ecome largely Europeanized. One' might 
even say they have b ec om e  internationalized, because C E N  and C E N E L E C  are 
themselves heavily influenced by the International Standards Organization (ISO). In 
1991, the European C o m m u n i t y  held high-level discussions with ISO, I EC  and with the 
United States Government (25th General Report, 1992, point 146). It is also an 
encouraging development that C E N  has agreed upon the standards required of 
certificating laboratories, which will do m u c h  to dissuade countries from discriminating 
against the goods of others on grounds that they do not trust their tests. Already 
European manufacturers are finding that they can speed certification for a n e w  product 
in one country by threatening to get it certified elsewhere. The strong reliance on mutual 
recognition, which extends m u c h  beyond technical regulations and standards in the 
general strategy for the establishment of the internal market, is supposed to be 
compatible with the so called principle of subsidiarity. Tsoukalis (1991, p. 71) indicates 
that mutual recognition is not devoid of problems: for example, how, Tsoukalis argues,
could ensure that mutual recognition and the ensuing 'competition a m o n g  rules' do not
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lead to a general erosion of standards? The negative aspect is that full European 
standards will emerge only slowly and that while national standards linger, commercial 
reality will keep them an obstacle to trade. O n e  of the key problems facing technical 
standardization for a single market for products is Article 36 (EEC) which gives to 
M e m b e r  States the ultimate responsibility for health and safety regulation.
4.3.1 The Effect of New Approach to Standard Harmonisation
T he  main practical problems for the n e w  approach are that although European 
Standards (ENs) for s om e  products have been agreed, it seems highly unlikely that 
sufficient standards for other directives (machinery safety and building products) will be 
agreed in the near future. For the machinery-safety directive alone it is estimated that 
200-300 E N s  are needed. There is, therefore, considerable pressure on the European 
standards institutions to w o r k  out the necessary ENs. The introduction of qualified 
majority voting has already helped to speed things up, as well as the participation of the 
E F T  A  countries and the re-orientating of industry (traditionally favouring national or 
international standardization) towards taking a m u c h  stronger interest in ENs. B y  
pursuing this n e w  approach, the European Commission has managed to stop the 
excessive proliferation of technically-detailed product-by-product directives and 
introduced a deregulation bias. T he benefit to industry lies in the fact that the costs of 
"non-Europe" are being reduced by means of the progress m a d e  under this n e w  
approach. T o  m a n y  industries, the n e w  technical standards will be the most important 
result of the Single Market. T he  Commission's view is that international standards 
should remain the main objective of standardization work. European standards, although 
more important for the European e conomy than purely national standards, will often be 
second best (Standardization in the European Community, (COM(91), 521 final, point 
44)).
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In a business survey undertaken by the Commission (European Economy, 1988, 
p. 51), managers were asked h o w  important they considered the removal of technical 
barriers to be for their company. T he  results have been compared with the judgments of 
Commission experts responsible for policy actions to overcome these trade barriers. The 
business survey results have been converted into a numerical score (The survey does not 
include services).
Table 4.3.1.1
IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL BARRIERS BY INDUSTRY
Rank order from the business | 
survey |
Judgment of expert services of 
the Commission
Degree of importance 
Great Medium Less
1 . Motor vehicles 68 X
2. Electrical engineering 66 X
3. Mechanical engineering 63 X
4. Chemical, of which:
-pharmaceuticals X
-other X5. Non-metallic mineral
products (cement, etc.)56 X
6 . Other transport equip. 55 X7. Food and tobacco 52 X
8. Leather 51 X9. Precision and medical
equipment 50 X
10. Metal articles 50 X11. Rubber products 50 X
12. Plastics 47 X13. Wood and furniture 44 X14. Metals 41 X15. Office and Data
processing machinery 41 X
16. Textiles 38 X17. Footwear and clothing 37 X18. Mineral oil refining 37 X19. Paper and printing 35 X20. Artificial fibres 31 X
Source: European Economy, No.35, 1988.
T he table indicates that electrical and mechanical engineering products, public 
and commercial transport goods and precision and office equipment are thought to 
suffer most from technical barriers. T he  mechanical engineering sector suffers because 
of differing safety regulations. In this area, the European Commission has already 
submitted a comprehensive proposal following the 'new approach' of specifying the 
essential requirements for 184 standards for machines (Table: 4.3.1.2). T he electrical
engineering sector suffers from differences in standards in telecommunications
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equipment. These are often set by national PTTs, with problems of product 
incompatibility. Consumer electrical appliances, however, no longer experience 
significant technical trade barriers as a result of the Low-Voltage Directive of 1973. 
Although the business survey suggests that motor vehicles are affected by technical 
obstacles this is probably due to a few remaining disparities which are difficult to 
harmonize (e.g., left-hand drive) and temporary disparities in national anti-pollution 
regulations which have received m u c h  attention.
T he  precision and medical equipment sector considers technical barriers to be of 
m e d i u m  severity. In a number of subsectors, notably in medical and surgical equipment, 
due to national regulations on health and safety, the market is mainly national. For that 
reason the European Commission has submitted a 'new approach' medical devices 
directive to the standardization bodies for 42 standards to be adopted (Table: 4.3.1.2). 
For chemicals and for m a n y  intermediate products like artificial fibres, textiles, oil and 
metals trade barriers are not high. For pharmaceuticals serious problems arise at the 
certification and registration stages.
In the construction sector the use of building materials has been heavily regulated 
in favour of public health, safety and the environment. The greater part of these barriers 
is expected to be eliminated once the 'new approach' harmonizing directive on 
construction materials for 484 standards is finally adopted by all M e m b e r  States.
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Table 4.3.1.2
STANDARDIZATION WORK UNDERTAKEN BY CEN , CENELEC AN
New Approach Directives Number of Standards
Pressure vessels 42
Toys 7
Construction products 484
Machines 184
Personal protective equipment 102
Medical devices 42
Gas appliances 54
Electromagnetic compatibility 23
Other Work
938
Information Technology 257
Telecommuni cations 30
Public procurement (1) 216Eurocodes 27
Steel 129
Advanced ceramics 52
Aerospace 300——————— 1,001
Totals 1,939
(1) Public procurement standards for the utilities.
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1991.
4.3.2 Industrial Sectors Influenced by Both Procurement Practices 
and Technical Barriers
Having identified the two independent variables which are most likely to have an 
effect on public procurement, namely the restraint of competition and different technical 
standards, it is necessary to identify the industrial sectors currently most afflicted with 
nationalist public procurement policies and thus eventually most likely to be affected by 
the above mentioned variables. There is an absence of statistical data on procurement 
contracts at both the national and European C o m mu n it y  levels, with the exception of 
France. Although there is obligatory publication of notification of contacts subject to 
C om mu n it y  rules in the Official Journal, past experience demonstrates that only a part 
of such contracts (only 2 5 %  in 1988) are actually advertised. The 'Cost o f non-Europe' 
Research in Public Procurement (1988, pp 17-23) compiled a breakdown of public 
purchases by supplying sectors and products. The figures need to be treated with caution
as the data have been compiled from a variety of sources and estimates due mainly to
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lack of central records of public contracts.
Table 4.3.2.1 
PRODUCTS/SECTORS AFFECTED BY OPENING UP PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (PP)
% of PP Products/sectors Restructuring
6.8 Aerospace equipment/arms Aerospace/arms4.6 Business services
3.7 Coal for power station Coal3.0 Specialized civil 
engineering & building
1.7 Motor Vehicles
1.6 Pharmaceuticals
1.3 All other mechanical eng.
1.2 Heavy steel fabrication Heavy Fabrication0.9 Shipbuilding Shipbuilding0.9 Power generation equipment Power generation0.9 Telecommunication equipment Telecom equipment0.9 Computer Equipment Mainframe Computers0.9 Railway rolling stock Railway rolling st0.7 School/office/desks/furniture0.7 Uni forms/clothing
0.5 Power cables
0.5 Lighting (office/street)0.4 Paper Supplies
0.3 Nuclear fuels Nuclear fuels0.3 Explosives
0.1 HVAC equipment
0.1 Mining equipment Supplies0.1 Military/police boots
Source: Atkins (1988) : Shares of public purchasing from
analysis of input-output data.
A  further selection of these products w as  m a d e  to arrive at the breakdown of 
public purchasing of goods and services by product and to extrapolate the figures to 
cover the twelve M e m b e r  States. A r m s  and the aerospace defence industries were 
excluded as they are not subject to European Community's procurement legislation. 
Also, products of little importance in total purchasing and commodities and raw 
materials (except coal) were excluded since near perfect international markets exist in 
most cases.
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Table 4.3.2.2
Break Down of Public Purchasing of Goods and Services by­
product in 1984. Extrapolation of Figures for Five 
Countries to EUR 12.
NACE-CLIO Group ECU billion % of total PP
01 Agriculture, fish s forestry products 2.7 0.6
06 Energy products 73.2 16.3
of which: 031 Coal 15.6 3.5
073 Refined oil 36.0 8.0
097 Electricity 9.9 2.2
30 Manufactured goods 147.2 32.7
of which: 170 Chemical goods 14.5 3.2
190 Metal goods 9.8 2.2
210 Agricultural/ind. machine 12.2 2.7
230 Office equipment, etc 8.6 1.9
250 Electrical goods 19.9 4.4
270 Motor vehicles 8.2 1.8
290 Other transport equipment 37.5 8.3
473 Paper & printing products 10.5 2.3
53 Construction
530 Building & construction 129.1 28.6
68 Market Services 98.3 21.8
of which:570 Wholesale/retail distribution 1 1 . 0 2.4
590 Hotel & catering 6.0 1.3
611 Road transport 5.4 1.2
670 Communications 8.0 1.8
690 Banking & insurance 8.4 1.9
710 Business services 20.7 4.6
730 Letting of buildings 6.2 1.4
790 Market services n.e.s. 12.1 2.7
Total 450.5 100
Source: Atkins (1988), using input-output data.
T he above table indicates that public purchases are concentrated in certain 
industries. Over 8 0 %  of the total purchasing is m a d e  from less than 20 of the 60 broad 
industry groups distinguished in this analysis. Energy products (which account for 
16.3% of total public purchasing in the Community), can been disregarded because 
purchases of energy by energy-producing entities are at present exempted by the Utilities 
Directive. Most of the products are from the manufacturing sector (which accounts for 
32.7% of total purchasing); electrical goods (4.4%), transport (10.1%), chemicals 
(3.2%), and machinery (4.6%). Construction and public works accounts for 28.6% of 
total public purchasing, or s om e  150 billion E C U  in 1986 for the C o m mu n it y  of Twelve 
(European Economy, 1988, p. 58). Although the potential for increased trade is in 
general limited by distance, the volume of purchases makes any savings potentially 
important. Trade is restricted by the on-site nature of most of the work, and the limited
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mobility of labour and the cost of transporting building materials, which also limit 
potential savings which could be offered by foreign contractors.
At present, other European markets are marginal for the construction industry. 
According to a 1987 report by the French Commissariat du Plan (European Economy, 
1988, p. 58), in construction w e  find the paradoxical situation that in 1986, U S  
construction firms w o n  6 billion E C U  worth of contracts in European countries, 
whereas the value of those w o n  by European firms in European countries other than 
their o w n  c am e  to only 0.6 billion E C U .  It would appear that there are - across the E C  
as a whole - parochial psychological and organizational operating procedures which are 
significant constraints on the development of a truly competitive procurement market 
(Cox, 1992, p. 149). Purchases of market services by government are considerable 
(21.8% of total public purchasing), but do not loom large in the general business of the 
supplying industries.
There is a large number of categories of utilities and services for which the 
potential for trade is very w e a k  -distribution of water and electricity, personal services, 
road transport and communications - because proximity of the final supplier and the 
customer is important. There are, however, undoubtedly areas within the services sector 
where there is potential for s om e  expansion of trade within the business services sector. 
Examples of these are engineering design, management consultancy, computer services, 
or architectural services. Business services, insurance and banking will benefit from the 
liberalization of services taking places under the internal market programme. 
Government and public enterprises will benefit from this liberalization just as will other 
economic agents. This sector also includes estate agents, legal services, accountants, 
advertising, and technical services. In most of these sectors, language and knowledge of 
local laws, customs and circumstances are the main barriers to cross border trade, and 
nationalistic purchasing is likely to be of little importance. Most business is done by or 
through local representative offices. Nevertheless in this, and in som e  other service
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sectors, there is opportunity for trade in border areas and in specialist services. 
Completion of the internal market will facilitate this trade, for which international 
tendering is a prerequisite.
Having identified the sectors that will be particularly affected by the opening up 
of public procurement, it is possible to re-group them into four groups of sectors for 
further analysis:
A. Traditional Public Procurement
* Coal mining
* Heavy fabrication sector (bridges, large boilers, nuclear vessels, railway 
tracks)
* Power plant equipment
* Railway rolling stock
* Shipbuilding
Important restructuring measures (mergers, closure of plants) are under w a y  
within that group. Potential economies of scale are envisaged.
B. Public Procurement in High Technology Fields
* Telecommunication equipment
* Office and data processing machinery
* Precision and medical equipment
* Aerospace
* Chemical industry (pharmaceuticals)
This group mainly consists of multinational companies and a large flow of intra- 
Union trade is taking place. Competition is on a world-wide scale.
C. Mass Consumption Products
* Motor vehicles
* Non-metallic minerals (cement and concrete products)
* Household electrical appliances
* Food and drink
* Textiles &  clothing (uniforms)
Intra-Union trade is considerable. Non-tariff barriers encourage market 
fragmentation.
D. Non-tradeable Items
* Construction and civil engineering
* Market Services
Opportunities for trade exist in specialist construction fields (e.g., aborts and ^
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ports) and in business services (e.g., real estate agencies, legal, accountancy, advertising 
and consultancy services).
Having identified the industrial sectors currently affected by both procurement 
practices and technical regulations and standards is not sufficient enough to indicate 
with certainty which of these sectors are most likely to be affected by the internal market 
policies. It could be sensed that procurement practices and technical regulations and 
standards are the major sources of obstacles. This, in turn, suggests that electrical and 
mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals and precision and medical equipment will be 
the most affected. This list turns out to include mostly the sectors of group B  under the 
heading 'Public Procurement in High Technology Fields'. This list turns out to include a 
number dynamic, high technology, high growth sectors where E U  firms, have 
apparently, been losing external and internal market shares. This correlation between 
sectors where intra-Community trade is fragmented and sectors whose international 
performance is poor is, in m a n y  ways, the link which is though to validate the vision 
underlying the 1992 programme (Geroski, 1991, p. 13). Geroski considers it reasonable 
to think that most of the gains of "1992" will be concentrated in a few sectors (and 
probably mainly in a few industries within each sector). It is firms and industries that are 
smothered by technical or health regulations, or which regularly supply the public 
sector, which seem likely to be most affected (Geroski, 1991, p. 14).
In telecommunication equipment for example, the major issues are procurement 
policies and technical standards (European Economy, 1988, pp 77-8), with national 
governments actively supporting and discriminating in favour of their national 
champions. The gains from standardizing technical specifications (because of better 
exploitation of economies of scale) are thought to be in the region of 0.58-1.1 billion 
E C U ,  while those resulting from a more competitive procurement regime are thought to 
be in the range 2.2-3.7 billion E C U ,  a total of 17-27% of the 1986 value of the 
telecommunications market (European Economy, 1988, pp 77-8).
List A, under the heading 'Traditional Public Procurement' includes sectors
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where restructuring is none the less likely to yield considerable cost savings. It is worth 
stressing that the major gains involved in liberalizing public procurement are thought to 
result from restructuring of production and the reduction in excess capacity that 
competition and a larger market are expected to induce. For industrial boilers, the 
industry's opinion is that opening up the internal market will assist the restructuring that 
already is taking place. T he industry also believes that a European merger policy, 
recognition of standards and other aspects of the internal market are more important 
than changes in purchasing policy ('Cost of non-Europe', 1988, Vol. 5, Part B, p. 104). It 
w a s  mentioned earlier on, in the case study of electric locomotives (section 2.3.5), that 
in that sector the industry considers that technology changes are forcing international 
procurement and are leading to pan-European grouping of manufacturers. Public 
procurement is therefore responding to technology changes and opening up public 
procurement per se will have little effect on the competitive environment, hence 
differences in technical standards are not a barrier to trade ('Cost of non-Europe', 1988, 
Vol. 5, Part B, p. 128).
Although the construction sector is considered to be mainly of non-tradeable 
activity, there are several subsectors, notably building products, engineering consultancy 
and large infrastructure projects, where intra-Community trade is already significant. For 
the four larger M e m b e r  States the average import penetration rate ranges between 1 5 %  
in Italy and 5 0 %  in the United K i n g d o m  (European Economy, 1988, p. 76). A m o n g  the 
barriers pointed out by the firms interviewed in the course of the study undertaken by 
BIPE, technical certification is the most important. Seventy per cent of the products 
covered by the study face som e  difficulty in order to comply with foreign technical 
regulations and in general about 6 0 %  did not meet those regulations. In the B I P E  study, 
the direct effect of the removal of the existing trade barriers w a s  estimated to be at 0.7% 
of the sector's total production value for the four largest M e m b e r  States (820 million 
E C U  for the European C o m m u n i t y  as a whole) (European Economy, 1988, p. 76). T he
harmonization of technical regulations will reduce the costs of obtaining the
95
certification, and to lesser extent, cost reduction will result from the removal of customs 
control (European Economy, 1988, p. 77). T he  standardization w o r k  currently attributed 
to C E N  relating to construction products is well under w a y  (Table: 4.3.1.2). 
Nevertheless, standardization at the Union level can only be conceived in a long-term 
perspective, since their acceptance also implies a modification of professional practice 
and the technical expertise of those involved in the building activity.
The pharmaceuticals industry is affected particularly from delays induced by 
registration requirements and technical requirements differ very little from one M e m b e r  
State to another (European Economy, 1988, pp 69-71).
B y  contrast, technical standards have a little effect to intra-Community trade in 
the car industry. Various technical advances in production, though likely to amount to 
savings of 5 %  of unit costs will probably be realized and completion of the internal 
market would be the catalyst for this restructuring process (European Economy, 1988, 
pp 73-4). Similarly, no significant obstacles to intra-Community trade exist in the 
textiles and clothing industry (European Economy, 1988, pp 74-6).
Table 4 .3.2.3
Industrial Sectors affected by both Procurement and 
Technical Standards liberalization
1Sectors %of PP |
1
1
Degree of standard 
importance 
Great Medium Low
30 Manufactured goods 32.7
of which: 170 Chemical goods 3.2 X
190 Metal goods 2.2 X
210 Agricultural &
industrial machin. 2.7 X
230 Office equipment 1.9 X
250 Electrical goods 4.4 X
270 Motor vehicles 1.8 X
290 Other transport
equipment 8.3 X
473 Paper & printing 2.3 X
53 Construction
530 Building &
construction 28.6 X
150 Cement etc 0.1 X
68 Market Services 21.8
of which:710 Business services 4.6 X
Source: European Economy 1988, "Cost of non-Europe", Vol. 5, 1988.
In conclusion it would seem that for six industrial sectors which account for 1 6 %
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of public purchasing, chemicals (3.2%), machinery (4.6%), electrical goods (4.4%), 
office equipment (1.9%), and motor vehicles (1.8%) standards are of m e d i u m  to great 
importance. It is reasonable to assume that harmonization of technical standards, ceteris 
paribus, will facilitate the opening up of public procurement only in these few sectors 
(and probably mainly in a few industries within each sector).
The EU's attempt to open up public procurement has influenced greatly not only 
it's o w n  industries but also n o n - E U  suppliers. For n o n - E U  suppliers the problem is the 
Utilities Directive Article 29, which threatens to create a so called ’Fortress Europe’. 
Under Article 29, purchasers can reject a bid with less than 50 per cent of European 
content. This provision has significant implications for n o n - E U  suppliers w h o  are n o w  
obtaining acceptance access to the E U  market via acquisitions and joint ventures with 
E U  firms. T he GATT Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) has influenced 
Union's legislation and it is likely to do the same by extending public procurement to 
sectors and public bodies that have been up to n o w  limited only to European Union 
suppliers. Although defence procurement is excluded under the Treaty of R o m e ,  it is 
clear that defence procurement, in its o w n  strange way, is beginning to follow other 
forms of public purchasing in being opened up to free cross-border competition and 
bidding. The European Commission and particularly the Directorate for Competition 
has an increasing interest in h o w  Europe's big defence contractors behave themselves, 
because most of these companies produce products for 'dual use' for the military and 
civil market and s ome of them are beginning to increase market share through mergers, 
acquisitions and joint ventures.
97
4.4 Conclusions on the Significance of Non-Tariff Barriers in 
Public Procurement
Although the European Union n o w  has comprehensive procurement legislation 
covering almost every aspect of public procurement, it is believed that an opening up of 
public procurement will not be achieved if two other equally effective barriers are not 
removed. These non-tariff barriers are the restrictive practices of firms that supply the 
public sector, aiming to restrict competition, and the existing differences in technical 
standards, regulation and certification which m a y  directly or indirectly discriminate 
against foreign suppliers or goods sold within a M e m b e r  State.
Confronted with the Union's policy to open up public procurement, firms might 
also respond by undermining such efforts through collusive tendering, cartels, mergers 
and acquisitions. Such anti-competitive practices mainly exist in industries where the 
public sector is the only or major purchaser and there is a comfortable relationship 
between public purchaser and supplier which creates high entry barriers and 
oligopolistic structure. Suppliers are concerned about market opening that threatens the 
oligopolistic structure of their market. T he  significant number of mergers, acquisitions 
and collaborating agreements that are taking place is one of the means by which national 
markets are becoming integrated. T he  pressure to mergers and acquisitions is essentially 
market-led with companies coming to terms with the ever increasing integration of the 
European market place. It is believed that mergers are already bringing close a real 
single European market. Whether this is a combination of market factors and E U  
procurement legislation is still too early to say, since in s om e  sectors, Europe-wide 
oligopolies will replace national oligopolies. The E U  has anticipated some of these 
responses by suppliers and has tried to formulate appropriate rules and regulations. 
Therefore competition policy is a core E U  policy and it is believed that it will prevent 
private economic actors from monopolizing the benefits of integration and ensure that 
M e m b e r  States activities remain neutral. T he  agreement on a European merger-control
u
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regulation is a significant step towards creating a coherent merger policy for the Single 
Market.
There is a close positive relationship between harmonization of technical 
standards and opening up public procurement. The European Union has identified that 
relationship and in the n e w  directives the rules on technical standards have been brought 
into line with the n e w  policy on standards. This n e w  policy is based on the principle of 
mutual recognition of standards and the process of legislative harmonization by laying 
d o w n  essential requirements while the elaboration of technical specifications in the form 
of European standards is entrusted to non-govemmental standardization organizations. 
The n e w  approach has caused a great impact in the creation of basic product law for the 
Single Market. The Cassis de Dijon case and its extension to similar cases has been very 
efficient in removing barriers based on discrimination against products from other 
M e m b e r  States. European Standards created by the European Standardization bodies are 
not themselves legally binding, but, if a product is manufactured to a European 
Standard, the enforcement authorities presume its conformity with the essential legal 
requirements. It is observed that the standard-setting habits of M e m b e r  States and other 
European countries have been largely Europeanized and indeed internationalized as the 
European Standardization bodies are influenced by the International Standards 
Organization. Practical problems exist and given the great d e m a n d  for standards it is 
questionable whether the essential safety requirements of the related directives will be 
completed on time. T o  m a n y  industries, the need for c o m m o n  technical standards will 
be the most important result of the internal market. Although s om e  studies have been 
carried out by the European Commission the economic impact of standards has been 
difficult to identify.
It is confirmed that the public procurement issue is of importance to a relative 
small number of industrial sectors. Nevertheless, the same sectors are also affected by 
differences in technical standards and anti-competitive practices. The seven selected 
sectors are mainly from manufacturing and one from business services:
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* chemicals/pharmaceuticals,
* metal engineering,
* machinery,
* office equipment,
* electrical goods,
* transport equipment,
* building materials, and
* business services.
This list is already of considerable size, amounting to 6 0 %  of total public 
procurement, or to $ 480 billion in 1990. These sectors represent a small range of 
situations according to indicators that are most relevant in assessing the likely impact of 
standards harmonization and competition on the opening up of public procurement:
(i) public procurement purchases are significant. They are of major 
importance to s om e  sectors (pharmaceuticals and telecommunication 
equipment) but a minor matter for other sectors (automobiles);
(ii) comprehensive public procurement legislation has been adopted;
(iii) standards are very important for high technology sectors and important 
for the traditional procurement sectors;
(iv) economies of scale are important for traditional procurement and less 
so for high technology sectors;
(v) price dispersion is above average (indication of barriers);
(vi) technology is low (boiler making) and high (telecommunication);
(vii) transport costs are slight (pharmaceuticals) or important (building 
materials).
(viii)tastes are relatively homogeneous.
The market structure of the above sectors generally evolves towards oligopolies 
and points to the importance of competition policy which is believed to be the core of 
the internal market objective. This concerns discriminatory practices and strategic 
organization of European enterprises. Internationalization, diversification, product 
differentiation and technological innovation have been the strategies pursued by the 
main European procurement supplying firms but also by foreign competition. There is a
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lack of detailed information regarding the structure of above eight European 
manufacturing and services industries involved in public procurement. Therefore, there 
is a need to scrutinize in greater detail the various internal and external strategies 
developed by firms to deal with the opening up of public procurement. It will also be 
necessary to develop a European perspective instead of a mor e  narrowly national one, 
and to choose micro-economic theory to be used in analysing a number of case studies.
A  picture starts to emerge of s o m e  multinational networks of firms which have 
not waited for the complete opening up of public procurement envisaged by the "1992" 
plan. Such networks of European Union firms with other European, American and 
Japanese firms are high volume suppliers in m a n y  procurement sectors such as heavy 
and electrical engineering, transport, energy, electronics, telecommunications and 
defence. They have been formed in a very similar w a y  by acquiring small firms and 
forming joint ventures and cooperative agreements. The n e w  structure is characterized 
by a more concentrated oligopoly which is likely to maintain its inherent collusive 
features and so to reduce the gains from the Single Market. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to examine, in the next chapter, the oligopoly concept and to provide som e  
recent evidence on multimarket contact and collusive behaviour of European public 
procurement suppliers.
101
5.0 THE LINKED OLIGOPOLY HYPOTHESIS: RECENT  
EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC  
PROCUREMENT SUPPLY INDUSTRIES
5.1 Is the Oligopoly Theory Necessary?
5.2 T he Linked Oligopoly Concept: Recent Evidence from Public 
Procurement Industries
5.3 T he Theory of Linked Oligopoly
5.3.1 The Historical V i e w  O f  Linked Oligopolies
5.3.2 Multimarket Interdependence and Market Competition in the 
Procurement Industries
5.4 Conclusions on the Evidence of Linked Oligopolies in Public 
Procurement
1 0 2
5.0 THE LINKED OLIGOPOLY HYPOTHESIS: RECENT  
EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC  
PROCUREMENT SUPPLY INDUSTRIES
5.1 Is the Oligopoly Theory Necessary?
S o m e  economists argue that the theories of perfect competition and monopoly 
are all that are necessary to predict the outcome of any situation. The general models of 
economic behaviour from Marshall to Chamberlain were perfect and monopolistic 
competition. These economists recognize the existence of small-group industries, but 
they believe that such industries will behave either like perfectly competitive ones or 
like monopolies. Duopoly models were considered as intellectual exercises rather than 
real-world situations. A. Cournot developed the first k n o w n  theory of duopoly in 1838. 
Probably the majority of economists do not accept this view and believe that m u c h  
behaviour, particularly in the manufacturing industries, cannot be understood without an 
explicit theory of oligopoly. In the 157 years since Cournot, economists such as H. V o n  
Stackelberg and H. Hotelling have advanced m a n y  models of oligopolistic behaviour.
Each firm recognizes that its best choice depends upon the choices its rivals 
m a k e  (Scherer, 1980, p. 151). In analysing market behaviour in an industry economists 
can use economic theory in yielding predictions after certain specific information has 
been added to its general assumptions. In the case of competition a m o n g  the few, it is no 
longer true that the solution depends only on the 'objective' factors of costs and market 
demand. T he attitudes of each competitor to the stratagems of his few opponents 
b e c om e  important, and, for the same costs and market demand, the equilibrium of the 
industry will vary considerably as the psychology of the competitors varies.
Manufactured procurement goods, as already mentioned in section 4.2.1, are 
dominated by oligopolistic industries and the necessary theory is that of oligopoly.
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Industrial organization economists during the 1950s and the 1960s argued that in an
oligopoly setting, each firm necessarily pays attention to the price and output decisions
of its rivals. A s  a result, in the view of the above economists, firms will be likely behave
less aggressively toward each other than they would if they were competing with a large
number of rivals. This reasoning suggests that higher than competitive prices are nearly
inevitable in oligopolies (Baker, 1993, p. 149). In 1964, George Stigler, a University of
Chicago professor w h o  would later win a Nobel Prize in economics, published an
influential economic article titled " A  Theory of Oligopoly" implicitly challenging the
view that supracompetitive oligopoly pricing is nearly inevitable. Stigler profoundly
changed the w a y  economists understand coordination a m o n g  oligopolists (Baker, 1993,
p. 150). Stigler's contribution w a s  to point out that firms would prefer to compete rather
than cooperate, and would undercut any cooperative understanding with rivals.
Developments in economic theory since Stigler's 1964 article have deepened
economists' understanding of oligopoly behaviour. Stigler discussed cooperation in
terms of an economic model in which each firm makes only one decision: whether to
cooperate or compete. This setting is termed a "one-shot game". F r o m  a contemporary
economic perspective, industry behaviour is understood as emerging from a repeated
game rather than from the one-shot g a m e  studied by Stigler. Firms often k n o w  they will
interact with the same rivals again and again and consequently base their present
decisions on the w a y  their rivals behaved in the past. Firms m a y  also recognize that their
current decisions m a y  affect rival responses in the future, and thus influence future
rewards. A s  a result, industry prices m a y  vary over time in a complex pattern. Another
contemporary insight about oligopoly behaviour arising from the perspective of the
theory of repeated games is that m a n y  equilibrium outcomes are typically possible, and
the choice of outcome turns on one of the possibilities standing out as self-evident
which in the language of oligopoly theory is termed "focal" (Tirole, 1988, p. 247). The
term "focal" encompasses strategies that b ec om e  self-evident because of negotiation,
*
direct experience with the game, social convention, an obvious sense of correct play,
and deduction and prospection. For example, one firm could announce its choice a m o n g
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possible outcomes at a press conference by saying "we intend to raise all prices by five 
percent next month". Such costless communication m a y  be all that is necessary for the 
industry m e m be r s  to identify one of the possibilities as the focal outcome, and in 
consequence, for all to select it as the self-evident w a y  to behave (Baker, 1993, p. 163). 
In s om e  cases coordination is not feasible without complex communication and in most 
cases competition law's prohibition of express and tacit agreements limits the terms of 
coordination to focal rules that are simply stated, thereby reducing the problem of 
identifying terms of coordination from a complex task to the choice of a single 
parameter. Bid-rigging m a y  be easier to arrange than most other forms of express 
collusion because procurement specifications typically - though not always - limit the 
dimensions of competition to one variable, price. Focal rules accomplish the same result 
of facilitating coordination by limiting the dimensions of competition to a small number 
of variables (Baker, 1993, pp 167-8). Collusion in procurement tendering can take m a n y  
forms. For example, a cartel might adopt a pure bid rotation or alternatively, cartel 
m e m be r s  in addition to the designated winner m a y  submit higher complementary or 
frivolous bids, perhaps to create the appearance of competition (Porter and Zona, 1993, 
p. 519). Stigler's insights about oligopoly explain w h y  it might be irrational for firms to 
reach an agreement, even w h e n  the traditional plus factors indicative of a secret 
agreement are present. This implies that it is likely to be more difficult for competition 
authorities to prove an agreement to fix price from circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, contemporary developments in economics suggest that the oligopoly
problem is more serious than previously thought. F r o m  a theoretical economic
perspective, the folk theorem emphasizes that concentrated industries are more
hospitable to coordination, and to achieving higher than competitive prices, than they
appeared to Chicago-oriented commentators heavily influenced by Stigler. This view
from theory is confirmed by what can be inferred about business practice from academic
business strategists. Business school faculty teaching strategy routinely counsel their
students that managers working for oligopolists should implement practices that would
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facilitate coordination (Baker, 1993, pp 198-7). Recent empirical industrial organization 
economics research also confirms that oligopolies are often able to exercise significant 
market power. T he  development in the 1980s of n e w  empirical statistical techniques for 
measuring market power in individual industries frequently permits more precise 
inferences about the performance of specific oligopolies than were available from prior 
studies employing older empirical approaches (Schmalensee, 1988, p. 976 and p. 988). 
These studies s ho w  that a great deal of market power exists in s ome concentrated 
industries, and anticompetitive conduct is a significant cause of high-cost margins 
(Bresnahan, 1988, pp 1052-3). Oligopolies m a y  not inevitably charge supracompetitive 
prices, but, as contemporary developments in economic theory suggest, and both 
business practice and the results of applying n e w  empirical tools confirm, oligopolistic 
coordination is a genuine concern in m a n y  concentrated industries (Baker, 1993, pp 
198). According to an official of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, oligopolies 
are fairly c o m m o n  in industrial structures where parallel behaviour and tacit collusion is 
observed (Interview with Mr. Frooms-Brown, July 1994, see Appendix C).
5.2 The Linked Oligopoly Concept: Recent Evidence from Public 
Procurement Industries.
T h e  observed increase in traditional public procurement industries mergers, 
acquisitions and joint ventures in different national markets has increased aggregate 
concentration at the European level while simultaneously reducing national market 
concentration. The trend toward multimarket expansion of procurement firms, and the 
consequent increase in aggregate concentration, has rendered the basic single market 
model obsolete for considering the competitive effects of the market-extension type of 
merger. It will be necessary to test on a theoretical and empirical level the linked 
oligopoly hypothesis, a concept that might prove useful for analyzing the effects of the 
multimarket expansion of large diversified European procurement firms.
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Taking, for example, a traditional procurement industry such as power plant 
manufacturing, in which products are complicated and of high value. N o  more than 20 
large manufacturers exist in the European power generation market (The Economist, 
Survey o f Multinationals, 27 M a r c h  1993, p. 20). M a n y  of them have joint ventures or 
alliances with one another, in research, design, full assembly, components^ distribution 
or marketing, for one product or for several, not only in Europe but anywhere in the 
world. Soon it becomes clear that everyone seems to be allied with everyone else. The 
same applies to m a n y  other industries in telecommunications, computers, 
pharmaceuticals and aerospace. There is nothing especially n e w  about alliances as they 
have long been a feature of oil exploration and mining. W h a t  is new, however, is the 
popularity of all kind of alliance, such as joint ventures, licensing deals, research 
consortia, supply agreement and so on (The Economist, Survey o f Multinationals, 27 
M ar ch  1993, p. 20). Around 9 0 %  of alliances in recent years, the above survey 
indicates, have been between firms from industrial countries and there has been a 
'switch away from alliances as a route into risky places and towards their use closer to 
the heart of the firm' (The Economist, Survey o f Multinationals, 27 M ar ch  1993, p. 20).
O n e  provocative view w a s  expressed at the World Economic F o r u m  in 
Switzerland in February 1993 by Cyrus Freidheim w h o  predicts that current economic 
and political developments will m e a n  that in future business would be dominated by 
vast multi-company alliances, which he calls "relationship enterprises", spanning 
different industries and countries, but held together by c o m m o n  goals which encourage 
them to act almost as a single firm (The Economist, 6 February 1993, p. 85). Doubtless, 
such alliances will exist. History, however, shows that alliances which operate primarily 
as cartels tend to be unstable. It is argued that it is hard enough to sustain agreement 
between two parts of the same company, let alone to bring together several firms with 
different owners, different objectives and, increasingly, different nationalities (The
Economist, Survey o f Multinationals, 27 M ar ch  1993, p. 23).
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In the next sections, theoretical arguments will be presented in support of the 
linked oligopoly hypothesis. A  focal point of the analysis at a later stage will be a 
discussion of its applicability to the EU's competition and mergers policy and its 
significance to stemming the increasing concentration at European level.
5.3 The Theory of Linked Oligopoly
5.3.1 The Historical View O f Linked Oligopolies
O n e  of the most significant developments affecting the organization of European 
industry in recent years has been the trend towards mergers and acquisitions. M a n y  
important industries involved in public procurement have been replaced (often by 
acquisition) by large conglomerates producing scores of diverse procurement products. 
T he  rapid emergence of the conglomerate form of business organization is raising 
fundamental questions regarding the implications of this trend for the procurement 
market system in which interfirm competition is the basic regulating device. T he debate 
surrounding the effect of conglomerate firms on competition centers on h o w  
conglomerate firms will interact with specialized rivals and with other conglomerates 
that they meet in m a n y  markets.
Traditional analyses of industrial behaviour typically link the exercise of market
power in an industry to internal features such as d e m an d  conditions, concentration and
barriers-to-entry ( B e m h e i m  and Whinston, 1990, p. 1). The traditional view is that the
presence of conglomerate firms in a market, ceteris paribus, will have no impact on
competitive rivalry. Competition in a market is determined solely by factors within that
108
market, i.e., the traditional market models are relevant. Conglomerate firms will attempt 
to maximize their profits in each of their markets as would independent firms, and 
therefore, their presence should have no effect on performance. Nevertheless, some 
economists have remained concerned that external factors m a y  also play a significant 
role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry. O n e  aspect of 
this concern relates to the potential effects of multimarket contact between firms and the 
possibility that such a contact could foster anticompetitive outcome (Bemheim, and 
Whinston, 1990, p. 1).
Historically, the economic theory and the empirical evidence dealing with the 
behaviour of firms confronting one another in unrelated markets have been sketchy 
(Scherer, 1980, pp. 340-2). Through the years, however, there has been a c om m o n l y  
held belief that multimarket contacts foster collusive behaviour in markets where rivals 
meet. A  consideration and adaptation of theories of industrial organizations would seem 
useful here, as postulated and developed by Alexander Henderson (1954, pp 565-584), 
Corwin Edwards (1955), Almarin Phillips, (1960, pp 602-613, and 1964, pp 32-45), and 
Oliver Williamson (1965, pp 579-607). Corwin Edwards w as  an early proponent of the 
view that conglomerate firms have unique effect on competition because of their 
character. In addition, the conglomerate firm holds power over its specialized rivals 
because of its large size and its geographic or product dispersion. These theories have 
been employed by a number of authors Heggestad and Rhoades, 1978; Scott, 1982; 
Feinberg, 1984 and 1985; Alexander, 1985; Martinez, 1990; Evans and Kessides, 1994, 
for an empirical analysis of linked oligopolistic markets in the US. Scherer (1980, pp. 
340-2) in his chapter "Conglomerate size and pricing behaviour" and under the heading 
of "The spheres o f influence hypothesis” examined the hypothesis that 'when 
conglomerate giants face other conglomerates in a w e b  of markets, they will compete 
less sharply than would specialists occupying the same markets'. A  conglomerate is a 
firm that sells in more than one distinct product and/or geographic market. Often, 
conglomerate firms are multimarket rivals. Corwin Edwards (1955) is given credit for
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the point:
WJten one large conglomerate enterprise competes with another, the two 
are likely to encounter each other in a considerable number o f markets. 
The multiplicity o f their contacts may blunt the edge o f their competition. 
A prospect o f advantage from vigorous competition in one market may 
be weighted against the danger o f retaliatory forays by the competitor in 
other markets. Each conglomerate competitor may adopt a live-and-let- 
live policy designed to stabilize the whole structure o f the competitive 
relationship. (Corwin Edwards, as quoted in Scherer, 1980, p. 340).
Henderson described a linked oligopoly situation as follows:
There may be thousands o f grocers, yet each grocer will be intimately 
affected by a small number o f neighbouring grocers who may be close 
geographically or similar in type o f customer to whom they cater.... 
Industry is like a forest; each tree is fa r from almost all the rest but each 
has some close neighbours. What looks at first sight like an imperfectly 
competitive industry turns out to be a series o f linked oligopolies. (A. 
Henderson, 1954, p. 565).
Phillips and M a s o n  give the following definition of the linked oligopoly theory:
The belief is that multimarket contact will lead to more cooperation in all 
markets common to rivals, and more cooperation translates into 
generally stable behaviour that exhibits higher prices and lower 
quantities. This kind o f cooperation among conglomerates is thought to 
be successful because the opportunity fo r retribution and the severity 
o f punishment fo r violating agreements, implicit or otherwise, are 
greater than they could be i f  firms met only in one market. (Phillips and 
Mason, 1992, p. 396)
Empirical support for a traditional description of linked oligopoly is not widely 
observed. Scherer (1980,/?. 340) argues that Edwards's observations on live-and-let-live 
attitudes a m o n g  conglomerate giants were influenced by the pre World W a r  II Japanese 
Zaibatsu groups, of which the four largest, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, 
controlled a substantial share of all Japanese activity. Nevertheless, Scherer indicates 
that s o m e  pre World W a r  II and post-war studies of Japanese firms give inconclusive 
evidence for supporting Edwards's hypothesis. O n e  fragment of qualitative evidence
1 1 0
comes from Alfred Kahn's pre Wor ld  W a r  II study of interfirm relations in the 
international chemical industry (Scherer, 1980, pp 341-2). Three conglomerates, LG. 
Farben in Germany, Imperial Chemical Industries in England, and du Pont in the 
United States had interests that touched in hundreds of product lines, and they 
unquestionably adopted a live-and-let-live policy towards one another, negotiating 
explicit geographic spheres of influence agreements for products on which they had 
exclusive patent protection and avoiding aggressive price competition where they did 
compete directly. Alfred K a h n  has reasserted his view on the linked oligopolies, in 
reference to airline deregulation and states:
When you have the same six carriers meeting each other in market after 
market, there is danger o f softer competition. It's not in their interest to 
insult one another excessively (A., Kahn, (1986), as quoted in Phillips 
and Mason (1992, p. 396).
Another well k n o w n  international business practice where respect of spheres of 
influence appears to be prominent, Scherer (1980, p. 342) indicates, is in the various 
international merchant marine cartels. Such cartels, taking the form of shipping 
conferences, where particular shipping lines and groups of lines charge a standard 
agreed freight rate on certain routes, and they dominate by threatening rival groups with 
rate warfare over routes in which the rivals' profit stake is greatest. T he European 
Commission, aware of the conference problem (see also section 10), has adopted a 
regulation on the application of the Article 85(3) of the first Treaty of.Rome to certain 
categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between shipping 
companies (O.J., C  167, 10 July 1990, p. 9). Kreis indicates that this regulation is a 
major step forward in the application of the C o m m u n i t y  competition law to maritime 
transport. Moreover, it has clarified the legal rules under which consortia serving 
C o m m u n i t y  liner trades m a y  operate and provides them with a broad and flexible group 
exception from the general prohibition of cartels (Kreis, 1992, p. 498).
A  few studies have attempted to ascertain empirically whether the performance
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of US companies has been affected by the theories of linked oligopoly, or "mutual 
forbearance" or "spheres of influence", or "extended interdependence". It w a s
Solomon, (1970, pp 323-335) w h o  first suggested that the linkage theory of oligopoly
could be appropriate for a market analysis in the banking sector in the United States.
She argues that horizontal mergers between two banks within the same market, market
extension mergers do not normally involve changes in structure that can be analysed
neatly through classic industrial organization theory (Solomon, 1970, p. 323). Solomon
suggests that an important element in oligopolistic markets is the degree of "linkage in
adjacent markets". "Multiple contact by the same banking leaders within a state, in
progressively more of that state's banking markets, m a y  serve to strengthen the lines of
communication between them and increase the adherence to any pre-existing group
competitive standards" (Solomon, 1970, p. 331). Solomon concludes that a fuller
consideration of these possible interrelationships and linkages would aid in the
operational evaluation of individual merger applications and supplement the normal
potential competition analysis (Solomon, 1970, p. 335). Heggestad and Rhoades (1978,
pp 523-532) examined the stability of market shares possessed by dominant banks with
multimarket contact. They found that market shares for the three largest banks were
m ore stable the more frequently these banks encountered each other in different
geographical markets. Scott (1982, pp 368-375) used 437 firms a m o n g  the largest U S
manufacturers which spanned several lines of business and found that profits were to be
positively correlated with multimarket contact in highly concentrated industries.
Strickland, (1984, pp 153-159) however, found an inverse relationship between
measures of multimarket interdependence and price-cost margins for 195 of the top
American manufacturers in 1963. Feinberg, (1985, pp 225-241) tested the linked
oligopoly theory of conglomerate behaviour at both company and industry level, using
1976 data from the Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business program. At the
company level, sales-at-risk, a measure of the importance of multimarket contacts, w as
found to have a significant effect in increasing price/cost margins in the moderate range
of concentration where collusion is feasible but difficult to achieve without mutual
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forbearance. The industry-level results were weaker, casting s om e  doubt on the 
hypothesis. Alexander (1985, pp 122-140), empirically tested the linked oligopoly 
theory as an explanation of the competitive behaviour a m o n g  bank holding companies 
in the U S  commercial banking industry, for two product markets using a sample of 69 
market areas. T he  empirical results were mixed. In the d e m a n d  deposit market, some 
evidence w a s  found that multimarket contacts have a positive impact on service charges. 
Moreover, this relationship held in moderately concentrated markets and using different 
measures for mutual forbearance behaviour. Alexander found no evidence that mutual 
forbearance behaviour has any impact on interest rates in the short-term business loan 
market. However, there w a s  s om e  evidence that interest rates, were, on average, higher 
in unit banking states than in limited branching states and this w a s  indicative of the 
more restrictive entry in unit banking states. Martinez, (1990, pp 589-595) empirically 
tested the linked oligopoly hypothesis by studying the behaviour of the US's one 
hundred largest bank holding companies. The result of this study indicated that 
interbank rivalry is adversely affected by the interlinking of the same banks in a large 
number of local markets. Evans and Kessides (1994, pp 341-366) examined empirically 
the effects of multimarket contact on pricing in the U S  airline industry. Their analysis of 
airline fares in the 1000 largest domestic city-pair routes revealed the presence of 
statistically significant and important multimarket effects: fares were higher in city-pair 
markets served by carriers with extensive interroute contacts. These findings were 
consistent with the claims (and documented evidence) of industry experts that airlines 
live by the "golden rule;" i.e., that airlines refrain from initiating aggressive pricing 
actions in a given route (especially a route that is important to s om e  of their competitors) 
for fear of what their competitors might do in other jointly contested routes. Thus, Evans 
and Kessides interpreted their results as strong evidence supporting the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis in the context of the airline industry (Evans and Kessides, 1994, p. 366).
Hughes and Oughton (1993, pp 203-224) examined the effects of diversification
and multimarket contact on the price-cost margin and the rate of return to capital of 418
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U K  manufacturing firms in 1979. T he  results showed a clear positive effect of 
multimarket contact on industry profitability.
Phillips and M a s o n  (1992, p. 396) criticized the studies of Scott (1982), Feinberg 
(1985) and the one by Heggestad and Rhoades (1978), pointing out that it w a s  difficult 
to distinguish the simultaneous impact of diversification and concentration, and other 
factors that might in general increase profits, from the influence of contact between 
rivals. That is possible and as Feinberg and Sherman (1988, p. 985) point out, real- 
world oligopolies have a large set of decision variables available to act on (price, output, 
capacity, advertising, research and development, etc.), the effects of interrelationships 
a m o n g  firms such as mutual forbearance have been difficult to determine by subjecting 
industrial data to statistical testing. Grabowski and Mueller (1970, pp 100-1) argue that 
given the rise of importance of the large diversified firm, microeconomic theory is 
basically a theory of the one-product firm and it has little to offer us by w a y  of testable 
hypotheses of h o w  multi-industry firms behave, nor does it provide us with a well 
accepted framework for analysing the behaviour of divisions of diversified companies. 
Yet the only source of data, they add, are the census data for industries which are 
aggregates of the figures for the single product firms, the major divisions of diversified 
firms based outside of the industry, or to resort to data on firms and accept the 
aggregation over the m a n y  diverse products the global corporation n o w  produces.
Given the difficulty of determining the effects of inter-relationships a m o n g  firms
such as the linked oligopoly by subjecting industrial data to statistical testing som e
authors, employing g a m e  theory, argue that in a controlled laboratory setting the validity
of particular behaviour assumptions can be examined with s ome precision. Hughes and
Oughton argue that a well-known feature of oligopoly models is that equilibrium
solutions depend on the behavioural rules or conjectures adopted by firms. Hence
oligopoly theory suffers from the degree of indeterminacy that is only resolved w h e n  the
behaviour rules are specified. The recent application of g a m e  theory to oligopolistic
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markets, Hughes and Oughton add, has provided the dual function of both highlighting 
the possibility of multiple equilibria and suggesting ways in which indeterminacy is 
resolved by indicating which conjectures/strategies are likely to emerge as evolutionary 
stable (Hughes, and Oughton, 1993, p. 207). Y a o  and Desanti indicate that non- 
cooperative g a m e  theory is the accepted economic analysis of oligopolistic interaction 
and it is based on the premise that fully rational oligopolistic behaviour requires a 
consideration of the interdependence of strategies, and that such a consideration leads 
managers to self-reinforcing set of strategies in which each strategy is best response to 
the other strategies (Yao and Desanti, 1993, p. 122). G a m e  theory also raises interesting 
issues about the legal tests for tacit collusion, and m a y  provide s ome useful insights, 
which can at least indicate w h e n  conduct is worth further scrutiny. B y  providing insight 
into the actual means through which tacit collusion is maintained, the theory m a y  also 
provide a lead on possible remedies (Yao and Desanti, 1993, pp 140-1).
Feinberg and Sherman (1988, pp 985-991) in their study of linked oligopoly
under experimental conditions, found evidence of mutual forbearance. B e m h e i m  and
Whinston (1990, pp 1-23), isolated conditions under which multimarket contact
facilitates collusion and showed that these collusive gains are achieved through m od es
of behaviour that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarket
firms. Phillips and Mason, (1992, pp 395-411) in a series of similar economic
experiments using students for testing the behaviour of firms, found no support for the
notion that multimarket contact leads to more cooperative choices in all markets where
rivals meet. The authors admit that they investigated only one of m a n y  conglomerate
scenaria and pointed out that with more testing it m a y  be possible to identify actual
markets in which conglomeration can increase competition, and others in which the case
would be otherwise. Despite such interest in the game-theory approach, it has not yet
provided results which could lead to a general theory of linked oligopoly. Although
appropriate controlled experiments cannot be conducted easily nor cheaply in the real
business world, the computerized study of oligopolistic behaviour is an extremely useful
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tool which might lead to generalizations about the decision-making process of the 
oligopolists in real-world situations. Although the concept of linked oligopolies has 
been debated for m ore than thirty years, it has not been significant in anti-trust cases [in 
the US], nor has it received m u c h  attention in the academic community (Martinez, 1990, 
p. 591). The anti-trust authorities in the U S  have contended that while conglomerate 
mergers do not involve competitors in individual markets, and thus cannot be analysed 
with the standard single market model of economic theory, there m a y  be significant 
adverse effects, as suggested by the conglomerate power hypothesis of Edwards. The 
U S  courts have rejected these arguments because of lack of empirical foundation 
(Heggestad and Rhoades, 1978, p. 526). In the Marine Bancorporation case (U.S. v. 
Marine Bancorporation, Inc. et al (1974), 2832) the Supreme Court struck, d o w n  the 
concept of linkage or network of state-wide oligopolistic banking market, as amounting 
to ..."'ephemeral possibilities" rather than to "probabilities"...1. Similarly in the 
Connecticut National Bank case (U.S. v. Connecticut National Bank, et al, (1974), 
2793), the court ruled that the "theory of linked oligopolies appears to be devoided of 
evidentiary support as it w a s  in Marine Bancorporation".
Adams, (1974, pp 1280-1) challenges the assumption that horizontal dominance 
is required for a firm or group of firms to exploit any monopoly power latent in the 
existing industrial environment. H e  also argues that a sound economic case can be m a d e  
for broadening the meaning of competition for anti-trust purposes beyond the present 
single market framework. A d a m s  suggests that analysis of inter-market linkages and 
total firm scale is a prerequisite to complete determination of the anticompetitive effects 
of any given merger. H e  also argues that where firms operate in multiple markets, the 
likelihood of collusion and the height of barriers to n e w  competition depend on s ome  
factors simply not detectable by individual market analysis.
Thus, an empirical foundation for the linked oligopoly hypothesis would have
important public policy implications in the European public procurement industries, as
well as in the industrial sectors where the conglomerate form of organization has been
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evolving since 1987 w h e n  the Single European Act c am e  into effect. In the internal 
European market, it is assumed that firms will develop organizational structures such as 
joint ventures, strategic alliances and networks necessary for firm survival given the 
intensified competition, while C o m m u n i t y  and Governments in the areas such as 
competition, mergers, and technology will also play a role. A n  important question to be 
asked about the assumptions that are m a d e  in section 4.2 is the possible contradiction 
between competition and cooperation. T he European answer to dilemmas posed by 
competition, cooperation and mergers shows that European policies are not based on a 
general theoretical foundation from which universal policy guidelines can be deducted 
(Groenewegen and Beije, 1992, p. 507). Groenewegen and Beije argue that 
policymakers in Europe have adopted a more historical, multidisciplinary, pragmatic and 
institutional approach, rather than a straightforward application of antitrust law or the 
ideas of the C h i c a g o - U C L A  school (Groenewegen and Beije, 1992, p. 507). W h e n  it is 
accepted that an organizational structure such as a strategic alliance, a merger or a 
technology program, can be efficient as well as inefficient, the theorist has the difficult 
task of showing under what set of conditions certain outcomes are most likely 
(Groenewegen and Beije, 1992, p. 507). Moreover, in the European C o m mu n it y  Merger 
Regulation of 1990, the size of the firm is viewed in absolute terms and is not related to 
market share. This implies that m a n y  mergers resulting in considerable market power 
m a y  fall outside the scope of the regulation because the firms operate in markets with a 
relative low total turnover.
T he evidence on h o w  multimarket contact and the theory of linked oligopoly
affects business behaviour is fragmentary and to s ome extent conflicting. The linked
oligopoly is intuitively plausible and as Martinez argues 'is one of the most intriguing
and promising concepts dealing with the multimarket relationship of firms, though it has
not been adequately explored' (Martinez, 1990, p. 591). Furthermore, the potential for
linked oligopoly is not limited to conglomerates but exists for any multi-product firms,
including "single-product" firms that operate in a number of distinct geographical
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markets ( B e m h e i m  and Whinston, 1990, p. 1). Finally, the linked oligopoly theory can 
help analyse the behaviour of the European procurement firms but it is necessary to 
admit that on the basis of the existing theory, it is impossible to m a k e  out an 
overwhelming case either for or against the theory's applicability.
5.3.2 Multimarket Interdependence and Market Competition in 
Procurement Industries
T he  current geographic expansion of large European firms has stimulated interest 
on its impact on aggregate concentration and on the opening up of public procurement. 
While the linked oligopoly hypothesis is relevant to industry in general, s om e  public 
procurement industries such as power generating, railway, telecommunication and data 
processing equipment and pharmaceuticals could provide a useful basis for testing 
purposes. The possible effects of multimarket relationship on market rivalry in public 
procurement industries has been highlighted since 1987 by the dramatic geographical 
expansion (de novo and by acquisition) of such industries and the m o v e  toward 
liberalization of public procurement not only in the European Union itself, but also in 
the n e w  European Economic Area ( EE A)  and in the countries that participate in the 
G A T T  agreement on government procurement.
D o  tendencies toward linked oligopolies exist a m o n g  European multimarket 
firms involved in public procurement?
S o m e  evidence is provided in Augusto Ninni's study of power equipment industry
and the opening up of public procurement markets in the European C om m u n i t y  (Ninni,
1990, pp 320-330). Ninni argues that after thq ABB and GEC-Alsthom mergers, a new,
even more concentrated oligopoly is characterizing the industry and this n e w  structure is
likely to maintain the collusive feature of the industry, so reducing the gains from the
Single Market for the utilities. The current structure of power equipment industry, Ninni
(1990, p. 332) indicates, - that is an oligopoly by birth- w a s  the result of early collusive
strategies a m o n g  firms. Such strategy w a s  formalized in the 1930s through a cartel, the
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International Electric Association (IEA). T he  main object of the cartel w a s  to provide 
information on tenders in the open market. Ninni, indicates that there is proof that the 
cartel w a s  working in the 1970s, and it is probably still working now, though with less 
ties. Ninni (1990, p. 329) finally concludes than in the European context the power 
equipment industry consists of three major ’networks' of firms aiming at being present 
in every (geographic) market, and keeping on a relatively flexible organization, through 
the use of joint ventures and the utilization of links with independent, specialized 
suppliers.
A n  other piece of evidence about linked oligopolies is found in the report 
prepared for the European Commission, on European conglomerate firms (Cubbin, and 
Geroski, 1990, pp 17-9). The authors of the report believe that there are anti-competitive 
effects springing from mutual forbearance and that there is s ome evidence that 
"multimarket contacts" are associated with higher profitability, a result consistent with 
the view that mutual forbearance facilitates the emergence of tacitly (or overtly) 
exclusive forms of behaviour.
A  third piece of evidence about linked oligopolies is found in a detailed study of 
the European railway industry by David M ay es  (1991, pp 130-161). M ay es  observes a 
great deal of activity in forming linkages between the railway supplying industries and 
predicts that major fragmentation of the market is likely to continue because of the 
structure of d e m a n d  (Mayes, 1991, p. 130). H e  also identifies that the immediate impact 
of the Single Market has not been on production but on ownership of railway equipment 
companies. H e  points out that it's impact has been rather a reduction by a third in 
effective number of companies - the necessary proportion suggested by Atkins in the 
papers of the Cecchini Report for reduction in capacity in the industry - and a 
consolidation of the major groups that have been formed (Mayes, 1991, pp 148-9). 
These groups are categorized as international, (one headed by ABB and the other by 
GEC-Alsthom) and national (such as a G e r m a n  alliance headed by Siemens plus some 
more small groupings).
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M ay es  identified the following process of market development of the railway 
industry (Mayes, 1991, pp 149-152). The first stage of the opening of market is in theory 
a choice of strategies for suppliers to maintain market power. T he  first action is merely 
to bid across borders and hence gain market share using the domestic market as a base. 
This is a high risk strategy as it relies upon purchasers suddenly becoming completely 
open-minded and upon the absence of important local knowledge or specific 
requirements possessed by the local firms. M ay es  indicates that this is not a realistic 
assumption. T he  first stage in the market evolution is, therefore, not to attempt to cross 
borders directly but to increase market power in two respects: First, by reducing the 
number of competitors and second by forming agreements with companies in other 
countries so that joint bids can be made. These can be one-off arrangement so that a 
consortium bid can be put together, or to a whole merger as those between GEC and 
Alsthom or a takeover or a whole range of intermediate arrangements such as joint 
holdings. All these are changes in ownership rather than changes in the location of 
plants and methods of operation. They are devices for enabling produces to get over the 
national barriers in the sense of being able to earn a return from operations in the other 
countries. Does it m e a n  the market becomes more competitive? T he answer to this must 
be 'yes' M a y e s  concludes, quite simply because foreign competition becomes a realistic 
threat. However, the effectiveness of this threat will begin to lose its validity if in fact, 
no substantial contracts are awarded to foreign contractors in Italy, Germany, France or 
the United K i n g d o m  (Mayes, 1991, p. 151). It can therefore n o w  set out the stages of 
market development for the traditional public procurement industries, as follows:
1. Agreement on the Single Market programme and the opening up of public 
procurement.
2. Formation of joint ventures, cooperation agreement, mergers and 
acquisitions.
3. Success of co-operative/competitive bids.
4. Reorganization of production and restructuring.
1 2 0
T he  primary concern with conglomerate mergers is that they alter market 
relationships. They m a y  bring multi-product firms into contact with each other in more 
than one market; this wider exposure to competitive retaliation m a y  create an 
interdependence that discourages aggressive price cut tenders or other competitive 
responses that might otherwise be made. W h e n  an oligopolist A  and his rival B  confront 
each other in several different markets, firm A, for example, believing that have a 
limited chance of success, m a y  place a m u c h  higher bid, in market (Ml) w h e n  it fears 
that rival B  m a y  retaliate not only in that market but in market (M2) as well (Areeda and 
Turner, 1979, p. 1086). Firm A  would participate in the 'game' because unless the g a m e  
is played on each occasion it will not be able to obtain the contracts in its o w n  market. 
Thus far the discussion has focused only on possibilities. T o  say that firm A  m a y  do so is 
not to say that it will do so. There are several m i n i m u m  conditions that must be met 
before this anti-competitive action takes place; even w h e n  these conditions are met this 
approach would be invalidated if the market is contestable by a reasonable number of 
third rivals w h o  do not have a market segment they can claim as their o w n  (Areeda and 
Turner, 1979, p. 1086).
* A  public procurement supplying firm and at least one rival must confront 
each other in two markets, each of which is somewhat oligopolistic in 
performance but not rigidly so (Areeda and Turner, 1979, p. 1084).
* T he supplying firm and at least an other two-market firm both be
' significant in both markets, and both markets must be relatively important to 
both firms. T he  concept of "significance" as used here is mor e  readily 
invoked in principle than proved in fact (Areeda and Turner, 1979, pp 1085- 
6).
But it is reasonable presumption that a firm with fifteen or twenty percent of a 
concentrated market is "significant" (Areeda and Turner, 1979, p. 1086).
* T o  be deterred from a placing a lower bid in one market a firm must be
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subject to sanctions in the second market. Firm A  will be able to offer a 
lower bid, or other competitive m o v e  in the first market unless another two- 
market company, Firm B, can subject the former to unfavourable 
consequences in the second market. Firm B, might be induced to exploit a 
previously unexploited advantage, or might engaged in predatory activity 
(Areeda and Turner, 1979, p. 1086).
T he  preceding discussion indicates that linked oligopolies might occur and might 
reduce competition that would otherwise occur; and prevent the opening up of public 
procurement. T he  likelihood of such results occurring m a y  increase with the number of 
significant multimarket firms and that conglomerate mergers thereby increase the 
possibility of anticompetitive results in the economy. Therefore, an opening up of 
European public procurement depends on firms' behaviour and on other barriers. If the 
linked oligopoly theory is supported then it follows that the present structure of 
European industry is hindering such an opening. If it is not supported then an opening 
up will depend solely on the removal of the other two non-tariff barriers such different 
technical standards and nationalistic purchasing.
1 2 2
5.4 Conclusions on the Evidence of Linked Oligopolies in Public 
Procurement
It is argued that European manufacturers and suppliers of procurement goods and 
services are oligopolistic in structure and that a plausible theory to explain firms's 
behaviour is that of oligopoly. T he  linked oligopoly hypothesis is an extension of the 
oligopoly theory and of s o m e  interest. T h e  primary concern with European mergers, 
acquisitions and collaboration agreements is that they bring multi-product firms that 
supply the public sector into contact with each other in more than one national market; 
this wider exposure to competitive retaliation m a y  create an interdependence that 
discourages aggressive price cut tenders or other competitive responses that might 
otherwise be made. A  few studies in the U S  and in Europe have attempted to verify 
statistically whether c om pa n y  performance has been affected by the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis, but evidence is fragmentary and to some extend conflicting. It is argued that 
the linked oligopoly hypothesis is intuitively plausible and it is one of the more 
promising concepts dealing with the multimarket relationship of firms, though it has not 
been adequately explored.
Empirical evidence to support this hypothesis would have considerable public 
policy implications in the context of European integration. It would influence the 
behaviour of m a n y  important European industries as well as in the industrial sectors 
where the conglomerate form of organization has been evolving since 1987 w h e n  the 
single European market initiative c am e  into effect by the Single European Act. A n  
analysis of inter-market linkages and total firm scale could be a prerequisite for a more 
credible determination of the anticompetitive effects of any given European merger.
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6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS OF LITERATURE REVIEW  ON  
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
The Policy Issues
T h e  liberalization of public procurement w a s  one of the key factors which 
initiated the debate on the European Community's Single Market. In its White Paper of 
1985 on Completing the Internal Market, the European Commission emphasized the 
need for legislative action to ensure that public procurement markets are fully opened up 
to C o m m u n i t y  competition. T he  vast size of the European public procurement market 
( 1 5 %  of the Community's G D P  or m ore than E C U  500 billion a year) means that market 
access is very important for all firms. Because M e m b e r  States had circumvented the 
free-trade provision of Article 30-36 and 59-66 of the Treaty of R om e,  the need for 
additional legislation w as  evident and consequently during the 1970s the W o r k s  and 
Supplies Directives were issued. Although they were regarded as a major step forward 
in the cause of intra-Community free-trade, the Directives had in reality a limited 
impact. A s  the Cecchini Report indicated, only 2 %  of public purchasing w a s  being 
awarded to firms outside the 12 national markets and som e  important sectors in the 
utilities were totally excluded and services unregulated. T he limited impact of the earlier 
C o m m u n i t y  Directives raises s om e  policy-relevant questions.
First, what exactly is the policy problem?
. Second, what is the contribution of legal and economic analysis in evaluating E U  
policy on public procurement?
Third, could an opening of public procurement be realized in the Single Market 
and what will it look like?
The Policy Problem
Previous studies indicated that a m o n g  barriers to trade in Public Purchasing are
the tendency of governments to protect national suppliers, either by limiting bidding to
k n o w n  firms, or by permitting public purchasers to develop and continue to use special
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standards which are not harmonized with European C o m m u n i t y  M e m b e r  States.
In 1988 the European C o m m u n i t y  published a broad analysis, the "Cost of non- 
Europe" or the Cecchini Report as it is better known, who se  objective w as  to evaluate 
the potential economic impact of completing the internal market and a part of the study 
covered the area of public procurement. T he  Cecchini Report indicated that 7 % - 1 0 %  of 
European C om mu n it y  G D P  is subject to individual contracts and thus potentially open 
to competition. Within the then European Community, the Cecchini Report argued that 
there were significant differences between countries in both the structure of public 
sector and the organization of public purchasing. Moreover, procedures for awarding 
contracts varied from one country and one purchasing body to another. Nationalistic 
purchasing pressures did exist and depended on the type of product. If for example it 
w a s  a visible (i.e., cars) or strategic (i.e., telecommunication equipment) product, or if 
there w a s  government pressure to support declining industries (i.e., coal mining).
The Cecchini Report also evaluated the economic implications of liberalization 
of public procurement and identified significant price differences and estimated savings 
of E C U  0.5% of 1986 G D P  (static trade effect, competition effect and restructuring 
effect). Public purchasing w a s  particularly concentrated on building and civil 
engineering, energy products, telecommunications, data processing equipment, transport 
equipment and business services. However, only a small proportion of public sector 
contracts were awarded to suppliers from other M e m b e r  States. The negative 
consequence of closed and protective procurement was evident in the high technology 
sectors where symbiotic relationship existed between suppliers and buyers, and such 
protection sustained more in number European companies than the U S  or Japan but of 
sub-optimum size and performance. Case studies related to seven manufacturing 
industries indicated that most of these industries suffered from excess capacity and that 
there w as  considerable scope for savings in public purchasing.
If the savings from the opening-up of public procurement markets are so large,
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w h y  have the M e m b e r  States up to n o w  failed to exploit such opportunities? T he  most 
likely explanation is that savings have been overestimated or that public procurement 
markets do not w o r k  properly. In view of the large degree of uncertainty the potential 
savings should be treated at best as very rough estimates; whether the opening up of 
public procurement should be viewed as matter of marginal or substantial importance 
the assumption is that it is of potentially substantial importance. T he  market failure 
approach suggests that state or rather European Union intervention is required whenever 
private markets are failing to w o r k  properly. Applied to public procurement, market 
failures arise where public purchasers restrict entry to the market and/or that other 
barriers exist. T he White Paper of the 1985 and the Cecchini Report resulted in the 
creation of European C o m m u n i t y  legislation aimed at the abolition of nationalistic 
purchasing and the opening up of public procurement to suppliers from every M e m b e r -  
State. The n e w  legislation n o w  covers almost every aspect of public purchasing over 
certain thresholds, with the exception of defence procurement. T w o  n e w  Directives 
have been adopted which strengthen the existing W o r k s  and Supplies Directive and a 
third Directive extends similar provisions to the Utility sector (water, energy, transport 
and telecommunications). T w o  more n e w  Directives provide a right of redress in case of 
a breach of the n e w  works, supply and utility rules and two n e w  Directives apply similar 
purchasing rules to the provision of services. Reference to standards are more precise 
and the directives oblige purchasing bodies to refer to European standards. T he Utilities 
Directive is considered as one of the more ambitious parts of the Single European 
Market. The European Commission argues that sectors such as telecommunications, 
energy and transport are important and a European market will enable them to 
strengthen their competitiveness on a world-wide scale.
T he  lack of effective compliance with procurement legislation w a s  seen as major 
reason for the failure of the earlier Directives. T he Compliance Directives provide 
remedies on the national level and they are expected to provide an incentive for 
aggrieved suppliers to initiate case and eventually to open markets by their o w n  actions.
Public procurement legislation has been an important part of European legal
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integration process and takes the form of a replacement of national procurement rules by 
European ones. Moreover, such an integration is a long and gradual process and reflects 
the changes under w a y  at the economic or political level. Although law is not the main 
catalyst of change in the integration process it has a dynamism of its o w n  and m a n y  
changes are conditioned by legal elements. The legal structure, on a national level, 
governing public procurement and remedies against illegal practices varies considerably 
across the EU. T he  original European C o m m u n i t y  directives on supplies and works in 
1970s helped little because they were not accompanied by efforts to align national 
remedies, depending instead on national administrative guidelines which provided no 
legal right for individual companies. Although there are m a n y  shortcomings and 
inadequacies in the Directives, they have improved access, transparency and legal 
security in m a n y  procurement sectors. There is n o w  a growing awareness by public 
purchasers that no longer can they expect to get away with ignoring Union rules on non­
discrimination with the same degree of impunity as in the 1970s and the 1980s. It is also 
believed that ingrained habits of nationalistic procurement policies are not likely to 
change overnight. There is also a need for an overall assessment of Member-States 
diligence in putting E U  provisions into practice. Although faulty compliance can be 
detected by the European Commission or the European Court of Justice it is the 
deliberate non-compliance which is more difficult to uncover.
The Effect of Other Barriers
T he  procurement directives are necessary but not sufficient instruments for 
opening up public procurement. There are two other important non-tariff barriers which 
have been restricting such an opening; restrictive practices by firms and the existence of 
national standards. Only s om e  economic sectors are effected by the internal market 
directives and public procurement in particular. These group sectors are:
* The traditional public procurement (power plant equipment, railway rolling
stock, etc.) with a small volume of intra-community trade and marked price differences.
Important restructuring measures such as mergers and acquisitions, concentration and
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closure of plants are under w a y  and economies of scale are large and capacity utilization 
is low.
* Public procurement in high technology fields (telecommunication 
equipment, data processing, medical equipment and aerospace) where the presence of 
multinational companies explains the small price differences and the large flow of intra- 
E U  trade, world-wide competition with growing d e m an d  and substantial R & D  
expenditure.
Confronted with an E U  policy seeking to liberalize public procurement, firms are 
also responding by attempting to undermine such efforts through collusive tendering, 
cartels, mergers and acquisitions. Oligopolistic behaviour by firms that supply the public 
sector acts as a brake on opening up the market for public procurement. Suppliers are 
concerned with market opening that threatens the oligopolistic structure of the market. 
The significant number of mergers and acquisitions currently observed in the European 
manufacturing and service industries is one of the means by which the national markets 
are being integrated. The pressure for such mergers is essentially market-led with 
companies coming to terms with the ever increasing integration of the European market 
place. Mergers are already bringing close a real single market and whether this is a 
combination of market factors and E U  procurement legislation is still too early to say, 
since in s ome sectors Europe-wide oligopolies will replace national oligopolies. O f  
course, the E U  has anticipated s om e  of these responses by suppliers and has tried to 
formulate appropriate rules and regulations. Competition policy is a core E U  policy and 
it is aimed at preventing private economics actors from monopolizing the benefits of 
integration and ensuring that M e m b e r  States' activities remain neutral. Thus, the 
agreement on a European merger-control regulation is a significant step towards 
creating a coherent merger policy for the Single Market. It can be expected that the 
more open the market, the more frequent strategies such as mergers and acquisitions 
will increase intra-EU trade and bring s om e  form of procurement liberalization.
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There is also a close relationship between harmonization of technical standards 
and opening up public procurement. T he  E U  has identified that relationship and in the 
n e w  directives the rules on technical standards have been brought into line with the n e w  
policy on standards. This n e w  policy is based on the principle of mutual recognition of 
standards and the process of legislative harmonization by laying d o w n  essential 
requirements while the elaboration of technical specifications in the form of European 
standards is entrusted to non-governmental standardization organizations. The n e w  
approach has caused a great impact in the creation of basic product law for the Single 
Market. T he  Cassis de Dijon case and its extension to similar cases has been seen as a 
very efficient w a y  in removing barriers based on discrimination against products from 
other M e m b e r  States. European Standards created under the aegis of the European 
Standardization bodies are not themselves legally binding, but, if a product is 
manufactured to a European Standard, the enforcement authorities presume its 
conformity with the essential legal requirements. Practical problems exist and given the 
great d e m an d  for standards it is questionable whether the essential safety requirements 
of the relative directives will be completed on time. Although s om e  studies have been 
carried out by the European Commission, the economic impact of standards has been 
difficult to be identified and measured. A  point to be questioned is whether mutual 
recognition will lead to a general erosion of standards.
Public procurement is of importance to a relatively small number of industrial
sectors. Nevertheless, the same sectors are also affected by differences in technical
standards and anti-competitive practices. T he  seven selected sectors are mainly from
manufacturing but include one from business services: chemicals/pharmaceuticals,
metal engineering, machinery, office equipment, electrical goods, transport equipment,
building materials, and business services. This list is already of considerable size,
amounting to 6 0 %  of total public procurement. The market structure of the above
sectors points to the importance of competition policy which is the core of the internal
market objective. This concerns discriminatory marketing practices and strategic
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organization of European enterprises. Internationalization, diversification, product 
differentiation and technological innovation have been the strategies pursued by the 
main procurement supplying firms.
A  picture starts to emerge of s o m e  multinational networks of firms formed by E U ,  
other European, American and Japanese firms which are large suppliers in m a n y  
procurement sectors such as heavy and electrical engineering, transport, energy, 
electronics, telecommunications and defence. They have been formed in a very similar 
w a y  by acquiring small firms and forming joint ventures and cooperative agreements. 
This n e w  structure is characterized by a more concentrated oligopoly which is likely to 
maintain its inherent collusive feature and so prevent an opening up of public 
procurement.
The Linked Oligopoly Hypothesis
Because European manufacturers and suppliers of procurement goods and 
services are oligopolistic in structure it is clear that the necessary theory to explain firms' 
behaviour is that of oligopoly. T he  linked oligopoly hypothesis, being an extension of 
the oligopoly theory, is an appropriate conceptual framework to analyse this problem. 
T he primary concern with European mergers, acquisitions and collaboration agreements 
is that they bring multi-product firms that supply the public sector into contact with each 
other, in more than one national markets; this wider exposure to competitive retaliation 
m a y  create an interdependence that discourages aggressive price cut tenders or other 
competitive responses that m a y  otherwise be made. Studies in the U S  and in Europe 
have attempted to verify empirically whether company performance has been affected by 
the linked oligopoly hypothesis but evidence is fragmentary and to s ome extent 
conflicting. It is believed that the linked oligopoly hypothesis is intuitively plausible and 
it is one of the more promising concepts dealing with the multimarket relationship of 
firms.
1 3 0
Concluding Remarks
The EU's objective of at economic integration and the emphasis on opening up 
public procurement provide the following conclusions. T he Union is engaged in an 
extensive effort to open-up public procurement in the M e m b e r  States, and to conform to 
the Treaty rules prohibiting obstacles to the free flow of goods and services through out 
the Union. Although there are m a n y  inadequacies and shortcomings in the present 
directives a comprehensive coverage of all aspects or public procurement is n o w  in 
place. T he  main challenge during the 1990s will no longer be the adoption of Public 
Procurement Directives but their enforcement. Although there is considerable 
experience of W o r k s  and Supplies procurement, the Utilities and Service sectors are 
n e w  approaches which have to be tested. Although legislation is a dependant variable it 
has a dynamism of its o w n  and is likely to influence the opening up of public 
procurement. Public procurement is of importance to a relative small number, but very 
important, of industrial sectors. T he  same sectors are also affected by the two other 
important non-tariff barriers, differences in technical standards and anti-competitive 
practices by firms w h o  supply the public sector. It is assumed that opening of public 
procurement will take place only w h e n  the two above mentioned barriers have been 
properly identified and removed. A  n e w  policy on standards based on the principle of 
mutual recognition and the process of legislative harmonization by laying d o w n  
essential requirements, is expected to facilitate the opening up of public procurement.
T he literature review indicates that firms are responding to the Union's efforts to 
open-up public procurement markets through a plethora of mergers, acquisitions and 
joint ventures. A  picture starts to emerge of s ome multinational networks of firms which 
have not waited for the completed opening up of public procurement in 1993. Such 
networks of firms are full-time suppliers in m a n y  procurement sectors such as in heavy 
and electrical engineering, transport, energy, electronics, telecommunications and 
defence. They have been formed in a very similar w a y  by acquiring small firms and 
forming joint ventures and cooperative agreements. T o  date, economic analyses of E U
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procurement legislation have focused on the macro-economics of legal integration. At 
the microeconomic level, little relevant research has been done. There is a need for an 
addition to the literature on the Single Market and to a contribution to the expansion of 
normative and empirical knowledge of the impact of public procurement on the 
European manufacturing and service industries. There is a need to examine in greater 
detail the various internal and external strategies developed by firms to deal with public 
procurement and the adoption of European standards. It will also be necessary to 
develop a European perspective instead of a more narrowly national one, and to 
investigate the forces of internationalization and changes in technology that bring 
structural and political changes in high technology sectors which transcend European 
borders, leading to a decline in national influences. T he n e w . structure which is 
characterized by a more concentrated oligopoly is likely to maintain its inherent 
collusive features and so to reduce the gains from the Single Market. It will be therefore 
necessary to investigate on a theoretical and empirical level the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis, a concept which might be useful for analysing the effects of the multimarket 
expansion of large diversified European procurement firms. Within the linked oligopoly 
it is hypothesised that multimarket contact of large European procurement suppliers 
leads to more cooperation in all markets c o m m o n  to rivals, and more cooperation 
translates into generally stable behaviour that exhibits higher prices and lower quantities 
of goods and services. This m a y  reduce competition that would otherwise occur and 
prevent the liberalisation of public procurement. It also raises the issue of the effect 
European integration. European integration will increase multimarket contact, which, 
according to the linked oligopoly theory, m a y  induce decreasing competition. This 
controversial prediction warrants an interesting theme in this theory. In chapter 9 an 
empirical investigation of the linked oligopoly hypothesis will be attempted using data 
on multimarket contact and other selected variables of leading European procurement 
supply firms.
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7.0 RESEARCH STRATEGIES AND DESIGN
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general framework for the empirical 
verification of the competitive relationships a m o n g  multimarket public procurement 
supply companies in the Single European Market based on the concept of the linked 
oligopoly hypothesis.
For analytical purposes the w o r k  is organized as follows. T he  following section 
defines the research objectives and provides a theoretical model of the linked oligopoly 
and a theoretical analysis of the relationship between multimarket contact, firm rank 
mobility and profitability. Chapter 8 describes the approach to selection and. collection 
of data on European companies involved in public procurement. Chapter 9 provides an 
empirical investigation of the influence of multimarket contact on rank mobility and 
profitability. T he hypothesis discussed in chapter 6 is tested using data on multimarket 
contact and other selected variables from a sample of European firms. Chapter 10 
summarizes and analyzes the findings of the research and discusses their effect on 
European competition policy in the context of European integration and recommends 
future action.
7.1 Research Objectives
T he literature review has so far indicated that previous studies, and in particular
the findings of the 'Cost o f  non-Europe' in public procurement, were not an assessment
of what would happen. It w as  merely an attempt to measure the costs to the European
C o m m u n i t y  of nationalistic purchasing and of non-tariff barriers. These studies did not
attempt to estimate whether all barriers would go or whether European manufacturing
and service industries would respond in a manner which would exploit the full potential
gains. In traditional public procurement industries such as heavy engineering, coal
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mining, power plant and railway equipment, where the initial impact of the opening up 
of public procurement is m ore likely to be unfavourable, it would lead to dynamic 
disadvantages. It is therefore important to try to understand h o w  this dynamic process of 
change takes place and, in particular, h o w  it is taking place. The main agents in this 
process of change are firms and it is therefore essential for the focus of attention to be 
on them (Mayes, 1991, p. 3). The Single European Market provides an excellent test­
bed for strategic response, in particular because it changes the rules of behaviour for 
firms.
At the present level of analysis of the literature three possible outcomes can be 
imagined:
* Opening of public procurement is not taking place and nothing changes. Public 
purchasers go on ordering through 'national suppliers'. Government pressures, the n e w  
cost of screening a m o n g  different suppliers and the 'experience with the manufacturer or 
supplier' explain this kind of behaviour.
* Public purchasers issue real tenders and there is real competition a m o n g  
suppliers. Suppliers have reduced their costs; n o w  they can offer a broader range of 
products and utilize a broad range of cooperative agreements. Public purchasers are free 
to choose suppliers and to adjust their o w n  structure and organization to the 
opportunities of the supply side. That is the evolution expected by the single market 
policy.
* Public purchasers issue real tenders, but collusion has already occurred a m o n g  
the supplier networks. In the European market new, even more concentrated group of 
linked oligopolies are able to share markets. Public procurement is not opened up in 
reality as the n e w  system of supply is able to 'internalize' all the gains of opening up the 
domestic markets.
T he  literature review, expert opinion (interviews with Mr. Turner, June 1994 and
Mr. White, July 1994, see Appendix C) and a brief monitoring of European Union
contract awards (see Appendix A), suggest that the third outcome is the most likely
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scenario. It has been noted that firms are responding to the EU's efforts to open-up 
public procurement through a plethora of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures and 
one could witness the emergence of multinational networks of firms which are major 
suppliers in m a n y  procurement sectors. Although s om e  earlier studies (see literature 
review) had m a d e  clear that a necessary condition for the opening up of public 
procurement is that the other two non-tariff barriers, restraint of competition and 
national standards, are removed, it is expected that anti-competitive behaviour of 
procurement firms is the most important barrier. Thus, opening of public procurement in 
a market Mi is determined by
Mi = f(Li, Si, Ci)
where
Li reflects legislation adopted in European level,
Si reflects the degree of standards harmonization adopted, and
Ci reflects the number and size distribution of suppliers within the market.
Such an opening up of European public procurement depends on firms'
behaviour and to other barriers. If the third outcome (opening up of public procurement
will be achieved not because of the existing legislation but because all trade barriers
being removed) is envisaged, it is reasonable to assume that the present structure of
European industry - a concentrated network of linked oligopolies - is hindering such an
opening. Therefore, an important part of the study is to develop and empirically to test
case studies providing examples of h o w  oligopolistic coordination actually works in a
multimarket setting. In section 7.3 the link between multimarket contact and collusive
behaviour is analysed. It is argued that the conditions under which intermarket contact
can facilitate tacit cooperation render the procurement supply industry an ideal candidate
for the empirical testing of multimarket contact effects. If such behaviour is not
substantiated, then an opening up will depend solely on the removal of the other two
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non-tariff barriers such as "different technical standards" and "nationalistic purchasing".
The empirical investigation will be focused on an analysis of the firms' strategic 
behaviour and mutual recognition of interdependence and it will fall into two stages: 
Firstly, the selection of a sample of European companies that supply the above public 
procurement sectors and secondly the collection and analysis of company data that are 
going to be used in order to test the linked oligopoly hypothesis.
The study has conducted a n umber of validation interviews with U K  officials in 
government departments, Trade Associations, Chambers of Commerce, politicians and 
companies involved in with public procurement and/or with Single European Market 
issues. Those persons formally consulted and a s ummary of their interviews are shown 
in Appendix C. Officials from the Office of Fair Trading, D T I  and Treasury represent 
the U K  on the Advisory Committee for Public Contracts, which meets regularly in 
Brussels to advise the European Commission on the operation of the public procurement 
regime.
T he  contribution of this thesis is the adaptation of a theoretical model, the 
development of an empirical test and the presentation of a thought experiment in the 
form of (i) reviewing of the literature on the linked oligopoly hypothesis and providing 
evidence from the public procurement supply industry, (ii) adopting a model that 
integrates arguments from the above literature and highlights the rationale of the above 
hypothesis, (iii) applying the propositions from the review and model to the case of 
European integration in general and European public procurement in particular, and (iv) 
providing an empirical test and offering hypotheses, complementing the ones that 
dominate the current literature, which m a y  be helpful in guiding future research into the 
effects of European integration on competition between European firms.
Having identified the research objectives the next section develops the theory 
that is used to examine the implications of concentrated networks of linked oligopolies.
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7.2 A  Theoretical Model of Linked Oligopoly
The linked oligopoly hypothesis m a y  be viewed as an extension of traditional 
oligopoly theory, which stresses the possibility of cross-market conjectural variations 
(Feinberg, 1985, p. 226). Using a model in which firms face one another in more than 
one market, there can arise a p h e no m en o n  that Feinberg and Sherman (1988, p. 986) 
call conjectural forbearance, the expectation one firm m a y  have about its rival's 
response in a different market. A  theoretical model with simple conjectures which 
include conjectural forbearance based on an earlier Feinberg model (1984, pp 243-9) 
w a s  developed by Alexander (1985, pp 125-7). The model considered from a quantity- 
setting perspective, is not the only possible w a y  to s ho w  the effect of linked oligopolies 
but it has the advantage of being straightforward. A  similar theoretical model but from a 
price-setting perspective w a s  presented in Feinberg and Sherman (1988, pp 985-993).
T he model described below is an adaptation of Alexander's duopoly model 
(1985, pp 125-7) and it is focusing on competition across geographical markets rather 
than product markets. It requires using conjectural variation functions to capture a 
duopolisfs perceived multimarket interdependence with its competitor. W h e n  this is 
done, both intra- and inter-market interdependence operate to reduce the profit- 
maximising output level of the firm. Each type of interdependence has an independent 
effect and reduces a duopolisfs output level below that of Cournot duopolist w h o  
assumes no interdependence with its competitor (Strickland, 1984, p. 21). In Cournot's 
duopoly model each firm supplies 1/3 of the market, at a c o m m o n  price which is lower 
than the monopoly price, but above the pure competitive price (which is zero in the 
Cournot example of costless production) (Koutsoyiannis, 1982, p. 218).
Suppose there are m  markets and n firms in each market, and all firms produce a
homogeneous good in each market. Further, assume that the d e m a n d  and cost functions
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are linear and identical across markets. T he d e m a n d  equation for market i is shown in 
expression (1).
nPj =  a, - b, I  q, (a,, b; >  0), ( 1)
where i represents the market (i =  1 , m); k represents firm ( k  =  1 , n); and 
qjk is firm k's output in market i.
First introduce costs. Total costs for c o m pa n y  k in market i are
It is assumed that all firms are identical with respect to cost factors, thus 
narrowing the focus to the price-raising impact associated with linked oligopoly 
behaviour. For the sake of simplicity, suppose the profits function for a firm is 
illustrated in equation (3) recognizing, of course, that the results apply to all multimarket 
firms (II denotes profits).
T he  first order condition for a profit m a x i m u m  (8 denotes differentiation) with 
respect to an output change in market 1 is
fi +  ci9ik (ci> fi >  °)> (2)
m n
n j = J j (( ai" b i £ j i k  - ci) 9ij * fi>- (3)
n n
m  n
(4)
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Let (Alexander, 1985, pp 125-6):
89ik/5clij =  V > V  i, j, and k; (5)
dqjj/dqy = 1; and
dqik/dqij =  F, V  i, j, k and 1,1 *  i and j & k (6)
Expression (5) represents the conventional within-market conjectural variation; 
that is, firm k's response in market i to a quantity change by firm j in that market. It is 
assumed that the conjectural variations are identical for all firms and all markets. 
Similarly, expression (6) represents the cross-market conjectural variation, which 
signifies, for example firm k's response in market i to firm j's quantity in market 1. In 
other words, h o w  is c ompany 1 expected to respond in market 2 (in terms of a quantity 
change) w h e n  company 2 reduces (or increases) output in market 1. It is also assumed 
that the cross-market conjectural variations are identical for all firms and for all markets, 
except that a firm does not change its output in market i as a result of changing its 
output in market 1. Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) and solving for qjj yields 
(Alexander, 1985, p 126):
n m
q 1 i “  (a l -cj -tq S q ik- ( n - l ) F 2 b iq ij)/b(2 +  (n-l)V). (7)
k=l i=2
k^j
Since d e m an d  and cost conditions are identical across firms and markets, (7) can 
be rewritten as
q* =  (a - c) / b ((n +  1) +  (n +  1)V +  (n +  l)(m -1) F, (8)
where q* equals the equilibrium quantity derived from the reaction function 
shown in (7) and a s  aj, b =  bj, and c s  cj.
Expression (8) can be manipulated to derive several useful propositions. First 
holding the number of rivals constant (n-1) along with V  and F  (within-market and 
cross-market conjectural variation terms), increasing the number of multimarket
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contacts (m-1) reduces the equilibrium quantity for any market. Second the impact of 
linked oligopolies (reflected by the term F) is weighted by (n-1) (m-1), which is the 
number of multimarket rivals weighted by the number of multi-market contacts. Thus, 
given that firms compete in a multiple number of markets, increasing the number of 
contacts m a y  potentially reduce competition as output is being restricted. The last step is 
to relate this theoretical result concerning market structure (n and m )  to the market price. 
Recall equation (1) represents the d e m a n d  function for market i. If all markets are 
assumed to be identical, then using equations (1) and (8) yields (Alexander, 1985, p 
127):
P  =  a - ((an - nc)/((n +  1) +  (n +  1)V +  (n ~ 1) ( m  - 1)F)), (9)
where an increase in F  leads to an increase in price. Consequently, the linked 
oligopolies' behaviour will impact positively on price (Alexander, 1985, p 127).
O f  course, strong assumptions about identical demands and costs across 
European markets are needed for the simple reaction function equilibria values of P  in 
(9). But simple situations are very desirable for initially exploring a p henomenon as 
complex as the linked oligopoly hypothesis in European public procurement.
There are, however, two considerations which argue against the likelihood of
multimarket collusion a m o n g  firms. First, there are obstacles to collusive agreements
a m o n g  firms. Firms with different cost structures, perceptions of industry elasticity of
demand, and future expectations must agree on the appropriate price which will
maximise joint profits. This difficulty will be compounded the more differentiated the
market's product is (Strickland, 1984, p. 21). Secondly, the linked oligopoly hypothesis
implicitly assumes that pricing decisions of firms are centralized decisions. T op
management is aware of the of myriad relationships it has with its diversified
competitors and orchestrates the agreements necessary for multimarket collusion. If
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firms are organized on divisional or profit-centre basis, however, pricing decisions m a y  
be decentralized (Strickland, 1984, p. 22). Thus, market performance reflects subsidiary 
firms competing as if they were independent entities and the case of linked oligopoly 
diminishes. The question of whether the holding company integrates the operation of all 
subsidiary firms or operates each as a separated entity depends on the level of decision­
making. O n  the organization level and in the case of large procurement contracts the 
holding company m a y  provide an array of services to the affiliated firm which m a y  
include technical advice, market research, and the procurement of equipment. For 
example, the joint subsidiary of the British GEC and French Alsthom firms, G EC- 
Alsthom International is coordinating tenders on a European level and provides 
information on local market conditions (Interview with Mr. Heigtley, N o v e m b e r  1994, 
see Appendix C). Thus, the linked oligopoly hypothesis is mor e  complex than a simple 
extension of present oligopoly models.
In the next section in this chapter, measures of firm interdependence are derived 
which capture the multimarket aspect of firm contacts. These measures are then used as 
additional explanatory variables in the analysis of the determinants of firm competition 
and profitability.
. 7.3 Multimarket Contact and Methodology
Evans and Kessides (1994, pp 344-5) argue that Bernheim and Whinston offer
the first formal and complete treatment of multimarket contact and collusive behaviour.
Bernheim and Whinston (1990, pp 1-26) demonstrate that with perfect monitoring,
identical firms, identical markets, and constant returns to scale technology, multimarket
strategies do not affect the opportunities for tacit cooperation. However, they also
establish that under a variety of plausible circumstances, multimarket contact can
facilitate tacit cooperation by effectively relaxing the incentive constraints governing
142
tacit agreements a m o n g  oligopolists. For example, if firm production costs differ across 
markets, collusion can be sustained through the development of spheres of influence. 
Similarly, if a single firm maintains an absolute cost advantage over its competitors, or if 
the number of competitors varies across markets, firms can pool the incentive 
constraints across markets and transfer the ability to collude from tightly oligopolistic to 
more competitive markets. Also, if d e m a n d  growth rates differ across markets, 
multimarket contact serves as a device to shift punishment power from rapidly to slowly 
growing industries (Evans and Kessides, 1994, p. 345).
The Bemheim-Whinston conditions render the European procurement supply 
industry an ideal candidate for the empirical testing of multimarket contact effects. T o  
begin with, in a still nationally based industry such as procurement supply where less 
than 5 per cent of contracts are awarded to non-national suppliers (Interview with Mr. 
Turner, June 1994, see Appendix C; DTI, 1994, point 77), firms compete with each 
other in a number European regional or national procurement markets. European 
regional or national markets offer significant cost advantages to the firm operating 
within such markets. Procurement supply firms will therefore tend to differ in their 
production costs across geographic markets, and spheres of influence centered on 
regional or national markets are likely to arise. For example, differences in firm 
production costs across markets are likely to arise because of different labour costs. In 
addition, there are differences both in the number of operating procurement supply firms 
and the rate at which d e m a n d  has been growing.
In empirical tests of the linked oligopoly hypothesis, appropriate definition of the
market is important. However, in the case of European public procurement supply
industry the literature review in chapter 4 (section 4.3.2) indicated that public purchases
are concentrated in certain industries and that over 8 0 %  of the total purchasing ( E C U
360 billion) is m a d e  from less than 20 broad industry groups. Manufacturing accounts
for 33%, construction for 28%, market services for 22%, and energy for 1 6 %  of total
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purchasing. F r o m  the Atkins Study of break d o w n  of public purchasing of goods and 
services (Table 4.3.2.2) nineteen broad public procurement sectors have been selected 
and from these sectors something of two hundred firms will be subject to examination. 
A s  mentioned earlier, the potential for linked oligopoly is not limited to conglomerates 
but also for any other firms, including 'single-product1 firms that operate in a number of 
distinct geographical markets. F r o m  the Financial Times European top 500 companies 
table by capitalization, the following nineteen procurement sectors can be identified 
from which companies will be sought for further analysis (Financial Times, 10 February 
1993).
Table 7.3.1
Specific Procurement Sectors for Company Analysis
Codes Sectors
433 Pharmaceuticals
481 Business Services
482 Computer Software &  Services
521 Defence/Aerospace
522 Defence/Electronics
523 Aircraft/Manufacturers
531 Computers
533 Communication equipment
534 Office Equipment
541 Electrical Equipment
551 Electronics
552 Instrumentation/Control Equipment
561 Engineering Services
563 Machinery
566 Machinery-Industrial/Speciality
591 Diversified Industrial (Manufacturing)
592 Heavy Engineering/Shipbuilding
611 Building Materials
613 Construction
Source: Financial Times, 10 February 1993.
O n c e  procurement supply markets are delineated, tests of the linked oligopoly
hypothesis require that market-specific conditions be appropriately defined. A
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procurement firm and at least one rival must confront each other in two European 
national markets each of which is somewhat oligopolistic in performance. Both firms 
must be significant in both markets and both markets must be important to both firms. 
F r o m  the above table a list of procurement lines of business (PLBs) and data on the 
European operation of the largest European companies can be compiled from specialist 
press and databases (i.e. Extel) and com pa n y  reports. A  procurement line of business 
refers to a firm's operation in one of 19 manufacturing or service procurement 
categories.
A s  will be argued in the next section, the second and the probably most
important measurement of multimarket contact is the "procurement sales-at-risk"
contact, where the focus will be on competition across geographical rather than product
markets. The "procurement sales-at-risk" measure, PROSAR, m a y  be interpreted in
the following manner. This measure reflects the percentage of market share that a
company controls in all other PLB markets which are subject to potential retaliation by
rivals firms. Essentially, PROSAR indicates the E C U  value of sales that a multimarket
firm m a y  potentially risk w h e n  tendering a low price in a given market. Accordingly, the
greater the value of such tenders which are subject to retaliation, the more important
they are in the decision calculus; hence the more likely it is that the firm will avoid
competitive behaviour in any given market. Perhaps a simple example will illustrate the
issues discussed here. Suppose that there are ten multimarket firms, each competing in
the same ten product markets. Under these circumstances it is likely that the contacts
have very little or no importance in the firm's strategic behaviour. O n  the other hand,
suppose that each company haS a 10 percent share of the market. It follows that a greater
market share will have a greater impact on behaviour of each company, since a m u c h
share of the market is at risk. A n  analysis of PROSAR on all PLBs implicitly assumes
an independence of observations and by implication of decision making across PLBs
within a company. Since the linked oligopoly theory requires that there be a company-
level decision making process coordinated across PLBs, a more aggregated company
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level analysis is appropriate here. A s  Feinberg (1985, p. 228), indicates, PROSAR will 
be aggregated over all PLBs for a c ompany and will be used as an explanatory variable. 
It is difficult to evaluate either multimarket geographic contact or multimarket operation 
(diversification), using publicly available data because companies are often secretive 
about their share of geographical markets and reluctant to reveal all their market 
affiliations.
7.3.1 Estimating Equation
Most previous empirical attempts discussed in section 5.3.1 have been based on 
cross-sectional models that analyse differences in performance across industries or 
markets with measures of multimarket contact included as right-hand-side explanatory 
variables. O n e  exception is the analysis of Evans and Kessides (1994) which incorporate 
time-series as well as cross-sectional analysis. Most of these cross-sectional analyses 
have found that multimarket contact significantly affects performance, although the 
results vary across studies. According to B e m h e i m  and Whinston (1990, p. 22), contact 
can either increase or decrease prices and profits depending on the degree of external 
contact and internal market characteristics. Thus, B e m h e i m  and Whinston conclude that 
"identifying the effects of multimarket contact on the price or profit level of an industry 
m a y  require significantly more complex explanatory variables than have thus far been 
used in the literature". In the present project this c o m m e n t  is addressed is taken seriously 
and an econometric model is devised with a view to testing the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis. In accordance with previous empirical wor k  on the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis the data set is aimed at incorporating a cross-sectional model of European 
procurement supply firms. T h e  unit of observation is a procurement supply firm with 
two dependent variables: (i) rank mobility variable between 1988 and 1992, and (ii) 
profits/revenue ratio for 1992. The following estimating equation will be used in the 
regression analysis.
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Estimating Equation
Linear Model of European Procurement C o m p a n y  Study of Linked Oligopoly 
Hypothesis
RANKi; PROFITSi = b l + b2Ll-HOMEi + b3L2-ECi + b4L3 EFTAi + 
b5L4-TOTALi + b6PROSARi + bTELi + b8ESi + 
b9HHIi* + blOGROWTHi + b llG r(A )i + bl2SHAREAi + 
bl3SALESAi + bl4DIVi + ei (4)
where
RANKi =  Change in ranking between 1988 and 1992;
PROFITSi =  Profits/revenue ratio for 1992;
Ll -HOMEi = H o m e  multimarket links;
L2~ECi =  E C  multimarket links;
L3-EFTAi -  E F T A  multimarket links;
L4-TOTALi =  S u m  of LI, L 2  and L3;
PROSARi =  Procurement Sales-at-Risk for 1992;
ELi — a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if European
Legislation has been adopted for a company's main line of 
business; 0 otherwise;
ESi -  a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if European
Standards have been adopted for a company's main line of 
business; 0 otherwise;
HHIi* =  Hirshman-Herfindahl Index of concentration or a CR4 
four-firm concentration ratio;
GROWTHi =  growth in firm demand;
Gr(A)i -  growth in industry demand;
SHAREAi = average market share;
SALESAi =  sales per market;
DIVi = diversification; 
d  =  random error term.
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T he  £ term in the model is added to account for the fact that the model is not 
exact, e essentially describes the random disturbances or model error, ei is assumed to 
be uncorrelated from observation to observation, with m e a n  zero and a constant 
variance (homogeneous variance assumption) (Myers, 1990, p. 9). T he e term can be 
viewed as an aid in accounting for any variation due to the individual characteristics of 
each company, that is apart from the terms supplied by the model (Myers, 1990, p. 3). 
T he standard model-fitting scenario often involves a degree of uncertainty of what terms 
to include in the model. T he  decision can be further complicated by the existence of 
multicollinearity and by the views outlined earlier on the importance of individual 
variables.
For that purpose a pilot study based on a sample of 106 companies w as  
undertaken at the early stage of the research project. Several modelling strategies were 
used in the pilot empirical analysis. Firstly a linear model, using all the above variables, 
w as  estimated for the rank mobility and profitability. Next, the linear model w as 
extended by adding a quadratic term. T he  purpose w as  to test a nonlinear relationship by 
allowing the concentration ratio to have different effect on performance. Thirdly, several 
interaction terms were included as additional explanatory variables to allow for linked 
oligopolistic behaviour to have differential effects at various concentration levels. 
Finally, an alternative model form for rank mobility w as  used by a log transformation of 
the data. These four functional forms of the empirical model highlight the various4
aspects of linked oligopoly a m o n g  multimarket public procurement supply companies in
Europe. T he results of the pilot regression of company rank mobility were very close to
the regression results obtained from the final model. Overall the results reported to
indicate that the linked oligopoly concept has s ome impact in company's rank mobility
and intercompany rivalry is adversely affected by the interlinking of the same companies
in a large number of E C  national markets. The results of the pilot regression of company
profits were superior of that obtained from the final model. For example, the coefficient
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of determination R-sq of the pilot regression w as  reduced from 32.0% to 18.3%. This 
implies that an increase in the sample size (from 106 to 240 companies) decreased the 
explanatory capability of the model. Nevertheless, in both models the procurement 
sales-at-risk PROSAR, w a s  found to have a statistically significant positive effect in 
c ompany profitability at 1 0 %  level.
7.4 Conclusions
T he  aim of this chapter is to develop a general framework for the research 
process on the opening up of European public procurement in the Single Market. It is 
hypothesized that although public purchasers m a y  issue real tenders, collusion m a y  
already is taking place a m o n g  the main supplier networks and in the European market a 
new, even more concentrated group of linked oligopolies are able to share markets.
A n  important part of the research design is to provide an empirical test of the 
linked oligopoly hypothesis at a European level. Procurement sectors subject to such 
testing have been identified. It is argued that manufacturers and suppliers of 
procurement goods and services are oligopolistic in structure and that the necessary 
theory to explain firms' behaviour is that of oligopoly. The linked oligopoly hypothesis is 
an extension of the oligopoly theory and appropriate. T he study will use a multi­
regression model to test the effect of multimarket expansion of large diversified 
procurement firms at the com pa n y  level. T h e  focus of the empirical test will be the 
impact of multimarket contact on two dependant variables: economic performance and 
changes in company rank positions. The primary explanatory variables in the analysis 
are two measures of multimarket contact links for geographical diversity and multiple 
links a m o n g  companies. T he  research analysis will be in three stages: Firstly, the
collection and building of com pa n y  database. Secondly, the selection of c ompany data
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that are going to be used in the regression analysis. Thirdly, the interviewing process for 
the validation of findings.
T o  s u m  up, the opening up of European public procurement depends on firms' 
behaviour and on other barriers. If the linked oligopoly hypothesis is supported in the 
empirical test it is reasonable to assume that the present structure of European industry 
is hindering such an opening.
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8.0 DATA SELECTION AND COLLECTION OF EUROPEAN  
LEADING  COMPANIES INVOLVED IN SPECIFIC 
PROCUREMENT SECTORS
8.1 Data Sources
There are no published Census of Production data for European firms on 
multimarket contact and diversification. This study uses data from a specially 
constructed database from a variety of data sources. The data were collected as follows: 
A  list w a s  obtained of the leading European firms that operated in the specified 
procurement sectors in 1992. This information w as  gained from two sources: (1) T he  FT  
500 European companies and (2) the Times Europe's top 1000 companies tables. The 
sample is not random and includes the largest European companies involved in the 19 
procurement sectors. The F T 5 0 0  ranks the 500 largest European companies by market 
capitalisation. A  company's capitalisation is the number of its shares multiplied by the 
price of its shares, and therefore represents a measure of the value of a c ompany in the 
eyes of investors. Capitalisation ranking has a number of advantages over other 
methods. It is a good guide to performance over time; it gives a proper weighting to 
service companies such as banks, w ho se  positions are distorted in tables based on 
turnover; and it takes proper account of loss-making companies, which get removed 
from lists which are based on profits. A  major disadvantage of ranking based on 
capitalisation is that nationalised companies that have only a minimal proportion of their 
capital openly traded on the market, are being excluded. T he  F T 5 0 0  tables have been 
based on market capitalisation at the end of September 1992.
Additional companies had to be added in the sample in order to give adequate 
coverage for most sectors. Such companies were chosen from "The T I M E S  1000, 1992- 
1993" Table (1992), compiled by the Extel Financial Services, which ranks Europe's top 
1000 companies by turnover. Turnover rankings are based on company's latest accounts
mainly ending on financial years 1990, 1991 and 1992. F r o m  the T I M E S  1000 Table,
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companies which operate in one of the procurement sectors set for analysis but they 
were not sho wn  on the F T 5 0 0  Table were selected. O n c e  the leading firms were 
identified, the next step w a s  to obtain information for each firm regarding data on 
c ompany subsidiaries and geographical distribution, company's major business 
activities, turnover and profits. T h e  F T 5 0 0  classification w a s  used to select the 
companies that will be included in the sample and company reports, Extel reports, " W h o  
O w n s  Who", and a number of other references to trace information on the structure and 
industrial involvement of the companies were examined. For example, Extel Financial 
Services compile data for the major European companies showing their geographical 
distribution and their major business activities. B y  selecting information for European 
firms involved in public procurement, from the top F T  500 for each PLB and additional 
companies from the Times 1000 companies, to give adequate coverage for most 
procurement industry categories will obtain a large sample and this choice will allow for 
large increase in degrees of freedom in statistical tests; it will also permit the inclusion 
of variables measured simultaneously at the level PLBs, and m a y  help disentangle 
efficiency and collusive behaviour.
A  computer database of companies' profiles w a s  created by the author and a 
sample of this database is provided in Appendix B-1.0. The database is designed to such 
a w a y  as to provide information on the variables that will be used in the two multi­
regression models described in section 7.3.2, set out to test the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis. T he  database is grouped into company records and "fields". A  record is all 
the information about each company. Each item in a record (such as turnover, profits, 
etc.) is in a "field". T he database has 240 c ompany records and 59 "fields" per record. 
The sample then consists of the largest 240 European companies operating in the 
selected procurement lines of business in 1992. This time-period w a s  chosen since data 
were available for firms and in that year a large number of European mergers w a s  
observed. The turnover in 1992 of the companies in sample amounts to E C U  896 billion
and their actual and potential procurement sales for the same year amounts to E C U  167
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billion, approximately 3 3 %  of the European procurement market which is worth more 
than E C U  500 billion a year (see Appendix A - 1.2 for the annual value of European 
procurement trade). T he  sample of firms w a s  restricted to this group for two reasons. 
First, a larger sample w a s  m ore difficult to obtain as it required detailed information 
about smaller European companies (not included in the Extel database). Such an 
undertaking would have required significantly greater resources without in any w a y  
improving on the quality of the sample. Second, most of the concern over mergers has 
focused on the acquisitions of the largest European firms. These firms are a m o n g  the 
most diversified in the European eco no m y  and have the multimarket operations 
necessary to display the linked oligopoly behaviour. Hughes and Oughton (1993, pp 
211-3) constructed a database for U K  manufacturing in 1979 and derived estimates 
from similar sources such as com pa n y  accounts, trade directories, reports and case 
studies. Table 8.0.1 lists the sample of the 240 European companies under each selected 
sector, ranked by turnover and showing their country of origin.
154
TABLE 8.0.1
List of the Largest 240 European Companies Operating in 
Specific Procurement Sectors
433 PHARMACEUTICALS
No: Rank* Company Nationality
1 5 Hoechst D
2 9 ICI UK
3 13 Ciba-Geigy SWI
4 17 Rhone-Poulenc F
5 26 Sandoz SWI
6 29 Akzo NL
7 30 Roche Holdings SWI
8 32 Smithkline Beecham UK
9 33 Degussa D
10 34 Solvay B
11 37 Glaxo Holdings UK
12 44 Boots UK
13 45 Office Comm Pharma F
14 47 Procordia SWE
15 74 Elf Sanofi F
16 75 Schering D
17 82 Gehe D18 94 Wellcome UK
19 102 Beiersdorf D20 121 Astra SWE
21 134 Pi sons UK
22 150 Novo-Nordi sk DK23 155 Altana D
24 156 Merck D
25 162 UCB B
26 174 Smiths & Nephew UK
27 181 Institute Merieux F
28 186 Synthelabo F
29 188 Monberg & Thorsen DK
30 205 Gambo SWE31 207 Gist-Brocades NL
32 209 Ares-Serono SWI
481 BUSINESS SERVICES
33 24 BET UK34 113 ECCO F
35 128 AAH UK
36 146 ISS-Inter Serv Systems DK
37 151 SGS SWI38 153 Sodexho F39 165 BIS F40 183 Beredsen (Sophus) DK
41 238 Blenheim Groupe UK
482 COMPUTER SOFTWARE & SERVICES
42
43
44
124
219
232
CAP Gemini Sogeti 
SEMA Group
Cos Computer Systems
F
UK
SWI
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521 DEFENCE/AEROSPACE
45 1 Daimler-Benz D
46 28 Aerospatiale St F
47 54 Rolls-Royce UK
48 71 SNECMA F
49 - 73 Matra F
50 76 Lucas Industries Uk
51 77 Alenla I
52 119 Fokker NL
53 190 Vickers UK
54 199 Sextant Avionique F
55 214 Breda I
56 217 Westland Group UK
57 177 Hunting UK
58 231 Meggitt UK
522 DEFENCE/ELECTRONICS
59 115 Oerliko-Buhrle Holding SWI
60 141 Diehl D
61 240 Ferranti International UK
523 AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
62 14 British Aerospace UK
63 92 Dassault Aviation F
531 COMPUTERS
64 31 IBM Deutchland D
65 38 Hewlett Packard UK
66 48 IBM UK UK
67 51 Machines Bull F
68 52 Olivetti I
69 79 ICL UK
70 106 Unisys UK
71 140 Compaq Computers UK
72 169 Digital Equipment Co UK
73 228 Getronics NL
533 COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
74 4 Alcatel-Alsthom F
75 36 Ericson SWE
76 55 Cable & Wireless UK
77 114 Ascom Holding SWI
78 168 Northern Telecom (STC) UK
79 175 Motor-Columbus SWI
80 195 Sirti I
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534 OFFICE EQUIPMENT
81 68 Rank Xerox UK
82 95 Buhrmann-Tetterode NL
83 160 Strafor Facom F
84 164 Oee-Van Der Grinten NL
85 167 Esselte SWE
86 216 Linotype-Hell D
541 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
87 2 Siemens D
88 3 Philips NL
89 6 ABB Asea Brown Boveri SWE/SWI
90 24 Schneider Group F
91 27 GEC UK
92 49 Pirelli Inter I
93 57 BICC UK
94 157 Bekaert B95 225 Felten & Guilleaunte Energi D
96 233 Datwyler Holdings SWI
97 234 Rheinelectra D
551 ELECTRONICS
98 42 Thomson - CFF F99 81 Nokia FIN100 88 Racal Electronics UK
101 120 Sagem F
102 171 Gestener UK
103 224 Electrocomponents UK
552 INSTRUMENTATION/CONTROL EQUIPMENT
104 93 Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung D
561 ENGINEERING SERVICES
105 87 Electrowatt SWI
106 215 Weir Group UK
107 221 AEA UK
563 MACHINERY
108 21 Pechiney F
109 62 Sulzer SWI
110 179 Delta UK
111 206 Five-Lille F
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566 MACHINERY - INDUSTRIAL / SPECIALITY
112 8 Bosch D
113 10 Mannesmann D
114 23 Man G D
115 43 Hoesch D
116 63 Linde D
117 69 BOC UK
118 78 SKF SWE
119 83 Trelleborg SWE
120 86 AMEC UK
121 110 Sandwik SWE
122 117 Atlas SWE
123 145 Valxnet FIN
124 149 TI Group UK
125 170 Glynwed Int UK
126 176 KSB D
127 180 Vallourec F
128 187 FKI UK
129 191 IWKA D
130 201 Smiths Industries UK
131 203 ESAB SWE
132 211 Simon Engineering UK
133 227 Bucher SWI
591 DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIAL (MANUFACTURING)
134 12 Mettalgesellschaft D
135 15 Viag D
136 20 BTR UK
137 22 Haniel D
138 35 Tractebell B
139 46 Arbed L
140 53 Air Liquide F
141 65 Repola FIN
142 91 GNK UK
143 104 Siebe UK
144 116 Bowater UK
145 126 BBA UK
146 127 T & N ' UK
147 131 Stock NL
148 137 SMH SWI
149 154 IMI UK
150 158 Otra NL
151 159 Williams Holdings UK
152 182 SIG SWI
153 189 Babock Inter UK
154 196 Morgan Crusible UK
155 210 Hafslund Nycomed NOR
156 212 DeDietrich F
157 222 Sasib I
158 230 Zellwerger Uster SWI
159 236 Haden Maclellan UK
160 239 Wagon Indust UK
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592 HEAVY ENGINEERING & SHIPBUILDING
161 16 Preusag D
162 18 Krupp F D
163 39 British Steel UK
164 41 Trafalgar House UK
165 58 Cockerill Saxnbre B
166 59 AGIV D
167 64 Deutche Babcock D
168 70 Hoogevens NL
169 85 Tomkins UK
170 89 Schindler Holding SWI
171 98 Kvaerner NOR
172 101 Dragados E
173 107 Bremer Vulkan D
174 118 Klocker-Humboldt-Deutz D
175 122 FAG Kugelfisher etc D
176 123 Kone FIN
177 125 SMI-Sta Mettallurgica I
178 130 Landis & Gyr SWI
179 135 Rheinmettal Berlin D
180 138 Costain UK
181 144 FLS DK
182 161 Internatio - Muller NL
183 213 Altos Hornos de Vizcaya E
611 BUILDING MATERIALS
184 11 Hanson UK
185 19 Saint - Gobain F
186 50 Lafarge Cqppee F
187 56 Holderbank Management SWI
188 60 GTM - Entepose F
189 61 RMC UK
190 67 Pilkinson UK
191 80 Poliet F
192 84 Wolsey UK
193 96 Harissons & Crosfield UK
194 99 Redland UK
195 105 Ciments Francais F
196 108 Aker NOR
197 109 Wiirpey UK
198 129 Blue Circle Ind UK
199 132 Metra FIN
200 142 Heidelberg Zement D
201 147 CRH IR
202 148 Sommer Allibert F
203 152 BPB Ind UK
204 163 English China Clay UK
205 166 Cimenteries CBR B
206 173 Euroc SWE
207 178 Partek FIN
208 184 Italclmenti I
209 185 Forbo Holding SWI210 193 Imetal F
211 194 Dyckerhoff D
212 198 MB-Caradon UK
213 200 Rugby Group UK
214 202 Hepwoth UK
215 208 Marley UK
216 218 Etex F
217 229 Jens Villadsens Fab DK
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613 CONSTRUCTION
218 7 Eaux Generale Des F
219 25 Bouygues F
220 40 Holzmann(Philipp) D
221 66 Tarmac UK
222 90 Hochtief D
223 97 Bilfiger & Berger D
224 100 NCC SWE
225 103 Hollandische Beton NL
226 111 Fougerolle F
227 112 Strabag D
228 133 BPA UK
229 136 Laing UK
230 139 Mowlera UK
231 143 Taylor Woodrow UK
232 172 Saipem I
233 192 Zublin D
234 197 Wienerberger Bau AU
235 204 Sika-Finanz SWI
236 220 Raine UK
237 223 Unicem I
238 226 Beige Des Betons B
239 233 Hojgaard DK
240 237 Higgs & Hill UK
Sources: Selection from FT500 and TIMES 1000 (1992).
♦Rankings by turnover from Extel and Company Reports (1992).
T he sample list includes the largest European companies and does not 
distinguish between companies from the then European C o m m u n i t y  and the rest of 
Europe. T he non-Community companies are all from the E F T A  M e m b e r  States. 
Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish between European C om m u n i t y  and E F T A  
markets for the following three reasons: first, m a n y  company reports on their geographic 
business analysis often include sales and profits figures attributed to "the rest of Europe" 
as a whole, and not to the European C o m m u n i t y  or to individual national markets. 
Second, all E F T A  M e m b e r  States already participate in a number of procurement 
contracts under the G A T T  agreement on public procurement. Third, since 1993, and as 
a result of the signing of the E E A  Agreement, European C om m u n i t y  procurement 
legislation also applies to the six of the seven E F T A  M e m b e r s  States (Bock, 1993, p. 
136). It is desirable, therefore, that firms from an E F T A  M e m b e r  State be analysed in 
the same w a y  as those from the European Community, provided that such a firm and at 
least one of its rival confront each other in at least two European national markets (one 
of which is situated in the European Community).
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8.1 Rank Mobility and Profitability of the Largest 240 European 
Companies Operating in Specific Procurement Sectors
8.1.1 Rank Mobility or Rank Change
At the level of the top 1000 European firms, competition manifests itself in the 
form of sectoral shifts; that is, changes in the importance of particular sectors within the 
general e conomy determine the rank position of the larger firms in given periods of 
time, because even these firms have one or two sectoral specialisations. For example 
eighteen firms of the thirty two listed under "Pharmaceuticals" are included in the first 
hundred large companies in the selection list (Table 8.0.1), while only seven firms of the 
twenty three listed under "Construction" are include in the first hundred ranking, 
reflecting the diminishing importance of the latter sector. Such generalizations have only 
a limited value, however. D e  Jong (1988) argues that w h e n  studying the list of the thirty 
largest European C o m m u n i t y  firms one notes appreciable differences with respect to 
individual firms within industrial sectors. Firms, Jong adds, m a y  even improve their 
position while being in relatively stagnating sectors partly due to diversifying mergers. 
Shifts in rank positions a m o n g  the larger companies are therefore a reflection of both 
sectoral tendencies and individual c o m pa n y  strategies which, together, Jong calls 
sectoral competition (de Jong, 1988, p. 7). Heggestad and Rhoades (1976, p. 444), 
disagree and argue that rank mobility and turnover are not elements of industry structure 
but rather reflections of firm conduct or rivalry that theory would predict to arise from 
certain market structures. 'That is, unlike structure, [rank] mobility and turnover do not 
cause a certain kind of conduct; rather they are a reflection of conduct of firms in a 
market', (Heggestad and Rhoades, 1976, p. 444).
The focus of the empirical test will be the impact of the linked oligopoly 
behaviour on two dependant variables. T he first variable to be examined is that of 
interfirm rivalry or rank mobility or rank change (RANK) of leading European
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procurement firms, as measured by changes in rank positions. The assumption is that the 
primary concern of the oligopolistic firms that supply the public sector is that rivals will 
mutually forebear from vigorous price competition, w h e n  they c o m e  into contact in 
more than one product or geographical market. The stability of dominant firms' market 
share is taken as an indirect measure of the degree of rivalry in a multimarket setting. 
T he  greater the stability over time, the less likely is the market to be competitive and less 
likely to be opened to all suppliers. T he  selection of rank mobility is a more meaningful 
indicator of inter-firm competition than market share change because of the greater 
psychological significance associated with the firm's position in an industry (Heggestad 
and Rhoades, 1976, p. 446). Thus, w h e n  firm B  surpasses firm A  in an industry, the 
event is greeted with far greater publicity than w h e n  firm A  merely loses s om e  of its 
market share to firm B.
T he  rank mobility dependent variable is measured by changes in rank positions 
by turnover for each of the firms from a list of leading European supplying companies 
s ho wn  in Table 8.0.1. Turnover rankings are based on company's latest available 
accounts mainly ending on financial year 1992 (with some companies reports available 
only for late 1991 or early 1993) taken from company annual reports and from the Extel 
Financial Services c ompany reports. T he  selected companies are ranked by turnover for 
the year 1992 (1991 or 1993) and 1988 (1987 or 1989) respectively and their rank 
changes are computed by s u m m i n g  the changes in rank position. T o  maintain 
consistency, only those companies ranked in the 1992 list on the basis of their turnover 
are included in the 1988 list. National currencies have been converted to E C U  by 
employing the exchange rates published in the Official Journal of the European 
Community.
RANKi = S |Rj92 - Rj88| (1)
i=l
where Rj92 turnover of the jth firm in 1992 and Rj88 is the corresponding turnover of
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While the rank mobility variable (.RANK1) outlined above is intended to reflect 
the general nature of rivalry in the European market, its emphasis on the leading firms 
m a y  in s ome cases not account for aggressive behaviour by the next echelon of firms. 
This is most likely to occur in situations of n e w  technology or n e w  firm entry 
(Heggestad and Rhoades, 1976, p. 446). 'Although the conduct of small firms is 
potentially important, rank changes a m o n g  the smaller more closely matched firms is 
more likely attributable to chance, and therefore, any change is trivial and meaningless' 
(Heggestad and Rhoades, 1976, p. 446). T w o  studies in the United States have 
employed changes in rank positions as a dependent variable to empirically test the 
assumption of the linked oligopoly hypothesis in U S  banking (Heggestad and Rhoades, 
1978, and Martinez, 1990). Following H y m e r  and Pashigian (1962, p. 85) and 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1978, p. 528) the absolute value of the change is calculated 
since both positive and negative changes reflect instability in the market.
A  second variation of the rank variable is also introduced (RANK2), intended to 
reflect the specific nature of rivalry between European companies at industry level. 
RANK2 measures sectoral rank changes in the same w a y  as RANK1 for the five year 
period 1988-1992 (The majority of com pa n y  and Extel reports publish financial 
accounts for the latest five years).
Statistics of the sample of 240 leading European companies (see Table 8.1.2) 
indicate that in 1992, 70 of them (or 2 9 %  ) did not change positions from their 1988 
ranks, while the average rank rftobility is 3.7 positions for the same period.
1988.
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8.1.2 Profits and Multimarket Contact
T he  second dependant variable of the empirical test is the impact of linked 
oligopoly behaviour on company profits. T he  year of observation is 1992, and it is a 
year of relatively low inflation in the largest European economies. T he  relation between 
seller concentration and profits tends to disappear in high inflation years. It is argued 
that the difficulty of finding a n e w  oligopolistic consensus on price is the likely reason 
(Scott, 1982, p. 372).
Although 1992 w a s  a recession year for the European C o m m u n i t y  (El-Agraa, 1994, 
p. 193) with low or even negative economic growth for some European economies, it is 
expected with s ome reservation that profits are higher in markets where oligopolistic 
structure and high multimarket contact coincide. Firms in these markets m a y  be 
technically efficient, but if resources m o v e  freely their profits, ceteris paribus, should be 
no mor e  than those of other firms. T he  linked oligopoly theoiy states that companies 
meeting rivals in m ore than one geographic or product market will be able to facilitate 
collusion in one or all of those markets and not compete away their profits. The second 
dependent variable employed here is therefore, profit before tax, computed from the 
Extel and C o m p a n y  Annual Reports for 1992 (figures for 1991 are used w h e n  1992 data 
are not available). Profitability is calculated as net profit before tax as a percentage of 
turnover (PROFITS). Scott (1982, pp. 368-375), Strickland (1985, pp 153-159), and 
Feinberg (1985, pp 225-241) employed profitability (the so-called price-cost margin 
(PCM)), as a dependent variable in their analysis of multimarket contact and economic 
performance of large U S  manufacturing companies. Hughes and Oughton (1993, pp 
203-224), also employed price-cost margin as dependant variable in their analysis of 
diversification and multimarket contact for the British manufacturing industry in 1979. 
Schmalensee argues that 'the drawback of profitability measures based on accounting 
data yield noisy measures of economic variables and even with large samples, m a y  miss 
real relations involving true, economic profitability and report spurious relations that are
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mere artifacts of accounting practices’ (Schmalensee, 1989, pp 961-2). O n  the other 
hand, firms use accounting data in decision-making, and m a n y  studies in the finance and 
accounting literature find that the stock market reacts to the publication of accounting 
reports (Schmalensee, 1989, p. 962).
TABLE 8.1.2
Selected Structural/Financial Indicators of 
Competitiveness of Europe1s Leading Companies in 
Supplying Public Sectors, 1988-92(a)
No. Companies Nationa- Sector Rank Mobility Profitabi­
lity Change from lity (c)
1988 (b) %
(RANKI)
1. Daimler-Benz D 521 0 2.066
2. Siemens D 541 1 4.072
3. Philips NL 541 1 -0.850
4. Al catel-Alsthorn F 533 2 5.986
5. Hoechst D 433 0 4.595
6. ABB Asea SWE/I 541 4 4 . 746
7. Eaux General F 613 2 2.153
8. Bosch D 566 0 3.264
9 ICI UK 433 2 -3.183
10. Mannesmann D 566 1 1.392
11. Hanson UK 611 1 10.409
12. Mettalgesellschaft D 591 1 0.962
13. Ciba-Geigy SWI 433 1 6.845
14 British Aerospace UK 523 1 -12.037
15. Viag D 591 25 3.031
16 Preusag D 592 20 2.494
17. Rhone-Poulenc F 433 3 5.667
18. Krupp F D 592 4 -0.919
19. St Gobain F 611 3 5.161
20. BTR UK 591 2 12.272
21. Pechiney F 563 1 2.014
22. Haniel D 591 4 1.962
23. Man G D 566 2 3.312
24. Schneider Group F 541 6 2.055
25. Bouygues F 613 8 1.971
26. Sandoz SWI 433 5 10.370
27. GEC UK 541 10 14.357
28. Aerospatiale F 521 1 -4.458
29. Akzo NL 433 6 5.639
30. Roche Holdings SWI 433 9 20.659
31. IBM D D 531 3 -2.239
32. Smithkline Beecham UK 433 7 21.364
33. Degussa D 433 9 1.558
34 . Solvay B 433 5 4.510
35. Tractebel B 591 153 12.830
36. Ericson SWE 533 8 3.502
37. Glaxo UK 433 21 34.836
38. Hewlett Packard UK 531 31 6.238
39. British Steel UK 592 20 -3.462
40. Holzmann (Phillip) D 613 21 2.606
41. Trafalgar House UK 592 7 -0.777
42. Thomson-CSF F 551 5 5.482
43. Hoesch D 566 8 1.565
44. Boots UK 433 3 10.220
45. Office Comm Pharma F 433 20 0.854
46. Arbed L 591 3 -3.232
47. Procordia SWE 433 30 12.135
48. IBM UK UK 531 21 -20.442
49. Pirelli Int I 541 21 -1.309
50. Lafarge Cqppee F 611 18 6.155
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51. Machine Bull F 531 9 -15.268
52. Olivetti I 531 20 -6.968
53. Air Liquids F 591 4 12.153
54. Roll Royce UK 521 10 -5.165
55. Cable & Wireless UK 533 44 20.260
56. Holderbank Management SWI 611 26 7.235
57. BICC UK 541 11 2.272
58. Cockerill Sabre B 592 4 2.140
59. AGIV-AG D 592 37 3.106
60. GTM-Entepose F 611 21 1.059
61. RMC UK 611 4 5.'305
62. Sulzer SWI 563 2 2.470
63. Linde D 566 21 6.330
64. Deutsche Babock D 592 11 1.626
65. Repola FI 591 27 -0.961
66. Tarmac UK 613 21 -11.930
67. Pilkinson UK 611 15 2.949
68. Rank Xerox UK 534 18 5.179
69. BOC UIC 566 13 7.871
70. Hoogovens NL 592 15 -3.628
71. SNECMA F 521 7 -3.443
72. BET UK 481 10 0.788
73. Matra F 521 3 2.797
74. Elf-Sanofi F 433 15 7.732
75. Schering D 433 1 8.338
76. Lucas Ind UK 521 9 0.998
77. Alenia I 521 80 1.310
78. SKF SWE 566 12 6.645
79. ICL UK 531 12 1.557
80. Poliet D 611 24 6.142
81. Nokia FI 551 40 4.441
82. Gehe D 433 3 3.223
83. Trelleborg SWE 566 20 -6.629
84. Wolsey UK 611 11 4.673
85. Tomkins UK 592 93 8.302
86. AMEC UK 566 9 -4.124
87. Electrowatt SWI 561 6 6.098
88. Racal Electronics UK 551 0 8.489
89. Schindler Holdings SWI 592 16 4.365
90. Hochtief D 613 37 4.775
91. GNK UK 591 32 6.109
92. Dassault F 522 22 1.927
93. Carl Zeiss-Stiffung D 552 8 2.547
94. Wellcome UK 433 3 28.640
95. Burhraann-Tetterode NL 534 14 3.346
96. Harissons & Crosfield uie 611 24 4 .397
97. Bilfinger Berger D 613 64 3.223
98. Kvaerner NOR 592 46 4 . 658
99. Redland UK 611 16 11.710
100. NCC SWE 613 47 -7.653
101. Dragados E 592 44 3.998
102. Beiersdorf D • 433 6 6.906
103. Hollandische Beton NL 613 26 2.104
104. Siebe UK 591 6 10.417
105. Ciments Francaise F 611 16 -5.542
106. Unisys UK 531 52 3.567
107. Bremer Vulkan D 592 98 1.954
108. Aker NOR 611 2 2.120
109. Wimpey UK 611 36 -6.911
110. Sandvik SWE 566 31 8.706
111. Fougerolle F 613 26 3. 910
112. Strabag D 613 31 2.219
113. Ecco F 481 34 2.469
114. Ascom SWI 533 11 -1.485
115. Oerliko-Burle SWI 522 35 2.065
116. Bowater UK 591 30 9.748
117. Atlas SWE 566 15 6.415
118. Klocker-Humberbolt D 592 33 0.057
119. Fokker NL 521 50 0.210
120. Sagem F 551 6 7.605
121. Astra SWE 433 50 32.887
122. Fag Kuggelfisher D 592 15 -12.048
123. Kone FI 592 25 4.619
124. Cap Gemini Sogeti F 482 58 0.869
125. SMI-Sta Mettallurgica I 592 29 -0.981
126. BBA UK 591 13 3.583
127. T & N me 591 16 4.532
128. AAH me 481 6 2.660
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129. Blue Circle UK 611 31 6.846
130. Landis & Gyr SWI 592 11 3.860
131. Stork NL 591 25 2.262
132. Metra FI 611 63 3.946
133. BPA SWE 613 2 -1.958
134. Fisons UK 433 5 9.624
135. Rheinmettal Berlin D 592 23 1.640
136. Laing UK 613 51 0.924
137. SMH SWI 591 15 14.952
138. Costain UK 592 23 -11.950
139. Moulem UK 613 23 -2.184
140. Compaq UK 531 20 7.300
141. Diehl D 522 1 0.529
142. Heidelberger Zement D 611 20 7.594
143. Taylor Woodrow UK 613 43 -5.391
144. FLS DK 592 6 3.336
145. Valinet FI 566 42 -0.625
146. ISS-Inter Serv DK 481 44 3.318
147. CRH IR 611 9 5.162
148. Sommer Allibert F 611 15 3.353
149. TI Group UK 566 31 7.604
150. Novo Nordisk DK 433 42 15.674
151. SGS SWI 481 8 12.248
152. BPB Ind UK 611 33 5.113
153. Sodexto F 481 15 4 .212
154. IMI UK 591 22 7.572
155. Altana D 433 8 7.227
156. Merck D 433 42 11.999
157. Bekaert B 541 8 4.072
158. Otra NL 591 33 4.701
159. Williams Holdings UK 591 28 15.578
160. Strafor Facom F 534 38 2.800
161. Internatio-Muller NL 592 19 1.533
162. UCB B 433 18 5.301
163. English China Clay UK 611 46 9.386
164. Oce-Van Der Grinten NL 534 17 4.357
165. BIS B 481 5 -0.448
166. Clmenteries CBR B 611 10 9.717
167. Esselte SWE 534 77 -0.111
168. Northen Telecom UK 533 18 8.994
169. Digital Equipment UK 531 23 -3.639
170. Glynwed Int UK 566 40 3.651
171. Gestener Holdings UK 551 25 3.021
172. Saipem I 613 6 6.540
173. Euroc SWE 611 45 -1.531
174. Smiths & Nephew UK 433 9 18.024
175. Motor-Columbus SWI 533 65 2.686
176. KSB D 566 23 6. 766
177. Huntig UK 521 62 3.593
178. Partek FI 611 44 -1.241
179. Delta UK 563 24 7.003
180. Vallourec F 566 27 6.766
181. Inst. Merieux F 433 54 15.703
182. SIG SWI 591 41 3.384
183. Beresden (Sophus) DK 481 24 15.536
184. Italcimenti I 611 7 5.961
185. Forbo Holdings SWI 611 2 4 .069
186. Synthelabo F 433 27 9.922
187. FKI UK 566 93 20.394
188. Monberg & Thorsen DK 433 16 2.588
189. Babcock Inter UK 591 8 2.807
190. Vickers UK 521 55 -3.604
191. IWKA D 566 16 4.490
192. Zublin D 613 24 1.102
193. Imetal F 611 122 7.240
194. Dyckerhoff D 611 8 4 . 992
195. Sirti I 533 14 29.327
196. Morgan Crusible UK 591 7 9.961
197. Wienerberger Bau AU 613 39 4.749
198. MB-Caradon UK 611 17 18.919
199. Sextant Avionique F 521 29 0.095
200. Rugby Group UK 611 16 11.151
201. Smiths Ind UK 566 50 16.080
202. Hepworth UK 611 30 7.139
203. ESAB SWE 566 9 2.483
204. Sinka-Finanz SWI 613 30 5.963
205. Gambro SWE 433 9 11.929
206. Fives-Lille F 563 21 2.729
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207. Gist-Brocades NL 433 28 7.997
208. Marley UK 611 44 1.423
209. Ares-Serono SWI 433 11 14.136
210. Hafslund Nycomend NOR 591 16 27.469
211. Simon Engineering UK 566 44 1.087
212. De Dietrich F 591 5 3.778
213. Altos Hornos E 592 40 -40.249
214. Breda I 521 27 -4.312
215. Weir roup UK 561 18 9.206
216. Linotype-Hell D 534 12 5.510
217. Westland UK 521 14 6.230
218. Etex F 611 7 9.122
219. Serna UK 482 15 4.656
220. Raine UK 613 5 3. 685
221. AEA UK 561 28 -11.295
222. Sasib I 591 9 8.026
223. Unicem I 613 4 11.733
224. Electrocomponents UK 551 23 14.709
225., Felten & Guilleaume D 541 7 3.911
226., Beige Des Betons B 613 2 2.424
227., Bucher SWI 566 15 6.179
228. Getronics NL 531 9 8.810
229. Jens Villadsens DK 611 23 3.829
230., Zellweger Uster SWI 591 22 0.832
231., Meggitt UK 521 4 28.571
232.. Cos Computers SWI 482 32 -32.315
233.. Datwyler SWI 541 12 3.982
234.. Rheinelectra D 541 4 10.956
235.. Hojgaard DK 613 13 -3.401
236.. Haden Maclellan UK 591 4 1.461
237.. Higgs £ Hill UK 613 27 -3.957
238., Blenheim UK 481 0 2.078
239.. Wagon Ind Uk 591 10 7.310
240.. Ferranti Int UK 522 116 -10.610
Average: 3.7 4.264
(a) Firms ranked in terms of their 1992 worldwide turnover
(b) Change in rank position for period 1992-1988
(c) Profits before tax as a percentage of turnover 
Sources: Company Annual Reports, Extel Reports
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8.2 Multimarket Links as an Indicator for Competition Intensity
T he  primary explanatory variables in the analysis are the four constructed 
measures of Intercompany Linkage (L ) and the Procurement Sales-at-Risk variable 
(PROSAR): the European sales/turnover in E C U  attributed to a company's procurement 
contracts outside its h o m e  country. T he  three constructed linkage measures are 
formulated in such a w a y  so as to capture the extent of geographical diversity attained by 
each company both within and outside their country of registration.
* T he  L I-H O M E variable is designed to monitor the degree of linkage attained 
by each company from its operations in the country of registration, and measures the 
number of subsidiaries and associated companies that it operates within its h o m e  
country;
* the L2-EC accounts for a company's geographic expansion in the European 
C o m m u n i t y  M e m b e r  States, and measures the number of the company's subsidiaries and 
associated companies in the European C om m u n i t y  M e m b e r  States excluding h o m e  
subsidiaries;
* the L3-EFTA measure takes into account the number of the company's 
subsidiaries and associated companies in the E F T A  M e m b e r  States (excluding h o m e  
subsidiaries w h e n  the company is registered in an E F T A  M e m b e r  State);
* the L4-TOTAL is a composite variable of the above three variables.
The above four linkage variables are calculated from D u n  and Bradstreet 
Directory, "Who Owns Who" (1992-1993), which gives a detailed list of all subsidiaries, 
associated companies, investment and non-trading companies of all major European 
firms. T he reliability of the Directory has been scrutinized by random checks of some 
company reports. All such subsidiaries and associated companies operating within their 
h o m e  country and within the other European countries are counted, taking care to 
disregard dormant companies, non-trading subsidiaries and associated companies, 
companies set up for investment and tax purposes, and companies set up to operate the
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company's pension funds (The Directory marks dormant and companies set up for 
investment and tax purposes). T he  assumption on which all three variables (Ll-Home, 
L2-EC and L3-EFTA) are constructed is that companies operating larger networks of 
subsidiaries tend to be most geographically diversified and, thus, likely to have a greater 
number of multiple contacts with other companies both within and outside their h o m e  
country. These multiple contact points are the elements that bind companies together to 
form a structurally and functionally integrated production and distribution system. Such 
multiple contacts by the same companies, either on a national or on a European basis, in 
a progressively large number of national or regional markets, is likely to strengthen the 
lines of communication between them, especially w h e n  they bid for large procurement 
contracts and thus to decrease intercompany rivalry. It is hypothesized that an increase 
(decrease) in the number of contacts has a negative (positive) impact on intercompany 
rivalry. A  similar structure of linkage variables w a s  employed by Martinez (1990, p. 
592).
Sample statistics (Tables 8.2.3, 8.3.1.1 and 8.3.1.2) s h o w  that the 240 European 
companies in the sample have 28,500 companies and subsidiaries in Europe (European 
C o m m u n i t y  and E F T A )  and typically:
* have hundreds of subsidiaries (average = 119)
* operate in 1-17 product markets (average = 4.25)
* operate in 1 - 6 procurement lines of business (average =
1.25)
* have subsidiaries in a majority of other Member States 
(average = 4.5 subsidiaries per national market)
A s  mentioned earlier on, the second important explanatory variable, 
" Procurement Sales-at-Risk", (PROSAR), per E C U  of c ompany sales, measures the 
importance of the European multimarket procurement sales to the company taking place
outside its national market. F r o m  company reports information could be obtained
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regarding c ompany sales (and/or profits) analysis regarding their main business 
activities and s ome limited information on the company's geographical business 
analysis. F r o m  the company's main business analysis taken from the Extel and/or 
C o m p a n y  Annual Reports it could possible to distinguish with s om e  reservation which 
of the above business activities belong to one of the targeted nineteen procurement 
sectors/categories. In m a n y  cases this becomes an arbitrary process because it is not 
always clear to qualify and/or to quantify which of the company's products or services 
are designated for the public or private sector, or for both. After the geographical 
analysis of each company, it could possible to calculate the percentage of actual and 
potential procurement sales taking place in the rest of European C o m mu n it y  and/or 
Europe, excluding sales in its h o m e  market. In some cases c ompany accounts do not 
provide such geographical business analysis and Procurement-Sales-at-Risk figures are 
calculated from the geographical distribution of company subsidiaries and in a few cases 
they are rough estimates (Appendix B-l.l). S o m e  companies in the pharmaceutical or 
construction sectors m a y  operate in one PLB and some others, like electrical equipment 
companies, m a y  have activities in m a n y  PLBs. For each line of business, information on 
market share, diversification, profits and vertical integration is sought. A s  some 
companies have only one PLB the focus will be on competition across geographic 
markets rather than product markets.
T he  actual and potential Procurement Sales-at-Risk (PROSAR) measure of 
multimarket linkage is based on the so called Sales-at-Risk (SAR) concept developed by 
Feinberg (1985, p. 227). T he  term "sales-at-risk" represents the concept of market sales 
that m a y  be lost w h e n  a rival firms cuts prices in other markets. Feinberg argues that 
sales-at-risk (SAR) is the theoretically and intuitively best measure of the importance of 
multiple market links a m o n g  companies. The SAR measure weights multimarket 
contacts by the sales that are at stake in the markets in which multimarket contacts 
occur. Feinberg indicates that S A R  does not distinguish between multimarket contacts 
due to conglomerate diversification and those due to vertical integration, but this is no
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defect; both types of contact should provide opportunities for facilitating collusion 
(Feinberg, 1985, p. 227). T he  term w a s  also used by Alexander (1985) on his empirical 
test of the mutual forbearance hypothesis. Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) have also 
used similar measures in their empirical investigation. F r o m  the above studies it is 
expected that the Procurement Sales-at-Risk variable (PROSAR) will have a negative 
effect on rank mobility and a positive one on a company's profitability. The majority of 
the companies in the sample with the exception of pharmaceutical, building materials 
and s ome construction companies, are operating in several product lines of business. 
Table 8.2.3 shows these firms' diversification and also the n umber of their procurement 
lines of business.
Table 8.2.3
Frequency Distribution Showing the Number of Selected 
European Companies With a Given Number of Lines of 
Business (LBs) and Procurement Lines of Business (PLBs)
Frequency
Number
(1)
Class:Frequency: 
Number of 
Companies 
with LBs 
(2)
Frequency: 
Number of 
Companies 
with PLBs 
(3)
Class Total:
(a)Number of (b)Number 
LBs PLBs
<l)x<2) (1) x(3)
1 18 214 18 214
2 35 41 70 82
3 30 6 90 18
4 39 4 156 16
5 35 1 175 5
6 21 1 126 6
7 7 0 49 0
8 4 0 32 0
9 4 0 36 0
10 1 0 10 0
11-17 2 0 29 0
Total: 791 LBs 341 PLBs
Column 1 contains a range of classes to avoid disclosure of 
disaggregated data.
Source: 1992 Company Annual Reports and Extel Reports.
The above table indicates that the majority of firms are multi-product companies 
operating in more than one line of business. For such multi-product firms PROSAR is 
calculated from the firm's procurement lines of business (as percentage of European 
sales), while for single-product but multinational firms PROSAR is calculated from the 
firm's sales across all its European geographic markets. T he  PROSAR measure weights
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multimarket contacts by the sales that are at stake in the geographic markets rather than 
product markets in which multimarket contacts occur. For a single procurement line of 
business, say company l's operation in a geographic market p,
n
PROSARjjj = I  S q j  (1)
F q*p 4
where =  c ompany l's sales in geographic market q.
A s  w a s  noted earlier, PROSAR measures the importance of multimarket contacts 
to the company and a positive relationship is manifested, reflecting more linked 
oligopolistic behaviour, especially at high level of concentration which allows for more 
strategic behaviour on the part of the firm. Therefore, the next section examines the 
importance of the concentration variable and also gives an analysis of the remaining 
explanatory variables.
8.3 Concentration as an Indicator of Competition Intensity
Concentration is an important independent variable used in the analysis because 
it is a proxy for the basic competitive structure of an industry. Thus, in markets 
characterized by a high level of concentration, the interdependence of firms is strong, 
and therefore, aggressive pricing and product policies are easily observed and 
recognised as potentially damaging because of retaliation (Heggestad and Rhoades, 
1976, p. 446). In this market environment it is, therefore, rational for a firm to avoid 
aggressive behaviour. It is anticipated that the lack of rivalry a m o n g  firms in 
concentrated markets will be reflected in relatively little rank mobility, and high profits 
a m o n g  the leading firms. T w o  questions are of central importance here: which measure 
of concentration should be employed and h o w  should geographic and product 
boundaries be drawn?
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T he  concentration ratio measures the share of the market or industry held by the 
m  largest firms ( m  =1, 2, 4, ...8, ...10, ...20,...). It is written
m
C =  S P : , (i = 1, ...m, m + 1 , n), (2)
1=1
where the ith firm has rank i in a descending order of classification, where C  =  the s u m  
of the shares of the m  top firms, and where Pi= the share of firm i. Problems arise in 
using the concentration ratio have been discussed by de Jong (1988, pp. 9-12), and a 
number of further general remarks m a y  be m a d e  concerning the difficulties which in 
fact relate to most measures:
* In the case of multi-plant firms, concentration at the enterprise level will 
obviously be higher than at the plant level. It is becoming more and more necessary, de 
Jong adds (de Jong, 1988, pp 9-12) to ask whether the concept of firm or company 
should not be replaced by that of the group, that is a set of distinct legal entities 
controlled by a central economic unit calculated on an overall basis. Such groups can be 
studied by means of consolidated balance sheets, but these do not disclose every activity. 
B y  means of (often minority) shareholding, interlocking directorships and personal ties, 
groups are able to control larger h u m a n  and financial resources than concentration 
measures would suggest.
T he  unit of concentration analysis in the present study is the enterprise group 
comprising all firms under c o m m o n  control. T he meaning of control is defined broadly 
in order to incorporate minority control, i.e., control with less than 5 0 %  of company 
shares.
* The selection of the variable in which size is expressed affects the results: If 
turnover (sales) are taken as the criterion, the importance of the firm in relation to
Types o f Concentration Measures
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d e m a n d  comes out neatly, but vertical integration is not taken into account, as it is w h e n  
added-value is used. Unfortunately data on added-value is insufficiently available for 
analytical purposes. Moreover, both criteria are affected by price changes which alter 
m o n e y  values. Employment and financial capital are both indispensable factors of 
production but reflect the capital intensity of the sector concerned. For instance, if firm 
size in mechanical industries is measured by employment, the results will be 
systematically undervalued. Assets, whether fixed or total, pose the problem of the 
difference between historic and current values, due to a m o n g  others, changes in the 
monetary unit, revaluations and depreciations.
The variable of concentration measurement in this study is sales (turnover). Sales 
figures and other financial information were converted to monthly or annual averages of 
European Currency Unit ( E C U )  (published in the Official Journal of'the European 
Community) in order to have a c o m m o n  denominator.
* It is necessary to define the product market in order to measure concentration. 
T he latter will obviously vary with the breadth of definition. In the European 
Community's N A C E  standardised classification a two-digit classification, distinguishes 
between manufacturing industries. T he  three-digit classification has about ninety-four 
subsectors, but even at this level of classification no real product markets can be 
distinguished, though such classification suffices to study firm behaviour (de Jong, 
1988, pp 9-12).
The majority of European firms that are included in the sample for further 
analysis, are in industry groups which cover a wide range of related industries. 
Consequently, data restrictions allows only the measurement of aggregate market 
concentration.
T he reference measure for size in the present project is sales turnover and 
concentration ratios in terms of the top-four firm-ratio (CR4), and the Hirschman- 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) have been calculated. For the numerator of the (CR4)
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concentration ratio the leading firms in the industry have to be identified. For single 
procurement product firms, for example pharmaceuticals, following the classification of 
Business Directories the industry includes firms with a majority specialization in 
pharmaceuticals but excludes firms with a majority specialization in chemical products. 
T he  ideal case for concentration measurement would be a firm with a 1 0 0 %  
specialization which sells in one geographic market. In reality, large multinational firms 
in the sample are diversified into non-procurement goods and services and maintain a 
network of non-European production by subsidiary companies. A s  w as  pointed earlier, 
in their Annual Reports, firms classify sales by product market and by geographic 
market, but this is done in separate statements and not a combination of both as is 
needed for concentration measurement. Consequently, a concentration ratio employed 
by Marfels (1988, p. 5) w a s  adopted, in which for the numerator of the concentration 
ratio the assumption had to be m a d e  that the sales ratio in the relevant product market is 
the same in the relevant geographic market.
* Equally important is the geographical definition of a market. Concentration 
tends to be m u c h  higher, ceteris paribus, in small industries or countries. O n  the other 
hand, calculations based on production in a national market would overestimate 
concentration if any imports were not taken into account.
T he analysis of concentration in terms of the relevant geographic market is done 
on European and not on a European C om mu n it y  scale. A s  competition cases m a k e  
clear, it is often difficult to choose a m o n g  market definitions (i.e. the Alcatel/AEG 
Kabel case discussed in chapter 10).
In contrast to the concentration ratio, various other measures take account of all
firms in the sector and differ mainly in the weights given to market share. O n e  of the
most representative measure is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI):
n 2H H I  = £  Ss, (3)
i=l
which is the s u m  of squared market shares of the n firms in the market. This takes
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account of all firms in the sector, weighted according to relative market share. T he  
smaller the firm, the less it counts. H H I could be employed as an alternative 
concentration ratio and it is presented in the original form, i.e., its values are 
standardized to the interval from 0 to 1 with the value of unity indicating a one-firm 
industry or market. In order to m a k e  the calculation procedure operational, only certain 
firms with more than a specific threshold in sales in the relevant geographic market have 
been included, which yields a m a x i m u m  of HHI. In addition the m i n i m u m  value, 
corresponding to a situation where n firms hold an identical share, will be 1/n:
n 2
HHI = E (1/2) = 1/n (4)i=l
H H I is therefore an inverse function of the number of firms in the sector. The simplicity 
of this measure and its link with oligopoly theory m a k e  it popular. Stigler (1964) 
suggests that the H H I provides a reasonable measure for the ease of detecting cheating 
on collusive agreements, but such arguments are not 'fully rigorous'; in short, 'received 
theory does not dictate the choice of concentration measure' (Schmalensee, 1989, p. 
966).
T o  s u m  up, two proxy concentration ratios, a top-four firm concentration ratio 
(CR4) and a Hirschmatt-Herfindahl Index (HHI), will be employed in the research. It 
is not possible to construct proper concentration ratios because of the lack of reliable 
aggregate data on a European level for 1992. Instead the proxy concentration ratio 
(CR4) and the (HHI) are calculated from the sample data as an improvement on 
employing officially defined "markets" for which geographic or product boundaries do 
not seem reliable. *
A  negative relationship between the CR4 or H H I and rank mobility, and a 
positive one with profitability is postulated due to opportunities for collusion in more 
concentrated markets.
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8.3.1 Collection and Measurement of Selected Structural Variables 
of European Leading Companies Involved in Specific 
Procurement Sectors
T w o  dichotomous variables that affect firm structure and performance are 
adopted. The first variable measures the effect of European Procurement Law (EL) on 
companies and takes a value of 1 if such European C om mu n it y  legislation has been 
adopted on the company's main procurement line of business and 0 if otherwise. It is 
expected that adoption of European procurement directives will reduce entry barriers 
because will allow any non-national com pa n y  to tender and be awarded of number of 
procurement contracts and this will have a positive effect on rank mobility and a 
negative one on a company's profitability.
The second dichotomous variable measures the effect of adaptation of European 
Standards (ES) on com pa n y  ranking and profitability. It will equal 1 if European 
Standards or International Technical Standards have been adopted on the company's 
main procurement line of business and 0 if otherwise. The ES variable, for the same 
reasons as E L,  is expected to have a positive effect on rank mobility and a negative one 
on company profitability.
Growth in demand (GROWTH) is included as an independent variable to reflect 
the likelihood of entry of n e w  firms and the likely disequilibrium of relationships a m o n g  
firms already in the market. Rapidly growing markets will tend, ceteris paribus, to be 
most appealing for n e w  entrants. T he  GROWTH variable is the average d e m a n d  growth 
computed from the company's average percentage change in the company's turnover 
sales from 1988 to 1992. Alexander (1985, pp 129-130) argues that an increase in 
de m a n d  m a y  lead to a short-run increase in price or, quoting Stigler (1964, pp 44-61)
w h o  states that a decrease in price because of a rapidly growing market creates
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uncertainty which induces cheating or tacit agreements. Therefore, the GROWTH  
variable can be expected to have a positive or negative effect on either profitability or 
rank mobility.
The rate o f growth fo r  industry Gr(A) is the average com pa n y  growth at industry 
level. This proxy for d e m a n d  growth is expected to have a negative impact on rank 
mobility and a positive impact on profit margins.
T w o  sales variables employed by Feinberg (1985, p. 229) are introduced. T he 
SHA REA variable is a company's sales-weighted average market share. It includes 
European company sales covering all lines of business (and not only procurement lines 
as in PROSAR) weighted by the number of European C o m m u n i t y  national markets in 
which the company operates at least one subsidiary or an associated company. F r o m  a 
previous study (Feinberg, 1985, p. 229) it is expected a negative coefficient on this 
variable for rank mobility or a positive one for profitability, regardless of whether the 
"cause" is greater market power, economies of scale, or both. It is calculated as the 
firm's total European sales (turnover) weighted by the number of average number of 
subsidiaries per national market. The formula used to calculate SHAREA is:
(No. of contacts/No. of national markets)
SHAREA =  -----    — ------------ ---------- ------- x 100 = % (7)
European Turnover
T he SALESA variable measures a company's average European sales of all its 
lines of business per national market. It is also expected a negative sign on this variable 
for rank mobility and a positive one for profitability, which is attributed to scale- 
economy advantages of larger size within each national market. It is calculated as the 
firm's total European sales turnover divided by the number of national markets where 
the company is present.
i»
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European Sales
SALESA »  ™—  --------  — -------------= ECU million (8)
No. of European National Markets
A  proxy diversification variable (D IV ) has been calculated for each firm's sales 
over its main lines of business. In their business analysis, companies report their annual 
sales over their main lines of business. Although these reported lines of business do not 
always distinguish between different product markets, it is possible to measure a 
diversification variable. This measure equals
DIVj = l-£Si2 (9)1=1
where a company operates in n markets and has a share of its total sales equal to Si in 
the ith market. The diversification variable employed by Feinberg (1985, p. 229) reflects 
both the existence of economies of multimarket operation, and efficiency effects of 
vertical integration. Therefore, a highly diversified company m a y  benefit from its 
economies of multimarket operations and thus it is expected that this variable will have 
a negative effect on rank mobility and a positive one on profitability. Hughes and 
Oughton (Hughes and Oughton, 1993, p. 219) argue that diversification had a negative 
but not significant effect on profitability, and they interpreted it in two ways. First, that it 
would represent a risk-profit trade-off and second that it could indicate diseconomies 
and inefficiencies arising from firm's diversification.
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Table 8.3.1.1 
Descriptive Company Statistics 
Variable Mean St. Deviation
RANKI 21.650 21.852
RANK2 2.2375 2.7348
PROFITS(%) 4.2639 8.2493
LI-HOME 68.171 84.756
L2-EC 42.221 47.923
L3-EFTA 8.9500 14.428
PROSAR(ECU) 696.13 1213.9
HHI 0.1030 0.0729
CR4 (%) 0.4930 0.1736
GROWTH 6.4941 10.413
GR(A) 6.2656 2.7916
SHAREA 1.0263 1.0534
SALESA 324.64 457.85
DIV 0.5534 0.2242
Source: Company Database (1992)
Table 8.3.1.2
Geographical Distribution of European Companies 
Subsidiaries and Associated Companies
Country Number of Companies Mean
Belgium 1,232 5.1
Germany 4,845 2 0 . 2
Denmark 600 2.5
Spain 987 4.1
France 4,878 20.3
Greece 129 0.5
Italy 1,785 7.4
Ireland. 301 1.3
Luxembourg 214 0.9
Netherlands 2,033 8.5
Portugal 230 1 . 0
UK 7,240 30.2
EFTA 2,148 9.0
LI-HOME 16,361 6 8 . 2
L2-EC 10,133 42.2
TOTAL 28,533 19.0
Source: Company Database (1992)
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Figure 8.3.1.2
Geographical Distribution of European Companies' Subsidiaries 
and Associated Companies
Geographical Distribution
N=240
EU Member States
Source: Company Database (1992)
8.4 Problems Associated with the Lack of Data
Data problems are acknowledged in this project. T he  high levels of merger 
activity in Europe in recent years and the trend toward conglomerate organization 
entities have rapidly increased the magnitude of data problems in this area. Mergers can 
effectively destroy data in the cross-sectional study of rank mobility. This is so because 
the potential for comparing rank mobility over time is impaired by the changing 
composition of the sample as a result of mergers. The increasing extent of firm 
diversification across different lines of business also creates serious data problems. The 
implicit assumption is that all firms in the sample follow similar behavioural patterns. 
This assumption seems most plausible if all of the firms produce a single well-defined 
product and appears least appealing if they each manufacture a different array of 
products only a few of which m a y  be produced by the other firms with which they are 
grouped.
There is also the problem of aggregation of data and the fact is that the data are
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aggregations of whole firms, divisions of firms, and parts of divisions of firms. The 
aggregate character of data, even at the corporate level provide obstacles in such a study. 
For example, the concentration variable represents the firm's sales across all the 
industries in which it produces rather than the corresponding measure in its major 
industrial activity. Hence, unless diversification by firms into more or less procurement 
intensive industries is negligible, the resulting estimate m a y  bear little relation to the true 
structural relation pertaining to the particular kind of public procurement activity. 
Concentration indexes m a y  be the best available measure of the "degree of monopoly" 
in an industry, but for m a n y  reasons, such as lack of Europe-wide industry data, they are 
at best crude and incomplete. E ven if the concentration ratio were a perfect measure of 
monopoly power, rank mobility and profitability are strongly influenced by other factors. 
These factors also m a y  not be subject to precise measurement; yet it will be necessary to 
take account of them in order to observe the pure effect of concentration on rank 
mobility and profits. T o  help illustrate the point it will be necessary to take a closer look 
at the firms in the pharmaceutical industry. O f  these 32 firms, some of them i.e., 
Hoechst, ICI, etc. (marked (*) and s ho wn  in Appendix B-l. 1) can be classified as based 
outside of the selected industry, or in the case of conglomerates, as having no real base 
industry at all. Obviously with a number of the firms producing pharmaceuticals being 
based outside of the industry, any assumptions regarding behavioural homogeneity for 
all pharmaceutical producing firms are questionable.
T he sample is non-random and includes the largest European companies 
involved in specific procurement sectors. Because the sampling is non-random, the data 
are not perfectly representative of the European procurement industry. Given that the 
research is designed to study the behaviour of the largest European companies involved 
in specific procurement sectors this is not a problem. T he lack of availability of 
company data for smaller European companies makes the sample size of 240 firms to be 
considered a small one. There is also concern for the accuracy of data. For example, the
profit data employed in the empirical study are also deficient. They reflect what might
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be different accounting procedures and policies and represent accounting profits with 
which it could be of s om e  concern. A s  it is necessary to add to all this the fact that the 
grouping of the industries for which data are available are not theoretically well defined, 
the empirical problems appear large. A n  attempt to confine the study, for example, to 
well-defined industries and specialized firms makes any generalisation of results 
unfounded. This is so because it involves financial reports from fifteen different 
countries with different national accounting systems. This w a s  apparent in the collection 
of data from a number of Swiss companies where m i n i m u m  information w a s  supplied 
regarding profits (net of tax) and geographical business analysis. T o  that effect som e  
profit figures could be underestimated. T he  problem of different currencies w as  dealt 
with by conversion to E C U ,  although conversion to their purchasing parity might be 
considered as a better alternative this would not have been possible within the 
limitations of this project.
Although multimarket contact figures were taken from one source, the Dun and 
Bradstreet Directory, their accuracy is a relative one as subjective decisions had to be 
m a d e  regarding the exclusion of dormant and non-trading companies. The same also 
applies regarding data in connection to procurement sales-at-risk (PROSAR) which 
include subjective estimations on actual and potential procurement sales.
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9.0 T H E  RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The analysis will use two multi-regression models to test the linked oligopoly 
hypothesis which states that multimarket contacts a m o n g  European procurement supply 
companies have the potential for facilitating collusion in one or m ore of the markets 
where these contacts occur. It could be argued that the primary concern of the 
oligopolistic multimarket and/or multi-product companies that supply the public sector 
is that rivals will mutually refrain from vigorous price competition w h e n  they c o m e  into 
contact in more than one national market. Hence, one could expect that profits to be 
higher in markets where high seller concentration and high multimarket contact 
coincide.
Also, the stability of dominant company's multimarket contact m a y  be taken as an 
indirect measure of the degree of rivalry in a multimarket setting. If the market shares of 
the same companies do not change over time, it could be considered as an indication 
that competition does not function well. T he cause and effect hypothesis is that changes 
in market position a m o n g  market leaders will reflect both price and non-price conduct 
(rivalry) of firms in a market, which in turn will affect performance (Martinez, 1990, p. 
592). The rivalry measure m a y  be also proxied by turnover or profits. Scott (1982, pp 
368-375) provides evidence that profits are higher for multimarket firms w h e n  contact 
and concentration are high, but lower where multimarket contact is high but seller 
concentration low.
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9.1 The Results for the Company Rank Mobility
9.1.1 The Results for the European Company Rank Mobility
(RANK1)
Table 9.1.0 contains the results from thq Minitab statistical package (Release 
8.21) for the regressions of RANK1, using all the three linkage measures (L l-HOME, 
L2-EC, and L3-EFTA), the "Procurement Sales-at-Risk" measure (PROSAR), the CR4 
concentration ration variable in place of the H H I variable, and the remaining selected 
structural variables (excluding D IV ) on data collected from a sample of 240 European 
leading companies involved in specific procurement sectors (Appendix B-l.l). The 
empirical results for the linear model are reported in equation (1). A n  additional 
composite variable of contact measure (L4-TOTAL), which is the s u m  of L l-H O M E, 
L2-EC and L3-EFTA variables w a s  initially added to the regression equation and found 
to be highly correlated with the other explanatory variables. Evidence of 
multicollinearity a m o n g  L l-H O M E , L2-EC, L3-EFTA and L4-TOTAL w a s  expected, 
and the L4-TOTAL variable has been removed from the equation.
Central to the study of the regression analysis are hypothesis tests which 
determine whether or not it could be reasonably confident that all the variables are, in 
fact, related. Generally, there are five steps to testing hypotheses, as outlined below 
(Younger, 1979, pp 208-219). T he  null hypothesis is the hypothesis of no effect, 
formulated for the express purpose of being rejected. In the regression analysis, the null 
hypothesis will typically be
Ho : B =  0
This states that there is no relationship between the variables, and it is hoped that 
this is a false statement. The alternative hypothesis is a statement of the experimental 
hypothesis, that it is suspected that there is a relationship between the variables in that 
population. For the analysis it is expected that the alternative m a y  be any of the 
following, depending on the particular variable:
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H j  : B  >  0  ( d i r e c t  r e la t io n s h ip ) ,  o r
H j : B <  0 (inverse relationship), or
H j : B =  0 (no relationship).
Choose a Significance Level
A  certainty of 9 5 %  or 9 9 %  is often required although a m i n i m u m  certainty of 
9 0 %  is sometimes acceptable. Although a researcher can employ a variety of degrees of 
certainty for various problems, s om e  researchers on the same problem of linked 
oligopoly employed a m i n i m u m  certainty of 9 0 %  (Scott, 1982, Feinberg, 1985), while 
others specified a higher level of certainty of 9 5 %  (Alexander, 1985, Martinez, 1990). 
Although a higher level of certainty of 9 5 %  is desirable it can be argued that the nature 
of the particular problem - a test of the linked oligopoly a m o n g  heterogeneous European 
companies - a lower level certainty of 9 0 %  will be acceptable.
Determination o f  the Critical Region
The critical region, or rejection region, consists of a set of values that constitute 
sufficient evidence to be 9 0 %  certain that H j  is true. T he critical region is determined 
by reference to tables of the Student's t-distribution and Fisher's F-distribution. T he t- 
statistic essentially compares the sample regression coefficient b to a hypothesized value 
of B, usually zero. A  difference b-B close to zero is evidence that H 0 is true. Values far 
from zero, either positive or negative, suggest that H 0 is false and thus H j  is true. T o  
determine h o w  large (in absolute value) t must be in order to be sufficiently different 
from zero, w e  refer to the significance level of 0.10, 0.05 or 0.01. Sometimes the 
hypotheses H Q:B =  0, H  j:B  =  0 are tested using an F-statistic instead of a t-statistic. In 
simple regression, an F-statistic is the square of t-statistic. Thus, F  are always positive, 
and large positive F-values suggest that H  j is true.
Calculation o f  the Value o f a Test Statistic
Standard programmes, including Minitab, usually compute t and F  statistics. 
T he  estimated standard errors (SE) of coefficients is customarily computed at the same 
time as the coefficients themselves. For example, SE forms the basis for confidence 
intervals and tests. For each 15 coefficient, the formula for estimating it with a 9 0 %  
confidence interval is of the standard form:
15 = b + 1 0.10 SE
T h e  observed t ratio to test 13 =  0 is 
t = b/SE
The F-statistic, by means of an analysis of variance, is the ratio of variance 
explained by regression to unexplained variance. Thus the F  test is acceptable as an 
alternative w a y  of testing the null hypothesis that 13 =  0.
Comparing Test Statistics to the Critical Region and drawing
Conclusions
T he  objective is to determine whether or not any relationship, either direct or 
inverse, exists between the independent variables and rank mobility. Rather than simply 
accept or reject, a more appropriate form for a test is the use p-values which are printed 
together with the t statistics.
In the following equation , s h o w n  as (1) on Table 9.1.0, RANK1 =  28.2 - 0.0295 
L l-H O M E - 0.0953 L2-EC + 0.145 L3-EFTA -  0.00086 PROSAR- 3.16 EL + 4.99 ES 
-  5.53 CR4 - 0.460 GROWTH + 0.390 GR(A) + 2.47SHAREA -  0.00297SALESA, 
the following variables are significant:
T h e  L l-H O M E variable has the expected negative effect on rank mobility but it 
is not statistically significant at conventional 1 0 %  level.
The L2-EC variable has also the expected negative effect on rank mobility and is 
statistically significant at the 5 %  level.
The L3-EFTA is not statistically significant and has an unexpected positive 
effect on rank mobility.
While one of the three linkage measures is found to be statistically significant, the inter-
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E C  linkage variable is statistically significant in relation to the L3-EFTA in explaining 
changes in market position. This is to be expected as the E F T A  market is smaller than 
that of the EC. F r o m  the Minitab S T E P W I S E  package regressions (shown in 
Appendix B-2.0), used for selecting a useful subset from a large collection of predictors, 
the L2-EC variable w a s  automatically selected.
STEPWISE regression is one of the sequential variable selection procedures. It is 
based on sequential F-tests - procedures constructed to arrive efficiently at a reasonable 
subset of regressor variables in cases where a large number of possible variables exist. 
Myers (1990, p. 185) indicates that the sequential variable selection procedures are an 
important part of the heritage of least square regression and are used by a large number 
of analysts. Myers adds, that multi-collinearity often clouds the picture, might suggest 
that the sequential variable procedures are not of practical use except in rare cases.
The other primary explanatory "Procurement Sales-at-Risk" variable, 
PROSAR, although has the expected negative effect on rank mobility has proven to be 
statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  level.
E L ,  a dichotomous variable takes a value of 1 if European procurement 
legislation has been adopted on the company's main procurement line of business. In 
equation (1) that variable has the opposite sign and has proven to be statistically 
insignificant at the 1 0 %  level.
ES, is a second dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if European 
Standards has been adopted on the company's main procurement line of business and for 
the same reason as EL is expected to have a positive effect on company's rank mobility. 
In equation (1) the ES variable has the anticipated sign but it is proving to be 
statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  level.
In equation (1) the CR4 concentration variable has an unexpected negative sign 
and it is statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  level.
In equation (1) the GROWTH variable is statistically significant at the 1 %  level
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of significance and does have the anticipated sign.
T h e  Gr(A) variable is statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  level and has the 
hypothesized sign.
TABLE 9.1.0
Regression of Company Rank Mobility (RZNK1) in a 
Procurement Line of Business, 1992, on multimarket 
Contact and Other Structural Variables
Equations 1 2
Constant 28.194 2.8712
(3.96) (9.13)
Ll-HOME -0.02947 -0.00132
(-1.63) (-1 .6 6)*
L2-EC -0.09531 -0.00597
(-2.31)** (-3.28)***
L3-EFTA 0.1447 0.00831
(1.09) (1.41)
PROSAR -0.00086 -0.00006
(-0.57) (-0.92)
EL -3.161 0.0083
(-0.71) (0.04)
ES 4.994 0.3405
(1.37) (2.18)**
CR4 -5.532 0.0356
(-0.60) (0.09)
GROWTH -0.4601 0.0116
(-3.46)*** (-1.98)**
GR(A) 0.3898 0.0223
(0.76) (0.98)
SHAREA 2.466 0 . 0 0 0 2
(1.75)* (0 .0 0)
SALESA -0.0029 -0.0005
DIV
(-0.77) (-2.97)**
R2 15.3% 24.6%
Standard error 20.59 0.909
F 3.74 6.76
N 240 240
Note.-Dependent variable = Rank; t-statistics in parenthesis
below estimated coefficients.
* Significant at 10 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
*** Significant at 1 percent level
T he SHAREA variable is a company's sales-weighted average market share. In 
equation (1) although the SHAREA variable is statistically significant at the 5 %  level 
has a positive sign.
The SALESA variable measures a company's average European sales of all its 
lines of business per national market. T he  results in equation (1) indicate that the 
SALESA variable is statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  level, but does have the 
hypothesized sign.
Considering the results for the linear model in equation (1) only two of the
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eleven explanatory variables are statistically significant at the 1 0 %  level and with the 
expected sign. However, the F-test indicates that the explanatory variables, taken 
together, are significantly different from zero suggesting a relationship between the 
variables and rank mobility. Moreover, the observed F-value of 3.74 falls within the 
critical F-value 1.82 at the 5 percent level of significance (Table VII. F  Critical Points, 
Wonnacott, and Wonnacott, 1977).
For multiple regression analysis statistical theory indicates that a simple plotting 
of ordinary residuals against each explanatory variable is often beneficial in highlighting 
either model under specification or a deviation from a homogeneous variance 
assumption. There are s om e  warning signs w h e n  a model is too simple and needs to be 
m a d e  more complex by including mor e  regressors. W h e n  the model has been correctly 
specified the residuals which are left over are of constant variance, independent and 
disclose nothing (Wonnacott, and Wonnacott, 1990, pp 461-4). For this model it is 
possible to plot the residuals against each of the regressors in turn to pick up an 
appropriate message. In m a n y  cases, plots of the ordinary residuals are not the optimum 
displays for revealing difficulties in the model and in the assumptions ( Myers, 1990, p. 
217). In the residual plots considered here, the studentised or standardized residuals 
will be used instead of the ordinary residuals. Both of these are of the form 
(residual)/(standard deviation o f residual) '. T he  standardized residual is calculated with 
the full data set and the studentised residual is calculated using the data set with the i-th 
observation deleted. Standardized residuals have a m e a n  of 0 and a variance of 1. 
Standardized residuals over 2 are usually considered large. A s  it is s ho wn  in Appendix 
B, if an observation has a standardized residual of over 2, Minitab prints an R next to 
the observation in the table of data, P R E D .  X V A L U E ,  etc. (Minitab Manual, 1990). If 
the form of a model is correct, and normality of errors is assumed, then about 95% of 
the residuals should fall in the range + 2  to -2, W h e n  the residuals are plotted against a 
function of the data such as predicted values of RANK!, the plot should exhibit no 
systematic trends. If such trends are observed, or large standardized residuals are
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observed, the model or s o m e  parts of it could be considered as suspect (Weisberg, 1980, 
p. 120). Figure 9.1.1 shows the plot of ordinary and studentised residuals against 
RANKI predicted values.
FIGURE 9.1.1
Plot of Ordinary and Studentised Residuals against Predicted 
RRNK1 Variable of Equation (1) of Table 9.1.0.
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It is noticed that the residuals are distributed around zero but in a non-random 
fashion, especially the ones with a positive value. A s  it w a s  indicated earlier the 
normality of the is assumed in linear regression. The t-tests, F-tests, and confidence
limits on parameters require the assumption of normality. In order to detect severe
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departures from normality, the graphical viewing of a normal probability plot of the 
residuals m a y  be useful. T he  normal probability plot is a plot of residuals against their 
expected values. If the residuals are suitably standardized, the straight line should go 
through the origin with a slope of 1.0. A  normal probability plot of RANK1 
standardized residuals is easily computed by the Minitab and s ho wn  in Figure 9.1.2. The 
plot reveals a skewed negative non-normal distribution and exhibits a clear flattening 
at both ends of the plot, suggesting that too m a n y  values relatively far from the m e a n  are 
in the sample for it to be considered a sample from a normal distribution. Myers 
indicates that the skewed error distribution is due to model functional form mis- 
specification (Myers,1990, p. 64). T he  remedy for non-normality is transformation of the 
dependent variable RANK1 Unfortunately, the transformation appropriate to achieve 
normality will often sacrifice linearity or constant variance. O f  the three, normality is 
least important in the analysis (Weisberg, 1980, p. 134).
FIGURE 9.1.2
Normal Probability Plot for Company Rank Mobility (JR2WK1)
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Transformation of the dependent variable RANK1 to a form that is more nearly 
normally distributed is the usual recourse to non-normality (Rowlings, 1988, p. 239). 
Heterogeneous variance, as with non-normality, is expected a priori with certain kinds 
of data. The same situations that give non-normal distribution will invariably give
heterogeneous variances because the variance in most non-normal distributions is
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3.0+
0 . 0+
related to the m e a n  of the distribution (Rowlings, 1988 p. 240). In m a n y  fields of 
application of regression analysis, failure of the homogeneous variance assumption is 
natural and expected (Myers, 1990, p. 286). T he  source of the problem is that error 
variance is often not independent of the m e a n  E(y). A s  RANK1 values and predictors in 
the data b ecome larger, variance around the regression tends to grow. T w o  approaches 
to handling heterogeneous variances are transformation of the dependent variable and 
the use of weighted least squares; the former is probably the more c o m m o n  (Rowlings, 
1988, p. 240). T he  principal remedies for non linearity are transformations and addition 
of polynomial and, occasionally, cross-product terms in the variables already in the 
model (Weisberg, 1980, p. 128). A  variance-stabilizing transformation, which is used 
often, is the natural log transformation, i.e., In RANK1. A s  Weisberg indicates 
(Weisberg, 1988, p. 128) the log (RANK 1+1) is a good candidate as RANK 1=0 for 
s om e  companies (the base is irrelevant) and the range of RANK1 mobility is broad from 
Oto 153.
T he  regression equation of log (RANK1+1) is s ho wn  in Table 9.1.0, equation
(2).
T he  linkage variable Ll-HOME  has the expected sign and is n o w  statistically 
significant at the 5 %  level.
T he  L2-EC variable has the anticipated sign and it is statistically significant at 
1 %  level. This is an improvement from the previous model where the above linkage 
variable w a s  only significant at the 5 %  level.
The third contact variable L3-EFTA remains statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  
level and has the wrong sign.
T he  other important variable of link oligopoly PROSAR is also statistically 
insignificant at the 1 0 %  level but has the expected sign.
F r o m  the remaining variables ES, GROWTH and SALESA are statistically 
significant at the 5 %  level and have the expected signs, while the remaining variables 
are statistically insignificant at thel0% level. Moreover the explanatory ability of the
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model has been increased and it is significant with a F-value of 6.76. T he coefficient of 
determination R-sq represents the proportion of variation in the response data that is 
explained by the model and it is easy to interpret. The present model is superior to the 
previous one s ho wn  in equation (1) as the coefficient of determination R-sq is 24.6 %  
an improvement from the R-sq =  15.3%. There is a dangerous criterion for comparison 
of candidate models simply because any additional model term will increase R-sq. This 
implies that R-sq can be m a d e  artificially high by a rather unwise practice of overfitting. 
Thus it will possible to subscribe to a model selection process that solely involves the 
consideration of R-sq (Myers, 1990, p. 38). T he  adjusted R-sq computed by the Minitab 
statistical package (Appendix B-2.3 and B-2.1) guards against the practice of 
overfitting. It is clear that R-sq (adj) = 21% is an improvement of the R-sq (adj) =  
11.2% of the previous model. Another standard criterion for comparing regression 
models is the estimate or error variance s-sq or standard error or its squared root s, 
which is called the estimated standard deviation about the regression line and it is 
sho wn  in Table 9.1.0. A  prudent plan would be to choose the candidate model with the 
smallest value of standard error or standard deviation. In our model s= 0.909 and 
anti!og(ln s)= 2.481 which is smaller than s= 20.59 of model (1).
Here one more criterion for a search for choice for best model is introduced that 
has a sound conceptual base and it is easily obtained computationally (Myers, 1990, pp 
178-185, Rowlings, 1988, pp 183-4, Weisberg, 1980, pp 188-9). In the data analysis it 
will be necessary to consider whether the model is underfitted (i.e., ignores or deletes 
relatively important model terms) or overfitted (i.e., includes model terms that have only 
marginal, or no contribution). Mallows' Cp statistic is an estimated of the standardized 
total m e a n  squared error of estimation for the current set of data (Myers, 1990, p. 182). 
T he C p  for p-parameter regression model is written as
A A
Cp= p + (s^-s^)(n-p)/s^
I could be possible then to favour the candidate model with the smallest C p
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value. A  reasonable n o r m  by which to judge the C p  value of a model is Cp=p, a value 
that suggests that the model contains no estimate bias and it is not underspecified The 
model chosen is with the line C p =  11.2 is clearly the best performer with 11 variables 
and with the highest R-sq= 15.1, (R-(adj)sq=11.0) and the smallest s=20.61. It also 
shows w h y  the D IV  variable w a s  not initially included in models (1) and (2).
TABLE 9.1.2
Best Subsets Regression of BANK1
L L
1 3 p G s s
- L - R R G H A
H 2 E 0 O r A L
0 - F s c w ( R E DAdj . M E T A E E R T A E s 1
Vars R-sq R-sq C-p s E C A R L s 4 H ) A A V
1 5.3 4.9 17.4 21.312 X
1 4.8 4.4 18.6 21.362 X
2 10.4 9.7 5.6 20.768 X X
2 8 . 8 8 . 1 9.9 20.954 X X
3 12.3 1 1 . 2 2 . 6 20.595 X X X
3 1 2 . 2 1 1 . 1 2.9 20.608 X X X
4 13.4 11.9 1 . 8 20.513 X X X X
4 13.3 1 1 . 8 1.9 20.521 X X X X
5 14.0 1 2 . 1 2 . 1 20.485 X X X X X
5 13.9 1 2 . 1 2.3 20.492 X X X X X
6 14.4 1 2 . 2 2.9 20.473 X X X X X X
6 14.3 1 2 . 1 3.2 20.485 X X X X X X
7 14 . 8 1 2 . 2 4.0 20.476 X X X X X X X7 14.7 1 2 . 1 4.1 20.482 X X X X X X X
8 14.9 1 2 . 0 5.6 20.502 X X X X X X X X
8 14 . 8 11.9 5.8 20.513 X X X X X X X X
9 15.0 11.7 7.4 20.538 X X X X X X X X X
9 15.0 11.7 7.4 20.539 X X X X X X X X X
1 0 15.1 11.4 9.2 20.573 X X X X X X X X X X
1 0 15.0 11.3 9.2 20.575 X X X X X X X X X X
1 1 15.1 1 1 . 0 1 1 . 0 20.611 X X X X X X X X X X X
1 1 15.1 1 1 . 0 1 1 . 2 20.618 X X X X X X X X X X X
1 2 15.1 1 0 . 6 13.0 20.656 X X X X X X X X X X X X
The plot of the studentised residuals against the predicted Log RANK1 values in 
Figure 9.1.3 do not indicate a particular pattern and the normal probability plot of the 
standardized residuals in Figure 9.1.4 shows a straight line expected of normally 
distributed data. Overall the results in both models, concerning the variables of interest, 
indicate that only L2-EC is statistically significant (at the 5 %  and the 1 %  level) and the 
F-statistics s h o w  that the explanatory variables, taken together, are significantly 
different from zero. This statistical relationship supports the hypothesis that the linked 
oligopoly concept has an impact in company's rank mobility and intercompany rivalry is
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adversely affected by the interlinking of the same companies in a large number of
European C om mu n it y  national and product markets.
FIGURE 9.1.3
Plot of Ordinary and Student!sed Residuals against 
Predicted LOG RMJK1 Variable of Equation (2) of Table 9.1.0
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FIGURE 9.1.4
Normal Probability Plot for Company Log Rank Mobility 
(BMIKl)
Studentised Residuals
— * *
1 . 6+ 222
454342
466*
88883
6+9*
0.0+ 89+3
7992
6 8 8 *
* 66 *
454
-1.6+ *43
222*
-  ***
— *  *
— * +------- + + + +.
- 2.0 - 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 
Z
198
9.1.2 Influence Diagnostics
In the previous section significant attention w as  focused on studying residuals in 
order to shed light on possible violation of assumptions. A m o n g  the techniques 
presented is the so-called outlier analysis, which is designed to highlight suspect data 
points. Outliers are detected for further checking because of concern that erroneous 
observations will exert an undue amount of influence on the regression results, influence 
that could be misleading. It is a necessary to identify these observations and determine 
the extent to which predicted values, estimate regression coefficients, performance 
criteria, etc. are influenced by them. The methodology exists in the Minitab regression 
package for both identification and assessment of the extent of that influence. Minitab 
calculates and stores H I leverages by using matrix algebra. It is c o m mo n ly  called 
"HAT" matrix H=X(X'X)-1X' where X  is the design (input) matrix. The leverage of the 
i-th observation is the i-th diagonal element, hi of H. hi depends only on the predictors; 
it does not involve the response RANK. If hi is large, the i-th observation has unusual 
predictors and the observation will have a large influence on regression coefficients. 
Several analysts consider hi to be large enough if it is over 2p/n or 3p/n. If an 
observation has hi>3p/n, Minitab prints an X  next to the observation, in the table of 
data, "Unusual Observations" (Appendix B-2.1). The "studentised" residual and H AT  
diagonal values (marked with X  and R )  reveal which individual observations have 
potential for exerting excessive influence. Standard regression computer software 
(including Minitab) it will allow to observe the change that would be experienced in 
certain key statistics if the i-th data point were set aside from the rest of the data. This 
then allows easy diagnostics of which statistics are influenced and to what degree 
(Myers, 1990, p. 257). These diagnostics have rapidly become a major component of 
m o d e m  regression analysis. **
Minitab also calculates a statistic called Cook's Distance or Cook's D  that 
combines the leverage hi and the standardized residual into one overall measure. Cook's
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D  can be viewed as the distance between the coefficients calculated with and without 
the i-observation. This interpretation suggests using the F-distribution to decide w h e n  
to consider Cook's D  is large. Rawlings suggests checking observations where Cook's 
D >F (.50, p, n-p). For reference, the 50th percentile for the F-distribution is 1.0 w h e n  
the numerator and denominator degrees are equal and it is always less than 1.0 of the 
denominator degrees of freedom is the larger. The 50th percentile does not get smaller 
than 0.8 unless the numerator degrees of freedom is only 1 or 2. Thus, Cook's D  in the 
vicinity of 0.8-1.0 would indicate a shift to near the 50th percentile in most situations 
(Rawlings, 1988, p. 268).
The DFITS statistics combine leverage hi, and Studentised Residual into one 
overall measure of h o w  unusual an observation is. Statisticians suggest that an 
observation where DFITS> 2V(p/n) should be considered unusual. T he purpose of the 
diagnostics is to aid the analysis to identify which data points are most crucial. F r o m  the 
first regression in the Appendix B-2.1 the computer calculates the RANK1 fitted values, 
ordinary, standardised and studentised residuals, hi, COOKD, and DFITS. In the case 
of present large data sets (n=240), DFITS values of 2.0 are extremely rare. However, 
even if n is large, it is not unusual to warrant some type of inspection. T he diagnostics 
statistics for RANK1 in Appendix B-2.2 illustrate the influence of all 240 companies 
without removing any of them. Observation 194 is the first c ompany w ho se  data should 
be carefully checked. Data point 194 has a very large ordinary residual 119.222 and an 
exceptional standardised residual of 5.909, and studentised residual of 6.407 signals an 
appreciably large residual induced by a relatively poor fit at the point. But is it really 
influential? A  very small H AT diagonal (0.0401) less than the yardstick of 0.1 (2p/n) 
could m a k e  possible to expect that influence might be limited. However, DFITS of 
observation 194 (DFIT= 1.309) is larger than the corresponding diagnostics value of 
0.45 (2Vp/n). A  further illustration of the influence of company 194 is the high value of 
COOKD=0.121 greater than the yardstick value of 0.05. O f  course observation 194 is
not the only company w ho se  data should be carefully checked. Observations 73, 82, 88,
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112, 120, 124, 127, 138, 211, 215, 217 and 240 have been checked as well. The 
revaluation verifies that the influential points are valid observations, therefore there is no 
reasonable justification for their removal. For example, observation 194 is the c ompany 
Tractabel that m o v e d  (fell) from the 35th position in 1988, to the 188th position in 
1992. The diagnostics appear to support the notion that the presence of outliers or set of 
high influence data points m a y  be a signal for a transformation. Indeed the log 
transformation of RANK1 improves the model and reduces the magnitude of residuals 
(i.e. observation 194 residual is n o w  only 1.895 and the studentised residual although 
still large, is 2.13 from the 5.91 of the previous model). A  Box-Cox transformation of 
the response RANK1, sho wn  in Appendix B-2.4, described by Myers (1990, pp. 310- 
315) and Weisberg (1980, pp. 137-141) w a s  calculated by raising the observed changes 
of rank mobility to a power. Since it w a s  found that such power is 0.1 which is very 
close to 0 corresponding to already employed log transformation, it appears that little is 
to be gained by transforming further RANK1. T he next section examines the results of 
the test on c ompany sectoral rank mobility.
9.1.3 The Results for the Company Rank Mobility at the Industry 
Level (RANK2)
T he  R a n k  mobility analysis in the previous section measures changes in the rank 
position of the 240 sample European companies in a single ranking order. It is plausible 
that even more interesting results should be possible by ranking companies at the 
industry level for the years 1992 and 1988. The industry/sectors in Table 9.1.3.1 have 
already been formed in order to calculate H H I, CR4 and Gr(A) variables.
T he  second variable RANK2 has been calculated in the same w a y  as the RANK1 
variable. F r o m  the best subsets regression of RANK2 the model with Cp= 11 is selected 
excluding Gr(A) variable. It should be noted that for RANK2 regression the 
concentration variable CR4 appears to be of primary importance and it is selected first 
(Table 9.1.3.2).
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Table 9.1.3.1
Aggregate Specific Procurement Sectors for Company Analysis
Industry/Sectors Code Number of
Companies
1 . Pharmaceuticals 433 32
2 . Business Services 481 9
3. Computer, Software £ Services 531, 482 13
4 . Defence/Aerospace 521, 522, 523 19
5. Communication equipment 533 7
6 . Office Equipment £ Supplies 534 6
7. Electrical Equipment 541 1 1
8 . Electronic Equipment/Instrument 551, 552 7
9. Engineering Services/Industrial 561, 563, 566 29
1 0 . Diversified Industrial 591 27
1 1 . Heavy Engineering/Steel Manufact592 23
1 2 . Building material 611 34
13. Construction 613 23
Total 240
Table 9.1.3.2
Best Subsets Regression of RANK2
L L
1 3 p G s s
- L - R R G H A
H 2 E O o r A L
O - F S C w ( R E DAdj. M E T A E E R T A E S I
Vars R-sq R-sq C-p s E C A R L S 4' H ) A A V
1 10.4 1 0 . 1 28.0 2.5935 X
1 5.7 5.3 42.0 2.6614 X
2 15.2 14.5 15.9 2.5285 X X
2 13.3 1 2 . 6 2 1 . 6 2.5573 X X
3 17.8 16.7 10.4 2.4957 X X X
3 17.4 16.4 11.5 2.5012 X X X
4 19.9 18.5 6 . 1 2.4684 X X X X
4 19.1 17.7 8.4 2.4805 X X X X
5 2 0 . 6 18.9 6 . 1 2.4629 X X X X X
5 20.4 18.7 6 . 8 2.4665 X X X X X
6 21.3 19.3 6 . 0 2.4573 X X X X X X
6 21.3 19.2 6 . 1 2.4577 X X X X X X
7 2 2 . 0 19.6 6 . 1 2.4522 X X X X X X X7 21.9 19.5 6 . 2 2.4530 X X X X X X X
8 22.5 19.8 6.5 2.4489 X X X X X X X X
8 2 2 . 2 19.5 7.4 2.4540 X X X X X X X X
9 22.7 19.7 7.9 2.4512 X X X X X X X X X
9 2 2 . 6 19.5 8.3 2.4532 X X X X X X X X X
1 0 23.0 19.6 9.1 2.4522 X X X X X X X X X X
1 0 22.7 19.3 9.8 2.4563 X X X X X X X X X X
1 1 23.0 19.3 1 1 . 0 2.4572 X X X X X X X X X X X
1 1 23.0 19.3 1 1 . 1 2.4575 X X X X X X X X X X X
1 2 23.0 18.9 13.0 2.4625 X X X X X X X X X X X X
The regression analysis of RANK2 is s ho wn  in Table 9.1.3.6. The two linkage 
variables LI-H O M E  and L2-EC are statistically significant at the 5 %  level while the
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third L3-EFTA is statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  level and of the wrong sign. The 
other important variable for the link oligopoly concept PROSAR is statistically 
insignificant at the 1 0 %  level and has an opposite sign. F r o m  the remaining variables 
ES, CR4 and GROWTH are statistically significant at the 1 %  level and with the 
anticipated signs, while the remaining variables remain statistically insignificant. T he  
contribution of concentration variable, CR4, is large, suggesting that marginal changes 
in concentration have a greater impact on rank mobility at moderate to high levels than 
at lower levels of concentration in a particular sector or industry. The overall 
significance of the model is good at p=000. Analysis of the residuals indicates that 8 
observations are very large, 45, 82, 124, 127, 138, 152 161, and 194. A  normal 
distribution plot shows that the model is not very far from straight line with flattening 
edges indicating s ome outliers. T he  existence of outliers with extreme values of ordinary 
residuals is shown in the following histogram.
FIGURE 9.1.3.3
Plot of Standardised Residuals against Predicted R&NK2 
Variable of Equation (1) of Table 9.1.3.6
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FIGURE 9.1.3.4
Normal Probability Plot for Company Rank Mobility (B&NK2) 
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Figure 9.1.3.5 
Histogram of Ordinary Residuals N = 240
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TABLE 9.1.3.6
Regression of Company Rank Mobility (R&NK2) in 
a Procurement Line of Business, 1992, on Multimarket 
Contact and Other Structural Variables
Equation 1 2 3(a)
Constant 4.9287 1.6304 5.7497
(5.38) (6.71) (5.88)
Ll-HOME -0.0041 -0.0013 -0.0033
(-1 .8 6)* (2.29)** (-1.52)
L2-EC -0.0086 -0 . 0 0 2 1 0.0409
(-1.76)* (-1.65)* (1 .1 2)
L3-EFTA 0.0039 0 . 0 0 2 1 -0.0217
(0.25) (0.51) (-1.18)
PROSAR 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 2
(1.06) (1.08) (0.13)
EL -0.7065 -0.1677 -0.5223
(-1.35) (-1 .2 1) (-1 .0)
ES 1.1896 0.3228 0.8989
(2.83)** (2.90)** (2 .1 0)**
CR4 -5.410 -1.6054 -6.937
(-4.93)*** (-5.52)*** (-5.23)***
GROWTH -0.0510 -0.0062 -0.0505
(-3.30)*** (-1.52) (-3.30)***
SHAREA 0.2080 (0.0470 0.1915
(1.24) (1.05) (1.15)
SALESA -0.0004 -0 . 0 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 0 2
(-0.91) (-1.33) (-0.53)
DIV 1.0003 0.3156 1 . 2 2 2 0
(1.32) (1.58) (1.63)
L-ECXCR4 -0.2247
(-1.59)
L-ECx(CR4) 2 0.2274 
(1.89)*
R2 23.0% 23.5% 25.7%
Standard error 2.457 0.6516 2.424
F 6.19 6.38 6 . 0 2
N 240 240 240
Note.-Dependent variable = Rank; t-statistics in parenthesis
below estimated coefficients.
* Significant at 10 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
*** Significant at 1 percent level
(a) L2-EC, L2-ECXCR4, and L2-ECx(CR4) 2 are highly correlated
with other predictor variables.
Equation (2) of Table 9.1.3.6 shows the results of log transformation of RANK2. 
In that case log transformation does not improve the quality of the model as it did with 
RANK1; it rather makes it worse. T he  same applies with the introduction of the 
interaction and quadratic terms Ll-ECxCR4, L1-EC(CR4)2, PROSARxCR4 and 
PROSARx(CR4)2 in equation (3) where multicollinearity is a problem. Therefore the 
model of equation 1 appears to be the most suitable model.
205
9.2 The Results for the Company Profitability
T he second dependant variable of the empirical analysis employed here is 
com pa n y  profitability defined as the company's net profits before tax as a percentage of 
turnover. F r o m  previous studies (Scott, 1982, pp 368-375, Feinberg, 1985, pp 225-241, 
Hughes and Oughton, 1993, pp 203-224), it is expected that profits are higher in 
markets where oligopolistic structure and multimarket contact coincide. T h e  same 
explanatory variables employed in the R a n k  Mobility analysis are also included in the 
empirical model. The major difference is that it is anticipated that all variables should 
have the opposite sign of that expected in the R a n k  Mobility analysis as companies with 
higher profits are expected to have lower rank changes.
F r o m  the Best Subset and the Stepwise regressions of PROFITS variable, 11 
predictors have been selected as the regression model. T he results of the regression 
equation for the linear model are reported in Table 9.2.1.
TABLE 9.2.1
Regression of Company ProfitsU) in a Procurement Line of 
Business, 1992, on Multimarket Contact and Other Structural 
Variables
The regression equation is
PROFITS =2.34 - 0.00338 LI-HOME - 0.0103 L2-EC + 0.0103
L3-EFTA +0. 000938 PROSAR + 2.81 EL - 4.79 ES - 4.25 CR4 + 0.204
GROWTH + 1.38 SHAREA -- 0.00262 SALESA + 4., 88 DIV
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P VIFConstant 2.341 2.845 0.82 0.412
LI-HOME -0.003383 0.006851 -0.49 0.622 1.4
L2-EC -0.01029 0.01529 -0.67 0.502 2 . 2
L3-EFTA 0.01034 0.04947 0 . 2 1 0.835 2 . 1
PROSAR 0.0009378 0.0005639 1 .6 6* 0.098 1.9EL 2.812 1. 625 1.73* 0.085 2 . 0
ES -4.794 1.306 -3.67*** 0 . 0 0 0 1.7
CR4 -4.247 3.405 -1.25 0.214 1.4
GROWTH 0.20352 0.04803 4.24*** 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0SHAREA 1.3797 0.5232 2.64** 0.009 1 . 2SALES A -0.002623 0.001431 -1.83* 0.068 1 . 8
DIV 4.877 2.346 2.08** 0.039 1 . 1
s = 7.632 R-sq = 18.3% R-sq(adj) = 14 .4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F PRegression 11 2982.88 271.17 4. 66 0 .00 0
Error 228 13281.45 58.25
Total 239 16264.33
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SOURCE DF SEQ SS
Ll-HOME 1 29.05
L2-EC 1 31.00
L3-EFTA 1 7.56
PROSAR 1 2.36
EL 1 1.36
ES 1 887.25
CR4 1 63.61
GROWTH 1 958.23
SHAREA 1 554.47
SALESA 1 196.31
DIV 1 251.68
Unusual Observations
Obs. Ll-HOME PROFITS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 24 4 2.066 -2.168 3.249 4.234 0.61X
2 87 4.072 3.050 3.613 1 . 0 2 2 0.15X
3 140 -0.850 0.927 3.017 -1.777 -0.25X
4 162 5.986 8.937 5.832 -2.951 -0.60X
5 179 4.746 -2.757 4.973 7.503 1.30X
8 108 -12.037 3.835 1.752 -15.872 -2.14R
15 193 14.357 -2.329 2.068 16.686 2.27R
16 28 -4.458 -0.163 3.563 -4.295 -0.64X
20 15 34.836 9.447 1.547 25.389 3.4 OR
31 21 20.260 3.697 1.731 16.563 2.23R
34 107 5.305 2.428 3.931 2.877 0.44X
50 8 28.640 5.585 1. 675 23.055 3.10R
61 538 10.409 2.140 3.015 8.269 1.18X
68 575 1.059 5.059 3.310 -4.000 -0.58X
87 1 1 32.887 12.337 1.554 20.550 2.75R
1 2 0 180 10.956 8.348 3.890 2.608 0.40X
141 91 -11.950 3.351 0.974 -15.301 -2.02R
153 62 -1.241 4 . 694 3.006 -5.935 -0.85X
161 44 7.240 -9.673 3.394 16.913 2.47RX
163 148 29.327 7. 987 1.878 21.340 2.88R
180 20 -32.315 4.366 1.715 -36.681 -4.93R
197 22 -20.442 4.854 1.675 -25.296 -3.40R
2 0 0 48 6.109 -5.386 3.200 11.495 1.66X
217 87 20.394 3.554 1.782 16.840 2.27R
2 2 1 3 -40.249 -3.153 1.841 -37.096 -5.01R
233 30 28.571 8.682 1.376 19.889 2.65R
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
Lack of fit test
Possible curvature in variable CR4 (P = 0.021)
Possible interactions with variable CR4 (P = 0.001) 
Possible lack of fit at outer X-values (P = 0.008)
Overall lack of fit test is significant at P = 0.001
Note - Dependent variable = profitability.
(1 ) Profits before tax as a percentage of turnover
* Significant at 10 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
T he three important variables of linkage, L l-H O M E , L2-EC and L3-EFTA, are 
all statistically insignificant at the 1 0 %  while the first two have an unexpected negative 
sign. However, the other variable of interest, PROSAR, is statistically significant only at 
the 1 0 %  level and with the anticipated positive impact on profitability. T he  ES 
dichotomous variable and the GROWTH are statistically significant at the 1 %  level 
while the sales-weighted average market share variable SHAREA, and the
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diversification variable D IV  are statistically significant at the 5 %  level and all have the 
hypothesized signs. T he  dichotomous EL variable and the average sales per market 
variable S A L E S A  are statistically significant at the 1 0 %  level and the concentration 
variable CR4 is statistically significant at the 1 %  level but all have the wrong signs. The 
variance inflation factor (V IF ) statistics printed by Minitab alongside the coefficients is 
very small so multicollinearity is not affecting the precision of the parameter estimates. 
A n  examination of the residuals and the other diagnostic statistics i.e. hi, Cook's D, 
DFITS indicates s ome large values. T he  "unusual observations" printed by Minitab 
indicate that 14 companies have large values of ordinary and standardised residuals 
(marked R). Moreover, companies 180, 197 and 221 have very large residuals because 
of very large reported financial losses for 1992 which influence the model parameters. 
This is sho wn  in the following plots of ordinary and studentised residuals which reveal 
the existence of som e  very large outliers. Moreover, a normal distribution plot indicates 
a shape of a light-tailed error distribution often caused by the heterogeneous variance 
(Myers, 1990, p. 64, Rowlings, 1988, p. 264).
FIGURE 9.2.3
Plot of Ordinary and Studentised Residuals against Predicted
Company Profitability (%) of Equation in Table 9.2.1.
Ordinary Residuals 
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Studentised Residuals
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Figure 9.2.4
Normal Probability Plot for Company Profitability Data 
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A n  experimental lack o f fit test (XLOF) statistics computed by Minitab suggests 
that there is a possible curvature and possible interactions with variable CR4 and a 
possible lack of fit at outer x-values. T h z Minitab Manual (1990, p. 54), indicates that 
the above test should be used with caution as it is possible for curvature in one variable 
to s h o w  up as interaction with another variable or vice versa. In practice, it could be 
possible not to distinguish between the presence of model shifts (outliers) and a light­
tailed error distribution. However, the end result of the two is more likely to be the same 
w h e n  least squares is used; modest changes in the data set can result in substantial 
changes in the estimates and in the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis created by
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the "pull" of the regression toward the deviant data points. M a n y  authors suggest that a 
robust procedure is one that is resistant or insensitive to the non-ideal conditions 
(Weisberg, 1980, p. 237, Rowlings, 1988, p. 238, Myers, 1990, p. 348). A  robust 
regression procedure would reduce the impact of gross errors, or outliers, in the data 
by reducing the weight given to large residuals. The useful robust procedures essentially 
"weight down" the influence of data points that produce residuals that are large in 
magnitude. A s  a result, use of the methodology described by Myers (1990, pp. 349-356) 
is employed, which includes using least squares to obtain estimates. O n e  important class 
of robust estimates are called M-estimates, a shorthand for maximum likelihood type 
estimates. A  procedure called iteratively reweighted least squares (IRWLS) based on a 
choice of Huber's influence function is used with a tuning constant r=1.0. T he s u m  of 
the absolute residuals for the least squares estimations procedure is 1,190.1 Profits (%) 
for 1992. The initial robust estimate of the scale parameter is <jQ =  4.708. There are m a y  
choices for this estimate. The robust estimate of scale adopted by Myers, (1990, p. 351) 
is chosen:
a  =  1.5 m e d  |ei| (i=l, 2,. . . n)
Weighted least squares w a s  then employed to generate n e w  coefficients and thus 
n e w  residuals. The n e w  estimates and a sample of n e w  residuals are sho wn  in Table 
9.2.5. T he results of the 7th and final iteration are given in Table 9.2.6. Included are a 
sample of the weights that produced the final robust regression coefficients and the final 
set of residuals. T he s u m  of the absolute residuals at the final iteration is 1,141.6, 
indicating a better overall quality of fit that provided by ordinary least squares. Table 
9.2.7 shows the value of the regression coefficients, and the s u m  of the absolute 
residuals at each of seven iterations. It is noted that the companies that produced 
weights substantially less than 1.0 are indeed the same companies with the diagnostic 
results that have the largest least squares residuals. Contradictions seem to occur for 
some companies. For companies 4 and 5, for example, the com pa n y  4 carries a weight 
of 1.0 while company 5 of 0.627. A  closer look reveals that their residuals are -2.950
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and 7.502 but their H AT diagonals printed by Minitab are 0.583 and 0.424 respectively. 
T h e  H AT value of com pa n y  4 is higher than that of c ompany 5. However, the M - 
estimation, as described here, weights according to the size of the residuals without 
regard to the leverage associated with the observation. Therefore, there is a danger that 
high leverage observations such as c ompany 4 might underservedly receive full weight 
because the residual is kept low due to high leverage. This difficulty with standard M - 
estimator, Myers indicates that has generated interest in modifications which fall into 
the general class entitled bounded influence regression (Myers, 1990, p. 353).
TABLE 9.2.5
Initial Residuals and Weights in Robust 
Regression for Company Profitability
Company ei W±,o
1 4.233 1 . 0
2 1 . 0 2 2 1 . 0
3 -1.776 1 . 0
4 -2.950 1 . 0
5 7.502 0.627
6 -3.425 1
7 -1.502 1
8 -15.872 0.485
9 2.615 1
1 0 7.382 0.637
240 -5.5954 0.841
TABLE 9.2.6 
Results for the Final IRWLS Step
Company ei wi
1 3.9486 1 . 0
2 2.7226 1 . 0
3 -1.3567 1 . 0
4 -0.9908 1 . 0
5 8.7956 0.464
6 -1.5565 1 . 0
7 -0.1717 1 . 0
8 -15.5088 0.263
9 2.4808 1 . 0
240 8.4217 0.485
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TABLE 9.2.7
Regression Coefficients and Stun of Absolute Residuals 
For the 7 IRWLS Steps
Step OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
bO.Ro 2.344 2.318 2.450 2.563 2.585 2.969 2.739 2.763
bl.Ro -0.0030 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
b2.Ro -0.0109 -0.0007 -0.009 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 1
b3.Ro 0.0103 -0 . 0 1 0 0 -0.017 -0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 2 2 -0 . 0 0 2
b4.Ro 0.0009 0.0007 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
b5.Ro 2.8120 3.2890 3.446 3.438 3.462 3.418 3.402 3.396
b6 .Ro -4.794 -4.2890 -4.209 -4.116 -4.072 -4.043 -4.030 -4.025
b7.Ro -4.247 -2.7090 -2.425 -2.379 -2.364 -2.453 -2.475 -2.495
b8 .Ro 0.203 0.1690 0.150 0.140 0.134 0.130 0.128 0.127
b9.Ro 1.3797 1 . 2 0 1 0 1.162 1.152 1.153 1.148 1.147 1.146
blO.Ro-0 . 0 0 2 -0 . 0 0 2 0 -0 . 0 0 2 -0 . 0 0 2 -0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 1
bll.Ro 4.877 2.591 1.965 1.739 1.665 1.603 1.603 1.596
S|ei| 1190.1 1153.5 1146.0 1143.3 1142.2 1141.9 1141.7 1141.6
T he  final regression in Table 9.2.8 reveals that the quality prediction of the model 
has improved significantly as the F-statistics increased from 4.66 to 5.86. F r o m  the 
variables of interest, PROSAR is n o w  statistically significant at the 5 %  level from the 
previous 10%, while the linkage variables remain insignificant with wrong signs except 
for the L2-EC variable which n o w  has the anticipated positive sign. The SHAREA 
variable is n o w  statistically significant at the 1 %  level while the GROWTH variable 
remains statistically significant at the same level. F r o m  the remaining variables EL n o w  
is statistically significant at the 1 %  but of the wrong sign, while the D IV  variable 
became statistically insignificant but with the correct sign.
TABLE 9.2.8
Robust Regression of Company Pxofltsl1) in a Procurement Line 
of Business, 1992, on Multimarket Contact and Other 
Structural Variables (final iteration)
The regression equation is PROFITS =2.76-0.00409 LI-HOME +
0.00176 L2-EC - 0.0229 L3-EFTA +0.000703 PROSAR + 3.40 EL -4.03
ES - 2.49 
1.60 DIV
CR4 + 0.127 GROWTH +1.15 SHAREA - 0 .00198
Predictor Coef St dev t-ratio PConstant 2.763 1.809 1.53 0.128
LI-HOME -0.004093 0.004349 -0.94 0.348
L2-EC 0.001761 0.009202 0.19 0.848
L3-EFTA -0.02287 0.03145 -0.73 0.468
PROSAR 0.0007030 0.0003343 2 .1 0** 0.037
EL 3.396 1.053 3.23*** 0 . 0 0 1
ES -4.0258 0.8506 -4.73*** 0 . 0 0 0
CR4 -2.494 2.133 -1.17 0.244
GROWTH 0.12724 0.03443 3.70*** 0 . 0 0 0
SHAREA 1.1466 0.3216 3.57*** 0 . 0 0 0
SALESA -0.0019836 0.0008633 -2.30** 0 . 0 2 2
DIV 1.596 1.483 1.08 0.283
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Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS
Regression 11 1205.12
Error 228 4264.52
Total 239 5469.63
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
Ll-HOME 1 35.73
L2-EC 1 1.95
L3-EFTA 1 15.91
PROSAR 1 0.48
EL 1 35.52
ES 1 412.43
CR4 1 13.63
GROWTH 1 244.73
SHAREA 1 324.99
SALESA 1 98.08
DIV 1 21.67
MS
109.56
18.70
F
5.86 P0. 00 0
Unusual Observations
Obs. Ll-HOME PROFITS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St. Resid1 244 2.066 -1.879 1.931 3. 945 1.02X2 87 4.072 1.344 2.116 2.728 0.72X
3 140 -0.850 0.503 1.981 -1.353 -0.35X
4 162 5.986 6.981 3.406 -0.995 -0.37X
5 179 4.746 -4.060 3.334 8.806 1.63X
16 28 -4.458 -0.385 2.119 -4.073 -1.08X20 15 34.836 8.504 0.996 26.332 2.41R
34 107 5.305 5.136 2.354 0.169 0.05X
50 8 28.640 6.486 1.091 22.154 2.21R68 575 1.059 3.452 2.103 -2.393 -0.63X
87 11 32.887 9.609 1.019 23.278 2.26R120 180 10.956 7.299 2.391 3.657 1.01X
153 62 -1.241 2.667 1.918 -3.908 -1.01X
163 148 29.327 5.561 1.221 23.766 2.29R
180 20 -32.315 5.781 1.159 -38.096 -2.89R
182 372 2.153 0.304 1.737 1.849 0.47X
197 22 -20.442 5.580 1.084 -26.022 -2.40R221 3 -40.249 0.024 1.243 -40.273 -2.97R
233 30 28.571 6.467 0.871 22.104 2.21R
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
Note - Dependent variable = profitability.
(!) Profits before tax as a percentage of turnover 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
T he purpose of the robust regression is to provide an alternative to least squares 
w h e n  outliers are present. Data from companies that have received a weight of less than 
unity have been considered suspicious and have been examined for arithmetic input 
errors. But the primary function of the methodology is estimation and not diagnostic. 
T he  regression coefficient of interest PROSAR is superior to that of least squares. 
However, the diagnosis of outliers leaves no formula for what to do with maverick data 
(Myers, 1990, p. 356). Weisberg argues that the remedies for data sets with suspected 
outliers or influential cases are mor e  complex than any other remedies proposed and 
recommends one of the following two remedies (Weisberg, 1980, p. 136). First, it might
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be possible to refit the regression without the offending cases and see exactly what 
happens. Secondly, it might be possible to consider reasonable transformations of the 
data that would appear to m a k e  influential cases less important or improve the fit of the 
regression to the cases that are suspected outliers. M a n y  types of transformation of data 
have been attempted, such as the addition of interaction and quadratic model terms and 
natural log transformation of Profits variable, without a better fitting or a better 
predicting model. M a n y  analysts argue that outliers and overly influential points should 
not be discarded indiscriminately as they m a y  be the most informative observation in the 
study (Rowlings, 1988, p. 242 and Carroll et al, 1988, pp 175-176). However, it is felt 
that this is not a good enough reason to eliminate the outliers, even though their 
influence is counter productive. A  pilot regression analysis (n=T06) which included 
mostly the largest companies by turnover gave a m u c h  higher coefficient of 
determination R = 3 2 %  than the present 18.3%. Moreover, a closer look at the outliers, 
indicated that they included valid data.
T he  conclusion is that the above robust regression provides a satisfactory fit to 
the bulk of the data and the goal of the analysis is not merely to find a single estimate 
but rather to understand the data, and m ore importantly the phe no m en a  being studied. 
T he  analysis suggests a positive strong relation between com pa n y  profitability and 
procurement sales-at-risk, a measure of importance of multimarket contacts. This 
relationship is found to have a significant positive effect in com pa n y  profitability which 
the linked oligopoly suggests is more likely due to collusion rather than efficiency. 
However, it is usually possible to end the analysis by accepting one model and estimate, 
even if the acceptance is only tentative and will change with the input of n e w  data or 
n e w  economic theory.
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9.3 Conclusions on the Analysis
It will be recalled from the preceding sections that the linked oligopoly theory, as 
an explanation of the competitive behaviour a m o n g  multimarket public procurement 
supply companies has been examined for rank mobility and profitability using a sample 
of 240 large European companies. A  s u m ma r y  of the regression findings at both sector 
and aggregate level are s ho wn  in Table 9.3.1. This theory states that companies meeting 
rivals in more than one European markets will be able to facilitate collusion in one or all 
of those markets w h e n  they tender for procurement contacts. T he  empirical results of 
this analysis indicate that intercompany rivalry is adversely affected by the interlinking 
of the same companies in a large number of European national markets. T he  results 
reported for c ompany rank mobility indicate that there is a negative relationship between 
rank mobility and intercompany European C om m u n i t y  contacts. A  second analysis of 
rank mobility at the industry level gives support for the linked oligopoly hypothesis as 
well. A n  alternative test of the linked oligopoly hypothesis of European companies 
behaviour involved in public procurement, indicates that the procurement sales-at-risk, a 
measure of the importance of multimarket contacts has a significant effect in increasing 
profit margins in the moderate range of concentration where collusion is feasible but 
difficult to achieve without a linked oligopolistic structure.
The unexpected relationships between the two dependent variables and som e  of 
the explanatory variables does, however, invite ex post rationalizations. The 
dichotomous variable that measures the effect of European procurement law on the 
firm's main procurement line of business (EL), w a s  expected to reduce entry barriers 
and to have a positive effect on rank mobility and a negative effect on profitability. In 
fact it has a negative but insignificant effect on rank mobility (RANK2) and a positive 
and significant effect on profitability. O n e  ex post explanation, is that it is still too early 
for the European procurement legislation to have any effect on opening-up public 
procurement. This view has been supported by the majority of expert opinion (see
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Appendix C  with interviews with officials involved in public procurement and/or Single 
European Market issues). Firms operating in the opened-up sectors are still more likely 
to be subject to preferential nationalistic treatment (interview with Mr. Heigtley, 
N o v e m b e r  1994, see Appendix C).
Table 9.3.1
Summary of Regression Results of Company Rank Mobility and Profitability
Explanatory Variables
R A N K lV )
Coefficient
RANK2
Coefficient
PROFIT,5<2) 
Coefficient
L I - H o m e Negative* Negative* Negative
L 2 - E C Negative *** Negative* Positive
L 3 - E F T A Positive Positive Negative
P R O S A R Negative Positive Positive**
E L Positive Negative Positive***
E S Positive** Positive** Negative***
C R 4 Positive Negative*** Negative
G R O W T H Negative** Negative*** Positive***
G R ( A ) Positive
S H A R E A Positive Positive Positive ***
S A L E S A Negative** Negative Negative**
D I V Positive Positive
R2 24.6% 23.0% 18.3%(3)
Natural log transformation of RANKI 
Robust regression of PROFITS  
Ordinary Least Squares coefficient of determination
Significant at 10 per cent level 
Significant at 5 per cent level 
Significant at 1 per cent level
T he  SALES A variable which measures a firm's average European sales of all its 
lines of business although has the expected negative and significant effect on rank 
mobility (RANKI), it has an unexpected negative but significant effect on a firm's 
profitability. O n e  explanation is that the SALES A variable which is a proxy variable for 
economies of scale, indicates that the logistics of coordinating production and
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0)
(2)
(3)
*
distribution in the geographically fragmented European market could outweigh any 
benefits from economies of scale. There is another possible explanation of such negative 
relationships. T he  above variables m a y  be capturing the influence of an omitted variable 
and this results in the negative relationship with rank mobility and profitability.
Another important point is that the two explanatory variables of intercompany 
linkage, L2-EC and PROSAR do not have a simultaneous significant effect on both 
rank mobility and profitability. While the L2-EC linkage variable has a significant effect 
on rank mobility, PROSAR has an insignificant effect. Alternatively, while the 
PROSAR variable has a significant effect on a firm's profitability, L2-EC has an 
insignificant effect. O n e  explanation is that the more stable firms with a large n umber of 
non-home subsidiaries might have expanded into national markets which m a y  bid for a 
few procurement contacts in order to establish their presence in those markets. Another 
explanation is that the most profitable firms m a y  also be the least geographically 
expanded firms outside their 'home' market, although they might earn large in value 
procurement contracts (i.e. aerospace, defence). In sum, the measures of intercompany 
linkage m a y  be picking up the effect of these factors in addition to the influence of 
linked oligopoly behaviour. T he  most likely explanation is that the deficiencies inherent 
in the data introduced random noise which prevents the true relationship from being 
estimated. Although the L2-EC linkage variable is accurate enough there is some  
skepticism about the accuracy of data used for the calculation of the Procurement Sales- 
at-Risk. D u e  to that, the PROSAR relationship with L2-EC tend to be more potential 
than actual. Firms m a y  be present in regional markets and never actually meet as direct 
competitors (i.e. s om e  construction companies). T he above problem, however, seems to 
point more toward finding no relationship rather than a significant unexpected 
relationship. At least part of the reason for the comparative lack of research in this area 
has been insufficient data on European firm multimarket contact and procurement sales. 
It is believed that the increasing interest in company and financial data of international
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companies will enable s o m e  commercial information suppliers to offer the possibility of 
m or e  accurate data on firm's sales in the future, though extensive research would still be 
necessary to determine actual multi-contact relationships a m o n g  sample firms. A  
weighted procurement sales-at risk proxy (that combines L2-EC and PROSAR variables 
as one measure) which will reflect both the number and importance of multimarket 
contacts a m o n g  European suppliers will be an improvement. A s  noted above, this thesis 
w a s  primarily concerned with only two dimensions of linked oligopoly behaviour: rank 
mobility and multimarket collusion; and profitability and multimarket collusion. O n  the 
basis of the data examined, one important conclusion is that, in the procurement 
industry, the traditional measures of the structure of supply, such as market share and 
concentration, are not accurate indicators of performance. T h e  estimating relationship 
between concentration and the dependent variables were generally insignificant with the 
exception of sectoral rank mobility (RANK2). It seems more likely that the expected 
negative significant relationship resulted from the sample firms operating in 
concentrated sectors. A  more appropriate analysis would be the introduction of the 
change in concentration over s o m e  time period. Finally, the effect of firm diversification 
did not capture the possible impact of diversified firms on either rank mobility or 
profitability. Diversified firms are hypothesized to have advantages over non-diversified 
firms such as cross-subsidization and reciprocal dealing which might enable them to 
expand their market shares at the expense of non-diversified rivals.
A  further analysis investigating the nature and effects of multimarket rivalry 
a m o n g  European companies is likely to be fruitful. The extensive geographical 
distribution of European companies' subsidiaries and associated companies and the 
prominence of the conglomerate firm in the European e c o no m y  today, makes it 
necessary for any research investigating the opening up of the European market not to 
ignore this cross-market rivalry.
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10.0 CONCLUSIONS
The European Union is engaged in an effort to open up public procurement in its 
M e m b e r  States. The literature review and the majority of expert opinions (see Appendix 
C  of interviews with U K  officials) indicated that the nature of public procurement 
operations in the European Union is such that the procurement legislation in place and 
the harmonization of technical standards is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for opening up of public procurement. It is expected that changes in the suppliers 
themselves will yield m ore competitively oriented procurement behaviour. Firms are 
responding to the European Union's efforts to open up public procurement through a 
w a v e  of mergers and acquisitions and it is possible to witness the emergence of 
multinational networks of conglomerate firms which are full-time suppliers in m a n y  
procurement sectors. Ascribing these changes alone to the Single Market Pro gr a mm e  in 
general and to the procurement legislation in particular, is a little difficult, however. 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have also been helped by lower regulatory 
barriers to overseas investment, lower telecommunication and transport costs and more 
open domestic and international capital markets.
If it is desirable to gauge the success of the opening up of public procurement by 
analysing suppliers o w n  conduct there are some grounds for wondering about the 
effectiveness of the policy. This is because the emerging structure of European firms in 
general and procurement suppliers in particular, raises unique competition issues which 
cannot be analyzed satisfactorily with traditional models of the theory of the firm. This 
thesis has examined one of those issues, the linked oligopoly hypothesis, that states that 
multimarket contact of large European procurement suppliers will reduce competition 
through the creation of linked oligopolistic behaviour. Current competition policy 
ignores multimarket contact. Yet multimarket contact a m o n g  firms m a y  increase their 
ability to exercise market power (i.e., to raise prices above competitive levels) without
engaging in collusion that would violate antitrust laws (Scott, 1991, p. 225). That is
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because such contact m a y  allow the large European firms that supply the public 
procurement sector to respect each other's "spheres o f influence" by adopting non- 
aggressive behaviour in those markets for fear of retaliation in other markets important 
to them. This hypothesis thus implies that firm behaviour in one market is conditioned 
by firm relationship in other markets. It also raises the issue of European integration. 
European integration will increase market contact, which according to the linked 
oligopoly theory, m a y  induce decreasing competition. Moreover, the collusive nature of 
European product markets is facilitated by the increased incidence of joint ventures and 
cooperative R & D  projects. For example, the 1980s witnessed a considerable increase in 
the number of technology alliances and additionally an increase in number of R & D  
projects financed by the European Community. K a y  reports, on the basis of European 
Commission data, that the number of joint venture activity in the European C o m m u n i t y  
almost doubled in numbers from 1986-7 to 1987-8, while the frequency of joint ventures 
with non-European C o m m u n i t y  partners actually declined over the same period (Kay, 
1991, p. 354-5).This means that firms not only face increasing multimarket contacts, but 
are also increasingly engaged in multiproject encounters (Wegberg, et al, 1994, p. 254). 
It is this trend, W e g b e r g  et al argue, that fortifies the m o v e m e n t  toward European 
Union-wide collusive arrangements, which is a further argument in favour of the 
observation that European integration m a y  decrease, rather than increase, competition 
(Wegberg, etal, 1994, p. 254)
The objective of this thesis w a s  twofold. First, to determine the potential for 
inter-company contacts a m o n g  the leading procurement supply firms in the Single 
European Market. This w a s  based on a sample of 240 of the top 1000 European 
manufacturing and service companies in 1992 that are procurement suppliers. A n  
analysis of their operations in 1992 indicated that the 240 sample firms have a total of 
28,533 active, trading subsidiaries and associated companies in Europe (European 
C o m m u n i t y  and E F T A  M e m b e r  States). T he  average sample firm has a total of 119
subsidiaries and associated companies in the entire European market; on average 68
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subsidiaries in its h o m e  market, 42 subsidiaries in the rest of the European C om m u n i t y  
and 9 subsidiaries in the E F T A  M e m b e r  States. The majority of the sample firms (63%) 
are of British, G e r m a n  and French origin, with the British firms being more active. 77 
British companies (32%) have a total of 7,240 European subsidiaries and associated 
companies followed by the Ger ma n s  with 40 firms (17%) and with 4,845 subsidiaries, 
and the French with 35 firms (15%) and with 4,878 subsidiaries. Moreover, each firm 
has the potential for further vertical contacts with each competitor; the average firm of 
the sample operates in 4.3 lines of business and 1.4 procurement lines of business with 
actual and potential procurement sales outside its h o m e  market of the value of 696 
million E C U .  It is difficult to place any economic meaning to these statistics, however, 
since there is no prior information concerning the interpretation of these numbers. They 
simply indicate that these leading European firms have the potential for inter-market 
relationships with one another and that this potential undoubtedly increased as the w a v e  
of mergers escalated throughout the last decade. S o m e  interviewees found very 
interesting the extent of com pa n y  geographical analysis in Europe (Interview with Mr. 
Turner, June 1994, see Appendix C). A s  another interviewee put it" ...the large number 
of subsidiaries and associated companies all over Europe is the outcome of a clever 
strategy of firms to demonstrate that there is a large number of suppliers where in reality 
there are only very few of them" (Interview with Mr. White, July 1994, see Appendix 
C).
This information on the n um be r  of inter-firm contacts w as  then used to 
accomplish the second objective of this thesis - the empirical estimation of the 
relationship between the firm interdependence created by these multimarket contacts. 
Four constructed measures of firms' interdependence, intercompany linkage (L I, L2 
and L3), and Procurement-Sales-at-Risk, were estimated which capture both the 
number and relative importance of external contacts. These measures were then 
introduced as explanatory variables together with other additional variables in two 
equation models of the determinants of firm rank mobility and profitability. The
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regression results were consistently as predicted by the linked oligopoly hypothesis. T he 
empirical results indicated that both interlinkage measures on h o m e  and on European 
C o m m u n i t y  level, the adoption of European standards in the firm's main line of 
business, and the rate of growth, reduce a firm's rank mobility significantly. T he robust 
regression results of firm profitability indicate that the interlinkage measure of 
Procurement Sales-at-Risk, the adoption of European standards, the rate of growth, and 
the company's sales-weighted average market share, increase a firm's profitability 
significantly. Based on these regression results, the linked oligopoly hypothesis appears 
to be supported. Such a conclusion is in accordance to the majority of documented case 
study evidence of linked oligopolistic behaviour and from empirical evidence in the 
United K i n g d o m  bus industry (Interview with Mr. Elliott, June 1994). It suggests that 
multimarket contact and conglomerate mergers m a y  be detrimental to efficiency and to 
competition but still desirable from a firms' viewpoint as means of increasing collusion 
and market power.
The Oligopoly Problem and Parallel Behaviour
The linked oligopoly hypothesis of large European procurement supply 
companies raises two interesting points. First, firm interdependence is created by 
multimarket contacts a m o n g  competitors. Since the number of (product and 
geographical) markets is finite, firm interdependence will increase as firms diversify and 
encounter each other in more and more geographical markets. Second, multimarket 
interdependence limits multimarket competition a m o n g  supplying firms. Each firm 
'respects' markets important to its competitors with the understanding that they will 
reciprocate. Such tacit collusion will present competition authorities with a multimarket 
version of 'conscious parallelism'. Perhaps the most difficult issue in applying the 
European Union's competition rules, from both a legal and economic perspective, is 
identifying an agreement between firms bidding on a public contract to fix prices w h e n  
the evidence of agreement is circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence is distinguished
from direct evidence of an agreement and additional inference is required to resolve the
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matter at issue w h e n  the evidence offered is circumstantial. In particular, courts and 
commentators have debated for s o m e  time whether conscious parallelism by oligopolists 
w h o  recognize their interdependence provide a sufficient basis for the European Court 
to infer an unlawful agreement under the term 'concerted practice' in Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty of R om e,  and if not what additional circumstantial evidence is required to 
prove a conspiracy. T h e  difficult issue of proving an agreement to fix prices from 
parallel pricing and other circumstantial evidence is at the core of the European 
Commission's efforts to attack the "oligopoly problem". H o w  E U  competition law 
should deal with oligopolies has long been a problematic issue. According to W h i s h  and 
Sufrin the lack of provisions which specifically address the matter of oligopoly is one of 
the most notable features of European C o m m u n i t y  competition law and yet the 'problem' 
of oligopoly is well k n o w n  (Whish, and Sufrin, 1994, p. 61). A s  the head of Economics 
Branch of the Office of Fair Trading in L o n d o n  put it 'oligopoly is a problem not only in 
the E U  and the United K i n g d o m  but everywhere (Interview with Mr. Elliott, July 1994). 
E U  law has concentrated on the issue of the presence or absence of collusion between 
oligopolists because of the legislative provisions with which the competition authorities 
have had to work. E U  law has thus taken a behavioural rather than a structural approach 
to the problem. Article 85 E E C  prohibits agreements and concerted practices between 
undertakings which prevent, restrict, or distort competition and Article 86 E E C  prohibits 
the abuse of dominant position. If an agreement between oligopolists can be proved then 
clearly it m a y  be caught by Article 85. T he problem is w h e n  oligopolists indulge in 
parallel behaviour because each individually perceives that to be in its o w n  best 
interests. If a competition authority accepts that ’conscious parallelism' m a y  occur 
between oligopolists without collusion it faces the dilemma that it must try to identify 
what is such conscious parallelism and whether it does nothing about the competitive 
distortions which arise from the parallelism or whether it can s o m e h o w  intervene in the 
absence of collusion.
T he  European Court of Justice (ECJ) accepts the concept of conscious
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parallelism (Whish and Sufrin, 1994, p. 63). In the Dyestuffs case ([1972] ECR 619 
[1972] CMLR 557 at para 66) it said that '...parallel of behaviour m a y  not by itself be 
identified with a concerted practice' and in the Suiker Unie case ([1975] ECR 1663 
[1976] 1 CMRLR 295 at para 174) it said that Article 85 does not deprive an economic 
operator of its right to adapt itself intelligently to its competitors' existing and anticipated 
conduct. In the Woodpulp case ([1993], 4 CMRLR 407) the E C J  clarified the scope of 
the term 'concerted practice' in Article 85. T he  decision confirms that the principle that 
parallel behaviour, without overt communication, does not amount to a concerted 
practice and that parallel behaviour can only be used as evidence of such concerted 
practice if concertation is the only plausible explanation for parallel behaviour (Van 
Gerven and Navaro, 1994, p. 607). However, two questions are left unanswered; 
namely, what evidence must be produced by the European Commission to establish that 
a concerted practice does, in fact, exist and, given that the Treaty of R o m e  provides no 
obvious means h o w  should the European Commission be able to regulate such parallel 
behaviour (Jones, 1993, p. 273)? It is not surprising that the Commission has turned its 
attention to the possibility of using Article 86 against oligopolies. Article 86 prohibits 
the abuse of a dominant position 'by one or more undertaking’. The  significance of the 
reference to more than one undertaking has given rise to controversy. T he apparent 
rejection by the European Court of Justice in the Hoffman-La Roche case ([1979] ECR 
461 [1979] 3 CMLR 211) of Article 86 as a tool for controlling oligopolistic behaviour, 
and the subsequent lack of enthusiasm in cases such as in the Alsatel case ([1986] ECR 
5987 [1990] 4 CMLR 434) seemed to suggest that the problem of oligopoly could not 
be controlled under that Article. Oligopolists w h o  collude are caught by Article 85. 
W h e r e  oligopolists behave in an identical fashion because of the structure of the market 
on which they operate they should not be condemned for abusing their position if their 
conduct is rational -even inevitable- non collusive behaviour (Whish, and Sufrin, 1994, 
p. 69). Trepte, argues that for a number of reasons linked to the questions of the relevant 
market in which dominance must be held, Article 86 is likely to be of less significance
than Article 85 in the area of public procurement, but remains important. This is
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particularly so because a breach of the procurement rules m a y  also prove to be a breach 
of Article 86, thereby giving rise to alternative means of recourse (Trepte, 1993, p. 94).
However, the European Commission is keen to extend its control over 
oligopolistic markets. In the Italian Flat Glass case (OJ, 1989, L33/44 [1990] 4 CMLR 
535) it held that three Italian producers of flat glass as participants in a tight 
oligopolistic market, had a collective dominant position and that they had abused it. 
Soon after the European Commission adopted a decision in the French-West African 
Shipowners Committees case (OJ, 1992, L I34/1) and imposed substantial fines for 
infringements of both Article 85 and Article 86, by various shipping companies w h o  
shared amongst themselves the liner cargo between ports in France and those in Wes t  
Africa. In a further decision on shipping routes to Africa, the Cewal case (OJ, 1993, 
L34/20), the European Commission applied both Article 85 and Article 86 to a liner 
conference and held that there w a s  a dominant position held jointly by the conference 
members. In the Cewal case the European Commission held that 'the fact that s o m e  of 
the Cewal's activities are authorized by a block exemption does not prevent Article 86 
from being applied to the activities of the Conference and that Cewal had a dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 86'.
W h a t  conduct would amount to an abuse of an oligopolistic dominant position? 
F r o m  previous cases regarding dominant firms, W hi sh  and Sufrin indicate that prices 
can be abusive under Article 86 if they are excessive, unfair, predatory or 
discriminatory. Parallel pricing on the part of collectively dominant firms should not be 
abusive per se, they add, but should be condemned only if the price has s om e  other 
characteristic such as being excessive and/or is part of parallel m ov es  to prevent price 
competition on the market (Whish and Sufrin, 1994, p. 75).
The E E C  M e r g e r  Control Regulation 4064/89 seeks to preserve competition b y
imposing a "negative" check on the concentration of excessive market power in the
225
hands of one or m ore undertakings. Article 2 of the Regulation provides that a 
concentration which does create or strengthen a dominant position, resulting in the 
significant impeding of competition would be declared incompatible with the C o m m o n  
Market. A  critical question is whether the expression 'a dominant position' has the 
same meaning in this context as it does under Article 86 and whether it covers 
oligopolistic dominance. If it does not do so then the European Commission will be 
unable to use the Regulation to prevent the creation or strengthening of an oligopoly. It 
is also interesting to compare this aspect of the Regulation with the position under 
M e m b e r  States' national systems of merger control, for example in the United Kingdom, 
France and G e r m a n y  which all have systems which can control mergers in oligopolistic 
markets. The position arose in the Alcatel/AEG Kabel case (OJ, 1991, L I22/48) in 
which the proposed merger fell within the oligopoly presumption in G e r m a n  law 
whereby, since the three largest firms on the market would have more than a fifty per 
cent market share between them, the proposed merger w as  presumed incompatible with 
the G e r m a n  legislation. T he  European Commission's analysis of the market led it to the 
conclusion that the risk of joint dominance w as  not present in this case - there were, for 
example, m a n y  smaller competitors and strong buying power - and it decided not to 
oppose the concentration. This concern w a s  clearly stated in July 1992 in the European 
Commission's Nestle/Perrier decision (OJ, 1992, L356/10) that European C o m mu n it y  
mergers control does cover oligopolistic dominant positions T he  Nestle/Perrier 
decision, offers useful insights into the European Commission's concept of oligopoly 
and the criteria it intends to use to declare a concentration in an oligopolistic market as 
incompatible with the Single European Market. A s  a matter of terminology, the 
European Commission is using oligopolistic dominance to describe the concept under 
the Merger Regulation, as distinct from the terminology it and the C FI  have used w h e n  
dealing with Article 86. T he  European Commission examined a long list of factors to 
establish whether the market is prone to the development of tacit collusion or, as it is 
also called in the decision 'anti-competitive parallel behaviour'. M ost factors cited in the 
economic literature have been considered. O n e  of the these is obviously the
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concentration ratio as the merger itself increased concentration considerably, by 
reducing the number of nationwide suppliers of mineral water in France from three to 
two, which increases the facility to reach agreements. In the Nestle/Perrier case, 
however, the European Commission looked beyond the concentration ratio to asses 
whether the merger would lead to anti-competitive parallel behaviour. In its decision the 
European Commission took into consideration the firm's previous behaviour including 
existing pricing parallelism, the inelasticity of d e m a n d  for the product, the similarity in 
the firms' size, nature and costs, the maturity of technology, the minor importance of 
R & D  in the industry, the weak, disparate and merely local nature of the firms which 
comprised the fringe of small competitors, and the high barriers entering the market. 
S o m e  factors such as the pattern of orders or sensitivity of the industry to capacity 
utilisation, are not explicitly developed in that decision. A  particular aspect of the 
decision which is worth noting is that all the factors examined, point in the same 
direction (facility of tacit collusion). Therefore, there is no discussion of whether the 
different factors have a specific weight. A  question that will certainly be raised in future 
cases is whether these factors should be weighted, assuming that it is possible, and h o w  
this could be done in practice in order to decide whether a dominant position is being 
created or reinforced (Alonso, 1993, p. 122). Bringing oligopolistic dominance within 
the ambit of E U  merger control covers, potentially, considerably mor e  mergers than if 
the Regulation is limited to controlling only those which create or strengthen single firm 
dominance. At a time w h e n  lowering of the E U  dimension threshold has been deferred, 
the development of the concept of oligopolistic dominance extends the European 
Commission's jurisdiction in a different direction without the necessity of further 
legislative activity.
Updating Competition Rules to the Global Market Place
It is necessary to update competition rules and enforcement to conform more
closely to the n e w  realities of the global market-place. A s  the pressures of world
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competition grow, the increasing pressure for greater efficiency in a firm's operations 
takes on n e w  weight as a reason for mergers and other actions that are likely to result in 
demonstrated savings in cost. T he  critical antitrust task of defining the relevant market 
includes locating the appropriate geographic boundaries in which the competitive battle 
occurs. Increasingly, this requires changing the traditional viewpoint as to the limit of 
the market.
Public procurement, as shaped by the expanding body of E U  directives, has 
therefore had a considerable impact on the European Commission's control of mergers 
in a significant number of cases since the Merger Control Regulation c am e  into effect in 
September 1990. These have mostly concerned parties which supply specialist products 
to supply companies operating in the fields covered by the Utilities Directive. The 
decisions refer to the procurement rules introduced by that directive as a crucial factor in 
opening traditionally national supply markets to EU- wi d e  competition. T o  date, virtually 
all the mergers decisions which have considered public procurement practice have done 
so prior to the entry into force of the relevant directives. The cases have therefore tended 
to look forward to the likely effect of n e w  procurement rules on supply markets, 
particularly those of utilities. The European Commission has occasionally appeared 
over-optimistic in its expectations for the opening of markets as a result of the 
procurement directives and other internal market measures, causing it to over-emphasize 
hypothetical sources of increased competition which have yet to materialise. O n  the 
other hand, these decisions do illustrate the European Commission's commendable 
practice of looking at dynamic developments in market conditions, rather than treating 
them as static and unchanging, w h e n  assessing the effect of mergers on competition 
(Brown, 1994, pp 28-9). Oligopolistic dominance under the Merger Regulation gives 
the European Commission the ability to influence the structure of the markets at a 
crucial point of their development, rather than merely trying to regulate the behaviour of 
undertakings. A n  ability to control the creation and strengthening of oligopolies should
logically m e a n  less need to use collective dominance under Article 86. However, the
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fate of collective dominance under Article 86 and that of oligopolistic dominance under 
the Merger Regulation are not dependent on each other. The power to regulate the 
formation of oligopolistic market structures and the power to control the behaviour of 
undertakings on oligopolistic markets are separate issues (Whish, and Sufrin, 1994, p. 
82).
T he  development of the concept of collective dominance cannot be isolated from 
other developments of the jurisprudence on Article 86. It has to be seen as part of the 
European Commission's general expansion of the application of Article 86. O n e  aspect 
of this has already been alluded to, namely the finding of narrow geographic markets in 
which undertakings can be found to be individually dominant. The concept of collective 
dominance is still in its infancy and its parameters are uncertain. This n o w  constitutes 
the evaluation criteria to be applied, as a result of the Nestle/Perrier decision but also as 
a result of decisions which have further developed this subject: Varta/Bosch, 
Alcatel/AEG Kabel, Thom EMI/Virgin Music, Rhone-Poulenc/Snia (Picat, and 
Zachmann, 1993, p. 245). The theory of linked oligopoly suggests that analysis of 
market extension mergers in public procurement supply industries in Europe should not 
be limited to the probable effects upon present or potential competition. W h e n  a 
com pa n y  which already holds a large share of the market, on a local, regional, or 
national level, secures a n e w  controlling primary market position through elimination of 
a strong local firm, its ability to extend its domination to still other markets throughout 
Europe seems likely to be enhanced. Purely conventional analysis by the European 
Commission, with its emphasis on the measurement of market shares and on discerning 
the degree of potential competition in the primary market of the acquired firm, m a y  
permit such mergers, which this recognition of market linkages throughout the broader 
secondary market area would stop. T o  illustrate this possibility, it could be desirable to 
look at the first Alcatel/Teletra merger approved by the European Commission on M a y  
17, 1991 (OJ, 1991, L I22/48). T he  acquired firm Teletra, a telecommunication
equipment supplier and a Fiat subsidiary, w a s  acquired by the French firm Alcatel. T he
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parties were the two principal suppliers to the Spanish monopoly operator of public 
telecommunications networks, Telefonica. Their concentration would give the newly 
created entity a very high combined share of over 80 per cent on the line transmission 
market in Spain. Such a high market share suggested the creation of dominant position 
and so it did raise serious doubts about the transaction's compatibility with the C o m m o n  
Market. T he  case w a s  subjected to in-depth "second phase" investigation by the 
European Commission under the M C R .  T he  European Commission ultimately cleared 
the transaction bringing together two major suppliers on a highly concentrated market 
which had a record of being closed to non-national suppliers and where s ome technical 
barriers to entry persisted. Brown, (1994, p. 21) indicates that 'this decision was 
somewhat dubious in competition terms'. While it is right to assess the dynamics of an 
evolving market and future potential competition, B r o w n  adds, the European 
Commission seemed to base its conclusion on a hypothetical market situation which had 
yet to arise, and to place undue weight on the stated intention of the monopoly national 
purchaser Telefonica to alter its previous procurement habits. The European 
Commission had to decide whether the merger of the two largest suppliers to 
Telefonica, giving a market share of over 80 per cent, would give the n e w  entity a 
dominant position in that market and thereby impede effective competition. European 
C o m m u n i t y  competition case law suggests that such a high concentration of market 
share would normally constitute a dominant position (Hoffman-La Roche [1975] E.C.R. 
461 at 520). T he  European Commission defined the relevant geographic market as 
Spain, rather than the European C o m m u n i t y  as a whole. This w as  party because 
Telefonica, traditionally purchased from locally established suppliers (although this had 
started to change), and partly because there w a s  no obligation to procedures of the 
Utilities Directive for a further five years (The Utilities Directive w a s  not due to c o m e  
into effect until January 1, 1993, in most M e m b e r  States, and not until January 1996, in 
Spain). H o w e v e r  the European Commission w a s  satisfied that the Spanish market 
would b ec om e  open to greater competition and that the parties' combined markets 
would not be maintained at such a high level in the future. Within the European
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Community, however, concentration w a s  particularly high. Alcatel w a s  ranked 1st in 
sales from the list of the top 12 telecommunication equipment suppliers of the European 
C o m m u n i t y  market, for 1989, and with concentration ratio of the top 5, top 10 and top 
20, being 54.4%, 70.5% and 81.8% respectively (Panorama of European C o m m u n i t y  
Industry, Statistical Supplement, 1992, pp 10-1). The parent com pa n y  of the acquiring 
c ompany Alcatel, Alcatel-Alsthom, a French conglomerate is ranked 4th by turnover in 
the 240 sample list of companies and 24th in the Times Europe's top 1000 companies 
(The Times, 1000, 1992-93, p. 58). T h e  c ompany w a s  involved in the following five line 
of business (Extel C o m p a n y  Report for 1992):
Communication Systems, Alcatel 57.2%
Energy and Transport, GEC-Alsthom 28.8%
Electrical Engineering (CEGELEC) 8.4%
Batteries 1.8%
Services 3.8%
Alcatel-Alsthom's geographical market sales were:
France 41.5%
Germany 17. 4%
Rest of Europe 28.7%
Rest of the World 12.4%
The company also had subsidiaries and associated companies (a total of 247) in 
almost every European C o m m u n i t y  and E F T  A  M e m b e r  States. Within the European 
Community, however, concentration of telecommunication equipment suppliers was 
particular high; Alcatel and Siemens the two leading suppliers held over 4 0 %  of the total 
telecommunication sales at the end of 1989, prior to this merger. They were already 
operating singly in every one of the 12 of the European C o m m u n i t y  national and in 5 of 
the 6 E F T A  countries markets. O n c e  Europe-wide concentration and leader market 
saturation has reached this level, and probably before it, any complete or effective 
separation of the markets in which branches of the same system operate would seem 
unlikely. Procurement contracts tend to be sought actively by leading telecommunication 
suppliers on a national-wide basis. S o m e  technical barriers to entry are still operating, 
limiting from out-of-national systems, except in the case of holding companies
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(Interviews with M s  McIntyre and Mr. Stem, June 1994). A s  between linked markets 
parallelism in price tends to be found. Certain guidelines are established at the head 
offices of the leading suppliers within the national market which filter back to primary 
procurement markets served by the suppliers subsidiaries (Interviews with Mr. Heigtley 
and Mr. Stean, N o v e m b e r  1994). Also, under these circumstances, one m a y  perhaps find 
evidence of price or service discrimination in markets in which purchasers (because of 
size or lack of sophistication) possess lower bargaining power and a lesser degree of 
ability to "shop around" for more favourable prices and terms. F r o m  the statistical 
analysis it is clear Alcatel-Alsthom has a large inter-market control on 
telecommunication supply equipment which is not limited to its h o m e  state (France) or 
in the primary market of the acquired c ompany (Spain), but extends to a broader 
adjacent geographic markets (i.e. Portugal, Italy, Germany, etc.) and not only in 
telecommunication equipment, but also in other procurement lines of business (i.e. 
electrical and transport equipment and electrical engineering). That empirical analysis 
constitutes evidence of the linked oligopoly. In the light of such evidence, it is likely that 
the European Commission might not allowed the Alcatel/Teletra merger if it recognized 
of Alcatel’s market linkages throughout Europe.
For the same reason the European Commission in its second decision involving 
Alcatel, taken eight months after the first, might have stopped the acquisition by Alcatel 
of the G e r m a n  manufacturer of power and telecommunications cables, AEG Kabel. The 
European Commission refused to grant a request by G er ma n y  for referral of the case to 
its national competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt. T he  Bundeskartellamt 
contended that there were distinct G e r m a n  markets for telecommunication cables and 
power cables, and that the proposed concentration would create or strengthen a 
dominant position in those markets which the merged entity would hold jointly (as an 
"oligopoly") with two other companies. In considering these issues, the European 
Commission again took into account the strong bargaining power on the d e m an d  side 
and the influence of the Utility Directive 'will reduce the possibility of conscious
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parallelism on the part of suppliers'. T he  European Commission ignored multimarket 
contact which is necessary for effective oligopolistic consensus in a concentrated 
industry w h e n  the industry's firms having grown interdependent in several markets, will 
compete less vigorously. H o w e v e r  the point is that "antitrust" investigations never 
consider all markets simultaneously, but only those which are brought to the attention of 
the competition authorities for one reason or another. Hen ce  the approach to 
investigating particular markets must include an awareness of markets links, and the 
potential for the indirect exercise of market power via these mechanisms (Office of Fair 
Trading Research Paper, 1994, p. 72).
It is beyond the scope of this project to guess as what proportion of area 
intermarket control, or what pattern of control (limited to adjacent geographical or 
product markets, or not) should constitute presumption of linked oligopoly. But it is 
suggested that once concentration over a cluster of interlinked markets within the E U  
and E E  A  ( E F TA )  - or, alternatively, region - has reached a certain specified level, any 
further dominant firm acquisitions of controlling positions in adjacent geographic or 
product markets might be prohibited outright, irrespective of the national competition 
law with respect to market concentration. Indeed, as a limiting situation, beyond s ome 
critical level of E U - wi d e  (or national) concentration, any further acquisitions of 
controlling market positions by the leaders, in whatever geographic markets might be 
prohibited, following either a 'test case' or a n e w  Merger Regulation. A s  an economic 
adviser to the Monopolies and Merger Commission in L o n d o n  indicated, there is a need 
for a periodic review of the present E U  competition legislation which is an old 
fashioned and cumbersome piece of legislation (Interview with Mr. Frooms-Brown, 
July 1994). The leader might be permitted to go into highly concentrated local, regional 
or national markets in order to stimulate competition and improve the calibre of local, 
regional or national firm products or services, but only through establishing de novo or 
through small firm (or 'foothold') acquisitions.
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The contribution of this thesis is that it has presented s om e  theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence applicable to the multimarket setting. It discussed first the 
background of difficult and immediate urgent analytical problem - that of the market 
extension public procurement supply company merger - which has for s ome time 
troubled the European Commission and at least som e  of the national competition 
agencies of the European Union M e m b e r  States. It has next attempted to sketch out one 
alternative and more generalized approach to market analysis, the linkage theory of 
oligopoly and to illustrate a practical application of some of these concepts. For first 
time a model of linked oligopoly w a s  applied on empirical data of leading European 
supply companies. T he  linked oligopoly theory provides justification for analysing 
competitive issues in public procurement at the aggregate level. T he  theory suggests that 
as the larger European companies meet one another in increasing numbers of local 
markets, these markets m a y  b e c o m e  less competitive. T he  most robust result is that of 
the negative effect of multimarket contact on company rank mobility. T he above 
evidence supports the hypothesis that European integration m a y  decrease, rather than 
increase, competition. Another contribution of this w ork is the application in the 
multiple regression analysis of m o d e m  diagnostic methods for outlier detection and 
plotting of residuals. It also presents procedures that are used as alternative to standard 
methodology w h e n  assumptions are violated. Transformations are presented with 
illustrations. Weighted regression is used as an alternative to ordinary least squares 
w h e n  the homogenous variance fails.
There are m a n y  other ways to measure multimarket contact and in future w or k  it 
will be necessary to look at this. The current measure has the virtue of simplicity while 
covering the main European firms in public procurement rather than say, a 
representative pair (e.g., Scott, 1982). A  fuller consideration of these possible 
interrelationships and linkages between the larger European procurement supply firms, 
is expected to aid in the operational evaluation of individual merger application on a
European level and to supplement the normal potential competition analysis. In sum, it
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is just the beginning of the rethinking of the conceptual elements of industrial 
organization theory in search of a m ore generally applicable standards of analysis. This 
study concludes, however, that there are sound theoretical and empirical arguments to 
believe that multimarket collusion m a y  increase in post-1992 Europe. It seems 
meaningful, therefore, to r e c o m m e n d  future research on this issue in the context of 
European integration. Both theoretical and empirical w o r k  m a y  aim at systematically 
identifying conditions which further or impede multimarket contact. Hopefully, more 
empirical testing in m a n y  diverse European markets will be forthcoming. F r o m  an 
empirical angle future research m a y  focus on providing direct evidence involving the 
contact-interdependence-competition relationship a m o n g  European firms. Special 
attention should be focused on the benefits and costs of arranging multimarket 
agreements such as joint ventures and R & D  agreements in the heterogeneous 
atmosphere of European procurement industry. M a n y  of the larger and more 
sophisticated multinational companies with substantial number of subsidiaries are 
moving toward a more advanced stage of organization. They are becoming transnational 
organizations with activities and responsibilities spread more evenly around the world. 
W e i d e n b a u m  states that the standard geopolitical m a p  is out of synchronization with the 
emerging business and economic m a p  and as economic and technological forces are 
powerful agents of change, governments find it increasingly difficult to contain them 
(Weidenbaum, 1994, p. 29). Therefore, is necessary to update competition laws and 
enforcement to conform mor e  closely to the realities of the global market-place.
There are global competitive factors that m a y  moderate the factors facilitating the 
sustainability of (explicit or implicit) collusion within the European Union (Wegberg et 
al, 1994, pp 280-1). W e g b e r g  et al indicate that there are three issues worth noting. 
Firstly, European product markets will continue to be competitive if third country 
(Asian, U S )  firms are allowed to continue operating in these markets. European 
alliances m a y  in fact indicate intensified competition between European and non-
European firms. Secondly, European firms also have m a n y  links with third-country
2 3 5
firms. Thus, if the former exclude the latter from the European market, they m a y  face 
retaliation in other markets (particularly Asian and/or U S  markets). Moreover, non- 
Europeans m a y  step up the search for links with European firms, a strategy in order to 
bypass the disadvantages of being an outsider. Thirdly, intra-European collusion m a y  
support global competition. Cooperation provides European firms with financial means 
for investment without which they might be forced to exit from R&D-intensive product 
markets. In the global arena competition would diminish if European firms are 
eliminated.
In the case of key industries such as electrical and mechanical engineering, 
telecommunication equipment and pharmaceuticals, the appropriate global view means 
that what seems to be a rather unconcentrated industry in one state is really part of a 
concentrated and m u c h  larger group of world-wide linked oligopolists. Increasingly, this 
requires changing the traditional viewpoint as to the limit of the market, as the relevant 
market is virtually the entire global market-place. It is warranted that competition policy 
should be updated to correspond to economic reality. In the meantime, a main purpose 
of this w o r k  has been to generate m ore interest in research and perhaps, more 
understanding a m o n g  competition analysts, policy makers and economists of the highly 
complex and often elusive issues of oligopolistic markets in the context of European 
integration.
236
R E F E R E N C E S
Adams, William James, (1974) 'Market Structure and Corporate Power: The Horizontal 
D ominance Hypothesis Reconsidered', Columbia Law Review, October, pp 1276-1297.
Albert-Ball Report, (1984), Towards Economic Recovery in the1980's, European 
Parliament Working D o c u m e n t  1983, London: Touche Ross.
Alexander, Donald, L., (1985), 'An Empirical Test of the Mutual Forbearance 
Hypothesis: T he Case of B a n k  Holding Companies', Southern Economics Journal, pp 
122-140.
Alonso Briones, Juan F., (1993), 'Economic Assessment of Oligopolies under the 
C o m m u n i t y  Merger Control Regulation', European Competition Law Review, No. 3, pp 
118-122.
Areeda, Phillip and Turner, Donald, (1979), 'Conglomerate Mergers: Extended 
Interdependence and Effects on Interindustry Competition as Grounds for 
Condemnation', University o f Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127, pp 1083-1103.
Arrowsmith, Sue, (1992), Public procurement in the European Community, Vol II: A 
Guide to the Procurement Cases o f  the Court o f Justice, Winteringham: Earlsgate Press.
Bael van Ivo, (1989), 'Public Procurement and the Completion of the Internal Market: 
L a w  and Practice', Legal Issues o f European Integration, pp 21-48.
Baker, Jonathan B., (1993), 'Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, 
the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory', The Antitrust Bulletin, 
Spring 1993, pp 143-219.
B e m he i m,  Douglas B. and Whinston, Michael D., (1990), 'Multimarket Contact and 
Collusive Behaviour', RAND Journal o f Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp 1-23.
Bird and Bird, (1991), Selling to the Public Sector: Public Procurement in the Single 
Market, pamphlet, London: Bird &  Bird.
Bock, Christian, (1993), 'The E E A  Agreement: Rules on Public Procurement', Public 
Procurement Law’ Review, No. 3, pp 136-157.
Bresnahan, Timothy F., (1989), 'Empirical Studies of Industries with Market P ow er 1, in 
Handbook o f Industrial Organizations, Schmalensee R., &  Willig R., (eds),
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.
Brown, Adrian, (1993), 'The Extension of the C o m mu n it y  Public Procurement Rules to 
Utilities', Common Market Law Review, Vol. 30, pp 721-748.
237
Brown, Adrian, (1994), 'High H op es  for Competitive Supply Markets: The Impact of 
Public Procurement on E C  Merger Control', Public Procurement Law Review, No. 3, pp 
16-29.
Bulletin of the European Commission, (1990), Public Procurement in the Excluded 
Sectors, Supplement 3/90, Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities.
Bulletin of the European Commission, (1991), Industrial Policy, Supplement 3/91, 
Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities
Carroll R. J., and Ruppert D., (1988), Transformations and Weighting in Regression, 
N e w  York: C h a p m a n  and Hall.
Cecchini Paolo, (1988), The European Challenge, Aldershot: G o w e r  Publishing 
Company.
Commission of the European Communities, (1988), Public Procurement, Research on 
the "Cost o f  Non-Europe", Vol. 5, Parts A  &  B, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EC.
Commission of the European Communities, (1988), Technical Barriers in the EC, 
Research on the "Cost o f non-Europe", Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the EC.
Cowling, K., et al, (1990), Industrial Policy after 1992, London: Anglo-German 
Foundation.
Cox, Andrew, (1992), 'Implementing 1992 Public Procurement Policy: Public and 
Private Obstacles to the Creation of the Single European Market', Public Procurement 
Law Review, No. 2, pp 139-154.
Cox, Andrew, (1994), 'The Future of European Defence Policy: T he Case for 
Centralised Procurement Agency', Public Procurement Law Review, No. 3, pp 65-97.
Cubbin J., and Geroski P., (1990), European Conglomerate Firms, Luxembourg: 
Commission of the European Communities.
Dehousse Renauld et al, (1990), 'The Legal Dimension', in The Dynamics o f European 
Integration, Wallace W., (ed), London: Pinter Publishers.
Dehousse Renauld, (1992), 'Integration v. Regulation? O n  the Dynamics of Regulation 
in European Community', Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol. X X X ,  No. 4, pp 
383-402.
Department of Trade and Industry, (1994), Public Procurement Review, London: DTI.
238
T he  Economist, 'Europes Internal Market', 9 July 1988.
T he  Economist, 'The Global Firm: R.I.P.', 6 February 1993.
T he  Economist, 'Survey o f  Multinationals', 27 M a r c h  1993.
T he  Economist, 'A Survey o f  European Union', 22 October 1994.
El-Agraa, Ali M., (1994), The Economics o f  the European Community, London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Elhermann Claus-Dieter, (1992) 'The Contribution of E C  Competition Policy to the 
Single Market', Common Market Law Review, pp 257-282.
European Commission, (1990), Seventh Annual Report (1989), Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the EC.
European Commission, (1991), Eighth Annual Report (1990), Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the EC.
European Economy, (1988), No. 35, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the EC.
European Economy, (1989), No. 42, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the EC.
Feinberg Robert M., (1984), 'Mutual Forbearance as Extension of Oligopoly Theory', 
Journal o f  Economics and Business, Vol. 36, pp 243-249.
Feinberg Robert M., (1985), "'Sales-at Risk": A  Test of the Mutual Forbearance Theory 
of Conglomerate Behaviour', Journal o f  Business, Vol 58, No. 2, pp 225-241.
Feinberg Robert M .  and Sherman Roger, (1988), 'Mutual Forbearance under 
Experimental Conditions', Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 54, pp 985-993.
Financial Times, ’Building Links Across Borders', 23 N o v e m b e r  1991, p. 2.
Financial Times, 'Survey on World Telecommunications', 1 October 1991.
Financial Times, 'Survey on Light Rail Systems', 6 April 1992.
Financial Times, 'Survey on the Computer Industry', 7 April 1992.
Financial Times, 'Survey on World Electricity', 14 M a y  1992.
Financial Times, 'Source o f  Change fo r Mergers', 23 July 1992, p. 16.
239
Financial Times, 'Survey on Power Generating Equipment', 'Two Cheers for 
Competitive Bidding', 31 July 1992, p. III.
Financial Times, 'Indignant EC Springs to Defence o f its Directive', 03 February 1993, 
p. 7.
Financial Times, 'US Bans EC Bids fo r Public Contracts', 28 M a y  1993.
Financial Times, 'Gatt Sound Warning Over EC Preferential Trading', 29 M a y  1993.
Financial Times, 'Prising Open the Public Sectorf, 13 October 1993.
Financial Times, 'Brussels Gets Tough on Public Contracts', 23 N o v e m b e r  1994.
Fishwick F., (1986), Definition o f  the Relevant Market in Community Competition 
Policy, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC.
Geroski, Paul A., (1989), Barriers to Entry and Intensity o f  Competition in European 
Markets, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
Geroski, Paul A., (1991), '1992 and European Industrial Structure', M c K en z ie  G  &  
Venables A,(eds), The Economics o f the Single European Act, London: Macmillan.
V a n  Gerven, Gerwin and Navarro Varona, E du me ,  (1994), 'The W o o d  Pulp Case and 
the Future of Concerted Practices', Common Market Law Review, Vol. 31, pp 575-608.
Grabowski, Henry and Mueller Dennis, (1970), 'Industrial Organization: The Role and 
Contribution of Econometrics', American Economic Review, Vol. 60, pp 100-4.
Greenwold, Stephen and Cox, Andrew, (1993), 'The Legal and Structural Obstacles to 
Free Trade in the United States Procurement Market', Public Procurement Law Review, 
No. 2, pp 237-252.
Groenewegen, J., and Beije, P.R., (1992), 'The European A n s w e r  to the Dilemmas of 
Competition, Cooperation, and Mergers', Journal o f Economic Issues, Vol. X X V I ,  No. 
2, pp 493-511.
Hanks, Brian, (1993), 'Telecommunication - A Critical Supplier Point o f View', 
mimeograph, Conference held at the University of Birmingham 22-3 April 1993.
Hansson Goete, (1990), Harmonization and International Trade, London: Routledge.
Harvey Fred, (1993), 'EC Purchasing Directives, Problems Facing the Private Firm', 
mimeograph, Conference held at the University of Birmingham 22-3 April 1993.
Heggestad, Arnold A., and Rhoades, Stephen A., (1976), 'Concentration and Firm 
Stability in Commercial Banking', Review o f Economics and Statistics, Vol. 58, pp 443-
240
452.
Heggestad, Arnold A., and Rhoades, Stephen A., (1978), 'Multi-Market 
Interdependence and Local Market Competition in Banking', Review o f Economics and 
Statistics, Vol 60, pp 523-532.
Henderson, Alexander, (1954), 'The Theory of Duopoly', Quartely Journal o f 
Economics, pp 565-584.
Hertig, Gerald, (1991), 'The European Community', International Review o f Law and 
Economics, No. II, pp 331-342.
Holmes, Peter, (1989), 'Economies of Scale, Expectations and Europe 1992', The World 
Economy, Vol. 12, pp 525-537.
Holmes, Peter, (1991), 'Non-tariff Barriers', The Economics o f  the Single European Act, 
London: Macmillan.
Horspool, Margot, and Korah, Valentine, (1992), 'Competition', The Antitrust Bulletin, 
S u m m e r  1992, pp 337-385.
Hughes, Kirsty and Oughton, Christine, (1993), 'Diversification, Multi-market Contact 
and Profitability', Economica, Vol. 60, pp 203-224.
Hymer, Stephen and Pashigian Peter, (1962), 'Turnover of Firms as a Measure of 
Market Behaviour', The Review o f Economics and Statistics, Vol. 44, pp 82-7.
Jacquemin, Alexis, (1991), 'Foreword', in The Economics o f the Single European Act, 
M cK e n z i e  G  and Venables A, (eds), London: Macmillan.
Jong, de H.W., (1988), The Structure o f  European Industry, T he  Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.
Jones, Alison, (1993), 'Woodpulp: Concerted Practice and/or Conscious Parallelism?', 
European Competition Law Review, No.6, pp 273-279.
Kay, Neil, (1991), 'Industrial Collaborative Activity and the Completion of the Internal 
Market', Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol xxiv, No. 4, pp 347-362.
Keohane, R., etal, (1990), 'Conclusions; C om m u n i t y  Politics and Institutional Change', 
in The Dynamics o f  European Integration, Wallace W., (eds), London: Pinter Publicers.
Koutsoyannis A., (1982), Modem Microeconomics, London: Machmillan.
Kreis, Helmut W .  R., (1992), 'EC Competition L a w  and Maritime Transport', The 
Antitrust Bulletin, pp 481-501.
241
Lipsey, Richard G., (1980), An Introduction o f Positive Economics, London: 
Weidenfield and Nicholson.
M a c M a n u s ,  Susan A., (1991), 'Wh y  Business Are Reluctant T o  Sell T o  Governments', 
Public Administration Review, Vol 51, N o  4, pp 328-343.
Martin, J.M.F., et a\, (1991), 'Product Market Versus Regional Cohesion In T he  
Community', European Lan> Review, Vol. 16, No.3, pp 224-237.
Martinez, John E., (1990), 'The Linked Oligopoly Concept: Recent Evidence from 
Banking', Journal o f Economic Issues, Vol X X I V ,  No. 2, pp 589-594.
Mayes, David G., (1991), The European Challenge; Industry's Response to 1992, D. G  
May es  (ed.), H e m e l  Heampstead: Harvester Wheatsheat.
M c G o w a n ,  Francis and Thomas, Stephen, (1989), 'Power-Plant Equipment Industry', 
The World Economy, Vol. 12, pp 544-556.
M c G o w a n ,  F. and Thomas, S., (1993), Bureaucratic Rules Versus Competition? An 
Alternative Approach to Utilities Procurement in the EC Electricity Sector, 
mimeograph, Conference held at the University of Birmingham 22-3 April 1993,
Minitab Manual, (1990).
Montagnon, P., (1990), European Competition Policy, London: Pinter Publishers.
Myers, R a y m o n d  H., (1990), Classical and Modern Regression With Applications, 
Boston: P W  S/Kent.
Ninni, Augusto, (1990), 'Recent Changes in the Power Equipment Industry and the 
Opening up of Public Procurement Markets in the EC', Energy Policy, May, pp 320-330
O E C D ,  (1979), Concentration and Competition Policy, Paris: O E C D .
Office of Fair Trading (1994), Barriers to Entry and Exit in UK Competition Policy, 
Research Paper 2, London: Office of Fair Trading.
O w e n ,  R., (1989), Guide to 1992, London: Times Books.
Padoa-Schioppa et al, (1991), Europe after 1992: Three Essays in International 
Finance, N e w  Jersey: Princeton University.
Pelkmans, Jacques, (1987), 'The N e w  Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization', Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol. X X V ,  No. 3, pp 249-269.
Pelkmans, Jacques, et al, (1988), Europe's Domestic Market, London: Routledge.
242
Phillips, Almarin, (1960), 'A Theory of Interfirm Organization', Quartely Journal o f 
Economics, pp 602-613.
Phillips, Almarin, (1964), 'Competition, Confusion, and Commercial Banking', Journal 
o f  Finance, pp 32-45.
Phillips, O w e n  R. and Mason, Charles F., (1992), 'Mutual Forbearance in Experimental 
Conglomerate Markets', RAND Journal o f Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp 395-414.
Picat, M a r c  and Z a c h m a n n  Jacques, (1993), 'Community Monitoring of Concentration 
Operations: Evaluation after over T w o  Years' Application of Regulation 4064/89', 
European Competition Law Review, No. 6, pp 240-255.
Porter, Robert H. and Douglas Z o n a  J., (1993), 'Detection of Bid Rigging in 
Procurement Auctions', Journal o f Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 3, pp 518-538.
Public Finance Foundation, (1990), Cartels & Public Procurement: The Costs o f  
Cartels to Public Bodies, Discussion Paper 27, London: Public Finance Foundation.
Purchasing and Supply Management, 'Selling to Government', M a y  1992.
Purchasing and Supply Management, 'Procurement Directives - Who is Playing by the 
Rules?' M a y  1994.
Ravenscraft, David, J., (1983), 'Structure-Profit Relationships at the Line of Business 
and Industry Level', Review o f  Economics and Statistics, pp 22-31.
Rawlings, J., (1988), Applied Regression Analysis, Pacific Grove, California: 
Wad sw o rt h  &  Brooks, 1988.
Roseman, Daniel, (1988), T o w a r d s  a G A T T  C o d e  on Trade in Telecommunication 
Equipment', The World Economy, March, pp 135-149.
Scheingold, Stuart, A., (1965), The Ride o f  Law in European Integration, Westport, 
Connecticut: Gre en w oo d  Press.
Scherer, F. M., (1980), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Chicago: R a n d  McNally Publishing.
Schmalensee, Richard, (1989), 'Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance', in 
Handbook o f Industrial Organizations, Schmalensee Richard and Willig Robert, (eds), 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.
Scott, John T., (1991), 'Multimarket Contact A m o n g  Diversified Oligopolists', 
International Journal o f Industrial Organization, Vol. 9, pp 225-238.
243
Scott, John T., (1982), 'Multimarket Contact and Economic Performance', The Review o f  
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 64,pp 368-375.
Snyder, Francis, (1993), 'The Effectiveness of European C o m m u n i t y  Law: Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques', Modem Law Review, pp 19-54.
S olomon Harris, Elinor, (1970), 'A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly', Journal o f Money, 
Credit and Banking, pp 323-36.
Strickland Allyn D., (1984), Firm Diversification, Mutual Forbearance Behaviour and 
Price-Cost Margins, N e w  York: Garland Publishing.
Strickland, Allyn D., (1985), 'Conglomerate Mergers, Mutual Forbearance Behaviour 
and Price Competition', Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp 153- 
159.
Tirole, Jean, (1988), The Theory o f  Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
M I T  Press.
Trepte, Peter-Armin, (1993), 'Public Procurement and the C o m m u n i t y  Competition 
Rules', Public Procurement Law Review, No. 2, pp 93-114.
Tsoukalis, Loukas, (1991), The New European Economy, N e w  York: Oxford University 
Press.
Vanni D'Archirafi, R., (1994), 'The Commission's Action P ro gr a mm e  for the Years 
Ahead', European Access, p. 7-9.
Wainwright, Richard, (1990), 'Legal Reforms in Public Procurement', Yearbook o f  
European Law, Vol. 10, pp 133-146.
V a n  W e g b e r g  Marc, V a n  Witteloostuijn Arjen and R o s c a m  Abbing Michiel, (1994), 
'Multimarket and Multiproject Collusion; W h y  European Integration M a y  Reduce Intra- 
C om m u n i t y  Competition', De Economist, Vol. 142, No. 3, pp 253-285.
Weidenbaum, Murray, (1994), 'Antitrust Policy for the Global Market-Place', Journal o f  
World Trade, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp 27-31.
Weisberg, S., (1980), Applied Linear Regression, N e w  York: J. Willey &  Sons.
Weiss, Friedl, (1987), 'The L a w  of Public Procurement in E F T A  and the EEC',
Yearbook o f European Law’, pp 81 -111.
Weiss, Friedl, (1988), 'Public Procurement in the E EC :  Public Supply Contracts', 
European Law> Review, Vol 13, pp 323-330.
Weiss, Friedl, (1992), 'Public Procurement L a w  in the E C  Internal Market 1992: the
244
Second C o m i n g  of the European Champion', T he Antitrust Bulletin, S u m m e r  1992, pp 
307-335. ,
Weiss, FriedI, (1993), Public Procurement in European Community Law, London: T he 
Athlone Press.
Williamson, Oliver E., (1965), 'A Dyn am i c  Theory of Interfirm Behaviour', Ouartely 
Journal o f Economics, pp 579-607.
Winter, Jan A., (1991), 'Public Procurement in the EEC', Common Market Law Review, 
Vol. 28 pp 741-782.
Wistrich, E., (1989), After 1992, The United States o f Europe, London: Routledge.
Wish, Richard and Sufrin Breda, (1994), 'Oligopolistic Markets and E C  Competition 
Law, Yearbook o f European Law’, Vol. 12, pp 59-83.
Wonnacott, T. and Wonnacott R., (1990), Introductory Statistics fo r Business and 
Economics, Santa-Barbara: J. Wiley.
Woolcock, Stephen etal, (1991), Britain, Germany and 1992, London: Pinter 
Publishers.
Woolcock, Stephen, (1991), Market Access Issues in EC-US Relations, London: Pinter 
Publishers.
Yao, D., and Desanti, S., (1993), 'Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit 
Collusion', The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp 121-141.
Younger, M .  S., (1979), A Handbook fo r Linear Regression, Massachusetts: Duxbury 
Press.
245
A P P E N D I X  A
A -l ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACT DATABASE
A -l.l Description of the Database and Sampling Procedure
A n  experimental database of European public procurement contracts w a s  built 
covering a large sample of contract awards of all types of purchasing entities in all 
Member-States. All these contacts awards have been published in Official Journal "S" 
series in January 1993, and they refer to tenders that have been advertised in the Journal 
during the last couple of months of 1992. These awards cover mostly "Works" and 
"Supplies" contacts as the compulsory advertisement of the "Utility" and "Service" 
contracts c o m m e n c e d  on the 1st of January 1993 and subsequently the awards for such 
contracts were announced in February or M ar ch  of 1993.
During January 1993, something of over 1200 contract awards were published in 
the Official Journal and 117 of such contracts have been randomly selected for further 
analysis. For comparison, in 1992 m ore than 9,200 public sector contracts were 
awarded, according to Euro-Bid Watch, a consultancy which analyses the European 
Community's contracts data (Financial Times, Exporter 22, 13 October 1993, p. 22). 
The assumption is that all European C o m m u n i t y  procurement contracts are advertised 
and published in the Official Journal while in reality a percentage of such contracts 
never do so. T he  purpose of the analysis of the database is to s h o w  the extent of the 
opening up of public procurement and to identify some important features such as the 
origin and type of successful tenderer, type of award procedures, award criteria, average 
n umber of tenders, G A T T  participation and the type of goods or services supplied. The 
origin and type of successful tenderer(s) is an important constituent of the sampling 
procedure and name, address and country of registration were recorded. A n  example of 
a contract award details recorded in the database is shown in Figure A - l .
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Figure A-I.
Serial No: 69 Title: Uk-Birmingham: Flats
Awarding Authority: Birmingham City Council
Nationality: UK Award Procedure: R Date of award: 2.12.92
Type of Contract(W,S,U,Se): W No of Tenders Received: 8 
Award Criteria: LP 
Standard specification: n/a
Successful Tenderer(s): Wates Construction (Midlands) Ltd, 
Birmingham
Nationality of Tenderer(s): UK GATT Participation: N
Price (s) Nat Currency: £ 5,127,317 
Exh/rate: 0.799 ECU
Goods/Services supplied: Flats (Design, construction and 
restoration)
______ R: Restricted, W: Works, LP: Lowest Price, n/a: no available,
N: none
A -1.2 Analysis of the Database and Additional Information
T he  findings of the analysis confirms the thesis that there is very little direct 
public sector purchasing from foreign suppliers. Only 0.5% of the number of contracts 
(or 0.02% in value) w as  awarded to a foreign suppliers. This is actually lower than the 
findings (2%) of the "Cost o f  non-Europe" in 1988 and it m a y  partly due to the small 
sample size as only 117 contracts were examined. A  D T I  survey reports that 5 - 1 0 %  of 
contracts are awarded to suppliers from other E C  countries (DTI, 1994, points 77-78). 
The findings do not s h o w  the extend of trade between M e m b e r  States as there is an
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u n k n o w n  percentage of imports that are purchased from local suppliers and local 
branches of European multinationals. M a n y  European multinationals appear as local 
suppliers as they are based within the national borders of each M e m b e r  State (i.e. 
Olivetti Belgium, Siemens Italia, and Philipps UK). Table A-l shows that France is the 
country with the largest share in the number of contacts (34%), followed by the United 
K i n g d o m  (29%), G e r m a n y  (25%), and Italy (9%). Table A-2 shows that G er ma n y  has 
the largest share in the value of awarded contracts (68%), followed by the United 
K i n g d o m  (15%), France (13%), and Italy (3%). Germany's top place is due to an 
exceptional high value contract of ( E C U  198.5 million) for an urban railway project . If 
one ignores that exceptional contract, then in first place is the United K i n g d o m  (39%), 
followed by France (34%), G e r m a n y  (16%), Italy (8%), and D e n m a r k  (2%). S o m e  
Member-States such as Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal are not represented at all 
and this is due to the fact that although they advertise their contracts they rarely publish 
contract awards. According to Euro-Bid Watch the share of European C o m m u n i t y  
public sector awarded by country for the period January-July 1993 is (Figure A-2): 
G e r m a n y  31%, United K i n g d o m  25%, France 18%, Italy 10%, D e n m a r k  4%, Spain 3%, 
Belgium, 2%, Netherlands 2%, Greece 2 %, Ireland 1%, Lux em b ou r g  1%, and Portugal 
1 %  (Financial Times, Exporter 22, 13 October 1993, p. 22).
Table A -l
Share of EC Public Sector Contracts Awarded (January 1993)
Countries B D DK E F GR I IR L NL P UK Total
Contracts
(Number) 3 29 2 0 35 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 33 114
% 2 25 2 31 9 1 1 29 1 0 0
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Table A-2
Value of EC Public Sector Contracts Awarded (January 1993)
Countries B D DK E F GR I IR L NL P UK
Contracts 0.5 218.1 2 . 8 0 41.9 0 10 0 0.20.5 0 47.7
(ECU m)
% 0 . 1 68 1 13 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 15
Adjusted 19.6
% 0.3 16 2 34 8 0.1 0.04 39
Figure A-2
Procurement Contracts January-July 1993
■ 1  Country
T he  database analysis of contract awards of January 1993 (Table A-3), confirms 
the predominant use of the open tendering procedure (48%), which is a sharp 
improvement to that of the "Cost o f non-Europe" of 7 %  in 1988, while restricted 
procedures amounts to 3 8 %  from the previous 45%. Throughout the European 
Community, of the 31,000 tenders advertised in 1993, the most c o m m o n  procedure w as  
open (49%), with the remaining 5 1 %  being of the restricted nature. O f  these, 6 8 %  took 
the generic title ’restricted’ (where only contractors invited by the awarder m a y  tender), 
with the remainder roughly being split between accelerated restricted, 1 8 %  and 
negotiated 1 4 %  (Purchasing and Supply Management, M a y  1994, p. 18).
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T a b l e  A ~ 3
Use of Public Procurement Procedures, January 1993.
No. of Contracts %
Open Procedure: 56 49
Restricted : 45 38
Negotiated : 4 4
n/a * : 1 1 1 0
*Not available data
T he database analysis of contract awards in January 1993, revealed that the 
majority number of contracts w a s  for Supply (73%), followed by Works (26%), and as 
it w a s  expected there w a s  absence of Utility and Service contracts. In value terms, the 
Works contracts amounted to 57%, while the Supply contracts amounted to 4 3 %  of the 
total value of the awarded contracts.
T he  average number of tenders w a s  9 tenders per contract with s om e  national 
variations. A w a r d  criteria were dominated by the flexible "most economically 
advantageous offer..." 66%, while the "the lowest price" criterion w a s  only applicable to 
7 %  of the contracts and with no available data for the remaining 2 7 %  of the awarded 
contracts. Each contract w a s  possible to be awarded to more than one supplier or 
contractor with an average of 3.2 suppliers/contractors per contract.
T he database analysis of contract awards in January 1993 revealed the following 
shopping list in a descending order of frequency:
Works_____________________ Supplies___________ Services____ Utilities
Building/refurbishment(4) Medical equipment(9) Laundry 
Electrical works(2) Foodstuff(7) Services
Plastering(2) Computer equipment(8)
Flat design/construction Fuel(4)
Park construction Software(2)
Various building works Military Supplies 
Window, roofing and (combat boots,tents,
Ventilation installations uniforms etc.,(9)
Landscaping Vessel
Motorway Telqphones Cabinets
Urban railway Printing & stationary
Bridge construction Precision instruments
Mole construction Trucks
Motorways Hospital supplies
Footpaths Telephones
Clinic construction
School "
2 5 0
Table A-4 shows the share of the European C om m u n i t y  public procurement 
contracts awarded by leading industrial classification, for January-July 1993. These 
contracts c am e  from every M e m b e r  State of the European C o m m u n i t y  and for the 
Utilities Directive which is considered as an important market-opening initiative and 
one of the most important parts of the Single European Market programme. Contract 
tenders advertisements c a m e  from major and minor utilities. About 40 of those notices 
stated a contract value making a total of s om e  E C U  500 million (Financial Times, 
Exporter 22, 13 October 1993, p. 22). That is probably far short of the overall value of 
advertised contracts, but still equals the annual value of trade in the whole European 
C o m m u n i t y  public procurement sector before legislation w a s  introduced (Financial 
Times, 3 February 1993, p.7).
Table A-4
Share of EC Public Sector Contracts Awarded by Leading 
Industrial Classification, January-July 1993______________
Building and Civil Engineering
Metal Products, Mechanical, Electrical
Vehicle & Precision Engineering
Minerals & Chemicals
Energy and Water
Services and Miscellaneous
Other Services
Banking & Finance, Insurance 
& Business Services 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, 
Transport & Communications 
Other Manufacturing
40 %
27%
8%
2%
1%
4%
1%
15%
2%
Source: Euro-Bid Watch, Financial Times, Exporter 22, 13 October 
1993, p. 22.
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A P P E N D I X  B
B-l.Q Sample of Data Base Company Profile.
No: 4 Company: Alcatel- Alsthom Nationality: F  Sector: 533
M A J O R  A C T I V I T I E S :  C  is an international 
producer of technologically advanced infrastructure equipment 
for the communication systems, energy and transport. The main 
activities are (1) Communication Systems Alcatel, (2) Energy 
and Transport, G E C - A L S T H O M ,  (3) Electrical Engineering,
C E G E L E G ,  (4) Batteries, (5) Services.
G E O G R A P H I C A L  D I S T R I B U T I O N
(Number of European subsidiaries including associated 
companies):
B:9 D: 11DK:1 E: 10F:162GR: 11: 8 ER: 2 L: 0 NL: 14P:2 
UK: 13 EFTA: 14
LI: 162 L2:71 L3-EFTA: 14 L4: 247
L l home subsidiaries, L2 other EC subsidiaries, L3 EFTA subsidiaries, L4 Total EC+EFTA)
BUSINESS ANALYSIS (1992 and 1988 figures unless otherwise stated)
Turnover(m): Ffrl61,671Date:Dec 92ECU ex/rate:6.681 
T/over(ECU): 24,199
Profit(m): Ffr9,678 Profit(ECUm): 1,449 
Profit%: 5.986
Turnover(m)*: Ffrl27,958 Date*: Dec 88 ECU ex/rate:7.036 
T/over(ECU)*: 18,186
MAJOR BUSINESS LINES ANALYSIS
Communication Systems 
Energy and Transport 
Electrical Engineering 
Batteries 
Services
Ff 109,700 57.2 %
55,400 28.8 %
16,100 8.4 %
3,500 1.8 %
7,300 3.8 %
LBs: 5
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I
MAJOR PROCUREMENT LINES ANALYSIS- Nos: 4
SECTOR(l): Communication eq CODE: 533 T/R(ECUm): 16,420 %: 57 
SECTOR(2): Electrical eq CODE: 541 T/R(ECUm): 8,292 %: 29
SECTOR(3): Heavy eng(elec) CODE: 592 T/R(ECUm): 2,410 %: 8
SECTOR(4): E n g  Services CODE: 561 T/R(ECUm): 1,093 %: 4
G E O G R A P H I C A L  A N A L Y S I S :
France Ffr67,230 41.5 % Total Europe ECU 21,210 8 8%
Germany 28,132 17.4 % RoE 46.1%
Rest of Europe 46,339 28.7 %
Rest of World 40,339
Ffrl61,677
O T H E R  V A R I A B L E S :
RANKI: 0 RANK2: 2 PROSAR: 13007 EL: 0 ES: 0 HHI:0.441 CR4: 0.923 
GROWTH: 5.540 G(A): 14.155 SHAREA: 0.097 SALESA: 1768 DIV: 0.580
C O M M E N T S :  1. Communication systems includes (a) Telecommunications: network systems, 
radiocommunication, space and defence, Business systems (major orders for the GSM -Transmobile 
radiotelephony terminal- for France, Belgium, Netherlands and Australia, (b) telecommunication and 
energy cables. 2. Energy and transport includes (a) Power generation, C is major manufacturer of gas 
turbines and supplied Electricite de France and German utilities with coal generators, (b) Power 
transmission and distribution (c) Rail transportation and rolling stock with major orders from national 
railways, (d) nuclear, connection and mechanical, Fromatone. 3.Electrical engineering as a supplier of 
electrical engineering systems and electrical contracting, (e) Production of batteries by SAFT and its 
subsidiaries, (f) Services includes Engineering (Sogelerg-Sogreah) providing diagnostic consulting and 
contracting services for major projects in the public and private sectors.
Source: Extel C o m p a n y  Reports
2 5 3
B-l.l COMPANY DATA
No Coup any Nat Sector RANK2 RANK1 Profit%
1 Daimler-Benz* D 521 0 0 2.066
2 Siemens D 541 1 1 4.0723 Philips NL 541 1 1 -0.8504 Alcatel- Alsthom F 533 0 2 5.986
6 ABB Asea Brown Boveri Swe/i 541 2 4 4.746
1 0 Mannesman D 566 0 1 1.392
13 Ciba-Geigy Swi 433 0 1 6.84514 British Aerospace UK 523 0 1 -12.03719 Saint-Gobain F 611 0 3 5.161
20 BTR UK 591 1 2 12.27223 Man G D 566 0 2 3.31224 Schneider Group F 541 2 6 2.05525 Bouygues F 613 0 8 1.97126 Sandoz Swi 433 4 5 10.370
27 GEC UK 541 1 1 0 14.35728 Aerospatiale St F 521 0 1 -4.45831 IBM Deutschland D 531 2 3 -2.23932 Smithkline Beecham UK 433 1 7 21.36436 Ericson Swe 533 0 8 3.50237 Glaxo Holdings UK 433 1 2 1 34.83640 Holzmann (Phillipp) D 613 2 2 1 2.60642 Thomson-CSF F 551 0 5 5.48243 Hoesch AG D 566 0 8 1.56544 Boots UK 433 1 3 1 0 . 2 245 Office Commercial Pharma F 433 0 20 0.85447 Procordia Swe 433 1 30 12.13550 Lafarge Coppee F 611 2 18 6.15551 Machine Bull F 531 1 9 -15.26852 Olivetti I 531 2 2 0 -6.96854 Rolls Royce UK 521 0 1 0 -5.16555 Cable & Wireless UK 533 0 44 20.2656 Holderbank Management Swi 611 6 26 7.23557 BICC PLC UK 541 0 1 1 2.27261 RMC UK 611 2 4 5.30562 Sulzer Swi 563 1 2 2.47063 Linde D 566 4 2 1 6.33065 Repola Fi 591 0 27 -0.961
66 Tarmac UK 613 1 2 1 -11.9367 Pilkinson UK 611 4 15 2.949
68 Rank Xerox UK 534 0 18 5.17972 BET UK 481 0 1 0 0.78873 Matra F 521 1 3 2.79774 Elf Sanofi F 433 1 15 7.73278 SKF Swe 566 0 1 2 6.64580 Poliet F 611 8 24 6.14282 Gehe D 433 3 41 3.22384 Wolseley UK 611 3 1 1 4.67387 Electrowatt Swi 561 1 6 6.098
88 Racal Electronics UK 551 0 0 8.48994 Wellcome UK 433 1 3 28.6498 Kvaerner Nor 592 5 46 4.65899 Redland Pic UK 611 0 16 11.710104 Siebe UK 591 1 6 10.417
1 1 1 Fougerolle F 613 3 26 3.910
1 2 0 Sagem F 551 0 6 7.605131 Stork N1 591 4 25 2.262149 TI Group PLC UK 566 1 31 7.604151 SGS Swi 481 1 8 12.248160 Strafor Facom F 534 2 38 2.800
2 0 1 Smiths Industries UK 566 4 50 16.08
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LI L2 L4 PROSAR EL ES CR4 HHI GROWTH Gr(A) SHAREA SALESA DIV
244 90 362 3925 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 7.011 2.769 0.068 3130 0.521
87 73 191 7541 0 0 0.834 0.215 6.640 3.532 0.036 3062 0.930
140 269 498 4181 0 0 0.834 0.215 1.040 3.532 0.239 1232 0.660
162 71 247 13007 0 0 0.923 0.411 5.540 14.155 0.097 1768 0.580
179 360 684 4762 0 1 0.834 0.215 5.966 4.624 0.265 1523 0.820
148 125 315 2732 0 0 0.445 0.077 7.505 3.259 0.226 821 0.712
2 0 58 105 1737 1 0 0.357 0.056 6.250 7.927 0.162 449 0.646
108 119 230 1622 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 11.330 2.769 0.299 767 0.69870 114 196 1724 1 1 0.335 0.053 5.450 3.882 0.182 8 8 6 0.870
482 107 612 701 0 0 0,429 0.080 10.520 7.278 1.035 489 0.804
1 0 1 38 158 1462 0 0 0.445 0.077 5.86 3.730 0.226 652 0.776
168 75 258 1788 0 0 0.834 0.215 9.805 3.532 0.434 540 0.723
333 37 380 706 1 1 0.487 0.083 11.060 7.920 0.557 842 0.4698
18 89 1 2 2 1611 1 0 0.357 0.056 8 . 1 2 0 7.927 0.281 301 0.708
193 54 253 3175 0 1 0.834 0.215 0.510 3.532 0.223 937 0.796
28 4 32 3202 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 6.386 2.698 0.262 3051 0.728
2 1 83 1 1 2 2189 1 1 0.702 0.164 4.460 6.946 0.144 640 0.628
42 62 115 1174 1 0 0.357 0.056 4.475 7.927 0.370 184 0.606
63 59 143 2610 0 0 0.923 0.411 7.750 14.155 0.320 268 0.307
15 28 56 1824 1 0 0.357 0.056 15.690 7.927 0.190 204 0.284
68 2 1 94 253 1 1 0.487 0.083 10.82 7.920 0.243 609 0.612
41 26 70 1031 0 0 0.791 0.192 0.354 3.954 0.264 414 0 . 8 6 8106 61 184 873 0 0 0.445 0.077 6.15 3.309 0.399 381 0.646
98 14 1 1 2 52 1 0 0.355 0.056 8.84 7.927 0.301 580 0.506
15 1 2 27 45 1 0 0.357 0.056 10.786 7.927 0 . 1 0 0 898 0
109 82 233 591 1 0 0.357 0.056 15.94 7.927 0.513 315 0.641
192 36 248 826 1 1 0.335 0.053 11.260 3.882 0.887 279 0.69930 63 108 906 1 1 0.702 0.164 -1.305 6.946 0.272 303 0.486
238 1 2 2 403 1997 1 1 0.702 0.164 -5.272 6.946 0.897 312 0.66172 8 82 522 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 12.39 2.769 0.729 312 0.479
2 1 5 27 619 0 0 0.923 0.411 20.423 14.155 0.227 330 0.247
26 49 76 1757 1 1 0.335 0.053 15.131 3.882 0.539 391 0.615
164 32 203 448 1 1 0.834 0.215 4.850 3.532 0.718 349 0.594
107 320 446 2317 1 1 0.335 0.053 9.685 38828 1.081 341 0.453
2 0 43 67 1449 1 1 0.445 0.077 5.322 3.730 0.276 242 0.79719 41 73 283 0 0 0.445 0.077 11.999 3.730 0.197 305 0.89356 77 169 738 1 1 0.429 0.080 0.484 7.498 0.451 374 0.518191 36 232 166 1 1 0.485 0.083 0.736 7.920 1.063 445 0.48548 108 191 1070 1 1 0.335 0.053 2.393 3.882 0.731 261 0.347
1 0 114 143 3323 1 1 0.834 0.227 5.115 5.802 0.364 324 0213 123 344 401 0 0 0.616 0.138 3.088 13.552 1.404 245 0.80467 37 107 977 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 6.395 2.769 0.424 311 0.637
107 80 195 681 1 0 0.357 0.056 9.129 7.927 0.744 217 0.553
19 71 103 594 1 0 0.445 0.077 5.420 3.730 0.541 190 0.302159 1 0 170 175 1 1 0.335 0.053 10.674 3.882 1.057 447 0.585
1 2 2 60 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.357 0.056 14.444 7.927 0.923 340 0.68183 9 93 245 1 1 0.335 0.053 9.474 3.882 1.037 183 0.214
71 50 134 855 0 0 0.445 0.077 7.118 3.730 0.521 2 1 2 0.613
123 61 190 235 0 0 0.791 0.192 5.920 3.820 1.104 172 0.787
8 1 2 25 488 1 0 0.355 0.056 8.178 7.927 0.170 1 2 1 0
47 23 78 832 0 0 0.316 0.052 18.565 7.038 0.610 353 0.74063 98 176 1364 1 1 0.336 0.053 3. 780 3.882 0.982 2 2 1 0.59529 38 72 612 0 0 0.429 0.080 1 0 . 2 1 7.498 0.396 150 0.513
214 1 0 224 186 1 1 0.487 0.083 11.651 7.920 2.346 382 0.747
8 2 1 0 272 1 1 0.791 0.192 6.005 3.954 0.999 199 0.637
87 41 137 183 0 0 0.429 0.080 11.026 7.498 1.148 119 0.90554 38 98 219 0 0 0.470 0.077 3.800 3.309 1.415 85 0.708
2 39 45 189 0 0 0.616 0.138 9.177 13.552 0.512 52 0.786
16 25 46 276 1 1 0.834 0.227 14.822 5.802 0.418 1 1 0 0.776
27 9 36 105 0 0 0.445 0.077 -1.27 3.730 2.068 70 0.548
2 5 5
No Coup any Nat Sector RANK2 RANKI Profit%
1 1 Hanson* UK 611 0 1 10.409
22 Hanlel D 591 1 4 1.96229 Akzo* N1 433 1 6 5.63939 British Steel Uk 592 2 20 -3.46249 Pirelli International I 541 1 2 1 -1.30958 Cockerill Sambre B 592 0 4 2.140
59 AGIV - AG D 592 3 37 3.106
60 GTM - Entepose F 611 4 2 1 1.059
64 Deutche Babcock D 592 0 1 1 1.62670 Hoogovens N1 592 2 15 -3.628
71 SNECMA F 521 3 7 -3.44376 Lucas Industry UK 521 2 9 0.998
77 Alenia I 521 5 80 1.31081 Nokia Fi 551 0 40 4.441
83 Trelleborg Swe 566 2 20 -6.629
86 AMEC UK 566 1 9 -4.12489 Schindler Holding Swi 592 0 16 4.36590 Hochtief D 613 4 37 4.775
92 Dassault F 522 3 2 2 1.927
93 Carl Zeiss-Stiftung D 552 0 8 2.54796 Harissons & Crosfield UK 611 3 24 4.397
97 Bilfinger & Berger D 613 8 64 3.223105 Ciments Francais F 611 6 16 -5.542108 Aker Nor 611 3 2 2 . 1 2109 Wimpey UK 611 6 36 -6.911
117 Atlas Swe 566 1 15 6.415
1 2 1 Astra Swe 433 4 50 32.887124 CAP Gemini Sogeti F 482 2 58 0.869125 SMI-Sta Mettallurgica I 592 3 29 -0.981127 T & N UK 591 1 16 4.532129 Blue Circle Industries UK 611 2 31 6.846134 Fisons UK 433 0 5 9. 624
137 SMH Swi 591 1 15 14.952141 Diehl D 522 0 1 0.529142 Heidelberger Zement d 611 6 20 7.594
146 ISS-lnter Serv Systems Dk 481 3 44 3.318
147 CRH IR 611 4 9 5.162150 Novo-Nordisk Dk 433 5 42 15.674152 BPB Industries UK 611 3 33 5.113
153 Sodexho F 481 0 15 4.212155 Altana D 433 1 8 7.227156 Merck D 433 5 42 11.999158 Otra N1 591 2 33 4.701159 Williams Holding UK 591 4 28 15.578162 UCB* B 433 1 18 5.301164 Oce-Van Der Grinten N1 534 0 17 4.357165 BIS F 481 0 5 -0.448
166 Cimenteries CBR B 611 4 1 0 9.717168 Northern Telecom (STC) UK 533 0 18 8.994170 Glynwed International UK 566 1 40 3.651179 Delta UK 563 2 24 7.003
181 Institute Merieux F 433 5 54 15.703183 Berendsen (Sophus) Dk 481 0 24 15.536186 Synthelabo F 433 1 27 9.922
197 Wienerberger Bau Au 613 6 39 4.749205 Gambro Swe 433 0 9 11.929207 Gist-Brocades NL 433 6 28 7.997
2 1 0 Hafslund Nycomed Nor 591 2 16 27.469
228 Getronics N1 531 1 9 8.810
234 Rheinelectra D 541 0 4 10.956
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LI L2 L4 PROSAR EL ES CR4 HHI GROWTH Gr (A) SHAREA SALESA DIV
538 54 600 92 1 1 0.335 0.053 7.899 3.882 1.088 680 0.838
1 1 1 63 192 146 1 1 0.429 0.085 8.873 7.498 0.461 513 0.363
125 138 287 756 1 0 0.357 0.057 0.129 7.927 0.572 414 0.73880 32 1 2 0 665 1 1 0.316 0.052 -3.467 7.038 0.300 625 0.75930 59 96 924 0 1 0.834 0.215 -3.203 3.532 0.378 313 0.64571 62 136 1411 1 1 0.316 0.052 3.301 7.038 0.633 177 0.690
1 2 1 31 170 1052 1 1 0.316 0.052 15.321 7.038 0.448 313 0.664575 44 620 822 1 1 0.335 0.053 10.755 3.882 1.725 359 0.835
62 2 0 92 744 1 1 0.316 0.052 8.097 7.038 0.379 379 0.748
55 31 8 8 2031 1 1 0.316 0.052 -0.838 7.038 0.286 254 0.635
34 6 41 315 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 6.288 2.769 0.485 338 0.552
37 27 67 518 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 4.825 2.769 0.287 233 0.4728
45 1 0 57 998 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 24.933 2.769 0.272 327 0.750
50 49 129 732 1 1 0.791 0.192 -6.743 3.954 0.531 2 0 0 0.768
252 93 384 361 1 1 0.445 0.077 1.312 3.730 1.567 245 0.878
1 2 1 1 1 136 1 2 0 1 1 0.445 0.077 9.839 3.730 0.930 406 0.495
2 2 31 61 1042 1 0 0.316 0.052 9.627 7.038 0.310 136 0.176
193 33 227 610 1 1 0.487 0.083 12.431 7.920 1.279 280 0.556
1 2 2 14 935 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 -1.970 2.769 0.234 644 0 . 1 1 2
40 24 72 390 1 1 0.791 0.192 4.836 3.954 0.454 196 0.499
194 2 0 214 63 1 1 0.335 0.053 2.772 3.882 1.747 250 0.684
36 1 0 46 734 1 1 0.487 0.083 17.998 7.920 0.323 290 0.452
24 18 42 1119 1 1 0.335 0.053 8.841 3.882 0.297 2 2 1 0.500
109 2 1 137 153 1 1 0.335 0.053 6.198 3.882 1 . 1 0 0 254 0.524
41 5 47 39 1 1 0.335 0.053 -1.601 3.882 0.573 328 0.696
2 1 54 79 718 0 0 0.445 0.077 5.132 3.730 0.611 90 0.641
1 1 1 0 25 904 1 0 0.357 0.057 20.280 7.927 0.195 128 0.798
22 29 57 1 1 2 0 1 1 0.702 0.164 17.127 6.946 0.316 149 0
20 41 68 1243 1 1 0.316 0.052 11.432 7.038 0.437 156 0
50 26 80 447 1 1 0.429 0.080 6.750 7.498 0.897 139 0.65853 1 2 72 332 1 1 0.335 0.053 4.278 3.882 0.786 187 0.56653 35 1 0 1 270 1 0 0.357 0.056 11.26 7.927 1.625 51 0.44338 1 1 50 27 1 0 0.429 0.080 10.353 7.498 0.710 196 0.27651 9 61 176 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 5.813 2.769 0 . 6 6 6 187 0.70229 2 33 1 2 1 1 1 0.335 0.053 10.192 3.882 0.663 311 0.737
13 23 47 345 0 0 0.616 0.138 15.201 13.552 0.632 152 0.30234 106 140 637 1 1 0.335 0.053 4.380 3.882 1.622 176 0.444
2 1 38 68 408 1 0 0.357 0.056 15.912 7.927 0.712 66 0.476
25 86 115 688 1 1 0.335 0.053 3.480 3.882 0.930 124 0.25416 1 2 29 317 0 0 0.616 0.138 3.645 13.552 0.340 105 0.285
14 15 2 2 192 1 0 0.357 0.056 7.305 7.927 0 . 2 0 1 90 0.6114 39 49 782 1 0 0.357 0.057 -23.157 7.927 0.496 69 0.634
1 1 92 104 740 1 1 0.429 0.080 14.617 7.498 0.885 145 0
73 23 99 1 1 0 1 1 0.429 0.080 2.793 7.498 1.798 86 0.71925 33 63 262 1 0 0.357 0.057 8.215 7.927 0.505 87 0.664
1 2 35 54 815 1 1 0.834 0.227 8.423 5.802 0.643 104 0.496
71 5 77 1 2 0 0 0.616 0.138 6.902 13.552 1.290 239 0.311113 129 249 431 1 1 0.335 0.053 6.123 3.882 3.453 72 0.462
14 16 32 578 0 0 0.923 0.411 10.300 14.155 0.277 116 0
44 16 60 52 1 1 0.445 0.077 0.619 3.730 1.059 157 0.774
75 1 1 86 68 1 1 0.445 0.077 3.696 3.730 1.533 114 0.72014 52 75 1 2 0 1 0 0.357 0.056 27.486 7.927 0.881 85 0.532
6 54 79 447 0 0 0.616 0.138 12.740 13.552 1.106 59 0.559
106 69 191 1 0 0 1 0 0.357 0.057 14.777 7.927 2.507 45 0.16383 17 104 444 1 1 0.487 0.083 28.979 7.920 2.603 160 0.760
7 45 59 399 1 0 0.357 0.057 17.581 7.927 1.134 52 0.041
6 1 2 19 156 1 0 0.357 0.057 -4.888 7.643 0.473 63 0.498
54 22 105 259 1 0 0.429 0.080 17.374 7.498 2.277 46 0.6147 4 1 1 71 1 1 0.702 0.164 20.964 6.946 0.842 145 0.663
180 28 208 17 0 1 0.834 0.215 5.199 3.532 8.739 49 0.459
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38 Hewlett Packard UK 531 3 31 6.23875 Schering D 433 2 1 8.33879 I CL UK 531 0 1 2 1.55785 Tomkins UK 592 13 93 8.302
1 0 1 Dragados E 592 5 44 3.998103 Hollandsche Beton Groep N1 613 2 26 2.104107 Bremer Vulkan D 592 1 0 98 1.954
1 1 2 Strabag D 613 3 31 2.219113 Ecco F 481 1 34 2.469114 Ascom Holdings Swi 533 0 1 1 -1.485115 Oerlico-Buhrle Swi 522 1 35 2.065118 Klocker Humbort Deutz D 592 6 33 0.057119 Fokker NL 521 3 50 0 . 2 1 0
1 2 2 Fag Kugelfisher D 592 4 15 -12.048123 Kone Fi 592 2 25 4.619126 BBA Group UK 591 1 13 3.583130 Landis & Gyr Swi 592 5 1 1 3.860132 Metra Fin 611 14 63 3.946135 Rheinmettal Berlin D 592 6 23 1.640136 Laing UK 613 6 51 0.924138 Costain UK 592 7 23 -11.950139 Mowlem UK 613 5 23 -2.184143 Taylor Woodrow UK 613 7 43 -5.391144 FLS Dk 592 2 6 3.236145 Valmet Fi 566 1 42 -0.625148 Sommer A1libert F 611 1 15 3.353157 Bekaert B 541 0 8 4.072161 Xnternatio-Muller NL 592 7 19 1.533163 English China Clays Uk 611 5 46 9.386169 Digital Equipmet UK 531 2 23 -3.639173 Euroc Swe 611 4 45 -1.531176 KSB D 566 9 23 4.936178 Partek Fin 611 3 44 -1.241180 Vallourec F 566 0 27 6 . 766182 SIG Schweizerische Industrie Swi 591 4 41 3.384184 Italcimenti I 611 2 7 5.961185 Forbo Holdings Swi 611 2 2 4.069188 Monberg & Thorsen Dk 433 1 16 2.588190 Vickers UK 521 3 55 -3.604191 IWKA D 566 1 16 4.490193 Imetal F 611 2 1 1 2 2 7.240194 Dyckerhoff D 611 3 8 4.992
195 Sirti I 533 1 14 29.327
196 Morgan Crusible UK 591 3 7 8.961198 MB-Caradon UK 611 5 17 18.919199 Sextant Avlonique F 521 0 29 0.095
2 0 0 Rugby Group UK 611 1 16 11.151
2 0 2 Hepworth UK 611 6 30 7.139203 ESAB AB Swe 566 2 9 2.483204 Sika-Finanz Swi 613 2 30 5.963206 Fives-Lille Cie F 563 1 2 1 2.729208 Marley UK 611 8 44 1.423209 Ares-Serono Swi 433 1 1 1 14.136
2 1 1 Simon Engineering UK 566 4 44 1.087214 Breda I 521 0 27 -4.312215 Weir Group UK 561 2 18 9.206216 Linotype-Hell D 534 0 1 2 5.510
2 2 2 Sasib I 591 1 9 8.026229 Jens Villadsens Fabriker Dk 611 2 23 3.829232 COS Computer Systems Swi 482 2 32 -32.315
258
LI L2 L4 PROSAR EL ES CR4 HHI GROWTH Gr (A) SHAREA SALESA DIV
5 23 41 4893 1 0
27 40 72 740 1 0
42 44 1 1 0 1686 1 0
82 24 106 37 1 1
28 1 29 49 1 1
39 39 80 498 1 1
56 59 59 259 1 1
50 4 65 256 1 1
14 3 26 2 1 0 0
26 31 60 295 0 0
34 36 78 461 0 0
52 30 85 333 1 1
7 2 9 334 0 0
13 18 37 399 1 1
27 107 149 1053 1 1
43 2 1 64 225 1 1
1 0 29 42 1061 1 1
51 51 134 774 1 1
31 1 2 48 229 1 1
60 1 1 71 5 1 1
91 8 1 0 0 58 1 1
85 15 1 0 1 89 1 1
64 1 1 75 40 1 1
124 90 246 426 1 1
25 2 1 60 138 1 1
1 0 24 37 2 2 1 1 1
14 31 49 464 1 1
41 18 60 115 1 1
23 26 56 355 1 1
4 30 42 139 1 0
46 47 1 0 1 372 1 1
2 19 25 422 1 1
62 59 131 485 1 1
28 5 34 2 0 0 1 1
8 18 27 160 1 1
52 3 56 67 1 1
14 48 70 771 1 1
30 7 44 85 1 0
23 18 47 79 0 0
43 2 0 72 175 1 1
44 2 1 68 37 1 1
27 1 0 41 136 1 1
148 19 174 45 0 0
88 37 127 216 1 0
25 1 1 36 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 0 2 1 132 0 0
24 16 40 140 1 1
35 32 67 349 1 1
16 63 84 89 1 1
6 16 26 240 1 1
19 14 34 47 1 1
16 7 27 86 1 1
16 23 41 282 1 0
47 14 61 7 1 1
92 19 1 1 1 73 0 0
27 0 28 9 0 0
1 1 3 192 1 0
44 34 81 43 1 1
1 2 1 0 32 318 1 1
2 0 18 40 2 0 2 1 0
0.702 0.164 11.958
0.357 0.056 0.559
0.702 0.164 14.779
0.316 0.052 27.712
0.316 0.052 17.218
0.487 0.083 12.095
0.316 0.052 4.580
0.487 0.083 11.251
0.702 0.138 11.829
0.600 0.121 -6.432
0.923 0.411 8.289
0.316 0.052 -12.472
0.607 0.122 15.450
0.316 0.052 0.160
0.316 0.052 13.730
0.429 0.080 5.921
0.316 0.052 9.393
0.335 0.053 23.740
0.316 0.052 -2.125
0.487 0.083 -2.618
0.316 0.052 3.766
0.487 0.084 4.942
0.487 0.083 0.046
0.316 0.052 9.270
0.445 0.077 1.127
0.3355 0.053 55.235 
0.834 0.215 2.732
0.316 0.052 1.188
0.335 0.053 -0.535
0.702 0.165 1.541
0.335 0.053 -0.479
0.445 0.077 12.059
0.335 0.053 -1.010
0.445 0.077 -2.247
0.429 0.080 20.079
0.335 0.053 7.168
0.335 0.053 4.983
0.357 0.057 11.599
0.607 0.121 -2.768
0.445 0.077 9.285
0.335 0.053 -63.380
0.335 0.053 9.181
0.923 0.411 16.290
0.429 0.080 9.711
0.335 0.053 16.967
0.600 0.121 -3.318
0.335 0.053 4.121
0.335 0.053 7.331
0.445 0.077 7.422
0.487 0.083 9.704
0.445 0.077 -4.644
0.335 0.053 -6.142
0.357 0.056 15.226
0.445 0.077 -5.653
0.607 0.121 -7.914
0.445 0.077 19.588
0.834 0.227 9.969
0.429 0.080 16.201
0.335 0.053 -6.036
0.702 0.164 -7.472
6.946 0.073 556 0.730
7.927 0.361 165 0.559
69466 0.311 209 0.667
7.038 1.862 228 0.769
7.038 0.642 1129 0.679
7.920 0.586 278 0.797
7.038 0.960 384 0.684
7.920 0.675 385 0.663
13.552 0.281 370 0.303
2.769 0.390 190 0.691
14.155 0.540 178 0.719
7.038 0.576 1 2 2 0.601
2.769 0.196 508 0.203
7.038 0.270 113 0.373
7.038 0.901 115 0.475
7.498 0.966 135 0.617
7.038 0.270 92 0.553
3.882 0.982 113 0.674
7.038 0.493 152 0.649
7.920 0.957 297 0.254
7.038 1.623 126 0.407
7.920 1.027 2 0 0 1 0.468
7.920 0.837 183 0.466
7.038 2.687 76 0.679
3.730 0.691 87 0.820
3.882 0.265 139 0.664
3.532 0.496 82 0.492
7.038 0.761 161 0.660
3.882 0.875 79 0.494
6.946 0.307 95 0 . 1 1 2
3.882 1.066 95 0.645
3.730 0.301 83 0.379
3.882 1.702 1 2 0 0.734
3.730 0.804 117 0.171
7.498 0.759 142 0.639
3.882 1.531 229 0
3.882 0.692 86 0 . 8 6 6
7.927 0.728 123 0.617
2.769 0.704 104 0.723
3.730 0.992 90 0.737
3.882 1.259 54 0.614
3.882 0.609 105 0.513
14.155 2.271 77 0.800
7.498 2.676 28 0.741
3.882 0.943 106 0.372
2.769 0.361 91 0.368
3.478 1.949 128 0.612
3.882 1.150 58 0.777
3.730 1.693 41 0.687
7.920 0.702 37 0.443
3.730 0.914 46 0.360
3.882 1.104 98 0.625
7.927 1.267 66 0.209
3.730 3.203 39 0.740
2.769 2.461 56 0.647
3.730 4.745 148 0.306
5.802 0.294 113 0.474
7.498 3.806 33 0.623
3.882 1.070 61 0.393
6.946 1.559 32 0.347
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No Conpany Nat Sector RANK2 RANK1 Profit%
5 Hoechst* D 433 0 0 4.595
7 Eaux Generale Des* F 613 0 2 2.153
8 Bosch* D 566 0 0 3.264
9 XCI* UK 433 0 2 -3.183
1 2 Mettalgesellschaft D 591 0 1 0.962
15 Viag* D 591 3 25 3.031
16 Preusag* D 592 2 20 2.494
17 • Rhone-Poulenc F 433 0 3 5.667
18 Krupp F D 592 0 4 -0.919
2 1 Pechiney* F 563 0 1 2.014
30 Roche Holdings Swi 433 3 9 20.659
33 Degussa D 433 3 9 1.558
34 Solvay* B 433 2 5 4.510
35 Tractebel B 591 1 2 153 12.830
41 Trafalgar House UK 592 0 7 -0.777
46 Arbed L 591 0 3 -3.232
48 IBM UK UK 531 2 21 -20.442
53 Air Liquide F 591 0 4 12.153
69 BOC UK 566 2 13 7.871
91 GNK UK 591 1 32 6.109
95 Buhrmann-Tetterode N1 534 1 14 3.346
1 0 0 NCC Swe 613 3 47 -7.653
1 0 2 Beiersdorf* D 433 1 6 6 . 906
106 Unisys Uk 531 2 52 3.567
1 1 0 Sandvik Swe 566 3 31 8.706
116 Bowater UK 591 2 30 9.748
128 AAH UK 481 1 6 2.660
133 BPA Swe 613 0 2 -1.958
140 Compaq Computers Uk 531 2 20 7.300
154 IMI UK 591 1 22 7.572
167 Esselte Swe 534 3 77 -0.111
171 Gestetner Holdings Uk 551 0 25 3.021
172 Saipem I 613 0 6 6.540
174 Smiths & Nephew UK 433 3 9 18.024175 Motor-Columbus Swi 533 1 65 2 . 686
177 Hunting Uk 521 6 62 3.593
187 FKI UK 566 7 93 20.394
189 Babcock International Uk 591 0 8 2.807
192 Zublin D 613 2 24 1 . 1 0 2
2 1 2 De Dietrich F 591 1 5 3.778
213 Altos Hornos De Vizcaya E 592 2 40 -40.249
217 Westland Group UK 521 0 14 6.230
218 Etex F 611 0 7 9.122
219 Serna Group Uk 482 1 15 4.656
2 2 0 Raine UK 613 3 5 3.685
2 2 1 AEA Uk 561 3 28 -11.295
223 Unicem I 613 1 4 11.733
224 Electroconponents Uk 551 0 23 14.709
225 Felten & Guilleaume Energi D 541 0 7 3.911
226 Beige Des Betons B 613 0 2 2.424
227 Bucher Swi 566 1 15 6.179
230 Zellweger Uster Swi 591 4 22 0.832
231 Meggitt Uk 521 0 4 28.571
233 Datwyler Holdings Swi 541 0 1 2 3. 982
235 Hojgaard Holdings Dk 613 2 13 -3.401
236 Haden Maclellan Holdings UK 591 0 4 1.461
237 Higgs & Hill UK 613 6 27 -3.957
238 Blenheim UK 481 0 0 2.078
239 Wagon Industrial UK 591 0 1 0 7.310
240 Ferranti International UK 522 9 116 -10.610
260
LI L2 L4 PROSAR EL ES CR4 HHI GROWTH Gr (A) SHAREA SALESA DIV
91 171 313 1592 1 0 0.357 0.056 -0.084 7.927 0.178 1038 0.819
372 161 539 1987 1 1 0.487 0.083 11.659 7.920 0.242 1837 0.782
50 38 106 1917 1 1 0.445 0.077 5.276 3.730 0.058 1250 0.647
64 107 188 1083 1 0 0.357 0.056 0.559 7.927 0.133 831 0.697
205 105 334 342 1 1 0.429 0.080 5.873 7.498 0.347 667 0.665
80 56 147 1160 1 1 0.429 0.080 19.035 7.498 0.143 • 1027 0.809
307 85 407 971 1 1 0.316 0.052 19.554 7.038 0.342 983 0.661
76 126 224 1262 1 0 0.357 0.056 5.315 7.927 0.181 855 0.771
170 97 293 1199 1 1 0.316 0.052 8.712 7.038 0.255 795 0.814
53 57 119 475 0 0 0.445 0.077 2.445 3.730 0.160 611 0.691
13 39 57 1411 1 0 0.357 0.056 10.691 7.927 0.165 240 0.635
33 38 96 260 1 0 0.357 0.056 -1.584 7.927 0.245 392 0.698
24 168 2 1 0 645 1 0 0.357 0.056 0.096 7.927 0.350 355 0.764
70 13 84 56 1 1 0.429 0.080 6.691 7.498 3.888 34 0.352
432 32 470 611 1 1 0.316 0.052 10.553 7.038 1.394 278 0.574
79 215 302 556 1 1 0.429 0.080 1.213 7.498 0.789 382 0.643
2 2 81 1 1 0 1406 1 0 0.702 0.164 -1.178 6.946 0.213 426 0.667
33 26 61 331 1 1 0.429 0.080 3.595 7.498 0.197 215 0.451
15 26 51 50 1 1 0.445 0.077 5.991 3.730 0.461 1 1 1 0.470
48 63 116 151 1 1 0.429 0.080 -0.044 7.498 0.776 2334 0.360
41 65 107 960 1 1 0.834 0.227 9.104 5.802 0.557 192 0.665
186 1 0 0 305 143 1 1 0.487 0.083 -5.158 7.920 1.647 289 0.423
9 13 28 219 1 0 0.357 0.056 6.635 7.927 0.128 151 0.628
5 18 40 1746 1 0 0.702 0.164 0 . 8 8 8 6.946 3.636 198 0 . 8 8 8
60 51 1 2 2 315 1 1 0.445 0.077 -0.448 3.730 0.860 99 0.634
139 26 168 44 1 1 0.429 0.080 1.441 7.498 2.407 194 0.565
30 8 38 53 0 0 0.616 0.138 9.624 13.552 0.576 579 0.306
26 1 33 344 1 1 0.487 0.083 10.940 7.920 1.007 819 0
3 7 15 315 1 1 0.702 0.164 14.615 6.946 0.106 195 0
81 2 1 109 244 1 1 0.529 0.080 2.453 7.498 1.240 108 0.796
40 78 135 406 1 1 0.834 0.227 -12.618 5.802 2.355 47 0.749
29 51 68 433 1 0 0.791 0.192 16.961 3.954 1.423 62 0.301
257 73 356 319 1 1 0.487 0.083 4.188 7.920 4.606 54 0.612
26 28 57 150 1 0 0.357 0.056 7.924 7.927 1.128 51 0.869
52 28 80 131 0 0 0.923 0.411 30.497 14.155 2.561 347 0.397
49 1 1 60 32 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 2.498 2.769 3.480 108 0.537
87 15 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 0.445 0.077 -15.501 3.730 3.536 59 0.811
35 1 2 51 1 2 0 1 1 0.429 0.080 0.765 7.498 0.794 1 0 0 0.765
40 1 45 51 1 1 0.487 0.083 15.877 7.920 1.781 281 0.759
34 9 43 64 1 1 0.429 0.080 7.418 7.498 1.453 82 0.694
3 2 6 72 1 1 0.316 0.052 -11.399 7.038 0.307 1 2 2 0
17 2 18 56 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 3.334 2.769 1.554 127 0.552
2 2 16 38 142 1 1 0.335 0.053 0.702 3.882 1.074 55 0.503
27 39 68 302 0 0 0.702 0.164 19.201 6.946 1.647 65 0.392
61 3 64 7 1 1 0.487 0.087 11.238 7.920 3.137 128 0.608
9 2 1 1 42 0 0 0.445 0.077 -1.449 3.730 0.903 249 0
57 5 62 66 1 1 0.487 0.083 9.214 7.920 3.865 1 0 0 0.236
14 6 20 68 1 0 0.791 0.192 0.349 3.954 0.884 90 0.345
5 3 9 125 1 1 0.834 0.215 3.400 3.532 0.429 84 0.455
28 5 33 56 1 1 0.487 0.083 5.722 7.920 2.917 126 0.130
38 15 53 151 1 1 0.445 0.077 2.423 3.730 3.145 67 0.575
2 2 18 44 76 1 1 0.429 0.080 -3.943 7.498 1.727 31 0.740
30 18 52 95 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 11.766 2.769 2.443 43 0.702
17 1 2 30 91 1 1 0.834 0.215 1.922 3.532 1.118 55 0.859
36 1 2 50 83 1 1 0.487 0.083 -2.036 7.920 1.087 46 0.078
54 8 62 6 1 1 0.429 0.080 8.698 7.498 3.621 27 0.580
46 7 53 9 1 1 0.487 0.083 -6.703 7.920 3.764 88 0.256
25 19 47 271 0 0 0.616 0.138 49.767 13.552 2.881 47 0
44 1 2 58 22 1 1 0.429 0.080 4.346 7.498 2.377 38 0.627
13 5 19 24 0 0 0.607 0 . 1 2 1 -43.396 2. 769 1.274 30 0.500
(*) 1, 5, 7, 8 , 9, 11, 15, 16, 21, 29, 34, 102, 162 are companies with a main activity in
non-procurement sector but with a substantial share of it because of their large size.
For companies 25, 36, 43, 50, 58, 73, 77, 95, 111, 123, 154, 214 and 230 latest accounts 
available are for 1991.
For companies 39, 44, 85, 128, 132, 152, 179, 187, 189, 196, 215, 221, 224, 232, 239, 240 
latest accounts available are for January-March 1993.
For companies 5, 7, 8 , 11, 22, 26, 28, 31, 35, 46, 48, 53, 58, 60, 69, 73, 77, 79, 80, 82
90, 92, 93, 97, 101, 106, 109, 111, 112, 119, 120, 132, 133, 142, 165, 176, 179, 187, 188
194, 195, 197, 199, 180, 203, 212, 214, and 223 PROSAR has been estimated from companies' 
geographical distribution or it is a rough estimate.
For companies 38, and 140 profits taken from their American parent company.
For company 106 turnover and profits taken from their American parent company.
For company 168 profits taken from parent company for 1990.
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B-2.0 STEPWISE REGRESSION OF RANKI ON 12 PREDICTORS, 
WITH N= 240
STEP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CONSTANT 26.07 29.30 25.97 26.66 24.90 26.05 25.99
L2-EC
T-RATIO
-0.105
-3.64
-0.108
-3.85
-0.099
-3.51
-0 .0B1
-2.71
-0.079
-2 . 6 6
-0.073
-2.41
-0.099
-2.45
GROWTH
T-RATIO
-0.48
-3.69
-0.47
-3.71
-0.46
-3.62
-0.44
-3.47
-0.44
-3.43
-0.44
-3.42
SHAREA
T-RATIO
2.9
2.23
3.3
2.53
3.0
2.33
2 . 6
1.87
2 . 6
1.89
LI-HOME 
T-RATIO
-0.029
-1.70
-0.032
-1.87
-0.026
-1.46
-0.026
-1.48
ES
T-RATIO
3.5
1.28
3.3
1 . 2 0
3.5
1.25
SALESA
T-RATIO -0.0037-1.13
-0.0040
-1 . 2 2
L3-EFTA
T-RATIO 0.130.96
S
R-SQ
21.3
5.27
2 0 . 8
10.43
2 0 . 6
12.29
20.5
13.35
20.5
13.95
20.5 
14 .42
20.5
14.76
Minltab Release 8.21
B-2.1 REGRESSION OF RANKI ON II PREDICTORS
The regression equation is 
RANKI = 28.2 - 0.0295 LI-HOME - 0.0953 L2-EC + 0.145 L3-EFTA - 0.00086 
PROSAR- 3.16 EL + 4.99 ES - 5.53 CR4 - 0.460 GROWTH + 0.390 
GR(A) +2.47 SHAREA - 0.00297 SALESA
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P VIFConstant 28.194 7.116 3.96 0 . 0 0 0
LI-HOME -0.02947 0.01811 -1.63 0.105 1.3L2-EC -0.09531 0.04126 -2.31 0 . 0 2 2 2 . 2L3-EFTA 0.1447 0.1330 1.09 0.278 2 . 1PROSAR -0.000861 0.001521 -0.57 0.572 1.9
EL -3.161 4.456 -0.71 0.479 2 . 1ES 4.994 3.633 1.37 0.171 1 . 8CR4 -5.532 9.282 -0.60 0.552 1.5GROWTH -0.4601 0.1329 -3.46 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 1GR(A) 0.3898 0.5157 0.76 0.451 1 . 2
SHAREA 2.466 1.411 1.75 0.082 1 . 2SALESA -0.002969 0.003868 -0.77 0.444 1 . 8
s = 20.59 R-sq = 15.3% R-sq(adj) = 1 1 .2%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 11 17439.2 1585.4 3.74 0.000Error 228 96683.4 424.0
Total 239 114122.6
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
LI-HOME 1 2766.6
L2-EC 1 4105.3
L3-EFTA 1 159.6
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PROSAR 1 1788.7
EL 1 105.4
ES 1 1415.3
CR4 1 28.2
GROWTH 1 4862.4
GR(A) 1 302.1
SHAREA 1 1656.0
SALESA 1 249.8
Unusual Observations
Obs. LI-HOME RANK1 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 244 0 . 0 0 -1.53 8.78 1.53 0.08 X
2 87 1 . 0 0 1.37 9.71 -0.37 -0.02 X3 140 1 . 0 0 0.92 8.19 0.08 0.00 X4 162 2 . 0 0 0.34 16.03 1 . 6 6 0.13 X5 179 4.00 1.05 13.39 2.95 0.19 X
16 28 1 . 0 0 10.57 9.64 -9.57 -0.53 X34 107 4.00 -6.04 10.59 10.04 0.57 X61 538 1 . 0 0 6.79 8.23 -5.79 -0.31 X
68 575 2 1 . 0 0 6.80 9.06 14.20 0.77 X73 45 80.00 11.29 4.54 68.71 3.42R82 36 64.00 19.43 2.96 44.57 2.19R
1 1 2 14 54.00 11.25 4.06 42.75 2.12R
1 2 0 180 4.00 40.98 10.54 -36.98 -2.09RX124 82 93.00 17.45 3.70 75.55 3.73R127 56 98.00 22.64 2.90 75.36 3.70R138 51 63.00 18.45 4.67 44.55 2.22R153 62 44.00 36.11 8 . 1 1 7.89 0.42 X161 44 1 2 2 . 0 0 58.90 9.25 63.10 3.43RX194 70 153.00 33.78 4.12 119.22 5.91R
2 0 0 48 32.00 18.75 8.70 13.25 0.71 X
2 1 1 40 77.00 32.64 5.00 44.36 2.22R215 52 65.00 15.54 6 . 1 1 49.46 2.51R217 87 93.00 40.69 4.58 52.31 2.61R240 13 116.00 48.20 7.25 67.80 3.52R
R denotes an 6bs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
B-2.2 INFLUENCE DIAGNOSTICS FOR RANK1
ROW Fits St. Res Resid Tresid HI COOKD DFITS
1 -1.5314 0.08222 1.531 0.08204 0.181845 0.000125 0.03868
2 1.3721 -0.02049 -0.372 -0.02045 0.222384 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 -0.010943 0.9214 0.00416 0.079 0.00415 0.158300 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001804 0.3353 0.12883 1.665 0.12855 0.606275 0.002130 0.159525 1.0526 0.18840 2.947 0.18800 0.422814 0.002167 0.16091
6 9.1179 -0.40502 -8.118 -0.40427 0.052621 0.000759 -0.095287 18.6312 -0.87140 -17.631 -0.87094 0.034596 0.002268 -0.16487
8 3.6751 -0.13409 -2.675 -0.13380 0.061471 0.000098 -0.034249 12.3206 -0.46055 -9.321 -0.45975 0.034145 0.000625 -0.08644
1 0 3.2396 -0.06481 -1.240 -0.06467 0.137302 0.000056 -0.02580
1 1 18.0032 -0.79068 -16.003 -0.79003 0.033968 0.001832 -0.14814
1 2 8.4440 -0.12144 -2.444 -0.12117 0.044820 0.000058 -0.0262513 11.1252 -0.15677 -3.125 -0.15644 0.062850 0.000137 -0.0405114 13.9803 -0.44278 -8.980 -0.44200 0.029948 0.000504 -0.0776615 14.7850 -0.24141 -4.785 -0.24091 0.073504 0.000385 -0.0678616 10.5749 -0.52625 -9.575 -0.52542 0.219328 0.006484 -0.2784917 15.9963 -0.64233 -12.996 -0.64150 0.034597 0.001232 -0.1214418 17.8881 -0.53546 -1 0 . 8 8 8 -0.53462 0.024932 0.000611 -0.0854919 18.3436 -0.52169 -10.344 -0.52085 0.072954 0.001785 -0.14611
20 15.9905 0.24773 5.009 0.24722 0.035725 0.000189 0.04759
2 1 20.7319 0.01315 0.268 0.01312 0.019732 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00186
22 20.4782 -0.76386 -15.478 -0.76316 0.031731 0.001593 -0.1381523 16.8149 -0.43496 -8.815 -0.43418 0.031453 0.000512 -0.0782424 16.8442 -0.68358 -13.844 -0.68278 0.032746 0.001318 -0.1256325 17.1404 0.14208 2.860 0.14177 0.044639 0.000079 0.0306426 13.6821 0.81535 16.318 0.81475 0.055448 0.003252 0.1974027 18.9575 -0.04725 -0.957 -0.04715 0.031729 0.000006 -0.0085328 23.7230 -0.72447 -14.723 -0.72371 0.026047 0.001170 -0.1183529 18.4219 0.07921 1.578 0.07904 0.064000 0.000036 0.02067
263
30 18.0412 -0.39688 -8.041 -0.39615 0.031941 0.000433 -0.0719631 17.3038 1.34458 26.696 1.34698 0.070372 0.011405 0.37060
32 16.0881 0.48913 9.912 0.48832 0.031630 0.000651 0.08825
33 18.0363 -0.35163 -7.036 -0.35095 0.055697 0.000608 -0.08523
34 -6.0368 0.56838 10.037 0.56753 0.264653 0.009689 0.34047
35 21.1753 -0.94071 -19.175 -0.94047 0.020163 0.001518 -0.13491
36 18.4141 0.12782 2.586 0.12754 0.034823 0.000049 0.02423
37 25.9379 0.05249 1.062 0.05237 0.034432 0.000008 0.00989
38 22.9128 -0.09401 -1.913 -0.09380 0.023714 0.000018 -0.01462
39 22.0467 -0.34764 -7.047 -0.34697 0.031081 0.000323 -0.06214
40 13.9840 0.20182 4.016 0.20140 0.066251 0.000241 0.05365
41 14.1942 -0.21352 -4.194 -0.21307 0.090071 0.000376 -0.06704
42 17.1868 -0.69940 -14.187 -0.69861 0.029709 0.001248 -0.12224
43 12.9303 0 . 1 0 2 0 1 2.070 0.10179 0.029188 0.000026 0.01765
44 16.3428 -0.21432 -4.343 -0.21387 0.031714 0.000125 -0.03871
45 20.4099 0.17625 3.590 0.17588 0.021562 0.000057 0.02611
46 14.1071 1.32663 26.893 1.32886 0.030920 0.004679 0.23737
47 23.9710 -0.63476 -12.971 -0.63393 0.015303 0.000522 -0.07903
48 18.2741 -0.60530 -12.274 -0.60446 0.030344 0.000955 -0.10693
49 16.0216 -0.79452 -16.022 -0.79388 0.041081 0.002254 -0.1643250 21.3791 -0.90373 -18.379 -0.90337 0.024675 0.001722 -0.14369
51 17.9666 1.39221 28.033 1.39510 0.043860 0.007409 0.29880
52 19.5056 -0.17224 -3.506 -0.17187 0.023106 0.000058 -0.02643
53 20.2962 -0.70545 -14.296 -0.70467 0.031514 0.001349 -0.12711
54 22.2901 0.18299 3.710 0.18260 0.030735 0.000088 0.0325255 25.6405 -0.97231 -19.641 -0.97219 0.037769 0.003092 -0.19261
56 20.8201 0.20599 4.180 0.20556 0.029027 0.000106 0.03554
57 23.8382 0.35308 7.162 0.35240 0.029721 0.000318 0.06168
58 23.5933 -0.77962 -15.593 -0.77895 0.056600 0.003039 -0.1908059 19.1893 0.93527 18.811 0.93502 0.046075 0.003521 0.2054960 30.9181 0.94395 19.082 0.94373 0.036342 0.002800 0.1832761 6.7940 -0.30696 -5.794 -0.30635 0.159802 0.001493 -0.1336062 19.3092 -0.75019 -15.309 -0.74947 0.017920 0.000856 -0.1012463 12.2540 -0.31077 -6.254 -0.31015 0.044939 0.000379 -0.0672864 26.6785 -0.32812 -6.678 -0.32747 0.023031 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 1 -0.0502865 25.1367 -0.20724 -4.137 -0.20681 0.060408 0.000230 -0.05244
66 21.7559 -0.87331 -17.756 -0.87285 0.025156 0.001640 -0.1402167 19.3254 0.87029 17.675 0.86982 0.027352 0.001775 0.14586
68 6.8042 0.76759 14.196 0.76689 0.193419 0.011774 0.3755469 24.4674 -0.66060 -13.467 -0.65978 0.019886 0.000738 -0.0939870 25.3240 -0.51056 -10.324 -0.50973 0.035763 0.000806 -0.0981771 21.5139 -0.71574 -14.514 -0.71497 0.030282 0.001333 -0.1263472 20.0351 -0.54419 -11.035 -0.54334 0.030287 0.000771 -0.0960273 11.2935 3.42069 68.707 3.50429 0.048628 0.049840 0.7922674 28.5758 0.57031 11.424 0.56947 0.053746 0.001540 0.1357275 20.5928 -0.02954 -0.593 -0.02948 0.050458 0.000004 -0.0068076 21.4405 -0.60936 -12.441 -0.60851 0.017076 0.000538 -0.0802077 18.6160 -0.12873 -2.616 -0.12845 0.026167 0.000037 -0.0210678 17.8091 0.94270 19.191 0.94247 0.022709 0.001721 0.14367
79 24.1375 -0.10564 -2.137 -0.10541 0.034555 0.000033 -0.0199480 22.8593 -0.73572 -14.859 -0.73497 0.038042 0.001784 -0.1461681 24.2995 -0.01472 -0.300 -0.01469 0.024171 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0023182 19.4274 2.18727 44.573 2.20573 0.020705 0.008429 0.3207283 22.3084 -0.30990 -6.308 -0.30928 0.022791 0.000187 -0.0472384 24.4602 -1.09834 -22.460 -1.09884 0.013864 0.001413 -0.1302985 29.2884 0.32885 6.712 0.32820 0.017686 0.000162 0.04404
86 20.2587 -0.25996 -5.259 -0.25943 0.035003 0.000204 -0.0494187 15.4399 1.70594 34.560 1.71316 0.032153 0.008057 0.31225
88 17.7978 1.98222 40.202 1.99513 0.029977 0.010119 0.3507389 21.8212 0.35277 7.179 0.35209 0.023407 0.000249 0.0545190 25.5113 -0.46442 -9.511 -0.46362 0.010902 0.000198 -0.0486791 27.1221 0.18977 3.878 0.18937 0.015291 0.000047 0.0236092 21.5725 -0.81587 -16.572 -0.81527 0.027007 0.001540 -0.1358393 19.9401 -0.24270 -4.940 -0.24220 0.022982 0.000115 -0.0371594 21.9598 -1.03376 -20.960 -1.03391 0.030557 0.002807 -0.1835695 24.8481 -0.23758 -4.848 -0.23709 0.018051 0.000086 -0.0321596 22.8997 1.05350 2 1 . 1 0 0 1.05376 0.054004 0.005280 0.2517797 19.4947 -0.52129 -10.495 -0.52046 0.044216 0.001048 -0.1119498 17.0955 1.22438 24.905 1.22573 0.024316 0.003113 0.1935099 21.0629 0.58774 11.937 0.58690 0.027240 0.000806 0.09821
1 0 0 27.1740 -0.60926 -12.174 -0.60842 0.058436 0.001920 -0.15157
1 0 1 21.4409 -0.66064 -13.441 -0.65982 0.023873 0.000890 -0.10319
1 0 2 34.1807 0.39258 7.819 0.39185 0.064448 0.000885 0.10285103 16.0164 0.84006 16.984 0.83952 0.036129 0.002204 0.16253104 29.4649 -0.07157 -1.465 -0.07141 0 . 0 1 2 0 0 1 0.000005 -0.00787105 19.9700 -0.09673 -1.970 -0.09652 0.021888 0.000017 -0.01444106 21.6965 -0.23262 -4.697 -0.23213 0.038710 0.000182 -0.04658
264
107 26.9293 -1.09445 -21.929 -1.09493 0.053236 0.005613 -0.25964
108 20.1866 -0.51215 -10.187 -0.51132 0.067058 0.001571 -0.13708
109 22.0581 -0.20425 -4.058 -0.20382 0.069092 0.000258 -0.05553
1 1 0 28.0125 0.58571 11.987 0.58486 0.012183 0.000353 0.06495
1 1 1 27.4426 -0.16822 -3.443 -0.16786 0.012334 0.000029 -0.01876
1 1 2 11.2500 2.11758 42.750 2.13402 0.038883 0.015117 0.42923113 23.7982 0 . 0 1 0 1 0 0 . 2 0 2 0.01008 0.057685 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.00249114 17.9249 0.44995 9.075 0.44916 0.040685 0.000716 0.09250115 19.1593 0.98216 19.841 0.98209 0.037650 0.003145 0.19425
11-6 16.8735 -0.38768 -7.873 -0.38696 0.027340 0.000352 -0.06488117 27.9549 0.00223 0.045 0 . 0 0 2 2 2 0.030283 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00039118 23.3500 -0.36811 -7.350 -0.36741 0.059835 0.000719 -0.09269
119 20.2009 -0.55337 -1 1 . 2 0 1 -0.55252 0.033809 0.000893 -0.10336
1 2 0 40.9755 -2.09040 -36.976 -2.10609 0.262177 0.129396 -1.25545
1 2 1 12.2130 0.96501 18.787 0.96487 0.106217 0.009223 0.33262
1 2 2 21.7686 -1.02146 -20.769 -1.02156 0.025115 0.002240 -0.16397
123 13.6046 -0.07989 -1.605 -0.07972 0.048822 0.000027 -0.01806
124 17.4493 3.72943 75.551 3.84022 0.032221 0.038590 0.70071125 20.3676 1.17876 23.632 1.17977 0.052127 0.006368 0.27666126 20.4678 0.27063 5.532 0.27008 0.014567 0.000090 0.03284127 22.6447 3.69627 75.355 3.80388 0.019871 0.023082 0.54162128 25.2800 0.28063 5.720 0.28006 0.020241 0.000136 0.04025129 24.3291 0.48454 9.671 0.48373 0.060587 0.001262 0.12285
130 21.9210 -0.54933 -10.921 -0.54848 0.067929 0.001833 -0.14807
131 25.7701 0.45628 9.230 0.45549 0.035031 0.000630 0.08679
132 33.5740 -0.02832 -0.574 -0.02826 0.031107 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 -0.00506133 17.0966 1.62996 32.903 1.63594 0.039026 0.008991 0.32968134 29.7039 -0.72212 -14.704 -0.72136 0.022246 0.000989 -0.10881
135 16.8536 0.40233 8.146 0.40159 0.033173 0.000463 0.07439136 26.3701 -0.65301 -13.370 -0.65218 0.011420 0.000410 -0.07010
137 23.5540 -0.61729 -12.554 -0.61645 0.024645 0.000802 -0.09799
138 18.4478 2.22147 44.552 2.24098 0.051493 0.022326 0.52214139 31.2325 -0.40412 -8.233 -0.40338 0.021333 0.000297 -0.05956140 30.2812 1.01512 20.719 1.01519 0.017621 0.001540 0.13596141 29.5675 -0.32146 -6.567 -0.32083 0.015691 0.000137 -0.04051142 20.8709 0.11062 2.129 0.11038 0.126342 0.000147 0.04197143 28.9499 0.68761 14.050 0.68682 0.015416 0.000617 0.08594144 25.1868 -0.95024 -19.187 -0.95003 0.038553 0.003017 -0.19024145 29.1136 0.63138 1 2 . 8 8 6 0.63055 0.017662 0.000597 0.08455146 2.1702 0.66733 12.830 0.66651 0.128344 0.005464 0.25576147 23.3236 -0.76192 -15.324 -0.76122 0.046143 0.002340 -0.16742148 28.9952 -0.48940 -9.995 -0.48858 0.016352 0.000332 -0.06299149 29.4067 0.81220 16.593 0.81159 0.015698 0.000877 0.10249150 21.6825 0.06533 1.317 0.06518 0.040797 0.000015 0.01344151 27.2551 0.86781 17.745 0.86734 0.013996 0.000891 0.10333152 22.1662 0.04090 0.834 0.04082 0.020223 0.000003 0.00586153 36.1054 0.41709 7.895 0.41634 0.155164 0.002663 0.17843154 30.3584 -0.16434 -3.358 -0.16399 0.015191 0.000035 -0.02037155 20.8421 0.98927 20.158 0.98922 0.020861 0.001738 0.14439156 27.7522 -1.01545 -20.752 -1.01552 0.015096 0.001317 -0.12573157 24.3505 -1.09519 -22.351 -1.09567 0.017840 0.001816 -0.14767158 21.6285 -0.27682 -5.628 -0.27626 0.025056 0.000164 -0.04429159 27.0224 1.38107 27.978 1.38384 0.032230 0.005293 0.25254160 24.9030 -0.43544 -8.903 -0.43466 0.014176 0.000227 -0.05212161 58.8978 3.42997 63.102 3.51431 0.201837 0.247918 1.76723162 25.3645 -0.85067 -17.365 -0.85015 0.017377 0.001066 -0.11305163 21.2825 -0.36802 -7.283 -0.36732 0.076579 0.000936 -0.10578164 21.6130 -0.72378 -14.613 -0.72302 0.038731 0.001759 -0.14513165 22.0091 -0.24593 -5.009 -0.24542 0.021675 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 2 -0.03653
166 27.2319 0.08741 1.768 0.08722 0.035071 0.000023 0.01663167 29.7059 -0.67165 -13.706 -0.67084 0.017989 0.000689 -0.09079
168 24.5948 0.26457 5.405 0.26403 0.015703 0.000093 0.03335169 23.8269 -0.72725 -14.827 -0.72650 0.019800 0.000890 -0.10325170 26.2454 0.18376 3.755 0.18337 0.015491 0.000044 0.02300
171 31.4824 -0.51316 -10.482 -0.51233 0.015972 0.000356 -0.06527172 34.0204 0.48944 9.980 0.48862 0.019587 0.000399 0.06906
173 19.4526 -0.41579 -8.453 -0.41504 0.025427 0.000376 -0.06704
174 36.6769 0.36148 7.323 0.36079 0.032139 0.000362 0.06574
175 30.8742 -0.19238 -3.874 -0.19198 0.043628 0.000141 -0.04100176 28.7757 -0.55128 -10.776 -0.55044 0.098994 0.002783 -0.18245
177 18.3371 -0.31808 -6.337 -0.31745 0.063986 0.000576 -0.08300
178 28.2682 -0.95697 -19.268 -0.95679 0.043967 0.003510 -0.20518179 34.7871 -0.57922 -11.787 -0.57838 0.023415 0.000670 -0.08956
180 28.8543 0.15664 3.146 0.15631 0.048974 0.000105 0.03547181 10.5707 -0.53370 -10.571 -0.53286 0.074872 0.001921 -0.15159
182 -6.9517 0.46794 8.952 0.46714 0.136997 0.002897 0.18612
183 18.8814 -0.93428 -18.881 -0.93402 0.036845 0.002783 -0.18268
265
184 13.1937 -0.55481 -11.194 -0.55397 0,040076 0.001071 -0.11319185 13.8776 -0.63545 -12.878 -0.63461 0.031510 0.001095 -0.11447
186 12.0185 0.63993 12.982 0.63910 0.029565 0.001040 0.11155
187 4.1353 0.79229 15.865 0.79164 0.054467 0.003013 0.19000
188 9.4571 -0.32035 -6.457 -0.31972 0.041900 0.000374 -0.06686
189 13.7558 -0.47993 -9.756 -0.47911 0.025549 0.000503 -0.07758
190 16.5398 -0.86595 -17.540 -0.86548 0.032516 0 . 0 0 2 1 0 0 -0.15867
191 16.3309 -0.36089 -7.331 -0.36020 0.026926 0.000300 -0.05992
192 23.2343 -0.70140 -14.234 -0.70061 0.028753 0.001214 -0.12055
193 11.2412 -0.31479 -6.241 -0.31417 0.073016 0.000650 -0.08817
194 33.7783 5.90933 119.222 6.40741 0.040119 0.121625 1.30993195 13.3403 -0.32549 -6.340 -0.32485 0.105157 0.001037 -0.11136
196 8.6875 -0.29613 -5.687 -0.29554 0.130144 0.001093 -0.11431
197 15.2373 0.28655 5.763 0.28597 0.046220 0.000332 0.06295
198 25.3226 -1.04368 -21.323 -1.04389 0.015697 0.001448 -0.13182
199 25.5523 -0.61456 -12.552 -0.61372 0.016201 0.000518 -0.07876
2 0 0 18.7544 0.70961 13.246 0.70884 0.178359 0.009109 0.33026
2 0 1 16.2032 -0.10963 -2.203 -0.10939 0.047597 0.000050 -0.02445
2 0 2 23.6093 1.15416 23.391 1.15500 0.031416 0.003601 0.20801
203 22.1368 -0.79353 -16.137 -0.79289 0.024820 0.001336 -0.12649
204 30.9197 1.07347 21.080 1.07383 0.090598 0.009567 0.33894205 25.7424 0.25691 5.258 0.25639 0.012394 0.000069 0.02872
206 29.0942 0.04440 0.906 0.04431 0.018738 0.000003 0.00612207 23.6490 -0-88340 -17.649 -0.88297 0.058745 0.004059 -0.22059
208 25.1475 -1.14125 -23.147 -1.14201 0.029871 0.003342 -0.20039
209 21.5041 -0.07424 -1.504 -0.07408 0.032065 0.000015 -0.01348
2 1 0 28.0449 -0.29540 -6.045 -0.29481 0.012472 0.000092 -0.03313
2 1 1 32.6443 2.22028 44.356 2.23975 0.058838 0.025682 0.56001
2 1 2 12.7874 0.61526 12.213 0.61442 0.070865 0.002406 0.16968213 28.6460 -1.14559 -22.646 -1.14638 0.078483 0.009314 -0.33455214 22.0013 -0.63862 -1.3.001 -0.63779 0.022595 0.000786 -0.09697215 15.5433 2.51490 49.457 2.54492 0.088004 0.050859 0.79055
216 30.5067 1.57088 31.493 1.57598 0.052163 0.011317 0.36971217 40.6927 2.60523 52.307 2.63909 0.049362 0.029369 0.60137218 30.1848 -1.08521 -22.185 -1.08564 0.014480 0.001442 -0.13159219 25.9320 -0.09473 -1.932 -0.09452 0.019091 0.000015 -0.01319
2 2 0 28.5870 -1.15234 -23.587 -1.15318 0.011980 0.001342 -0.12698
2 2 1 36.4649 0.17477 3.535 0.17440 0.035206 0.000093 0.03332
2 2 2 27.0961 -0.64598 -13.096 -0.64515 0.030758 0.001104 -0.11493223 29.5528 -1.10361 -22.553 -1.10414 0.015190 0.001566 -0.13713224 17.5674 -0.12664 -2.567 -0.12637 0.030792 0.000042 -0.02252225 30.5145 -1.25654 -25.514 -1.25814 0.027688 0.003747 -0.21231226 28.8480 -0.04188 -0.848 -0.04179 0.033343 0.000005 -0.00776227 33.2006 -1.44850 -29.201 -1.45202 0.041639 0.007597 -0.30266
228 22.9068 0.00468 0.093 0.00467 0.063899 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 2229 25.6369 -0.92816 -18.637 -0.92787 0.049206 0.003715 -0.21108230 33.2556 -1.53782 -31.256 -1.54246 0.025840 0.005227 -0.25121231 32.7807 -0.87606 -17.781 -0.87561 0.028564 0.001881 -0.15014232 34.7058 -0.62269 -12.706 -0.62186 0.018163 0.000598 -0.08458
233 24.2949 -1.00516 -20.295 -1.00518 0.038629 0.003383 -0.20149234 26.9200 -0.74142 -14.920 -0.74068 0.045018 0.002159 -0.16082
235 31.9132 -0.92599 -18.913 -0.92570 0.016208 0.001177 -0.11882
236 33.0636 -1.43694 -29.064 -1.44032 0.035271 0.006291 -0.27540237 40.4937 -0.67171 -13.494 -0.67090 0.048340 0.001910 -0.15121238 11.7866 -0.60892 -11.787 -0.60808 0.116441 0.004072 -0.22075
239 32.1547 -1.08507 -22.155 -1.08550 0.016903 0.001687 -0.14234240 48.1998 3.51743 67.800 3.60899 0.123817 0.145698 1.35668
266
B-2.3 REGRESSION OF LOG RANKI ON 11 PREDICTORS
The regression equation is
LOGRANK1 = 2.87 - 0.00133 LI-HOME - 0.00598 L2-EC + 0.00831 L3-EFTA
-0.000062 PROSAR + 0.008 EL + 0.341 ES + 0.036 CR4 -
+ 0.0224 GR. (A) - 0.0002 SHAREA -0.000507 SALESA
Predictor Coef Stied t-ratio P IFConstant 2.8712 0.3143 9.13 0 . 0 0 0
LI-HOME -0.0013282 0.0007998 -1 . 6 6 0.098 1.3
L2-EC -0.005978 0.001822 -3.28 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 2
L3-EFTA 0.008314 0.005876 1.41 0.158 2 . 1
PROSAR 0.00006213 0.00006717 -0.92 0.356 1.9
EL 0.0083 0.1969 0.04 0.967 2 . 1
ES 0.3405 0.1605 2 . 1 2 0.035 1 . 8
CR4 0.0356 0.4100 0.09 0.931 1.5
GROWTH -0.011603 0.005870 -1.98 0.049 1 . 1
GR. (A) 0.02236 0.02278 0.98 0.327 1 . 2
SHAREA -0 . 0 0 0 2 1 0.06234 -0 . 0 0 0.997 1 . 2
SALESA -0.0005067 0.0001709 -2.97 0.003 1 . 8
s = 0.9097 R-sq = 24.6%
Analysis of Variance
R-sq(adj) = 21.0%
SOURCE DP SS
Regression 1 1 61.5765
Error 228 188.6737
Total 239 250.2502
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
LI-HOME 1 13.2585
L2-EC 1 18.7951
L3-EFTA 1 0.3274
PROSAR 1 10.2594
EL 1 3.3573
ES 1 3.6947
GR4 1 0.2060
GROWTH 1 2.8752
GR(A) 1 1.1271
SHAREA 1 0.3998
SALESA 1 7.2760
MS
5.5979
0.8275
F
6.76 P0.000
Unusual Observations
Obs. LI-HOME LOGRANK1 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 244 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.4143 0.3879 -0.4143 -0.50 X
2 87 0.6931 0.5887 0.4290 0.1045 0.13 X
3 140 0.6931 1.0298 0.3619 -0.3366 -0.40 X
4 162 1.0986 0.9291 0.7083 0.1695 0.30 X
5 179 1.6094 1.0238 0.5915 0.5856 0.85 X
7 2 0 0.6931 2.5126 0.1692 -1.8195 -2.04R
16 28 0.6931 1.0731 0.4260 -0.3799 -0.47 X
34 107 1.6094 0.9912 0.4680 0.6183 0.79 X
49 123 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.3360 0.1844 -2.3360 -2.62R
61 538 0.6931 1.9057 0.3636 -1.2126 -1.45 X
68 575 3.0910 1.9754 0.4001 1.1156 1.37 X
73 45 4.3944 2.3348 0.2006 2.0597 2.32R
94 51 0.6931 2.6682 0.1590 -1.9751 -2.21R
1 2 0 180 1.6094 2.8259 0.4658 -1.2164 -1.56 X
1 2 2 27 0.6931 2.6999 0.1442 -2.0067 -2.23R
124 82 4.5433 2.6965 0.1633 1.8468 2.06R
127 56 4.5951 2.6975 0.1282 1.8976 2. H R
153 62 3.8067 3.3778 0.3583 0.4289 0.51 X
157 14 1.0986 2.9302 0.1215 -1.8316 -2.03R
161 44 4.8122 3.8651 0.4087 0.9471 1.17 X
183 50 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.3616 0.1746 -2.3616 -2.65R
194 70 5.0370 3.1414 0.1822 1.8956 2.13R
2 0 0 48 3.4965 1.8125 0.3842 1.6840 2.04RX
215 52 4.1897 2.4457 0.2699 1.7439 2.01R
230 28 1.0986 3.2130 0.1462 -2.1144 -2.35R
238 25 0 . 0 0 0 0 2.4556 0.3104 -2.4556 -2.87R
R denotes an bbs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
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B-2.4 BOX-COX TRANSFORMATION FOR RANK1
The purpose of the B o x - C o x  procedure is to simultaneously estimate X (the 
power of the transformation) and the parameters in the model. T he  procedure allows 
transformations on the R a n k  variable that accommodate negative or positive square root 
(X =1/2. X =-1/2), square (X=2), log (X =0), inverse square (X =- 2) and other fractional 
powers between -2 and 2. Since X u n k n o w n  can be computed for the above range of 
reasonable values for X (Weisberg, 1980, pp 137-141). For each X & 0, compute
L (X) =  n/2 In(X)2 - n/2 ( RSS^) +  (1 - 1) £  In(jyi)
and if X =  0, compute
L(X ) =  - n/2 In (RSS^) - £  ln(y)i
i= l
where R S S  is the residual s u m  of squares for each X. L(X) is computed for each X 
sho wn  in Table B-2.3.1 and the results are plotted in Figure B-2.3.1.
T a b l e  B - 2 . 3 . 1
Box-Cox BANK1 Data
Y1 for 1 =
-2 -1.5 -1.0 i 0 01 o 0.5 1 . 0 1.5 2 . 0
-1938 -1692 -1335 -1695 -1517 -1291 -1482 -1272 -1378 L(l)
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Figure B-2.3.1 
Box-Cox Plot for RANK1 Data
269
F r o m  the graph, w e  read off X -  0.1 and L(A.) =  1270. Clearly, L(Y) is nearly 
constant over the range from about -0.3 to 0.4, so any choice of X in this range will 
nearly maximize the likelihood function. A  (l-a)xl00% confidence interval for X is the 
set of all points X such that L(AQ >  L(X)-l/2x2(a,l) which is 1,272 for 9 5 %  confidence 
interval. Since this interval is very close to 0 corresponding to already employed log 
transformation, it appears that little is to be gained by transforming further RANK1.
B-3.1 REGRESSION OF RANK2 ON 11 PREDICTORS
The regression equation is
RANK2 = 4.93 - 0.00411 Ll-HOME - 0.00868 L2-EC + 0.0040 L3-EFTA +0.000192 
PROSAR - 0.706 EL + 1.19 ES - 5.41 CR4 - 0.0510 GROWTH + 0.208 
SHAREA -0.000419 SALESA + 1.00 DIV
Predictor Coef St dev t-ratio P VIFConstant 4.9287 0.9160 5.38 0 . 0 0 0
Ll-HOME -0.004108 0.002206 -1 . 8 6 0.064 1.4
L2-EC -0.008679 0.004923 -1.76 0.079 2 . 2
L3-EFTA 0.00397 0.01593 0.25 0.804 2 . 1
PROSAR 0.0001917 0.0001815 1.06 0.292 1.9
EL -0.7065 0.5233 -1.35 0.178 2 . 0
ES 1.1896 0.4203 2.83 0.005 1.7
CR4 -5.410 1.096 -4.93 0 . 0 0 0 1.4
GROWTH -0.05104 0.01546 -3.30 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 0
SHAREA 0.2080 0.1684 1.24 0.218 1 . 2
SALESA 0.0004187 0.0004608 -0.91 0.364 1 . 8
DIV 1.0003 0.7553 1.32 0.187 1 . 1
s = 2.457 R-sq «= 23.0% R-sq(adj) = 19.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 11 410 .825 37.348 6.19 0.000
Error 228 1376 .638 6.038
Total
SOURCE
Ll-HOME
L2-EC
L3-EFTA
PROSAR
EL
ES
CR4
GROWTH
SHAREA
SALESA
DIV
239
DF
1787.462
SEQ SS 
16.576 
32.346 
0.543 
15.154 
51.654 
50.623 
144.314 
71.376 
12.641 
5.007 
10.589
Unusual Observations
Obs. Ll-HOME Rank 2 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 244 0 . 0 0 0 -0.408 1.046 0.408 0.18 X
2 87 1 . 0 0 0 0.311 1.163 0.689 0.32 X
3 140 1 . 0 0 0 -1.197 0.971 2.197 0.97 X
4 162 0 . 0 0 0 0.780 1.878 -0.780 -0.49 X
5 179 2 . 0 0 0 -0.832 1.601 2.832 1.52 X
16 28 0 . 0 0 0 1.288 1.147 -1.288 -0.59 X
34 107 2 . 0 0 0 0.943 1.266 1.057 0.50 X
45 159 8 . 0 0 0 2.970 0.339 5.030 2.07R
61 538 0 . 0 0 0 1.347 0.971 -1.347 -0.60 X
68 575 4.000 1.528 1.066 2.472 1.12 X
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82 36 8 . 0 0 0 2.163 0.346 5.837 2.4 OR
1 2 0 180 0 . 0 0 0 2.619 1.252 -2.619 -1.24 X
124 82 13.000 2.811 0.482 10.189 4.23R
127 56 1 0 . 0 0 0 3.499 0.346 6.501 2.67R
138 51 14.000 2.842 0.542 11.158 4.66R
152 2 9.000 2.716 0.330 6.284 2.58R
153 62 3.000 4.289 0.968 -1.289 -0.57 X
161 44 2 1 . 0 0 0 7.344 1.093 13.656 6.20RX
194 70 1 2 . 0 0 0 3.511 0.499 8.489 3.53R
2 0 0 48 1 . 0 0 0 1.942 1.030 -0.942 -0.42 X
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
B-3.2 REGRESSION O f LOG RANK2 ON 11 PREDICTORS
The regression equation is
LGRANK2 = 1.63 - 0.00134 LI-HOME - 0.00216 L2-EC + 0.00215 L3-EFTA
+0.000052 PROSAR - 0.168 EL + 0.323 ES - 1.61 GR4 - 0.00625 GROWTH
+ 0.0470 SHAREA -0.000163 SALESA + 0.316 DIV
Predictor Coef St dev t-ratio P VTFConstant 1.6304 0.2429 6.71 0 . 0 0 0
LI-HOME 0.0013411 0.0005849 -2.29 0.023 1.4
L2-EC -0.002155 0.001306 -1.65 0 . 1 0 0 2 . 2
L3-EFTA 0.002154 0.004224 0.51 0.611 2 . 1
PROSAR 0.00005197 0.00004814 1.08 0.281 1.9
EL -0.1677 0.1388 -1 . 2 1 0.228 2 . 0
ES 0.3228 0.1115 2.90 0.004 1.7
CR4 -1.6054 0.2907 -5.52 0 . 0 0 0 1.4
GROWTH -0.006250 0.004100 -1.52 0.129 1 . 0
SHAREA 0.04700 0.04467 1.05 0.294 1 . 2
SALESA 0.0001631 0 . 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 -1.33 0.183 1 . 8
DIV 0.3156 0.2003 1.58 0.117 1 . 1
s = 0.6516 R-sq = 23.5% R-sq(adj) = 19.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1 29.8178 2.7107 6.38 0.000
Error 228 96.8196 0.4246
Total 239 126.6375
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
LI-HOME 1 1.7130
L2-EC 1 1.8237
L3-EFTA 1 0.0085
PROSAR 1 1.6285
EL 1 5.0387
ES 1 3.0326
CR4 1 12.7749
GROWTH 1 1.2078
SHAREA 1 0.7768
SALESA 1 0.7590
DIV 1 1.0542
Unusual Observations
Obs. LI-HOME LGRANK2 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 244 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0123 0.2774 -0.0123 -0.02 X
2 87 0.6931 0.2305 0.3085 0.4627 0.81 X
3 140 0.6931 -0.0550 0.2576 0.7481 1.25 X
4 162 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.3491 0.4979 -0.3491 -0.83 X
5 179 1.0986 0.1437 0.4246 0.9549 1.93 X
16 28 0 .0 0 0 0 0.4807 0.3042 -0.4807 -0.83 X
34 107 1.0986 0.6535 0.3356 0.4452 0.80 X
61 538 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.5872 0.2575 -0.5872 -0.98 X
66 71 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.3272 0.1024 -1.3272 -2.06R
68 575 1.6094 0.6541 0.2826 0.9553 1.63 X
69 62 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.3580 0.0946 -1.3580 -2.11R
1 2 0 180 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.8286 0.3322 -0.8286 -1.48 X
124 82 2.6391 1.2383 0.1277 1.4008 2.19R
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138 51 2.7081 1.2706 0.1437 1.4374 2.26R
153 62 1.3863 1.5096 0.2567 -0.1233 -0.21 X
161 44 3.0910 1.7921 0.2898 1.2989 2.23RX
194 70 2.5649 1.2265 0.1323 1.3385 2.10R
2 0 0 48 0.6931 0.6850 0.2732 0.0082 0.01 X
218 35 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.2966 0.0845 -1.2966 -2.01R
223 2 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.3870 0.0777 -1.3870 -2.14R
236 54 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.3020 0 . 1 2 1 0 -1.3020 -2.03R
239 44 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.2937 0.0825 -1.2937 -2.00R
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
B-3.3 REGRESSION OfRANK2 ON 13 PREDICTORS
* NOTE * L2-EC is highly correlated with other
* NOTE * LECxCR4 is highly correlated with other
* NOTE * LECCR42 is highly correlated with other
predictor variables 
predictor variables 
predictor variables
The regression equation is
RANK2 = 5.75 - 0.00335 Ll-HOME + 0.0409 L2-EC - 0.0218 L3-EFTA
PROSAR- 0.522 EL + 0.899 ES - 6.94 CR4 - 0.0506 GROWTI
SHAREA-0.000243 SALESA + 1.22 DIV -• 0.225 LECxCR4 + 0.
Predictor Coef St dev t-ratlo P VIFConstant 5.7497 0.9783 5.88 0 . 0 0 0
Ll-HOME -0.003351 0.002199 -1.52 0.129 1.4
L2-EC 0.04095 0.03669 1 . 1 2 0.266 125.8
L3-EFTA -0.02177 0.01847 -1.18 0.240 2.9
PROSAR 0.0000238 0.0001905 0.13 0.901 2 . 2
EL -0.5223 0.5232 -1 . 0 0 0.319 2 . 1
ES 0.8989 0.4273 2 . 1 0 0.037 1 . 8
CR4 -6.937 1.327 -5.23 0 . 0 0 0 2 . 2
GROWTH -0.05058 0.01531 -3.30 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 0
SHAREA 0.1915 0.1664 1.15 0.251 1 . 2
SALESA -0.0002434 0.0004631 -0.53 0.600 1 . 8
DIV 1 . 2 2 2 0 0.7491 1.63 0.104 1 . 1
LECXCR4 -0.2247 0.1412 -1.59 0.113 711.1
LECCR42 0.2274 0 . 1 2 0 1 1.89 0.060 314.4
s = 2.424 R-sq = 25.7% R-sq(adj) == 21.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS
Regression 13 459.622
Error 226 1327.840
Total 239 1787.463
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
Ll-HOME 1 16.576
L2-EC 1 32.346
L3-EFTA 1 0.543
PROSAR 1 15.154
EL 1 51.654
ES 1 50.623
CR4 1 144.314
GROWTH 1 71.376
SHAREA 1 12.641
SALESA 1 5.007
DIV 1 10.589
LECXCR4 1 27.749
LECCR42 1 21.049
MS
35.356
5.875
F
6.02
P
0 . 000
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Unusual Observations
Obs. Ll-HOME C2 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 244 0 . 0 0 0 -1.309 1 . 1 0 0 1.309 0.61 X
2 87 1 . 0 0 0 0.097 1.154 0.903 0.42 X
3 140 1 . 0 0 0 1.316 1.332 -0.316 -0.16 X
4 162 0 . 0 0 0 0.764 1.857 -0.764 -0.49 X
5 179 2 . 0 0 0 1.828 1.864 0.172 0.11 X
16 28 0 . 0 0 0 1.349 1.145 -1.349 -0.63 X
34 107 2 . 0 0 0 0.459 1.502 1.541 0.81 X
68 575 4.000 2.119 1.080 1.881 0.87 X
82 36 8 . 0 0 0 2.133 0.347 5.867 2.45R
1 2 0 180 0 . 0 0 0 2.549 1.243 -2.549 -1.22 X
124 82 13.000 3.323 0.508 9.677 4.08R
127 56 1 0 . 0 0 0 4.014 0.412 5.986 2.51R
138 51 14.000 2.288 0.584 11.712 4.98R
152 2 9.000 2.602 0.338 6.398 2.67R
153 62 3.000 2.830 1.132 0.170 0.08 X
161 44 2 1 . 0 0 0 7.590 1.083 13.410 6.18RX
182 372 0 . 0 0 0 -0.957 1.042 0.957 0.44 X
194 70 1 2 . 0 0 0 3.547 0.498 8.453 3.56R
2 0 0 48 1 . 0 0 0 2.051 1.017 -1.051 -0.48 X
240 13 9.000 4.458 0.863 4.542 2.01R
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
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A P P E N D I X  C
I N T E R V I E W S
T he  following section contains a s u m ma r y  of interviews with officials involved 
in Public Procurement and/or Single European Market issues.
1. Telephone interview with M r .  K. Tur ne r  of the South-West Regional Office 
of the Department of Trade and Industry, Bristol, 23 June 1994.
Mr. Turner thought that European procurement legislation and the harmonization 
of technical standards have not been very effective. Although there has been an increase 
in the advertising of tenders in the Official Journal, 9 5 %  of the contracts are awarded to 
h o m e  based companies. Mr. Turner w a s  aware of the major groupings of European 
firms which are very big full-line suppliers in m a n y  procurement sectors and which tend 
to have a "club" arrangement, thereby making it very difficult for small companies to be 
successful in breaking into it. H e  thought that more legislation w a s  desirable in order to 
deal with oligopolies and that the European Commission has been very optimistic in 
expecting that the procurement directives and other internal market measures will 
increase competition. H e  found very interesting the extent of c ompany geographical 
analysis in Europe. H e  w a s  not familiar with the concept of conscious parallelism but he 
w a s  aware of the Nestle/Perrier decision and the efforts of the European Commission to 
control oligopolies which he considered that is a good policy. H e  also felt that the 
imposition of n e w  European legislation for controlling the oligopoly problem w a s  
necessary. Finally he considered the trend for multi-company alliances spanning 
different industries and countries and acting as a single firm as highly plausible.
2 7 4
Mr. Cercher thought that E U  procurement legislation and the harmonization of 
technical standards for the railway industry are untested. It is therefore not possible to 
say that, within the 18 month period that the Utility Directives have been in force, they 
have succeeded in opening up public procurement. H e  thought that such an opening up 
is more likely to take place in ten years time. H e  considered that the influence of the 
present few major groupings of companies which are very big full-line suppliers and 
their effect on the Single European Market remains to be seen. Such groupings were an 
inevitable reaction of the Single European Market and the importance of combining 
resources for research and development.
T he  oligopolistic structure and the issue of monitoring mergers in the railway 
industry is an oversimplification. There are 2-3 companies each in the United Kingdom, 
in France and in G e r m a n y  and there is a compromise and desire for competition in the 
Single European Market in order to compete with the Americans and the Japanese.
There m a y  be s om e  truth in a multimarket interdependence which m a y  limit 
multimarket competition a m o n g  supplying firms especially in France and G e r m a n y  and 
specifically in the case of ABB. Mr. Cercher believed that oligopolies should be 
controlled having in m ind the public interest, but he could not c o m m e n t  on the 
possibility of "relationship enterprises". T h e  Railway Industry Association has a great 
deal of contact with the European Commission which he thinks is very constructive and 
business minded.
2 . T e le p h o n e  in t e r v i e w  w i t h  Mr. Stephen Cercher, R a i l w a y  In d u s t r y
A s s o c ia t io n ,  L o n d o n ,  2 3  J u n e  1 9 9 4 .
2 7 5
Mr. Elliott thought that procurement legislation and harmonisation of technical 
standards w o r k  both ways. Different countries still have different technical standards. 
Based on his experience cartels are m ore c o m m o n  w h e n  standards are homogeneous. 
Nevertheless, improvement in the harmonisation of standards will increase competition. 
Regarding the emerging n e w  trend of European suppliers to form groupings, and based 
on the United K i n g d o m  experience in the utilities sector, privatisation and the desire for 
sharing in R & D  costs especially in the defence contracts, have been the main influence. 
H e  thought that one must very careful with ventures as for example the joint venture 
between G M  and Nissan for building a 4-Wheel car in Spain, which w a s  approved by 
the European Commission although both companies have the resources and the 
technology to manufacture it separately.
Oligopoly is a problem not only in the E U  and the United K i n g d o m  but
everywhere. Article 86 of the Treaty of R o m e  has been inefficient or very difficult to
apply to oligopolies. Multimarket interdependence in oligopolistic markets is real and
undoubtedly will limit competition. Behaviour in one market is clearly influencing
behaviour in other markets. H e  w a s  familiar with the concept of linked oligopoly which
is a very n e w  concept in the United K i n g d o m  and referred to recent research on the
subject by H ughes and Oughton (1993) and by Professor Davies of the East Anglia
University. A s  an example of linked oligopolistic behaviour, he cited the bus industry in
the United K i n g d o m  in which his Office keeps an eye. This is because bus operators, in
most cities or regions, have formed a tight duopoly and they expand continuously in
adjacent markets (other cities or regions) by acquiring or driving out of smaller
operators, preventing n e w  entrants and overtly charging non-competitive prices. In
recent years a rapid growth in concentration has taken place in m a n y  industries and in
the case of oligopolies no price competition such as excessive advertising has been
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3. I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Mr. David Elliott, H e a d  o f  E c o n o m ic s  B r a n c h  o f  t h e  O f f i c e  o f
F a i r  T r a d in g ,  L o n d o n ,  1 J u ly  1 9 9 4 .
observed. Regarding legislation he argued that the United K i n g d o m  has better 
legislation than m a n y  other E U  M e m b e r  States, especially in the field of complex 
oligopolies. The Office of Fair Trading has good co-operation with the European 
Commission and together with their colleagues from the Department of Trade and 
Industry they participate in the Advisory Committee of the European Commission in 
competition issues.
4. Interview with M s  A m a n d a  McIntyre of the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), London, 1 July 1994.
M s  McIntyre, an economist, has been working in the C B I  for nine years and has 
been advising its m e m b e r s  on European public procurement issues. She considered the 
effect of E U  legislation and the harmonization of technical standards on the opening up 
of public procurement w a s  too early to say. The results of a recent survey undertaken by 
the C B I  and the D T I  focusing at the h o m e  market indicates that companies face 
difficulty in the Single European Market for securing procurement contracts.
There is a lack of basic knowledge on h o w  companies could approach suppliers 
for negotiating and meeting their requirements. Companies argue that a major obstacle 
is the lack of local contacts in order to bid for the contract. T he  existence of networks of 
large suppliers is only valid for the large firms which are very successful in bidding for 
contracts. Such success on behalf of the large companies in securing large procurement 
contracts is expected to provide a spin off for smaller companies. M e m b e r s  are 
concerned with the long delay that the Monopolies and Merger Commission in United 
K i n g d o m  imposes in talcing decision on mergers and m e m b e r  companies expect that the 
M M C  should be m o r e  practical. Although the relationship with the European 
Commission is very good there is a lack of practical commercial experience regarding
public procurement on behalf of the Commission.
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5. Interview with M r. Michael Stern, MP, Bristol, 2 July 1994.
Mr. S t e m  thought that European procurement legislation in principle has been 
ineffective. There is a need for a mor e  detailed legislation aimed at specific industries in 
order to break the buyer-supplier links. F r o m  his experience with the European 
Information Data market, Mr. S t e m  thought that barriers in Europe still exist. Regarding 
the harmonization of standards, he w a s  concerned that the E U  harmonization of 
standards will lower standards generally and especially for the United K i n g d o m  where 
high standards exist and he cited the B S I  quality standards campaign that most United 
K i n g d o m  companies try to comply with. T he  policy behind the creation of European 
networks and the cause of the recent w a v e  of mergers is due to the Single European 
Market and the existence of barriers which exist in the various national markets. This is 
the main reason that motivates companies to establish operations within each of the 
national market of the other European members. Such high concentration on s o m e  
industries is necessary for the creation of 'Euro-champions' in order to compete with the 
American and the Japanese companies.
Mr. Stem said that oligopolies are indeed a problem and he w a s  concerned with 
the existing national competition legislation and the United K i n g d o m  M on op o ly  and 
Mergers Commission which is very slow and ineffective in taking action. A s  an 
example Mr. S te m  cited the M M C  investigation in the United K i n g d o m  of the beer 
industry which caused so m u c h  hardship to m a n y  pub-owners and has not yet solved the 
oligopolistic problem of this industry. Regarding E U  competition policy he cited the 
important contribution of Sir Leo n  Brittan the former Competition Commissioner and 
his attempts to adopt a European competition policy. T he competition problem with 
other countries is that they must clear their practices and he referred to recent 
procurement scandals in France and Italy that prevented competitive tendering.
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6. Interview with M r. Ian White, MEP, Bristol, 4 July 1994.
Mr. White said that European procurement legislation will help to open public 
procurement provided there is adequate enforcement. The European Commission must 
play a more positive role in the enforcement of the E U  legislation and the harmonization 
of technical standards. T he  existence of large networks of procurement suppliers is the 
result of the efforts by such firms to confuse the market. T he  existence of such suppliers 
with a large number of subsidiaries and associated companies all over Europe is the 
outcome of a clever strategy on behalf of such firms to demonstrate that there is a large 
number of suppliers where in reality there are only very few of them. Mr. White did not 
think that there were enough provisions in national or European legislation which 
specifically address the issues of monitoring mergers and dealing with oligopolies. 
There is still a need to remove national obstructions placed by the national governments.
T he  European Commission m u c h  be involved in m ore consultation with the 
interested parties and he advocated that European companies should employ more 
litigation. H e  believed that multimarket interdependence is a strategy employed by 
oligopolists in order to take advantage of smaller companies and limit competition. 
Therefore the European Commission through n e w  legislation should play a bigger role 
but not at the expense of individual companies. Regarding the formation of "relationship 
enterprises", he thought that these were a dangerous possibility.
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Mrs. Harris thought that European procurement legislation has opened the 
market considerably and this is evident from the large amount of notices of notification 
to tender advertised in the Official Journal. It is also evident from the large amount of 
c ompany enquires regarding information on tenders from the T E D  database. T he  
C h a m b e r  provides a customised information service on European tenders to subscribed 
companies. A  major problem for companies that m a k e  enquires on tenders directly to 
the purchasing authorities is that purchasing authorities are either very reluctant or not 
very helpful to provide information on tenders and in most cases they refer them simply 
to the advertised notification published in the Official Journal. C o m p a n y  enquires on 
technical standards are passed over to the B S I  which are very helpful.
Mrs. Harris thought that the concept of linked oligopoly is plausible. They have a 
great deal of contacts with the European Commission and especially with D G  23 which 
provides the C h a m b e r  with updated and on-line information on public tenders. T h e  rest 
of the European Commission is also helpful provided one k n o w s  the proper contact and 
puts forward a precise enquiry.
7. Interview with Mrs. Shara H arris of the Bristol Chamber of Commerce, Bristol,
4 July 1994.
8. Telephone conversation with Mr. G. Fletcher, H e a d  of the Procurement 
Section of H.M .  Treasury, London, 7 July 1994.
Mr. Fletcher considered that the opening of public procurement is a long term
process which is getting better every time. T he Cecchini Report has already identified
that concentration will take place in the Single European Market and the transition from
national champions to European champions. T he  increase in concentration and the
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geographical expansion of European supplier companies is a sound business practice in 
order to compete with the American and Japanese companies. Public authorities do not 
discriminate and they are not encouraged not to buy from European suppliers, instead to 
look for value of money. T he  recent G A T T  agreement conclusion on public 
procurement is a considerable improvement on public procurement and is based on 
reciprocity. H e  could not c o m m e n t  on competition issues in public procurement but he 
believed that companies are conscious of not breaking competition rules. T he  Treasury 
participates in the advisory committee of the European Commission for the revision of 
procurement directives but he did not think that there is need for change in the 
procurement legislation.
9. Telephone interview with Mrs. Margaret West-Burnham, Institute of 
Purchasing and Supply, Stamford, 7 July 1994.
Mrs. W e s t - B u m h a m  said that European procurement legislation has not been 
very effective at all and only approximately 5 %  of contacts are awarded to non­
nationals. This is due not to the existence of any barriers but merely that suppliers are 
not aware that such contracts exist. Regarding different product standards they hardly 
receive any enquires from their m e m b e r s  and it is not one of their concerns.
Nevertheless, there is concern from companies which have been established in a 
M e m b e r  State which in reality are subsidiaries of non-European companies. She could 
not c o m m e n t  on the concept of linked oligopoly but she said that Institute’s m e m b e r s  
have problems with the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. They have a close 
relation with the European Commission regarding the attestation of the Utilities 
directive and with C E N  for the establishment of c o m m o n  standards. T he  Institute is also 
lobbying the European Commission hard for the pending revision of the procurement 
directives in a two years time.
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10. Written reply from M r .  Iain Adlington, Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), London, 18 July 1994.
Regarding oligopolistic behaviour, he commented on the concept of the linked 
oligopoly hypothesis in which firms respect each other's "sphere of influence" by 
adopting non-aggressive behaviour in those of fear of retaliation in other markets 
important to them. H e  indicated that the "chain store paradox" -a strategic g a m e  used 
by economists to analyse the response of an incumbent to the threat of entry- will be 
helpful to explain oligopolistic behaviour. It deals with markets where a reputation for 
exclusionary or predatory behaviour is the only significant entry barrier. It is believed 
that such reputation is mor e  likely to be established where there are other significant 
entry barriers, e.g. sunk costs or government regulations favouring incumbents. The  
"chain store paradox" would seem to suggest that predatory behaviour in the absence of 
other entry barriers would never occur, if the incumbent faces a k n o w n  (i.e., finite) 
number of potential entrants into his markets (or operates in a finite number of separate 
markets) he does not have an incentive to fight entry but instead will accommodate 
throughout.
O n  the question regarding the need to lower the E U  Merger Regulation 
thresholds, the United K i n g d o m  position is that this action would carry the risk that the 
European Commission's resources would be diverted a way from genuinely "European" 
cases. Furthermore, the D T I  is not aware of any evidence to suggest that anti­
competitive mergers below the present thresholds which affect trade within the 
European Union are being inadequately dealt with by national authorities.
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Mr. Frooms-Brown thought that E U  procurement legislation and harmonization 
of standards are necessary but not sufficient to open public procurement. Changes in 
nationalistic purchasing are necessary and these will take s o m e  time. T he  observed 
network of firms that are full time suppliers to m a n y  procurement sectors have been 
formed for R & D  and collaboration purposes. In oligopolistic markets tacit collusion has 
always been a problem and always there is the dilemma whether parallel behaviour is a 
prima facie evidence or not of collusion. T h e  effects of the procurement directives' 
competitive procedures will take a long time to increase competition especially in 
countries such as France and Italy. T he  concept of linked oligopoly is real and the M M C  
in examining a particular merger case, also looks at the spillover effect on the adjacent 
geographical or product markets, h o w  the other markets behave and h o w  they interact. It 
has been very difficult in the international market to ask for further information 
regarding the parent com pa n y  of a United K i n g d o m  subsidiary. This is because the Fair 
Trading Act, of 1973, restricts the M M C  legal power to obtain sensitive information 
from foreign jurisdictions. For example the M M C  has difficulty of obtaining 
information from France for a parent French company as a bilateral agreement on that 
issue does not exist between the two countries.
Oligopolies are fairly c o m m o n  in industrial structures where tacit parallelism is 
observed, and also what they call complex monopolies, an oligopolistic club, which 
displays parallel behaviour and tacit collusion. T he present European competition 
legislation could be improved as it is old fashioned and cumbersome. T he  European 
Commission must be m or e  aggressive and obtain more powers for 'dawn raids' and have 
a periodic review of legislation. Regarding European mergers the European 
Commission has been very efficient and quick the only problem has been lack of 
transparency. This is due mainly to the political process -where changes take place after
the original analysis of a merger case- as for example in the Nestle/Perrier case.
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11. Interview with M r. Victor Frooms-Brown, Higher Economic Adviser,
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), London, 22 July 1994.
12.Telephone interview with M r .  J oh n  Heigtley, Sales Manager of GEC-Alsthom, 
Rugby, United Kingdom, 25 N o v e m b e r  1994.
Mr. Heigtley w a s  in charge of European sales of GEC-Alsthom, a power plant 
manufacturing company, which is a joint subsidiary of the of the British and French 
firms GEC and Alsthom. H e  thought that E U  legislation has not helped at all in the 
opening up of public procurement in Europe. This is so because it is too early for the 
European legislation to have a significant effect. Harmonisation of European technical 
standards does not present a problem because GEC-Alsthom has local subsidiaries in 
their main European markets (i.e., M EN in G e r m a n y  and Alsthom in France). 
Nevertheless, they have problems in Italy where biding for contracts has been 
unsuccessful. This is due to the fact of nationalistic preference on behalf of Italian 
authorities which think that the 'Italian market is only for the Italians'.
Their sister com pa n y  GEC-Alsthom International is co-ordinating tenders on a 
European level and often they have a good feedback and receive useful information 
about local market conditions from m a n y  of their sister companies (including companies 
operating in other lines of business). Groupings of large European companies is a fact of 
life n o w  in Europe and he indicated the GEC joint venture with Siemens regarding GPT 
in the telecommunication sector. O n  the other hand he argued w h e n  they meet Siemens 
in the power generation equipment market they act like competitors. T he  same also 
applies with their second major competitor the Swiss-Swedish ABB.
Mr. Heightley did not think that of power equipment market is oligopolistic in 
structure as at present there are m a n y  power equipment manufacturers in Europe and he 
w a s  reluctant to predict what will happen in future. The grouping of GEC-Alsthom and 
M EN  were formed in order to increase market power. Finally, Mr. Heightly found the 
European Commission very bureaucratic w h e n  dealing with them in procurement issues.
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13.Telephone interview with M r .  W .  G. Stean, Business Development Manager, 
Balfour Beatty Projects & Engineering Ltd, subsidiary of BICC Pic, Sidcup, 28 
N o v e m b e r  1994.
Mr. Stean's c ompany is involved in the construction of power generation plants 
with major markets in the United K i n g d o m  and overseas. Regarding their market share 
in Europe the c ompany does not have a significant share in the main E U  markets 
because of local competition except in marginal markets like that of Greece where the 
c ompany recently tendered for a project.
T he Utilities Directive has a marked effect only in the United K i n g d o m  where 
power generation projects became public knowledge while previously, the pre-selection 
procedure w a s  normally used. A  good example is the recent notification for tendering i^i 
the Official Journal, in compliance with the Utilities Directive for the power station in 
Dicot in England, which is one of the largest power construction projects. Regarding the 
effect of European Directives on opening up of public procurement the situation is not 
very different than before. H e  thought that probably changes will take place in 4-5 years 
time.
T he  C o m p a n y  does not have any problem in relation of difference in European 
standards. They are reluctant to bid for contracts in the main European markets because 
they believe that the prospects of success are not very good and that profits margins are 
lower than in contracts outside Europe. T he  C o m p a n y  could obtain easily information 
regarding tenders in other European countries from its sister companies. In bidding for 
large projects an option is the formation of consortia with other companies. For 
example, Balfour Beatty formed a consortium with the G e r m a n  firm Hochtief for 
bidding for the Swedish-Danish bridge. Mr. Stean did not think that there is collusion 
a m o n g  European companies that form joint ventures but he indicates that 3 0 %  of the 
major contractors k n o w  each other very well. Nevertheless, there is an area where
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European contractors 'talk' before tendering but only w h e n  their client puts forward 
unreasonable contract terms. Apparently this does not happen very often.
T h e  C o m p a n y  has a great deal of contact with the European Commission and the 
European Investment B a n k  which co-finance m a n y  of their projects. H e  finds the 
officials from the above two bodies are very helpful and they display an 'impressive' 
knowledge of the power construction industry.
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